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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with the 'Japanization at work' debate. It investigates
different facets of the management of the labour process and employment relations in
Japanese manufacturing transplants in South Wales and the process of emulation of
similar management practices by a long established South Wales-based
autocomponents factory (given the pseudonym 'CarPress').
Much of the literature in industrial sociology takes a benign view on the impact of
Japanese management techniques on those individuals who bring their labour power
to the shop-floor of the 1990s. The dominant perception of such new practices as
teamworking, continuous improvement and employee involvement is that taken
together, these constitute a means of 'empowering' workers and 'democratising' the
management-labour relationship.
The thesis challenges this perception by systematically researching the interests and
attitudes of workers who are subject to the new management techniques. The original
research upon which it is based rests on shop-floor observations and interviews with
managers and union officials at 15 Japanese transplants in South Wales; two surveys
of workers at CarPress, involving the analysis of 920 questionnaires; over 150 semi-
structured interviews with CarPress workers and managers; and a process of continual
observation of developments at the factory between December 1993 and November
1995.
The research demonstrates how Japanese-style working practices dismantle traditional
rank and file controls over the labour process, impose stricter managerial prerogatives
and secure for capital a more flexible and productive consumption of labour power.
Moreover, rather than create a new paradigm for cooperative and autonomous work
relations, the thesis argues that taken together, the new management techniques
constitute an explicit model of labour regulation and control.
Finally, the thesis integrates social action at the point of production with such
economic and political developments as mass unemployment, the new customer-
supplier relations and state intervention in industrial relations. It considers how our
understanding of the relationship between these may contribute to contemporary
labour process theory on the nature of hegemonic regimes in advanced capitalism.
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JAPANIZATION ON THE SHOP-FLOOR: SOME
CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL OBSERVATIONS
Japanese management methods have acquired a special place in a number of
influential sociological studies of advanced capitalism. These analyses both reflect
and contribute to a prevailing belief that for those who labour in factories, Japanese
work organization can be an 'empowering', 'enriching' alternative to the alienation
and degradation associated with conventional Taylorism. For example, one classic
introductory text for sociology students suggests that Japanese corporations are more
'democratic' than their Western counterparts, that employees in Japanese plants at
home and abroad enjoy a real sense of autonomy and involvement at work (Giddens
1993, pp.292-295). And in his recent polemic against the 'productivist' and
'welfarist' concerns of the British Left, Giddens (1994) argues that although Japanese
lean production, like any capitalist manufacturing system, must ensure the effective
use of time, it is a system which also encourages the investment of time in cooperative
work relations and in developing close partnerships between customer and supplier.
From this point of view, distinctive social relations in Japanese production provide
new social indicators of labour performance - such as cooperation, autonomy and self-
esteem at the workplace - which beneficially supplement traditional productivist
concerns with labour productivity.
Similarly, salient features of Japanese employment relations together provide a key
exemplar of Lash and Urry's (1994) conceptualisation of reflexive accumulation in the
fragmented and flexible 'disorganized capitalism' of the late twentieth century. Here,
Giddens' social solidarity within the factory is further enriched by the 'white
collarization' and upskilling of blue collar workers. By participating in practices such
as teamworking, job rotation and quality circles, workers in Japanese factories are
held to accumulate valuable 'cultural capital' in the form of discursive or theoretical
knowledge and information-processing skills.
We hear very little about the fundamental dictates and social dynamics of capitalist
work organization in these accounts; its as if the factories of today are organized
solely with social responsibility and welfare in mind rather than pumping ever more
labour out of workers in the pursuit of profit. On the opening page of their book,
Economies of Signs and Space, Lash and Uny announce with some glee that although
Marx's analysis of the different circuits of capital can be incorporated into a 'post-
Fordist' examination of the globalization of capital, the central tenets of his analysis
of the contradictions of industrial capitalism can, post-1989, be confined as
'monstrous works' to the 'dustbin of history'. This truculent approach to academic
argument might well be designed to enhance book sales but it also reflects the current
drift in industrial sociology towards the business school agenda of managerialism and
organization theory. The dominant assumption here is that managerial agency should
now occupy the prime position on research agendas because shop-floor social action
and labour resistance no longer constitute a significant complication in the 'classless'
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and 'conflict-free' workplaces of the 1990s. As a consequence, many contemporary
studies tend to gloss over the fact that the process of change at the workplace is
determined not just by management but also by workers who often have separate
interests at stake, and indeed, by the impact of external economic and political forces
as well.
This thesis unambiguously opposes such tendencies. In analysing the impact of
contemporary shifts in work organization and employment relations at the point of
production, it gives precedence to the standpoint and interests of factory workers. It is
concerned with various aspects of the current debate on the 'Japanization of British
industry' which is defined and explored in some detail below. On one level, it seeks
to build on our knowledge of the different labour processes, the organization of
technology, the employment of new working practices and other management
innovations, and the structure of social relations and industrial relations in Japanese
manufacturing transplants in the UK. On another level - and the bulk of the thesis
focuses on this - it explores the process of emulation of these facets of Japanese
production by a traditional British manufacturing company. The thesis examines the
market-led influences and the underlying political forces which catalyse the diffusion
of practices, it considers the various mechanisms of diffusion, and it considers
managerial strategy and agency here as well. But above all, it systematically analyses
the views and actions of factory workers; those who have the greatest stake in
employment, but more often than not, the least say over the direction of change on the
shop-floor of the 1990s.
The thesis asks a number of pertinent questions of the assumptions that prevail in
current sociological and business school discourse. For shop-floor workers, is there
any substance to the fashionable and laudable maxim 'working smarter rather than
harder'? To what extent is the restructuring of their work really 'enriching' and
'empowering'? Can Japanese employment relations be accurately characterised as
more democratic and egalitarian than more traditional capitalist forms? And moving
from managerial ideology to concrete specifics, what impact do the changes have on
employees' work rates? What impact do they have on worker autonomy and control?
How do they affect the skill content of different jobs? Do they provide more
appealing forms of worker participation to supplant traditional trade union
representative democracy? How do they affect relationships between union shop
stewards and rank and file members and between unions and management? Indeed,
how do they affect general relationships between workers and management or the
more intimate relations between different workers? To put this another way, does the
restructuring of work and employment relations best seem to generate harmony and
trust on the shop-floor? Or is it best understood to lie on a continuum of capitalist
exploitation and subordination of labour accompanied by inherent processes of class
struggle and resistance?
This agenda inevitably emphasises processes at the point of production. However, the
thesis does not make the mistake of abstracting these from wider political and
economic influences. The imbalance of power between capital and labour in the
1980s and 1990s has ensured that although workers enjoy little influence over events
outside the factory gates, different capitals and their principal guardian - the capitalist
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state - have had a profound influence over their working lives. The thesis, therefore,
investigates the different ways in which factors such as changing product markets,
depressed labour markets, new supplier-customer relations, the dominance of the
customer over the producer and the state's role in shaping developments in industrial
relations have all impacted upon social action and the politics of production on the
shop-floor.
JAPANESE PRODUCTION MODELS
The authors of the International Motor Vehicle Programme of research into
productivity and management practices in the car industry provide one of the more
influential analyses of Japanese production techniques. Integrating their surveys of
global vehicle assemblers and suppliers with the conceptual work of Ohno (1988) and
Cusumano (1985) in particular, Womack et al. (1990) present lean production as a
pre-eminent, high productivity manufacturing system which is now dominant in Japan
and which, these authors argue, can and must be emulated by manufacturers in the
West. Tracing the development of lean production principles back to the early post-
war Toyota press shops, Womack et al. emphasise how the logic of waste elimination
in labour time, materials and product defects is central to the system. In contrast to
the inflexible, dedicated press machines in the West, which required teams of
specialists to master the time-consuming operation of die-changing, Toyota simplified
the process and began involving shop-floor workers in a systematic reduction in press
die changing times. This enabled the company to move into smaller batch production;
it caused reductions in machine downtime, line side buffers and product defects; and
as a consequence, increased labour utilisation rates.
Toyota extended these waste reducing principles into its vehicle assembly shops
where assembly line production was reorganised around flexible, multi-tasked teams.
The newly 'empowered' team workers were also expected to assume the role of both
industrial and quality engineer by participating in process improvement and defect
reduction, or kaizen, to use the Japanese term. This authority even extended to
stopping a whole production line rather than allow a faulty vehicle to pass
downstream. In one of their few references to the effect of this on the intensity of
production, Womack et al. exclaim in wonder that, 'as the work teams gained
experience identifying and tracing problems to their ultimate cause, the number of
errors began to drop automatically. Today, in Toyota plants, where every worker can
stop the line, yields approach 100 percent. That is, the line practically never stops!'
(1990, p.44).
Toyota mobilised the same logic of waste reduction in its restructuring of assembler-
supplier relations. Ostensibly, these changes were aimed at reducing risks to
incoming material and part supplies by replacing traditional low-trust, low-
commitment, contractual relationships with more cooperative inter-firm relations.
However, by integrating firms at different levels of its supply chain into the process of
product and manufacturing development, Toyota exerted sufficient control over these
suppliers to significantly reduce product and labour costs. Womack et al. observe that
this integration also enabled the development of just-in-time production which, by
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refining and more accurately coordinating the flow of parts into each stage of the
manufacturing process, contributed to further substantial cost reductions and
improvements in plant productivity.
These authors therefore provide a model of lean production which, in ideal typical
form, removes all slack, all human and material waste, from the manufacturing
operation. Moreover - and it is this which has caught the attention of many
contemporary sociologists - by placing the 'dynamic work team' at the heart of the
lean factory, they argue that shop-floor work in this highly stressed system somehow
becomes 'enriched' and 'de-Taylorised' by incorporating new conceptual tasks and
responsibilities: 'While the mass-production plant is often filled with mind-numbing
stress, as workers struggle to assemble unmanufacturable products and have no way to
improve their working environment, lean production offers a creative tension in which
workers have many ways to address challenges. This creative tension involved in
solving complex problems is precisely what has separated manual factory work from
professional "think" work in the age of mass production' (1990, p.101).
Like many managerialist accounts of contemporary changes to the capitalist labour
process, when it comes to considering labour's standpoint this analysis substitutes
rudimentary management ideology for hard empirical evidence. The assessment of
the impact of these changes on affected workers seems to be based on wishful
thinking rather than any systematic investigation, which is notable for its absence.
However, the interests of labour are not the central concern of this piece of research;
the interests of capital are, and in particular, the labour productivity gains that might
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accrue to Western manufacturing firms by adopting the Toyota lean production model.
Indeed, related questions of the potentialities and practicalities of transferring a body
of Japanese manufacturing techniques to the West continue to dominate the
'Japanization' debate rather than any serious consideration of the influence of
particular transplants or particular management innovations on workers and their
communities.
The same concerns inform the work of Kenney and Florida's (1993) more substantial
analysis of Japanese transplant operations in the USA. In a way, these authors go
even further than Womack et al.'s evangelism by insisting that not only is Western
emulation of Japanese management necessary in terms of advancing industrial
efficiency but it is also an inevitable outcome of the capitalist dynamic of
technological and organizational progress. Drawing explicitly on Gramsci's treatment
of Fordism as the most advanced system of production of its time - which he believed,
with or without the cultural supports of 'Americanism' was destined to penetrate the
West as a distinctive mode of production organization (Gramsci 1971) - they argue
that the diffusion of Japan's 'epoch-making new model of technology, work and
production organization' has the same inevitability about it.
Why is this? Kenney and Florida locate the advantages of lean production in the
shifting social relations between intellectual and manual labour which underlie
Japanese technological and organizational efficiency. They conceptualise Japanese
manufacturing practice within a framework of 'innovation-mediated production'
characterised essentially by the integration and harnessing of the intelligence and
knowledge of R&D staff, design engineers and shop-floor workers. Through the
organizational mechanism of the multi-functional team, the shop-floor is transformed
into a continuously innovative production laboratory. This creates advantages for
both labour and capital: 'the new model has transformed ordinary workers' knowledge
and intelligence into a source of value, created new methods of work, and established
a very efficient system for turning the potential value embodied in innovations into
mass-produced commodities that are the source of tremendous profit and capital
accumulation' (1993, p.9).
Described in this way, Japanese work organization sounds an appealing and laudable
alternative to the alienating and de-humanising organizational principles of Taylorism.
However, Kenney and Florida's analysis is flawed by certain inconsistencies and
ambiguities. Their research draws on surveys of various US-based Japanese
transplants in different industrial sectors and on interviews with managers, engineers
and shop-floor workers. But we are provided with only a minimum of qualitative
analysis of worker consciousness at the point of production and we are left with little
feel for the quality of working lives under these management regimes. Consequently,
as Smith (1994, p.292) has observed, despite the use of the appealing metaphor
'factory as laboratory', we are provided with no empirical evidence of the relationship
between engineers and production workers. This is unfortunate, in the light of the
relative neglect of the former in much research of the contemporary restructuring of
work in manufacturing industry. It is also unfortunate because, as with so much
managerialist writing, the failure to adequately research both sides of the
management-labour relation can lead to a mere reproduction of fanciful managerial
ideology. In this particular case, as one American ethnographer with a more authentic
experience of life on a Japanese assembly line has noted, the tendency to emphasise
the role of intellectual involvement, whether we term it 'innovation-mediated
production' or something else, is largely due to an unquestioned acceptance of
company rhetoric (Graham, 1995, p.'7).
A more fundamental criticism concerns Keimey and Florida's professed value-
neutrality in their refusal to make normative judgements on whether the Japanese way
is 'better' or 'worse' than traditional management techniques (1993, p.10). This
position is somewhat impaired by their insistent belief in the progressive inevitability
of the transfer of innovation-mediated production. It is also impaired by the corollary
of this position, that, 'like the opposition to Fordism in Gramsci's Europe, opposition
to the transfer of the Japanese production system comes from the laggard, indeed,
backward segments of society' (1993, p.31 5). It becomes more incongruous when the
authors turn their attentions to the negative consequences of diffusion: labour
intensification; health and injury risks; ideological control of workers through such
socialization measures as sophisticated recruitment techniques and direct
communications; strict absence and attendance policies; the exploitation of temporary
workers; unequal opportunities for black workers; and anti-trade unionism. This is a
long list. It is even conceded that the supposedly empowering team organization
offers real advantages to capital in terms of reducing labour costs and increasing
productivity, and that, through teamworking, the pace of production can be altered by
adding or removing workers without hindrance (1993, p.37).
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These admissions beg an important question. If Japanese 'innovation-mediated
production' produces 'bads' as well as 'goods' then how do those human beings who
labour under this system react to this? Are they so acquiescent and submissive that
Japanese managements can literally raise the intensity of production with impunity?
We are not told. The irony here is that in conceptualising a manufacturing system that
theoretically constitutes the anti-thesis of Braverman's (1974) imperative of direct
management control under scientific management, the authors, in effect, repeat the
latter writer's mistake of objectif'ing labour and abstracting their analysis from the
concrete reality of continuing class struggle and resistance. As with many
managerialist writers, the material condition and class consciousness of labour is
seriously neglected.
The implications of worker resistance take a more prominent position within the
analysis of Oliver and Wilkinson's (1992) study of the 'Japanization of British
Industry'. These authors also deal in universalistic models. Their paradigm of
Japanese manufacturing practices follows a similar pattern to the above American
writers. It idealises a system which completely synchronises production with the
demands of the market and which aims towards the complete elimination of waste in
production. This is achieved through the application of a variety of production
practices which will be considered in some detail throughout this thesis: Total Quality
Management (TQM) and continuous improvement (kaizen); production checks such
as statistical process control (SPC); just-in-time production (JIT); labour flexibility;
and multi-skilling through teamworking and job rotation. Oliver and Wilkinson argue
that, cumulatively, these practices create a fragile production system which is severely
11
exposed to labour disruption. Consequently, the model incorporates supporting
human resource management (HRM) practices such as long term job security for core
workers; careful employee recruitment and selection techniques; performance related
pay; direct communications and enterprise unionism. Risk avoidance also extends to
buyers/assemblers maintaining long term relationships with suppliers and close
scrutiny of their manufacturing costs and employment policies. Thus, in theory at
least, the high dependency strategies of Japanese production methods 'demand a set of
social (and technical) relations to support the fragile production system. Under this
system, strategies for living with uncertainty are swept away' (1992, p.323).
On the basis of data accumulated from longitudinal survey techniques and a small
number of limited case studies, Oliver and Wilkinson quantif' an increase in the use
of the above practices amongst both British employers and Japanese transplants. This
leads them to assert that a 'Japanization of British industry' is in progress.
The problem with this rudimentary methodology is that it raises as many questions as
it solves. Firstly, the analysis makes no attempt to explore variations in management
practice between firms in different manufacturing sectors. For example, as both
Milkman (1991) and Kenney and Florida (1993) discovered, rather than conforming to
universalistic models, Japanese electronics assembly transplants in the USA were
more influenced by the efficiency-based parameters of conventional production lines
and the traditional social relations of the host country. In these conditions, fragmented
assembly line work, American anti-trade unionism and limited employee involvement
remained a simple, logical and effective method of labour control.
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The authors' idealization of trust-building long term customer-supplier relations raises
further problems. Suppliers are supposed to gain here by enjoying such advantages as
more predictable markets, help and advice from the customer, financial security, and
so on, although they are also under constant pressure to produce the right quantities of
goods on time. But this oft-quoted feature of 'stakeholder capitalism' (Hutton 1995)
rarely takes into consideration those who hold a stake in employment within supplier
companies. Oliver and Wilkinson inform us that buyer/assemblers may often pre-
empt disruption to JIT supplies by attacking traditional industrial relations practices at
their supplying companies. If this is the case, then we need a more thorough
investigation of the implications of such innovations for shop-floor social action in the
many affected factories.
The same limitations to the authors' methodology raise a more fundamental criticism.
The argument that the high dependency nature of Japanese production methods
operates within supportive HRM policies creating 'a functional fit between production
methods and the social relations in which they are embedded' (1992, p.323)
constitutes the most original aspect of their thesis. They are not totally alone here.
For example, Dohse et al. (1985) believe that 'only a comprehensive perspective that
includes both the organization of the labour process and the organization of labour
relations can adequately explain the functioning of the Japanese model' (1985,
p.134)'. But if this is the case, then rather than rely on quantitative analysis to
In posing the question of why Japanese workers seem to accept the labour intensity and stress which is
inherent to their model of Japanese work organization, Dohse et al. (1985) emphasise different
functional aspects of the social relations which accompany the highly exploitative production methods.
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construct a facile functionalist fit between different sets of management practices we
need to examine exactly how such innovations function on the shop-floor. In so
doing, we might penetrate a further conundrum within Oliver and Wilkinson's
argument. That is, if the new, 'Japanized' labour process really is characterized by
more skill, more responsibility and more interest, to the extent that 'Japanese practices
seem to hold out the opportunity for improved quality of life' (1992, p.326), then why
does this shop-floor empowerment require propping up by special ideological
measures? Should we not expect worker commitment to emerge naturally from the
enriched labour process? On the other hand, if, in reality, the labour process is low-
skilled, multi-tasked, intensified and alienating then the 'cultural logic' of extensive
employee involvement may also make little sense. These contradictions and
ambiguities can only be resolved by moving away from the managerialist agenda and
considering the standpoint of labour. If we wish to understand the real logic of the
new HRM practices then we must turn our attention to their recipients, that is, we
have to thoroughly investigate their concrete impact on the consciousness and social
action of the human resource.
Despite some differences in detail, the above theoretical approaches share a common
approach in their construction of a paradigm of Japanese work organization and
employment relations. This is based on the general principles of flexible, low waste
production; enlarged and participatory labour processes; and cooperative employment
That is, the life long system of employment induces worker dependence on single corporations; the
individualised satei wage system - which is similar in many respects to performance related pay -
constitutes a decisive factor in the 'committed worker syndrome' since it induces worker dependence on
the arbitrary judgements of supervisors; and the absence of independent trade unionism militates against
the collective articulation and representation of Japanese workers' interests which forces workers to
turn against each other (in the form of peer pressure) rather than against their employer.
14
relations. Although some authors may be critical of these principles, and others find
them elusive in practice, the paradigmatic approach nevertheless dominates research
in this area (see for example, Bratton, 1992; Graham 1994 and 1995; Hayter 1993;
Jurgens et al. 1993; Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990; Milkman 1991; Morris et al. 1994;
and Schonberger 1982). Moreover, rather than measure concrete practice in Japan
against these ideal type constructions, many researchers either prescribe, or attempt to
substantiate, a process of international convergence through Western emulation of the
Japanese paradigm: a 'Japanization' of industry.
Before we consider particular case study evidence of this emulation process and its
impact on workers, we need to take a more critical look at its underlying assumptions.
Some writers deny the Japanese any influence over contemporary workplace
restructuring. For example, eschewing investigation into changes within
organizations, Ackroyd et al. (1988) shift the analysis towards the national economic
structure. They argue that fundamental differences between an integrated Japanese
economy - characterised by high levels of coordination between banking,
manufacturing and traditional capital - and a highly fragmented British economy,
present decisive limits on any attempts by British firms to respond to the Japanese
challenge. However, the problem with this approach is that although changes at the
organizational level are mediated by the structural features of the political economy,
as they are by structural changes in product markets, labour markets, state industrial
policies and so on, this does not mean that investigations at the organization level
must necessarily become secondary. Without the support of empirical evidence,
Ackroyd et al. ' s abstract conceptualisation (and rejection) of 'Direct', 'Mediated' and
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'Permeated Japanization' has little utility. If we wish to investigate the hypothesis
that Japanese work organization and labour performance may be having a significant
global impact, then whether we call this Japanization, emulation, diffusion, or
whatever, our first port of call must be the workplace. And if corporate attempts to
raise labour productivity and profitability constitute the dynamic behind emulation,
then developments in the process of extraction of surplus value at the point of
production must surely be our prime, though not sole, focus of investigation.
This clarifies the level of analysis employed in this thesis but it does not deny external
structural influences on work organization. In establishing the principles of work
organization that require investigation, questions do need to be asked of the
paradigmatic approach. To what extent can we accurately speak of a universalistic
Japanese model to which competing Western manufacturers aspire? Do not the
concrete ramifications of different sectoral practices, different technologies, product
markets, labour markets, national state policies, industrial relations traditions, and
indeed, distinctive single corporate cultures and logics together undermine notions of
universalism and convergence? If, as Elger and Smith (1 994b) observe in their
conceptualisation of 'Disaggregated Japanization', Japanese transnational
corporations are equivalent in intent to their Western counterparts in that, 'Japanese
firms take advantage of different regions of the globe for market and cost reasons, and
selectively adjust their factory regimes to fit into these local conditions' (1994, p.38),
does this eliminate any organizational distinctiveness? Moreover, if, as the same
authors suggest, emulating firms mobilise fears of the Japanese 'competitive threat'
more as an ideological component in their attempts to reinforce traditional
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management prerogatives, whilst merely borrowing certain elements of the Japanese
model in typical piecemeal fashion, does this render the concept of 'Japanization'
completely redundant?
These questions should certainly alert us to the fact that it would be wrong to
'overinterpret what are certainly significant innovations, to read them uncritically as
the precursors of a wholesale transformation of work and employment relations, and
thus to gloss over substantial continuities, real variations and persistent sources of
conflict in the contemporary restructuring of work and employment' (Elger and Smith
1994a, p.5). But they should not mislead us into assuming that the influence of the
Japanese is restricted to the realm of managerial ideology, that Japanese-style
management innovations have had minimal concrete impact on the lives of British
factory workers.
A personal anecdote might be useful here. For most of the 1980s, this author was a
senior union representative at a large British Aerospace design and production plant in
Bristol. One day in the summer of 1987, I remember being called before the site's
assistant managing director, along with my union colleagues. This man came from the
traditional management school; he communicated by barking rather than soft-talking,
he was overweight, wore an old fashioned pin-stripe suit and smoked Churchillian-
size cigars, continuously. I remember him standing up at the start of the meeting,
placing a foot on the desk in front of him and announcing: 'Right lads listen to me.
This site's in trouble. Our costs are too high, we don't produce enough and we don't
produce on time. We're going to be Japanised'. He proceeded to outline
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management's plans to introduce quality circles - and in the following months the site
unions proceeded to successfully block them. But his presentation was not just an
exercise in rudimentary management ideology, designed to instil a bit of employee
discipline; instead, it marked the beginning of a long process of material change on
the shop-floor and in the office. Over the following years, despite union opposition
and conflicts, with the guidance of different teams of external consultants our
management at Bristol and at many other BAe plants introduced teamworking, labour
flexibility, reductions in idle time, direct communications, union marginalisation,
individualisation of pay and successive lean manning strategies. These were not
marginal changes or mere continuations of previous managerial agendas. Many
people were sacked, whilst those lucky enough to keep their jobs suffered labour
intensification, stress, insecurity and a clear diminution in their ability to fight back,
whether collectively or individually.
On the basis of personal experience then, this author came to doubt the suspicion that
management's understanding of Japanese manufacturing performance and new
working practices was passed on to subordinates primarily in ideological terms. Even
if companies rarely implement complete 'Japanese packages' in paradigmatic fashion,
the ensuing, more fragmented changes can still significantly undermine shop-floor
traditions with detrimental consequences for thousands of workers. And herein lies
the link with Japanese transplants. The increasing number of Japanese firms operating
in the UK provide authentic examples of Japanese management put into practice.
Many British managers observe with some envy the ability of these TNCs to secure
the same labour regulation objectives as their own by taking advantage of greenfield
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conditions. When Japanese managements set up their manufacturing transplants
abroad, they may often maintain the organizational and industrial relations traditions
of both their particular sector and the host country, but they are also careful to sweep
away those particular traditions which are hostile to their intensive capital
accumulation strategies. For example, there is hardly a Japanese transplant operating
on a green field site in the UK which permits such shop-floor traditions as seniority
and informal rank and file controls over the labour process, or union regulation of skill
and task demarcations, or union influence over effort rates and labour deployment.
The important point then becomes, to what extent, in the distinctive economic and
political conditions of the 1990s, are British firms on brownfield sites emulating the
managerial strategies of these transplants by implementing the same labour regulation
policies and attacking their own shop-floor traditions? And is the social organization
of production that is distinctive within Japanese methods causing a significant change
in British shop-floor attitudes towards work and working practices (Tumbull 1986),
or, is the process of 'Japanization' characterised by inherent worker resistance and
conflict? These are the concerns of this thesis and it is in connection with the above
relationship, that is, between managerial innovations in UK-based Japanese
transplants and the impact of such innovations within emulating British firms, that the
expression 'Japanization' is employed. Thus, although the thesis does not accord with
the perspective applied by Oliver and Wilkinson, this author would not disagree with
their heuristic usage of the expression: 'as a short-hand term to describe a package of
changes that appear to be taking place in British manufacturing industry. In doing so,
we are really using Japanization as a metaphor, to try to describe and better understand
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one phenomenon (what is going on in UK industry) in terms of another (what is going
on in Japanese industry)' (1992, p.342).
CASE STUDIES OF JAPANIZATION AT WORK
Comprehensive studies of the impact of Japanese management innovations on labour
are few and far between. Whether managerialist in intention or not, most research
designs rely on different types of managers as key informants, occasionally
accompanied by a small number of perfunctory interviews with shop stewards and
members of the trade union bureaucracy to convey a sense of balance. As a result,
whenever the standpoint of the rank and file on the shop-floor is considered, the
ensuing account relies upon, at best, empathetic understanding and at worst, pure
speculation, rather than any systematic, in-depth analysis of workers' views. Of
course, managers do provide crucial information on contemporary corporate strategies
governing marketing and sales, product design, quality assurance and production.
And as agents of capitalist control, they are key informants on questions of labour
regulation. But accumulating data primarily from those representing the management
side of the capital-labour relationship can sometimes result merely in a reproduction
of managerial ideology as Trevor' s (1988) interpretive account of the restructuring of
Toshiba's electronics plant in Plymouth exemplifies2.
2 Trevor's (1988) 250 page investigation draws on qualitative analysis, spread over seven chapters, of
interviews with a small number of senior managers at Toshiba along with just one trade union official -
the evangelical 'new realist' national officer, Roy Sanderson of the EETPU (now AEEU). On this
somewhat uneven empirical basis, we are informed that such innovations as careful employee selection
and induction, total labour flexibility, single status, management-controlled direct communications,
management-controlled company councils and no-strike agreements provide employees greater job
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Moreover, many of the more radical exposures of managerial ideology and practice in
Japanese production provide only a limited picture of the various ways in which
worker resistance constrains the exercise of managerial prerogatives. Theoretical
ideal types of management control become reified on a shop-floor devoid of politics.
Deibridge et al.'s (1992) examination of management control and labour
intensification under JIT/TQM regimes provides a case in point. These authors
provide a compelling account of the ways in which the acceptance of new
responsibilities and tasks under teamworking forces workers to become more
accountable both to management and each other for their individual performance. The
natural visibility of the production process and worker performance in a highly
synchronized JIT factory offers management a simple means of direct control over the
labour process. More subtly, the application of peer pressure in a 'market
environment', where assembly line colleagues suddenly take on the role of customers
cajoling each other to maintain performance, provides a more corrupting form of
labour control. These regimes are presented as systems of efficient capital
accumulation which 'more completely subordinate labour to capital than previous
production regimes because they demand and create a situation where managerial
prerogative prevails and where there is little, if any, room for employees to exercise
counter-controls over the pace of work and task execution' (1992, p.98).
satisfaction and security. Significantly, the one chapter which considers the shop-floor's standpoint by
analysis of an employee attitude questionnaire survey, provides little evidence to substantiate this.
21
This critique contains two problems. Firstly, like many others, it develops a model of
control which focuses exclusively on developments at the point of production; it fails
to link these with such external influences on worker behaviour as the debilitating
effects of mass unemployment or state attacks on independent trade unionism.
Secondly, although the analysis is written in terms of the effects of Japanese
management innovations on workers, in fact labour is objectified. Relying on a few
factory visits and additional secondary sources, social action on the shop-floor is
ignored. Consequently, the authors must assume that in a state of 'more complete
subordination', labour loses the means to resist.
In a more recent case study, Deibridge (1995) attempts to redress the latter criticism
by employing participatory observation techniques in a UK-based Japanese electronics
transplant. Here, the author provides useful anecdotal evidence of the stress and
intensity of Japanese assembly line work; but on the basis ofjust one month's
experience of this we are told that worker resistance is almost non-existent under such
management regimes. He concludes that 'the experiences of workers under JIT and
TQM reflect an increasingly effective pressure from management toward the
processes of accommodation and adaptation by workers with the reduction in effective
counter-control and resistance. In effect, workers are forced toward surviving rather
than resisting their exploitation' (1995, p.814). Leaving aside the obvious point that
for those who work in the factories of capitalist mass production, life has always been
a question of endurance rather than unceasing resistance - meaning that any research
project lasting a mere month would be somewhat fortuitous to capture the decisive
forms of resistance which occur only periodically in response to certain managerial
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challenges - the analysis still fails to investigate exactly why resistance is generally
curtailed. Why do these transplant workers not unambiguously oppose their
conditions of intense exploitation? Why do they turn on each other rather than
management when the level of intensity is increased? Why is it a question of survival;
why don't they just leave? These crucial questions remain unanswered because the
analysis fails to procure the views of those who -if they are lucky - may spend, not one
month, but all of their working lives labouring in factories.
On the other hand, it might be argued that this represents a primitive line of enquiry
based on the supposition that the intensity of Japanese transplant production remains
embedded in Western social values of instrumentalism. In traditional mass production
factories, workers would be expected to reject managerial attempts to heighten levels
of exploitation because dominant instrumentalist values permit them to think and act
for themselves. As Graham puts it, 'workers are free to hate their work openly. Their
attitudes are their own. The bargain they strike with the company is simple and
straightforward: make quota and you get your pay' (1995, p.133). In contrast to this,
much of the literature on Japanization emphasises those ideological and socialization
components of Japanese production methods which attempt to colonise the worker's
psyche in order to control his or her labour power.
In their study of Nissan's car assembly transplant in Sunderland, Garrahan and
Stewart (1992) provide an influential analysis of this process; of managerial
endeavours to control and subordinate the workforce by mobilising an ideology built
on the appealing principles of consensus and participation. For these authors,
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Nissan's organization of teamworking and labour flexibility has nothing to do with
principles of enrichment and empowerment. The exigency for efficient, continuous
mass production ensures that workers perform only a limited range of cognate tasks,
day in day out. Workers exert minimal control here; labour flexibility and teamwork
are effected on managment's terms. Nissan's system of lean production intensifies the
extraction of surplus value on the simple basis of low skill job enlargement and the
expectation that workers continuously move around the same types of machines and
cover for absent colleagues where necessary. Moreover, under the guise of employee
participation, workers hand over to management those individual tacit skills and
elements of knowledge which may then be exploited to further intensify the rate of
production.
The essential claim of this argument is that, despite the highly exploitative nature of
the production system, Nissan's workers come to support and identify with the
objectives of their employer. They display a 'corporate consciousness'. Garrahan and
Stewart assert that in the absence of any effective means to articulate their collective
identities and interests - such as an independent trade union - Nissan's workers
become attracted to a seductive corporate ideology which advocates a collective spirit
of teamwork and consensus. The idea of a dichotomy of opposing management and
worker interests has no place here. An ideology of consent operates on two levels.
Firstly, through specific social forms such as teamwork and kaizen which depend
'precisely upon self-subordination for it shifts the locus of control onto individuals,
who perceive themselves as guardians of quality and flexibility' (1992, p.94 .). And
secondly, through a wider organizational framework which ensures that Nissan's one-
24
sided vision of a classless factory can be reproduced on the shop-floor each day: 'what
we are witnessing at Nissan is not only an organization which depends upon and
promotes consensus-building structures for quality products. The flip-side of this is
an organizational hierarchy of constraint, one that allows only those views of work
which are commensurate with its own' (1992, p.1 11).
Once again, we are presented - even though this is most certainly not what these
authors desire to see - with a picture of complete worker subordination, of total
management control. Is there any substance in this? Although we must acknowledge
the significant influence of mass unemployment and the lack of effective collective
representation on worker consciousness, nevertheless, can we really expect
individuals labouring under these regimes to display total commitment and even to
participate in the intensification of their own exploitation? Different case studies of
Japanese auto transplants in the USA suggest not. For example, Fucini and Fucini
(1990), Graham (1995) and Rinehart et a!. (1994) discovered that although shop-floor
workers may display an initial enthusiasm for the process of kaizen as means of
improving working conditions and health and safety, they soon become disillusioned
with managements' sole interest in reducing waste and idle time. As a result, this
process of 'mass employee participation' soon becomes the property of managers,
engineers and just a sprinkling of token workers. This contrasting evidence exposes
the fact that we have no real evidence of the extent to which Nissan has won the
'battle of hearts and minds' with its Sunderland workforce. Although Garrahan and
Stewart raise many important conceptual points concerning labour exploitation under
Japanese management regimes, their study is empirically flawed. On the authors' own
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admission, they did not gain access to the factory and they interviewed only 19 out of
the 3000 or so workers employed there. Consequently, the study is, for the most part,
a dismantling of the distinctive managerial propaganda reproduced by Nissan's
enthusiastic ex-Personnel Director (Wickens 1987) rather than a systematic evaluation
of the concrete impact of Japanese management innovations on the shop-floor.
Distinctive corporate ideologies, of course, constitute just one example of capital's
repertoire of labour control mechanisms. Technological development is another. The
spatial reconfiguration of existing technology, such as a Japanese-style conversion of
traditional clusters of single function machines into a multi-functional cellular
organization (Schonberger 1986), can effect efficiency savings and significant shifts in
shop-floor social relations. If new computer technologies are then incorporated into
this reorganization of technology, then labour regulation may be further enhanced.
Bratton's (1992) study of Japanization in the form of, what might be termed,
'computer-aided teamwork', found that this type of technological change, in small-
batch skilled production work at least, provided a degree of shop-floor autonomy
whilst simultaneously enhancing overall managerial control. Here we have a kind of
technologically mediated 'responsible autonomy' (Friedman 1977). Bratton's
operators enjoyed some discretion and new skills in the process of self-management of
teams but senior management surveillance through computerized production control
systems ensured the extension of overall managerial control over the labour process.
However, Bratton' s case study analysis contains certain shortcomings. Ostensibly
concerned with the process of 'Japanization at Work' it centres almost exclusively on
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changes in technology. He fails to operationalize the full range of measures aimed at
restructuring work organization and employee relations with which we identify the
Japanese. The thesis is therefore incomplete. Moreover, its more salient points apply
only to changes within small-batch craft production - an area of work which is
important and interesting in itself - but, notwithstanding the quixotic ideas of flexible
specialisation theorists such as Piore and Sabel (1984), this overlooks the fact that the
dynamic of change associated with Japanese production techniques is located
elsewhere, in capitalist mass production.
We must turn again to the USA for a more thorough examination of 'bases of control
and resistance' at the point of production under a Japanese management regime. In
her ethnography of shop-floor work at a Subaru-Isuzu Automotive (SIA) transplant -
which utilised covert participant observation techniques - Graham (1995) provides a
rich personal account of the day to day stress and conflict that accompanies life on a
Japanese assembly line. Drawing explicitly on Burawoy' s (1985) conceptualisation of
the hegemonic factory regime, Graham argues that the success of the Japanese
production system depends upon 'management's ability to fashion an environment
which appears free of coercion, giving no impetus for resistance. Instead of
management devoting time and energy to controlling the workforce directly, workers
control themselves' (1995, p.9'7). She provides seven particular components of a
multidimensional framework of compliance which together form, in Weberian
fashion, an 'iron cage of control': sophisticated recruitment techniques; scrupulous
employee induction programmes (both of these are eventually displaced by the
practice of employing and monitoring temporary workers); the team concept and the
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disciplinary influence of peer pressure; a philosophy of kaizen; shaping shop-floor
culture from the top down; a computerized assembly line; and just in time production.
Graham usefully explores the contradictions between what is, in abstract terms, a
sophisticated model of compliance and the harsher reality of working on an assembly
line. For example, the increasing intensity of a labour process characterised by rapid
and repetitive limb movements caused 25% of the workforce to suffer periodically
from carpel tunnel syndrome and other disabilities after just a few months of
employment. Yet, although the management tried hard to alleviate the symptoms of
this labour intensification by offering different medications, it could not modify the
driving logic of its system of lean, mass production: 'the repetition and speed of
assembly line work was inherently harmful to workers. Any solutions that would
reduce the work intensity created by repetition and line speed would threaten
production quotas - something team members believed the company would never
consider... .Providing a truly safe workplace is beyond their [the company's] control in
a competitive environment where the priority is quotas rather than safety first' (1995,
p.93). And predictably, even in their non-union environment, Graham's workers do
oppose this exploitation. She provides different instances of individual forms of
resistance, for example, workers maintaining a silent protest during team briefings and
more effective collective forms, such as team members surreptitiously stopping the
line in order to gain a breather.
Graham's methodology does have certain drawbacks, however, in that by
concentrating on the more mundane, everyday events which unfold on a transplant
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assembly line it loses sight of the wider picture. Covert participant observation
prevents the researcher from seeking answers to awkward questions from all actors
involved in the politics of production, that is, different managers, shop stewards and a
reasonable cross-section of factory workers. Moreover, her highly focused
ethnography excludes historical analysis of the development of management-labour
relations in the auto industry. Consequently, we are led to believe that, on the basis of
surface appearances, the Japanese production model merely represents an extension of
the 1 970s job redesignlhuman relations movement and its attendant concerns with the
consequences of worker alienation. The alternative possibility that many of the new
management techniques may have the more fundamental objective of appropriating
traditional worker controls on the shop-floor is ignored, as is the influence on this
process of external agencies such as the customer and the state.
Nevertheless, this particular study succeeds in switching our attention away from
managerial systems and simplistic abstract conceptualisations of 'total management
control' by elevating worker actions and consciousness to a pivotal point in its
investigation. In so doing, it underscores the essential contradiction between
contemporary Japanese managerial ideology and the demands of capital accumulation:
'the Japanese model is not equipped to deliver on its promises to workers. During a
corporation's quest to maximise profits, workers simply become expendable. Work
intensification and safety, issues traditionally addressed by unions, are the first areas
to be sacrificed for profit' (Graham 1995, p.154). And if this contradiction is
embodied in certain forms of worker resistance on a non-union, greenfield site, where
management could more readily fashion a pro-company culture, we should expect an
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intensified conflict on the battle-scarred terrain of the conventional brownfield shop-
floor.
Unfortunately, up to date empirical evidence on brownfield sites is somewhat scarce.
However, the small number of case studies which investigated work organizational
change and accompanying conflict during the 1980s do confirm this expectation. For
example, in Britain's food processing industry, Scott (1994) discovered that the
introduction of teamworking - ostensibly to develop fulfilling work routines and open
relationships between workers and supervisors - could not disguise the inherently
alienating nature of the assembly line labour process. Neither could it conceal
management's demand for a tougher unilateral approach to discipline and effort. In
his case study of the restructuring of work at a strongly unionised frozen food works,
shop stewards were initially able to exploit the self-management of teamworking in
order to maintain control over effort rates, labour deployment and j oh rotation. When
management then decided to claw back its prerogatives, increase production and raise
standards of discipline, it was forced to jettison the 'soft' participative approach and
defeat rank and file opposition by provoking, and eventually defeating, an all-out
strike.
Other case studies of British manufacturing plants attempting to emulate Japanese
working practices in the 1 980s found that, despite the distinctive free market
economic and political environment of the time, and despite occasional management
coercion, shop-floor resistance and trade union organization continued to place limits
on the exercise of managerial prerogatives (Starkey and McKinlay 1989; Taylor et al.
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1994; Turnbull 1986). Indeed, where the economic and political environment does act
to enforce cooperative relations these are unlikely to be permanent. At Taylor et al.'s
'Central Rebuild' electronics plant for example, 'the orchestration of a qualified
cooperation depended heavily on a sense of the continuing precariousness of the
whole factory against a background of marked sectoral and regional recession' (1994,
p.222). Thus, we cannot assume that the restructuring of work organization along
Japanese lines and the promulgation of new, consensual corporate ideologies must
necessarily, in mechanical fashion, engender a dynamic of Japanization in
employment relations characterised by the emergence of worker loyalty and
commitment.
In contrast to the currently fashionable conceptions of the 'conflict-free' factory, these
studies suggest that capital's attempts to restructure the organization of work and the
employment relationship are not unproblematic. They raise the possibility that despite
managerial intimidation, despite the cumulatively pernicious impact of anti-trade
union legislation from four successive Conservative regimes, despite the apparent
demise of the strike weapon, despite the continuing rationalisation ofjobs in
manufacturing, and despite the crippling stranglehold of consumer debt to building
societies and other financial institutions, workers still have a propensity to oppose
managerial prerogatives. Why might this be?
Earlier in this chapter, the author posed a series of rudimentary questions to challenge
some of the dominant business school assumptions which influence our understanding
of contemporary change at the workplace. Questions such as what is the impact of the
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new management techniques on effort rates? their impact on skills? on worker
autonomy? and on workplace democracy and labour relations? These are all
operationalised at various points in the coming chapters. But a central theme of the
thesis - and one which is absent from much of the current literature - is that the
implementation and unfolding of the new Japanese-style management practices in
established factories is a long drawn out and complex political process which is
propelled by a dynamic of tension, conflict and struggle between capital and labour. It
cannot be presented merely as the unproblematic substitution of one model of work
organization for another, as a clean rupture from Taylorism or Fordism for example.
Managers and workers have conflicting class interests. For most factory workers, life
on a production line remains arduous, monotonous and alienating. The slow, uneven
development of formal and informal rank and file influence over the pace of work, job
content, labour deployment and so forth was not the result of inherently cantankerous
work attitudes but instead the outcome of a long, fragmented, collective struggle for at
least a limited sense of dignity and autonomy at work. Contemporary management
attempts to undermine these gains and secure its own prerogatives in the name of
'progress', 'efficiency', 'empowerment' and even 'company survival', are likely to be
subject to different forms of working class opposition. The efficacy of this opposition
will also be contingent upon the prevailing balance of power between capital and
labour at the point of production and in the wider political economy. These are the
realities which govern the perspective of this thesis; realities which provide an
awareness that Japanization at the workplace is both a function and outcome of the
immanent process of class struggle in advanced capitalist societies.
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STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
The thesis is divided into two unequal halves. Part One comprises just two chapters
which investigate the nature of work organization and employment relations in
Japanese manufacturing transplants in South Wales. Part Two comprises five
chapters which together provide an in-depth case study analysis of the Japanization
process at a long-established British autocomponents factory - given the pseudonym
'CarPress' - based in South West Wales.
Essentially, the original research upon which this thesis is based rests on interviews
with different managers and shop-floor observations at 15 Japanese transplants in
South Wales; interviews with trade union officials in the region; interviews with
senior representatives of the Welsh Office, the Welsh Development Agency and
different employers' organizations; two surveys of shop-floor and office workers at
CarPress, involving the analysis of 920 questionnaires; over 150 semi-structured
interviews with CarPress workers and managers; and a process of continual
observation of developments at the factory between December 1993 and November
1995. A summary of the research methodology employed is provided in Appendix A.
Without becoming anchored to the idea of Japanese work organizational paradigms,
the two chapters in Part One attempt to establish the more salient aspects of Japanese
management tecimiques which some British firms, including the case study, may be
attempting to emulate. Chapter Two focuses upon the organization of the labour
process. Paying particular attention to the consumption of labour power in the
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different transplants, it investigates the nature of the work on the shop-floor; the skill
levels required; the intensity of work; labour deployment practices such as flexibility
and teamworking; the role of Japanese transplant workers in job design; and linked to
this, the extent to which they participate in Total Quality Management practices such
as kaizen.
Chapter Three addresses the different transplant personnel policies and explores the
connections between these and the disciplines of lean, mass production. Particular
practices and strategies scrutinised are: recruitment, selection and equal opportunity
policies; employee evaluation techniques; job security policies and the particular
practices which underpin these, such as the exploitation of temporary labour and the
extension of working hours; employee involvement practices such as direct
communications and single status policies; and finally, the style of industrial relations
and the role of trade unions.
Part Two encompasses the British case study. It is essentially an etbnography of one
South Wales company's attempt to restructure both the organization of work and
management-labour relationships on the shop-floor during the first half of the 1990s.
Chapter Four introduces the case study firm and establishes the context for the
processes of change which unravel in subsequent chapters. It briefly describes the
depressed locality in which the firm operates and the hazardous market conditions in
which it endeavours to survive. It also provides a summary of the mode of work
organization and different labour processes employed on the shop-floor and in the
engineering offices. The final third of the chapter begins exploring the influence of
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Japanese manufacturing techniques on this particular factory. It investigates both the
general impact of the Japanese on manager and worker consciousness and specific
concrete mechanisms and market pressures which catalyse the emulation process.
The remaining four chapters are divided equally between the re-organization of work
and the development of new personnel and industrial relations strategies. Chapter
Five provides two interconnected accounts of the transformation of the case study
firm's production control system and its intensifying impact on shop-floor labour
processes. Firstly, the chapter traces the shift in the firm's production control system
from a traditional, high stock, high buffer, 'just in case' arrangement to a low stock,
low buffer, imperfect 'just-in-time' system. Secondly, it narrates management's
simultaneous attempts to reclaim control over operators' work rates by substituting
bell to bell measured day work for payment by results. Different worker responses to
this rudimentary process of labour intensification are discussed.
The different facets of lean production control are not the only labour regulation
mechanisms available to contemporary management. Commencing with a summary
of the historical traditions of informal worker controls over the labour process,
Chapter Six chronicles the introduction of teamworking and kaizen at CarPress.
Drawing upon both qualitative and quantitative data, it analyses the different
processes by which shop-floor controls and defensive practices are undermined, work
rates are intensified and certain groups of workers suffer deskilling. Importantly, this
investigation does not just rely upon a description of the impact of these developments
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on the shop-floor; it also traces the complex political strategies and conflicts which
accompany the management of change.
Shop-floor struggle comes to the fore throughout Chapter Seven in vivid fashion.
Here, the process of introducing Japanese production techniques is placed into the
context of institutionalised labour relations. The chapter describes management's
initial attempts to fashion a more 'consensual' style of industrial relations - something
akin to business unionism - by simultaneously incorporating the firm's senior shop
stewards and exploiting the oppressive ideological impact of the British state's anti-
trade union legislation. When the company fails to change the resistant attitudes of
the shop-floor rank and file, 'consensus' rapidly transforms into coercion and
victimisation. The chapter narrates the events which lead up to the summary
dismissal of a number of scapegoated shop-floor workers and ends with a discussion
of the various structural factors which currently inhibit worker resistance to such
managerial intimidation.
Chapter Eight completes Part Two. Drawing again on both qualitative and
quantitative material, this examines the impact of a package of new personnel
measures - what we might call 'human resource management' - on the shop-floor. In
particular, it critically addresses the assumption that socialisation measures of the kind
used by Japanese transplant managements succeed in engendering positive worker
commitment and corporate loyalty. Following a similar path to Chapter Three, it
focuses upon the impact of new employee recruitment and selection techniques; equal
opportunity policy; labour retention and job security policies; and again, employee
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involvement measures such as more extensive employee communications and single
status policies. The chapter ends with an investigation of the impact of the
restructuring of work and employment relations on workers' values, that is, both
customary instrumentalism and the more intimate traditions of shop-floor solidarity.
The concluding Chapter Nine draws together the transplant survey and case study
evidence and outlines a model of Japanese labour regulation practices in South Wales.
It then summarises the different mechanisms and processes which influence the
diffusion of these practices and connects this with the impact of both the state and
customer-supplier relations on workplace restructuring. Finally, it considers how our
understanding of these new developments may contribute to contemporary labour




In contrast to elsewhere in the UK, manufacturing industry in Wales enjoyed a
significant revival during the 1980s. Between 1985 and 1990, manufacturing output
rose by 32.9%, 14.5 percentage points higher than the UK figure for the period; the
long term decline of manufacturing share of total GDP was reversed - an unparalleled
development in the OECD countries; and investment per manufacturing employee
amounted to 167% of the UK average, the highest figure for any UK region (Price et
al. 1994, pp.10-il).
Price et al. argue that recent inward investment in the region contributed substantially
both to this superior economic performance and to the restructuring of Welsh
manufacturing in favour of such light engineering sectors as automotive components,
office equipment and consumer electronics. In fact, the 'Welsh renaissance' goes
back further than this. The diversification and growth of the manufacturing sector
took hold nearly three decades earlier and, just as today, was led by non-indigenous
businesses including a high proportion of branch plants of international firms
(Lovering 1983; Morris 1987). Many of these employers operated purely as low skill
assembly units rather than centres of R&D and administration. Consequently, the
process ofjob creation was accompanied by a qualitative erosion ofjob content and
remuneration: 'the net result was an overall decline in the total of well-paid (male,
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skilled) jobs, and a rise in lower-paid (female unskilled) employment' (Lovering 1983,
p.61).
This restructuring process has continued unabated over recent years. During the
1 980s, Japanese multinationals accelerated their search for overseas investments in
response to a number of politico-economic pressures: the need to recycle Japan's trade
surpluses; increasing protectionism in world markets; the appreciation of the yen; the
increased prices of Japanese real estate and stocks which acted to push investment out;
and the globalization of these firms' trade and corporate structures (Elger and Smith
1 994a, p.20). Coincidentally, Japanese investment in Britain was actively encouraged
by successive Conservative governments both to rejuvenate the country's declining
manufacturing base and to undermine the traditions of free collective bargaining
between employers and independent trade unions.
As a result, between 1986 and 1990, Japanese investment increased sevenfold in the
UK. Wales was a major recipient of this; indeed, between 1979 and 1991, the region
accounted for 14.2% of all Britain's foreign direct investment (Price et al. 1994, p.12).
Many companies arrived in Wales because its restructured labour markets offered
certain distinctive advantages. Of course, the factors which determine the specific
location of foreign direct investment are many. However, as Morris and Hill (1991)
point out, relative unit labour costs and labour adaptability constitute the most
important considerations for Japanese companies. In Wales, the decline of coal, steel
and older manufacturing industries created large pools of malleable, dependent labour
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along the southern valleys and in the old industrial towns. This deindustrialisation
also established the Welsh labour force as the lowest paid in the UK'.
The presence of Japanese capital in Wales, therefore, is partly a function of these
advantageous economic conditions. By 1992, the region contained the highest number
of Japanese-owned manufacturing transplants in the UK: 34 factories which together
employed 13,000 workers out of a total of 50,800 for the UK as a whole (Anglo-
Japanese Journal 1992). These transplants operate in the consumer electronics,
electronic components, autocomponents, office equipment and plastics and chemicals
sectors. Many are concentrated in South Wales.
Part One of this thesis comprises a survey of the various facets of work organization
and employment relations in 15 of these South Wales factories. It places a particular
emphasis upon the impact of Japanese management techniques on the shop-floor
labour process and on the management-labour relationship. It also considers how
these management regimes exploit the economic and labour market conditions which
originally determined their decision to invest in South Wales.
Wales has the highest percentage of full time workers earning below 68% of average UK gross
weekly earnings - the decency threshold set by the Council of Europe (Hetherington 1994). Moreover,
in 1990, one in three of all full time workers in the region earned less than the Low Pay Unit's low pay
threshold of157 a week. In the same year, there were 216,500 such low-paid workers in Wales:
92,500 men and 124,000 women (Labour Research, April 1990).
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CHAPTER TWO
JAPANESE LEAN PRODUCTION IN SOUTH WALES
If a distinctive Japanese transplant regime is perceived by its competitors as superior
in terms of manufacturing performance and efficient capital accumulation, then that
regime might be expected to catalyse organizational changes within the competing
finns. Moreover, if some of the distinguishing features of the Japanese regime begin
to transcend both sectoral and national boundaries so that a universal set of
management practices emerges, then a more pervasive process of industrial
restructuring might be anticipated. The opening chapter of this thesis suggested,
however, that there exists little concrete evidence to substantiate such an elementary
concept of 'Japanization'. In reality, the operations of Japanese TNCs are shaped and
constrained by the same parameters which affect their competitors; parameters
governing different production technologies, different product markets, different
labour markets, and different industrial relations traditions.
So does this mean that there is nothing distinctive about Japanese management
practice which would warrant further investigation? Is its influence restricted to the
realm of ideological threat rather than material change at the workplace? Whilst
disputing notions of universal management models, this thesis argues that, from the
standpoint of those individuals who bring their labour power to the shop-floor of
Japanese transplants, there are differences with conventional British factories,
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differences of sufficient significance to engender a process of emulation and conflict
within the latter.
The purpose of this chapter, and the next, is to explore the salient features of Japanese
management practice in a specific UK region. Drawing on quantitative and
qualitative data accumulated through a survey of Japanese manufacturing transplants
in South Wales, the analysis seeks to establish exactly what is distinctive about
Japanese work organization and employment relations in this region. Notwithstanding
the above reservations concerning the validity of Japanese models, it also relies upon
an ideal type-approach to structure the investigation. Therefore, the chapter considers
those features of management practice most commonly associated with the 'Japanese
model': the reskilled labour process; just-in-time and lean production control;
flexibility, teamworking and other aspects of labour utilization; and total quality
management (TQM) practices such as kaizen.
THE SURVEY
At the time of the survey, in 1994, there were 17 fully Japanese-owned manufacturing
transplants based in the South Wales region 1 . Many of these are concentrated in the
consumer electronics and electronics component sectors, although firms operating in
the autocomponents and chemicals and plastics sectors are also present. Of these 17
This figure excludes the small number of Japanese firms employing less than 25 workers.
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firms, 15 agreed to participate in the survey and all of the above sectors were
represented.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 together provide an outline of these participating firms' products,
principal markets and workforce composition.
The two tables indicate that, with the partial exception of Sony, these Japanese
transplants are primarily manufacturing enterprises producing different consumer
goods, components and materials for British and European markets. Perhaps the most
striking aspect of their workforce composition is that although the firms employ few
design staff - and some use sub-contractors for plant maintenance - on average, the
number of indirect staff still amounts to 30% of the total workforce. Apart from
management and administration, most of the latter comprised shop-floor supervision,
industrial engineering and quality control personnel. The implications of this for the
nature of management control over the labour process are explored in more detail
below. For the moment, it should be noted that, despite dominant perceptions to the
contrary, the 'flat hierarchy' and the principle of multi-skilled direct production
workers taking on many of the tasks of redundant indirect employees are not
characteristics of Japanese work organization2.
2 This observation is not based purely on the survey results in South Wales. Lincoln and Kalleberg's
(1990) extensive comparison of employers' practices and employees' attitudes in Japan and America
found that Japanese corporations employed twice as many supervisors as their American counterparts
but fewer direct production workers relative to total employees. Overall, Japanese corporations had
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Table 2.2 also displays a good number of workforces comprising a high proportion of
women employees. Overall, women constitute nearly 50% of all transplant workers in
the region although this figure obscures disparities across sectors and occupations. In
particular, women are concentrated in the electronics sector where most are employed
as bottom grade production operators. This gender segregation will be considered
further below, and again, in Chapter Three.
With the exception of just one, the different transplant managements recognised trade
unions. Their industrial relations policies are explored in Chapter Three.
WORK ORGANIZATION AND THE LABOUR PROCESS
The factors which impact upon corporate strategies governing the organization of the
labour process are many. Consequently, any group of factories manufacturing similar
products may sometimes display clear, sometimes subtle differences in job design.
Nevertheless, most of the Japanese transplants organised their production on the
principle of continuous flow assembly lines involving repetitive and monotonous task
routines. These lines would be automated where batch size or standardised
components made this feasible, otherwise, production relied principally upon labour-
intensive manual work. Table 2.3 summarises this.
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Table 2.3, Work or2anization b y sector and company
MANUFACTURING	 COMPANY	 WORK ORGANIZATION
SECTOR














	 Automated component insert
assembly.
...............................................................•MHitachi	 Automated component insert
assembly.
..............Manual assembly line..
Star Micronics	 Automated component insert
assembly.
.........................................................................Man...Electronic Components	 Gooding Sanken





	 Unitary workstations; semi-
automated and manual
.................................................................Yuasa Batteries	 Automated and semi-automated
assembly lines.
Matsushita Electronic 	 PLC automated technology.
Components	 Unitary workstations, manual
...............................................
Matsushita Electronic 	 Automated assembly lines; PLC
Magnetrons	 technology.
Chemicals and Plastics
	 Sekisui	 Continuous flow processes
utilising extrusion technology.




Diaplastics	 Unitary extrusion and flow line
assembly.
Takiron	 Unitary extrusion machines.
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Although all sectors are not equally represented, inter-sectoral differences can also be
discerned in terms of cell-based assembly lines in the auto factory, conventional
moving assembly lines in electronics and unitary machine layout in plastics. These
differences are primarily a function of technological parameters and prevailing
sectoral trends and traditions. The nature of the labour processes in the different
transplants will now be examined, sector by sector.
Autocomponents
Calsonic is the only 1 00%-owned Japanese subsidiary operating in the auto sector in
South Wales. The factory manufactures different types of heat exchanger units with a
customer base spread across the European vehicle assembly industry. Unlike the other
transplants in the survey, Calsonic is not a classic Japanese green field operation. Its
Llanelli factory was formerly an old BL/Rover plant which underwent a management-
employee buy-out in advance of the Rover privatisation in 1988. The Calsonic Group
subsequently purchased the plant in 1989. However, despite this brownfield status -
and the legacy of shop-floor control over the labour process which accompanied it -
the combination of competitive market pressures and the emergence of a more
compliant trade union organization weakened by almost continual threats of
redundancy since 1988, facilitated a significant restructuring of work organization
involving the implementation ofjust-in-time production control techniques and
teamworking.
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Looked at purely in technological terms of 'efficiency' and 'flexibility', this
restructuring could be described as the substitution of continuous flow, cellular
production for the more inflexible, dedicated machine layouts associated with
'Fordism'. The Calsonic management inherited an orthodox form of work
organization based on the separation of machines and workstations into discrete
functional areas or 'clusters' (Schonberger 1986). Gradually, cell-based teamworking
replaced this arrangement allowing different machines and tasks to be grouped
together by product family rather than single function. The different teamworkers also
became more personally responsible for the quality of their work and more responsive
to the just-in-time supply requirements of the customer.
However, these changes also had a major political dimension. Rather than introduce
quixotic notions of 'ownership', 'self-management', or, as one writer has put it, 'the
creation of little factories within a factory' (Tumbull 1986), the reorganization was
aimed primarily at intensifying work rates and re-imposing managerial prerogatives.
In particular, it resulted in the rationalisation ofjobs, the removal of both formal and
informal job demarcations and the dismantling of those production buffers which gave
operators occasional breaks from the incessant intensity of production. Using classic
work measurement techniques, teams of industrial engineers set about re-organising
workstations, reducing the number of non-profitable process tasks, removing waiting
times in stores and transit, removing factory floor pallet areas for temporary
workstation storage and removing the stores themselves. What appears, ostensibly, as
a series of quite mundane organizational changes had more profound implications for
shop-floor operators. As one quality manager commented:
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Our style of working on the shop-floor has undergone quite a radical change as a result of all
this. We've virtually got rid of all the old buffers which literally used to pile up shoulder high
at every workstation. No longer do our operators work stop-go, stop-go, sometimes going flat
out, sometimes taking a rest. It's now bell to bell, steady, continuous working - with the
machines and technology driving the men rather than the other way around. It might not sound
like much of a change but it's a big change for us I can assure you.
The introduction of teamworking did little to enrich the operators' work. During the
processes of assembling, clinching and brazing the different metal rods, tubes and
gills that comprise a radiator assembly, operators in the labour-intensive manual areas
might rotate from one narrow task to another. But their work remained essentially
fragmented and low-skilled. By comparison, in the factory's high volume automated
areas, where assembly and brazing operations were performed by dedicated robotic-
based technology, although the different teams of operators enjoyed higher status
because they were employed on 'state of the art' technology, they also suffered
deskilling. In effect, they were converted into unskilled' line feeders' (Jurgens et al.
1993) with the sole responsibility of loading materials and parts into machine silos,
magazines and fixtures.
This segmentation of production tasks had a significant gender dimension. The
rationalisation ofjobs in the labour-intensive production teams resulted in many
women leaving the factory over recent years. At the same time, operators working in
the automated areas enjoyed relative job security. The fact that the latter were all men
was no coincidence. Stereotypical assumptions concerning 'natural' men's and
women's skills contributed to a gradual gendering of the work process (Cockburn
1985). The management at this plant, like many interviewed elsewhere, believed
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unquestioningly that women in manufacturing were only suitable for light, repetitious
assembly work. Anything beyond this constituted entryism into traditional male
territory. And at Calsonic at least, women were no longer perceived as cheaper than
their male colleagues. As one manager put it:
In a sense, fixing metal and materials on to jigs and large pieces of machinery is men's work
isn't it? It's dirtier and requires more heavy manual labour. Also, rightly or wrongly, the
women here had always been paid less than the men irrespective of function. But the effect of
the Act [Equal Pay] was to make our women operators as expensive as the men. There was no
longer a clear advantage to the Company in employing a mass of women. So, the new
technology gradually came in. And male workers, who in any case were more used to working
with process machinery, were recruited while at the same time our women gradually left
through natural wastage and voluntary redundancy.
Consumer electronics
A similar dichotomy between capital intensive, automated component insertion and
labour intensive manual assembly characterised the organization of production in the
large electronic assembly transplants. The technological logic of this has been
described in some detail by Taylor et al. (1991, 1995) and Delbridge (1995). Without
exception, predominantly male operators were deployed in the automated areas,
feeding and monitoring computerised component insert equipment used for mounting
standardised electronic components into printed circuit boards. Female operators
were then employed along conventional assembly lines for the more numerous and
complex manual assembly operations which go into the manufacture of domestic
videos, TVs and the like.
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Patriarchal assumptions governing distinctions between 'men's work' and 'women's
work' informed this division of labour as well. However, this was not the only factor.
The mass exploitation of large pools of low-waged female labour from the ex-mining
communities of South Wales provided major advantages to these different capitals in
terms of minimising wage costs and enlarging surplus value. Matsushita Electric
apart, where union organization was relatively strong and occasionally militant, most
of the electronics plants in the survey operated an informal wage-setting cartel. As a
result, most women employed as bottom grade assembly line workers earned just
£140 per week gross compared to the £155-E170 plus shift premia received by their
higher graded male colleagues.
In the automated areas, although the technology itself was complex, the male
operators were again effectively reduced to little more than line feeders. Their daily
tasks comprised loading basic PCBs, component ribbons and cassettes to machines;
multi machine minding; picking up and re-loading dropped components; and feeding
off finished work. Equipment breakdowns were the responsibility of skilled
maintenance teams or local contractors. The work was boring, monotonous and
degrading.
The same adjectives can be used to describe work in the main manual areas except
that this was also marked by its exceptional speed and intensity. The basic labour
processes were no different to those encountered in Cavendish' s (1982) ethnography
of life on an assembly line. Operators sitting at discrete positions along a
conventional production line carried out a small number of repetitive manual
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operations at rapid speed. Whether the task was component insertion, dry joint
probing, mechanical assembly, final packaging, or whatever, the basic skills were the
same: rapid component handling and perfect hand coordination.
Many operators appeared to the observer as highly charged automatons. At
Matsushita Electric in Cardiff for example, experienced component inserters were
expected to complete their operations on 10 boards per minute. Most cycles
comprised fitting 8 components to a board. Thus, most of these operators were fitting
80 components per minute, more than 1 per second. And they did this continuously.
The key difference between the labour process in these plants and traditional British
practice - as outlined by Cavendish for example - is that bell to bell working means
what it implies. The process allows no potential for creating individual buffers and
informal breaks; talking on the line is a disciplinary issue; all tasks are value-added
only so that extras, such as stopping work in order to change a component box, are
allocated to line side feeders; and operators enjoy no short breaks during machine
downtime, they immediately move on to alternative lines. Workers are asked to
squeeze 60 minutes labour power into every hour. As one shop steward complained:
Mind you, if the targets are constantly missed then the operative is taken to the desk. You get
warnings from your supervisor and you're told that, "you're too busy talking", or, "you're
looking around you too much and not concentrating". But sackings are rare. 95% of the poor
performers are transferred to an easier department if there is such a bloody thing. So, the
system is if you're caught talking and dreaming you're generally given a first formal warning
and then you're moved. It's harsh isn't it? Some of the departments on the shop floor work
under tremendous pressure. On the insertion lines and the control block lines you just haven't
got time to blink.
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Electronic Components
The organization of work in this sector followed no set pattern, although, like all other
transplants in the survey, these Japanese electronic component suppliers displayed an
invariable work intensity and sense of discipline on the shop-floor.
The diversity ofjob design and manufacturing technique was a function of quite
different product and process technologies and specific market characteristics and
traditions. At Gooding Sanken's new Welsh Development Agency greenfield site, for
example, the shop-floor was again divided into automated component insertion and
manual assembly areas. Here, however, fixed workbenches arranged as long assembly
lines but without expensive conveyor belt technology, sufficed for the plant's low
volume market requirements. The operators' labour processes again comprised
repetitive manual assembly tasks whilst the intensity of work was dictated by fixed
cycle times and tightly policed by shop-floor supervisors. Distractions from the task
in hand, such as talking to workmates on the line, were a common occasion for
reprimand and formal discipline.
The production process at Matsushita Electronic Components, near Swansea, did not
lend itself to straight line or cellular assembly line principles. Manufacturing
switching transformers and other similar components requires operators working at
single workstations performing customary tasks, such as winding copper wires around
metal cores, each hour of the working day. The skills employed here revolve around
rapidity and consistency of hand movement. Similarly, at Electronic Harnesses, the
efficient manufacture of wiring harnesses demanded a clustering of different work
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processes and unitary machines instead of assembly lines. The labour processes of the
predominantly female operators in this plant comprised rapidly feeding insulated
wires and crimps into semi-automated cutting and crimping machinery - which the
plant's persoimel manager likened to sewing machines - along with wire layout, hand
soldering and crimping. Rather than distribute task and ability on a rotational, 'multi-
skill' basis, the work was fragmented in Tayloristic fashion so that each operator
concentrated on her specific, narrow task.
Both Yuasa Batteries and Matsushita Electronic Magnetrons exploited more capital-
intensive work processes. Since it was established in 1982, successive investments in
automated process technology enabled Yuasa Batteries to manufacture around 5
million sealed lead acid batteries of different designs each year. Although this
technology furnished the plant's 30 in-house maintenance staff with a number of new
skills, the 450 process operators employed on the shop-floor were again reduced to
mere machine feeders and minders. Indeed, the minimal skills required here allowed
the company to recruit most of its workforce straight from local secondary schools.
Similarly, Matsushita's Electronic Magnetrons Cwmbran plant presented itself as a hi-
tech 'factory of the future' on the basis of its total automation and integration of the
manufacturing process. The factory employed just 19 direct operators who each day
produced 7,500 magnetrons for the domestic microwave industry. The operators'
labour processes were organised around 5 robotic workstations located along one line
and each linked by a sophisticated enclosed conveyor system. Put crudely, operators
fed the required materials and components onto conveyors at each workstation;
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robotic equipment performed different press, clench and assembly operations; and on
this cumulative assembly basis, every minute, 20 completed magnetrons appeared at
the other end of the factory, ready for despatch.
Maintaining the same inverse relationship between automated production technology
and operator skill observed elsewhere, the work was rudimentary, sometimes intense,
but always demanding in the sense that workers had to survive the boredom of a
monotonous and lifeless working day, week in, week out. Japanese managerial
efficiency, combined with the exploitation of sophisticated new technology of a type
that would enthral our contemporary business writers, had created a degrading, no-
skill labour process. As the site production manager put it when questioned on labour
flexibility:
In fact, we rotate our operatives every 1 to 2 hours. This is not a requirement of the
production process, it's purely for "job enrichment". The problem here is that the work is
very boring on the line and if we leave an operative at a single workstation for more than a
couple of hours then the work becomes so monotonous that mistakes can be made. In
truth, without being disrespectful, we could train monkeys to do these jobs. The only skill
involved is the use of a bit of aptitude when things go wrong.
Chemicals and plastics.
The management at the companies manufacturing foams, plastic mouldings and PVC
products, Sekisui, Diaplastics and Takiron, stressed the lack of anything distinctively
Japanese about the way work and technology were organized in their capital-intensive
factories. Nevertheless, they did emphasise the importance of securing management
control over labour deployment and maintaining the daily discipline and intensity of
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production. The manufacturing systems in these factories incorporated different types
of unitary extrusion machines on large batch, continuous processes. The operators'
job design was also standard for this type of industry: feeding in raw materials,
machine setting, multi-machine minding and feeding off the fmished product were all
customary daily tasks on the shop-floor.
At Dynic, a small Cardiff-based firm fabricating ribbon materials for computer
printers, the labour process involved slitting ribbon material to size on unitary,
manually controlled machines; or elsewhere, performing elementary assembly
operations for the manufacture of ribbon cassettes. Again, apart from the intensity of
work and the lack of union influence over this - which will be discussed later - the
management stressed that compared to similar firms in the region, there was nothing
unorthodox about the organization of the labour process on the shop-floor.
This chapter's remaining sections investigate particular management practices which
govern the intensity of production, the deployment of labour and worker participation
in reshaping the labour process. However, the significant preliminary point to emerge
from the analysis thus far, is that the basic shop-floor labour processes in these South
Wales manufacturing transplants have not been 'enriched' by the implementation of
some novel Japanese work organizational paradigm. Without exception, production
operators are employed in these factories on a variety of fragmented, monotonous and
repetitive tasks in the interests of efficient capital accumulation. To close this section,
the generally rudimentary, low-skill nature of this labour process is further
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demonstrated by considering the extent and quality of training required for the
operators to perform their work.
In keeping with the view that Japanese firms devote far more resources to training
than their British competitors (Keep 1991; Pang and Oliver 1988), and assuming that
this should represent something more substantial than 'on the job' or brief induction
training, each transplant management was asked to what extent formal NVQ skills
training was offered to operators on the shop-floor. Six of the 15 firms did provide
such training, but with the exception of a small minority of senior operators, this only
extended to the most basic NVQ Level i 3 . Moreover, the absence of NVQ
certification from the remaining 9 plants was not the result of parsimonious attitudes
towards employee training; it merely reflected a more candid appraisal of both
requisite operators' skill levels and the dishonest nature of contemporary state-funded
youth training. As a Sony manager commented:
Let's be honest. I know, and so to be fair do the operatives, that it is ridiculous to think
that their jobs could be "NVQable". I'm greatly concerned that so many companies are
offering this sort of NVQ training and claiming NVQ skills for so many jobs that just don't
warrant them. It's an abuse of the system and the Government knows it.
NVQ Level 1 certificates are awarded for 'competence in the performance of a range of work
activities, most of which may be routine and predictable', but as the CBI has also advised, competence
which is below the minimum reached by most young people who have completed youth training. (The
NVQ Monitor, National Council for Vocational Qualifications, Spring/Summer 1994; 'Business
Success Through Confidence', Investors in People, CBI, April 1991).
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LEAN PRODUCTION CONTROL
Although the processes of just-in-time production control (MI) are rarely researched
in any empirical depth, the concept remains central to managerialist presentations of
efficient, waste-free Japanese production practice. Schonberger (1982) places JIT at
the heart of Japanese production management and defines it idealistically as an
inventory control system where work and materials are constantly on the move, 'a sort
of hand to mouth mode of operation characterised by stockless production'. Oliver
and Wilkinson (1992) expand upon this by describing JIT as a waste minimising
system which seeks to match production exactly to market demand. They go on to
denote 3 conditions necessary for its operation: swift machine set-up times; simple
unidirectional material flow; and the implementation of TQM practices. On the basis
of their quantitative analysis of recent developments in the UK, these authors argue
that JIT is now becoming common practice in manufacturing firms.
To what extent is JIT established in the Japanese transplants of South Wales? The
real picture is more complex than the above analyses would suggest. Only 4 out of
the 15 firms surveyed claimed to use a JIT system. And notably, this small number
did not seem to be a function of any constraint in specific industrial sectors. Of the
four, one JIT company operated in the autocomponents sector, two were in consumer
electronics and one in plastics.
However, this does not mean that the remaining companies conformed to the
opposing - and sometimes inaccurate - 'Fordist', 'just in case', high buffer, ideal type.
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Many followed lean production strategies based on strict manning levels (which are
considered in the next chapter) and reductions in both work in progress and stock
levels matched with careful assessments of likely product demand.
Looking firstly at the JIT companies, both Sony and AIWA claimed to operate pure
JIT systems, an unusual achievement for UK-based consumer electronics assemblers
since a large proportion of the high value added electronic components are imported
from the Far East. Over a period of 20 years, Sony developed its 'global localisation'
strategy resulting in a fully integrated TV production plant at Bridgend. Key
assemblies such as cathode ray tubes were manufactured in-house whilst reportedly,
90% of other components were supplied 'locally', that is, from the UK and other
European Union countries. This complex network of suppliers delivered materials
and components to the factory every 2 hours on average, some direct, some via local
warehouses. The AIWA plant at Newport operated a more imperfect form of JIT
since many of its electronics components were imported from the Far East. However,
the company claimed to maintain close control over order schedules from its foreign
suppliers - including detailed procedures for monitoring all supplier transport
containers - to the extent that weekly shipments were possible, with daily supplies
received just-in-time via port-based warehouses.
Calsonic's production control system was designed to supply the JIT requirements of
Rover-Honda, Nissan and other prominent vehicle assemblers. The management at
this ex-Rover plant described their system as far more stressed and tightly controlled
than previous practice. In earlier times, the plant would receive a weekly order for a
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supply of radiator assemblies which was rarely subsequently refined in terms of daily
despatch requirements. Orders were received over the phone and casually adjusted
over the phone if necessary. This loose form of control, along with large batch
production and the prevalence of buffers on the shop-floor, created a relatively relaxed
system of coordinating supply with customer demand.
Under the new regime, the systematic reduction of buffers and machine set-up times
facilitated smaller batch sizes and a more precise JIT supply and delivery system.
Calsonic's main customers provided fairly accurate monthly estimates of supply
requirements and from these, hi-weekly and weekly forecasts were generated.
Through interaction with the customer on Electronic Data Interchange, production
planners were able to use these forecasts to issue daily shift production plans which
incorporated any final day to day adjustments. From these, the planners established
tightly controlled product despatch timetables, involving normally three despatches
per day to each customer at different fixed times.
Calsonic' s despatch arrangements with Nissan were typical. At precisely 7.00am,
7.45am and 3.00pm each day, a Nissan sub-contract driver would collect the exact
amount of units from the Calsonic despatch bay in accordance with the day's
production schedule. Within exactly 45 minutes, the driver inspected each pallet for
correct part quantities and pallet installation, loaded the vehicle and signed for
'ownership' of the load. At 7.45am, the driver left the despatch bay, whether or not
the complete order was loaded. Using classic time and motion measurement
techniques, Nissan and its delivery contractors established optimum pick up times at
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each supplier sufficient to allow transient storage at a large Nottingham depot. Upon
completion of each 'milk round' of suppliers in the region, goods were off-loaded at
Nottingham and physically divided into 4 daily time slots from which they were
delivered just in time to the Nissan plant in Sunderland.
These critical despatch schedules intensified the stress of mass production on the
Calsonic shop-floor. The system exerted a continual disciplinary pressure on the
teams and shifts responsible for meeting the customer's quality and quantity
requirements on time. Any team of operators failing to meet these requirements was
expected to work on until such problems were resolved. If the deadline was still
missed then Calsonic was forced to deliver free of charge to the affected customer.
Consistent failures placed contracts and jobs in jeopardy. And of course, we are not
talking about one deadline but a whole series of routine deadlines for each customer,
each day.
Although the majority of firms surveyed did not operate such closely controlled JIT
systems, they did attempt to tighten their production schedules and reduce work in
progress and stock levels. For those transplants locked into long term, 'cooperative'
supply relationships with the JIT assemblers, these objectives could be undermined by
the ability of the latter to pass their costs down the supply chain. A number of
managers spoke bitterly of this. One said:
No, this company does not operate JIT. And exactly what is JIT may I ask? Who can defme
it, can you? I certainly can't. I believe the concept of JIT is an idea that has been blown up
out of all proportion by the media and you academics. And it's all very well for the big fmal
assemblers such as those in the auto industry to claim to work a JIT system, which they might
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well do, I don't know. But in fact, all they are doing is pushing their stock holdings down the
supplier chain. And it's logistically impossible for all these suppliers to themselves run a JIT
system. So at some early stage, one level of suppliers will have to pick up the bill by holding
excessive levels of stocks.
And from a supplier to Sony:
I don't know what system Sony operate. All I know is that their order schedules are
unplanned and chaotic. We can't do anything else other than keep good stock levels with
which to supply them.
Notwithstanding these countervailing pressures, most of the Japanese transplants still
attempted to regulate their production costs by maintaining leaner production control
measures. Every firm operated a system for generating monthly, weekly, sometimes
daily estimates of likely sales demand. And this was often accompanied by
procedures which secured management accountability for work in progress and stock
levels. Sekisui provided a typical example where inventory levels had to be declared
by all appropriate managers on a monthly basis. This normally amounted to a
maximum of 10 days finished goods in stock, a maximum of 5 days work in progress
and 5 days raw materials and inventories.
The ramifications of such dry accountancy measures can be profound on the shop-
floor. As the case study of British emulation will demonstrate in Chapters 5 and 6, for
the production operator, 'minimal human and material waste' in the form of low stock
and low buffers, translates into no break or respite from the continuous grind of mass
production. Indeed, lean production control, whether in the form of an idealised just-
in-time or more prosaic forms of reducing inventory costs, constitutes a critical
component in management's repertoire of measures which aim to close up the pores
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of the working day. This is the more 'mundane' factor which unites the different
approaches to production control within the Japanese transplants in South Wales.
LABOUR UTILIZATION AND THE NEW WORKING PRACTICES
The survey investigated the Japanese firms' use of those new working practices which
seek a more efficient utilization of labour on the shop-floor. Practices such as
teamworking and other labour flexibility measures. The survey results are summarised
in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4, Use of new workin g practices
PRACTICE	 NUMBER OF	 PERCENTAGE
COMPANIES	 OF COMPANIES




2SPJ ....................:	 ... o....................
Job rotation	 7	 46
Use of floats	 10	 66
..............................................................................................9 ....................
Operators responsible for SPC
	 1	 6
Teamworking and labour flexibility
The concept of Japanese-style teamworking suffers from a distinct lack of clarity in
definition. One of its pioneers[has described the practice as the cellular organization
of labour and machinery in accordance with continuous flow principles. Here,
machines are grouped by product family rather than function and each team member is
required to operate the different machines in turn, moving items through a processing
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sequence, one piece at a timeToyota Motor Corporation 1992). More accurate
analyses of the Toyota system have reduced this idealised craft-based version to one
of mere multi-machine minding, where operators working in discrete cells may be
asked to operate more than one machine at any one time (Monden 1983). Other
managerialist analyses have complicated things further by arguing that single process-
based cells are also operable and may be used where large machines dedicated to
particular functions are common, such as in a press shop (Alford 1994).
{i' the precise format of the typical team organization is unclear, at least most
managerialist writers agree on its purpose. That is, teamworking simplifies factory
material flow; it reduces work in progress; it minimises manning levels; and, on an
ideological level, it mobilises a sense of quality consciousness and business
orientation amongst team members (Oliver and Wilkinson 1992). Moreover, on the
basis of primarily quantitative data analysis, many writers also agree that teamworking
has become a prevalent facet of work organization within both Japanese and British
firms in the UK (for example, IRS 1990; Oliver and Wilkinson 1992)]
Un1ortunately, what is missing from this type of discussion is a sense of shop-floor
politics. Teamworking is constructed as a mechanism of workplace efficiency or as a
mode of work organization which may be of mere 'technical interest'. The idea that it
could represent a significant managerial instrument of labour regulation which
critically undermines traditional shop-floor controls over the labour process tends to
get glossed over. As indeed, does the possibility that by effecting a process of shop-
floor fragmentation, teamworking weakens the collective articulation of workers'
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interests so that it constitutes a 'hard headed anti-union strategy for shifting the
balance of power further towards management, away from workers and unions'
(CAITS 1988, p.6).
How have the Japanese exploited teamworking in their South Wales transplants? In
fact, as Table 2.4 shows, less than half of the firms surveyed operated teamworking as
a distinctive form of work organization. Furthermore, only Calsonic, in the auto
sector, organised production into ideal typical cells.
At this factory, small teams consisting of between 6 to 12 operators were given the
responsibility of producing families of car radiator assemblies for specific customers.
Each team had its own leader, an elite operator who represented the 'totally flexible
worker'. The team leader was responsible for such matters as the multi-task
development of all team members, labour deployment and team performance. The
latter was also monitored openly by the use of a combination of digital and manual
display boards showing production targets; production performance; defect levels;
individual operator's task proficiencies; and, under the heading of 'team morale',
individual absenteeism records.
Case study analysis would be needed to establish the extent to which teamworking
in this plant changed worker attitudes. But on the basis of the survey investigations
there was little evidence of self-management or worker 'empowerment'. The
company maintained strict lines of accountability from teamworker to teamleader
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to foreman to production manager; orders were received from supervision and
strictly obeyed.
Nevertheless, it is ironical that this pre-war, multi-union site managed to organise a
more fundamental restructuring of work organization than most of the greenfield
Japanese plants in the survey. In fact, the crucial difference here is that much modular
assembly work in the auto industry actually lends itself to a team-based organization
rather than a conventional assembly line; and more importantly, competitive pressures
within this sector are ensuring that established companies introduce the practice as a
low manning, labour intensif'ing measure by purging the shop-floor of its traditional
labour demarcations and controls.
In contrast, the greenfield transplants in the electronics sector had no legacies of shop-
floor control to contend with. These companies continued to exploit rigidly
fragmented labour processes organised along single, straight assembly lines in
accordance with the traditions of this sector. Their teams merely constituted the total
number of operators on the line, which could sometimes extend to above 50 workers.
Their purpose was not to facilitate 'total flexibility' or 'self-management'.
'Teamworking' was a euphemism for the creation of organised units that could be
held accountable for line output and defect performance. As a manager in one of the
larger plants explained:
We operate an informal team structure which might change even on a daily basis, but these
teams are not organised for the purpose of team working, more for ease of communications
and to provide a line of accountability to the team or line leader. The team might consist of
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around 10 operatives and each will be co-ordinated by line leaders who really take up the
role of the traditional charge hands.
A majority of the firms surveyed, whether using team organization or not, were
attempting to enlist their employees into a 'customer ethos' to ensure that individual
operators meet the needs of downstream 'customers' (Deibridge et al. 1992). For
example, a personnel manager at one company stated:
Every one of our operatives is supposed to regard other operatives upstream or downstream
of the line as customers. And his downstream customers are expected to, and will, create a
fuss if the work they receive is not up to scratch. We've always supported this explicit
customer philosophy promoting the "individual as customer" idea. Not only will
operatives complain to each other about any colleague's poor work but they also register
complaints, sometimes bitter complaints, with the Company Advisory Board.
This, of course, was a new workplace individualism presented from management's
standpoint. In fact, the needs of the external customer 	 consistently brought to
the attention of shop-floor operators through continual quality campaigns,
communications meetings and kaizen. It is likely that workers did have a greater
sense of responsibility to the customer and the market. But this customer awareness
did not necessarily extend to social relations between workmates. For example, when
quizzed about the 'block assurance' customer/supplier system supposedly operating at
their plant, two stewards at Matsushita Electric commented:
No way! How can we check our own work let alone other people's work? We haven't got any
time. And the idea that you could give your own people a telling off for bad quality! You're
joking! We're all on the same grade on the shop floor, we're all the same. If I were to turn
round and give my mate a bollocking he'll just look at me and say "fuck off, who do you think
you are?"
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And on the idea of 'ownership'?:
Ownership of work? You've got to challenge this terminology strongly. What's it supposed to
mean? You only have the bloody unit in front of you for 2 seconds. So how are you supposed
to own it?
There was no evidence, then, that the organization of workers into teams, in whatever
form, acted to enrich the labour process. Even the practice of multi-tasking was
confined to narrow limits. In line with many other inward investors in the UK, the
Japanese transplants were more concerned to incorporate total labour flexibility into
their employment contracts than to put this principle into practice (Peck and Stone
1992; Morris et al. 1994). Although over three quarters of the firms had full
flexibility agreements with their trade unions, less than half operated any form ofjob
rotation. For many operators, life on the line meant staying at the same position day
in day out performing similar task routines. The only flexibility involved was in their
ability to adjust these routines for different model changes on the same line. As a
manager at Sony put it:
Some of our women on the main CIV line might move around the line on occasions but this is
unusual. The idea of operator flexibility here lies in their ability to handle different models on
a daily basis.
When quizzed about the enriching potential ofjob flexibility and rotation, many
managers expressed a candid cynicism. One commented:
I believe that this idea of continual movement between tasks to enrich the work process is
frankly a lot of bull shit. Most workers prefer to stay in the same spot most of the time. They
prefer one continuous boring routine to a number of continuous boring routines. And most of
all they prefer working with the same people.
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Indeed, a similar view was expressed by a GMB shop steward:
The GMB agreement is that there's no demarcation whatsoever on the shop floor. But in
practice operatives do tend to stay on the spot doing the same job. The most common reason
for moving around is when you're covering for absenteeism. It's not done for flexibility's
sake. If you've got people absent from a busy line then the supervision will throw other
operatives on. Many of our people don't like it mind, especially the older ones. When people
have been doing the same job all their lives they get used to it. They regard the job as their
job, it sort of belongs to them. So they hate being moved off it.
For most of these transplants, full functional flexibility and productive efficiency did
not go hand in hand. Although many of the firms did employ 'floats', elite operators
who performed any task upon request in order to cover for problems such as
absenteeism, in most cases these constituted less than 10% of the shop-floor
workforce. Maximising output and minimising waste formed the driving logic behind
continuous, lean production. Concepts such as 'enrichment' and 'empowerment' just
did not come into the equation. Production supervisors were held accountable for line
performance and they knew from experience that they could extract more output from
groups of operators performing the same daily tasks than from others who were
continually switching lines.
Placing full flexibility into labour contracts therefore served two purposes. Firstly, it
provided management sufficient flexibility in labour deployment to allow for
absenteeism and fluctuations in product demand. Secondly, it legitimised the
imposition of managerial prerogatives; and it suppressed the emergence of rank and
file controls over the labour process in the form of skill and job demarcations,
regulation of effort rates, and so on. And these principles of management-controlled
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flexibility were not negotiable. One shop steward reflected on the activities of an
unsuspecting young manager recently recruited at Matsushita Electric:
He's an unusual character for this place. He actually went around the lines talking to the girls
about their work and discovered that they were all bored stiff. He even asked me my opinion.
And I told him that there's a large number of youngsters here who get bored easily and some
of them might appreciate flexibility more than the older ones. But the supervisors are all
completely anti-flexibility. They've got their efficient lines and they want to keep them.
So this manager drew up a plan. He'd discovered some of the operatives were pissed off with
doing the same job day in day out so he came up with these new job rotation ideas. I don't
disagree with him, actually. But the management aren't going to allow it to happen. Rotation
will affect efficiency and rejects. This guy's new so he's got a lot to learn. But the best of
luck to him. He'll need it in this place.
Finally, a short note on machine maintenance. Nearly all of the transplants
maintained a strict division between their skilled maintenance teams and their
production operators. With the exception of Calsonic, operators were not responsible
for any aspect of machine maintenance. Moreover, although there was some evidence
of limited multi-skilling, the maintenance teams still preserved many of the traditional
skill divisions between electrical and mechanical fitters.
Calsonic recently introduced a total productive maintenance programme. As a result,
production operators became responsible for machine lubrication, machine cleaning
and other simple maintenance duties. Although it was impossible to assess the impact
of this venture on job satisfaction, the low-skill nature of the extra work ensured that
the operators' labour processes were subject to task accretion rather than upskilling.
Their work was also intensified. With no extra time allocated for completing these
new tasks, the exertion of further labour, in the form of simple machine maintenance,
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was substituted for the shop-floor's precious 10 minute wind-down period at the end
of each shift.
Job Design
The Japanese work organizational paradigm is supposed to provide some space for
direct production workers to participate in job design through such activities as
statistical process control (SPC), kaizen and team briefings. Some writers build this
aspect of 'worker democracy' into a post-Taylorist, flexible specialisation perspective
which assumes that direct management control now has no place in factories
characterised by the devolvement of decision-making to the shop-floor (Piore and
Sabel 1984). Braverman's (1974) dichotomy between the conception and execution
of tasks effectively becomes redundant.
However, not much evidence of this could be detected amongst the Japanese
transplants in South Wales. The limited worker involvement in kaizen is discussed in
the next section and the non-participative nature of team briefings in the next chapter.
As far as monitoring and adjusting production line work through SPC is concerned,
only two companies in the survey ever involved their operators in this. And one of
these, Calsonic, was recently forced to cancel its SPC programmes due to worker
apathy.
The role of the industrial engineer in these factories provides a more constructive
indicator of worker involvement in job design. For, as Jurgens et al. have argued, 'no
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job is more characteristic for Taylorism-Fordism than that of the industrial engineer,
whose job is to prescribe in detail the times and motions which the workers should use
when performing their work' (1993, p.19). To what extent had the work of these
engineers altered or even become redundant in the supposedly 'democratic', post-
Taylorist Japanese transplants?
The answer was very little at all. At all of the larger plants, teams of industrial
engineers were employed to carry out routine work measurement utilising traditional
time and motion studies. These were used in customary fashion for setting targets, for
line balancing and for cost and benefit analysis. At AIWA for example, one industrial
engineer was employed for every 30 operatives. In fact, for most of these firms, it
takes some imagination to envisage how matters could be any different once
production tasks had become so fragmented and shaped by the exigencies of the
continuous flow production lines. However, the irony here was the extent to which
some of these Japanese managements resolutely rejected y worker input into job
design. For example, a personnel manager at Electronic Harnesses stated firmly that:
Company procedures govern the way we orgarlise work. Indeed, the company highly
disapproves of the idea of allowing workers to change methods by themselves, this practice
is just not accepted. All operatives must comply with the company procedures.
And at Gooding Sanken:
The idea of workers designing their own jobs is frowned upon. Individual innovation with
regard work design is most certainly not the company philosophy here. Its our Japanese
managers who are responsible for establishing all work procedures.
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At Calsonic, teams of industrial engineers formed key personnel in the firm's
'management-led kaizens' in which managers and engineers, rather than operators,
designed and implemented major adjustments to work organization. Conventional
time and motion techniques were applied here. In a recent and typical exercise
examined in some detail by the author, the engineers attacked production line buffers
in one area by reducing non value-added process steps from 66 to 37 operations;
manning levels decreased from 80 to 74 operatives; and 'drumbeat' production
throughput increased from 2.35 units to 2.8 units per man hour.
Such productivity improvements were clearly a function of both improved capital and
labour utilization and labour intensification. And as practical exercises in the
systematic increase in the rate of extraction of surplus value, they will always run
counter to the interests of shop floor operators. However, the fundamental difference
between this industrial engineering process and traditional British practice is that the
former is not subject to trade union control or influence. Not one transplant
sanctioned any trade union input over the setting of standards or work reorganization.
One ex-British Steel shop steward, now employed at Matsushita Electric stated:
They stand over the operative for half an hour, or an hour maybe, timing the job and then they
make a calculation for the whole 8 hours. But it's a different ball game when you're
knackering yourself trying to keep to these standards for 8 hours a day.
I just fmd it all extraordinary here. I mean, it's impractical. You go flat out for one hour, you
can't help it when you're being watched, when there's someone looking at you, right over your
shoulder all the time. And then they expect you to keep this up for 8 hours a day. They're
impossible targets most of them.
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And trade union influence?
At British Steel, when we had the big time and motion studies, the shop stewards always
participated to make sure the whole thing was fair and above board. And the management
would always ask our pennission first! But here the whole thing is indiscriminate. Ask our
permission my arse! The time and motion people just suddenly appear and w&re not even
allowed to watch them. Okay, we might complain about a target here and there but you never
get any where. The company never allows us to see the records and measurements.
The targets established by these studies were rarely employed in conjunction with
individual bonus systems. They were certainly used to establish line performance
targets and to facilitate line balancing. But it was more than this. The untrammelled
process of industrial engineering could sometimes be effectively exploited to assert
management control in both a highly symbolic and absolute fashion. The same
steward again:
But it's strange, weird really. They know full well we can't reach some of these targets. It's
just stupid. They seem to take more satisfaction in the work study findings, in the actual work
measuring than they do in us reaching their impossible targets. They just like the watching.
There's nothing worse than having someone standing over your shoulders all the time knowing
they're watching your every move.
Bell to bell working
I must admit, coming from British Steel I was astounded by it at first. What it boils down to is
that in a Japanese plant your life is controlled by a buzzer.
Few analyses of Japanese working practices dwell to any extent on the simple
discipline of bell to bell working. Yet the manner in which this is imposed on
transplant workforces makes it one of the more obvious manifestations of the
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Japanese obsession with reducing idle time and squeezing out 60 minutes of useful
work from every worker in every hour.
Every one of the firms in the survey practised this down to the letter, using bells or
sirens to announce the beginning and end of each break. Typically, workers were
granted two 10 minute tea breaks and one half hour lunch break each day.
Observations at a number of plants during break periods highlighted exactly how
precious these few minutes were. If the Japanese managements wanted their 60
minutes of work every hour, then similarly, operators were forced to scramble around
to ensure that 10 minutes eating, smoking and resting time could be extracted from
every break. A number of times, at the moment when the break bell rang, affected
groups of operators would immediately drop tools and race each other to the canteen,
as if in a 100 metres Olympic final. This appeared to the observer as a kind of
'McDonaldised' break system (Ritzer 1993) taken to extremes.
Operators who did not report back to their workstations at the end-of-break bell, or
who did not seek permission to visit the toilet during work periods, would be
immediately subject to the disciplinary procedure. But some managers were not even
satisfied with this. At Matsushita Electric, for example, until 1990, two sirens would
be sounded for starting work. The first came 3 minutes early as a warning. Workers
were supposed to return to their workstations in preparation for the second siren. But
more often than not, they would cram a final coffee or cigarette into the last 3 minutes
and race to their workstations 30 seconds before the second siren. But Matsushita
resented this. During the Cardiff plant's 1990 pay negotiations, management refused
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to offer its shop-floor a pay rise unless operators agreed to report to workstations, and
be ready to commence work with tools in hand, immediately upon hearing the first
siren. With bitterness, the workforce was forced to donate to the company 3 minutes
break time, that is, 9 minutes a day, 45 minutes a week, in order to receive a cost of
living wage increase. It is this order of 'attention to detail' which tends to separate the
Japanese from many British manufacturers.
TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
Product and process quality concerns were integral to the manufacturing philosophies
of the different transplants. Many managers stressed that whether or not specific
quality assurance mechanisms and structures were in place, quality was seen as the
hallmark and a central philosophy of the firm. They also believed that the concept of
continuous improvement formed part of everyday thinking in the office and on the
shop floor.
In most factories, this philosophy was embodied in the vast array of quality campaign
banners, slogans, charts and symbols that were encountered wherever one walked on
the shop-floor. The AIWA plant at Newbridge provided a typical example. Shop
floor trade unionists had to endure the presence of a large embroidered banner,
fashioned in trade union style, overhanging the main shop. It was decorated with
symbols such as the Welsh Leek and the Polaris star, which, as a personnel manager
explained, signified that 'the plant is to be the guiding light for all of Al WA's global
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factories. We aim to meet these productivity and quality challenges ad become
Al WA's leading plant'. This corporate ideology supported the compu 1y' s ACE 95
campaign - Al WA's Challenge for Excellence - which, as the workers were
continually reminded through a plethora of posters, banners and briefuiigs, demanded
that they exceed all production targets by 150% and reduce product defects to below
1%.
Different TQM4 mechanisms give practical expression to the concept of continuous
improvement. The extent of their use in the South Wales transplants is summarised in
Tables 2.5 and 2.6. This section will focus upon kaizens and quality circles.
Table 2.5, Use of different Quality improvement practices
QUALITY IMPROVEMENT NUMBER OF FIRMS PERCENTAGE OF






Suggestion Schemes	 3	 20
Table 2.6, Companies usill! kaizens and Quality circles: organized times and participation rates
COMPANY	 KAIZEN/QCs	 KAIZEN/QCs	 PARTICIPATION
HELD IN
	 HELD IN	 RATES
COMPANY TIME WORKERS' TIME











Sekisui	 Yes	 No	 100%
...............................................................................................................................................
Takiron	 Yes	 No	 Majority
Total Quality Management is an idea, indeed, a philosophy, which involves delegating responsibility
for both product and process quality and meeting the customer's needs to the whole workforce.
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The terms kaizen and quality circle were often used interchangeably by the different
management interviewees despite the more precise, separate definitions in the
literature. Kaizen is both a philosophy and a specific concrete practice for involving
workers in quality improvement. As a philosophy, it stresses a new pro-enterprise
attitude which is based on a consensus between managers and workers of general
support for continuous improvement at the workplace and, in particular, for the
development of a consistent process-oriented way of thinking (Imai 1986). In
practical terms, this may mean involving the whole workforce in small group activity
which seeks gradual improvements to the efficient operation of different production
processes. Quality circles also comprise small groups of employees, normally led by a
teamleader or supervisor, who meet voluntarily to improve quality and productivity in
their own area (Oliver and Wilkinson 1992). Therefore, as far as the institutional
mechanisms of continuous improvement are concerned, the kaizen group is little
different from the quality circle.
Kaizens and quality circles are also mechanisms of labour exploitation. Under the
cloak of a benign 'one team' ideology, workers become involved in securing for their
employer higher levels of capital and labour utilisation, reductions in idle time, an
intensification of labour and a more sophisticated form of worker subordination. They
do this by apparently offering to management knowledge of those facets of individual
tacit skills and customary practice which provide workers with the means to exert
some control over the labour process. Therefore, kaizen and quality circles act to
convert rank and file control into management control: 'the company has an
ambiguous, but inescapable, relation to worker know-how; it is at once a threat to the
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company, for it can lead to worker-control-in-work, but when rendered generalisable
through the imperative that everything belongs to the company, it becomes a boost to
the enterprise' (Garrahan and Stewart 1992, p.76).
Although the outcome of such a system might still reproduce a classic separation of
conception and execution of tasks - since 'kaizened' production work remains highly
fragmented and repetitive - the process of worker participation may, nevertheless,
represent a marked shift from Taylorism, since workers themselves are acting as 'little
industrial engineers'. To what extent then, did the workers in the Japanese transplants
in South Wales participate in their own exploitation in post-Taylorist fashion?
As Table 2.5 shows, two thirds of the Japanese firms ran some form of continuous
improvement group although only two of these operated the full structure of local
groups reporting to factory level conventions. Most just met at the shop level,
regularly reporting their deliberations to lower management. However, Table 2.6
indicates a less impressive picture. Participation rates were variable to say the least,
with three of the firms restricting kaizen activity to supervision only. Two firms,
Matsushita Electric and Yuasa Batteries, originally organised plant-wide groups but
these were eventually disbanded due to a lack of interest on the shop-floor. A third,
Electronic Harnesses, put a stop to full participation because of management fears that
employees were straying beyond their remit. One manager stated:
Our Japanese management felt that too much of the group discussion was directed towards
wider issues such as production engineering and working practices, and wider corporate
issues such as pay or management. Insufficient time was spent on quality issues, improving
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product quality, in other words real continuous improvement. The management felt that
these groups should be discussing quality and nothing else.
Moreover, in some firms, particularly the smaller enterprises, the kaizenlQC groups
tended to be informal affairs with little of the organization and accountability
suggested by the literature. Nevertheless, full kaizen activity appeared to be
operational in at least a number of the larger manufacturers. Calsonic, in the auto
sector, was one of the more dynamic of these.
Calsonic operated kaizens at two levels. Management-led kaizens dominated by
senior managers and engineers were responsible for all substantial work
reorganization. An example of this activity was outlined in the 'job design' section
above. At a lower level, the company organised 40 kaizen groups, each comprising
between 4 to 8 members, to discuss small scale continuous improvements.
Significantly, management interviewees reported that this initiative came from a
number of British managers and that the idea of using participative kaizen techniques
in the Llanelli plant was initially met with a lack of interest from the British-based
Japanese managers.
These worker kaizens were controlled by management-appointed facilitators. They
were responsible for monitoring and shaping the 3 key stages of the kaizen process:
brainstorming, data analysis and adoption. Brainstorming is consultancy-speak for
problem identifying which was described as the freewheeling of ideas, 'encouraging
people to come up with ideas from the top of their heads whilst under a state of
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enlightenment'. But for some, this state of enlightenment too often drifted into
disenchantment. As one manager stated:
The operatives have taken to brainstorming of sorts but most kaizens I've attended, and that's
quite a few, have tended to generate into slanging matches which tend to put people under
pressure.
Once ideas were 'thrown up into the air' and recorded, each group went through a
'democratic' voting process to prioritise the most practical suggestions. The groups
met in company time but once suggested improvements were prioritised members
often worked in their own time to collect and analyse data and to formulate
countermeasures to each problem. The maintenance of strict documentary procedures
allowed management to monitor the process at all times. The end results of this
kaizen activity would be presented to senior management and if approved,
implemented and proceduralised.
Does such worker behaviour represent a break from Taylorism? None of the kaizen
groups in any firm in the survey were involved in fundamental aspects of work design.
At Calsonic for example, kaizen produced incremental improvements in matters such
as component rejects and small process hold ups, but this did not represent essential
industrial engineering work. And although Graham (1994) describes a process by
which American operators working in a Japanese auto transplant come to perform
time and motion studies on their fellow workers after being trained in the techniques
of industrial engineering, there was little evidence of such activity in South Wales. In
one instance, where an enterprising worker attempted this at Calsonic, his colleagues
reacted with a predictable sense of shop-floor solidarity. A quality manager:
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Sometimes there's been more opposition from the shop floor. Its still the case that only 40%
participate in the groups but we've also had more specific problems. For example, during one
kaizen exercise an operative got out a stop watch and timed the activities of his colleagues. If an
industrial engineer had done this there would not have been a problem but because he was an
operative it caused an outrage. He was sent to Coventry by the whole of the shop floor and as
far as I'm aware he still is. However, he's a big lad. He can handle it.
Overall then, the evidence from South Wales suggests that this 'partially autonomous
fonn of worker participation' represents less the reversal of the Taylorist emphasis
upon the specialist engineer (Wood 1989) and more, as Wood himself also admits,
strict management supervision of limited worker involvement in perfecting task
routines after which workers are 'returned to Taylorised jobs'. The Japanese
manufacturers in the region sometimes differed in their approach to reaching this
latter objective. The Calsonics, the AT WAs and the Sonys allowed their workforces a
hint of autonomy in the process of proceduralising work routines whilst other firms
would sanction no worker input at all. But in all cases, the outcome was the same:
fragmented tasks, tightly supervised work routines, minimum waste, and maximum
levels of output from a minimum number of low paid workers. Therefore, as
Thompson (1989) observes, such mechanisms of employee participation hardly
constitute meaningful forms of workplace democracy or job enrichment. Neither do
they undermine the processes of direct management control: 'certainly, the delegation
to workgroups of some immediate and localised production decisions, such as those
on the monitoring of product quality, can happily coexist within managerial structures
of directive control' (1989, p.226).
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To conclude this chapter, the survey data demonstrate that a distinctive, post-Taylorist
Japanese work organizational paradigm has not been gradually installed along the
South Wales valleys. Although some plants displayed a number of the salient features
commonly associated with Japanese management practice, not one conformed with
the idealised 'Japanese model' which stresses enriched, multi-skilled labour
processes, self-managing workteams, total flexibility, and opportunities for full
worker participation in job design and process improvement. The survey was not
equally representative of every major sector in which Japanese manufacturing firms
operate. This was due to the clustering effect of electronics plants in this region.
Nevertheless, with four sectors at least partially represented, one would expect to
discern some evidence of an emergent paradigm assuming such an entity existed
outside of academic textbooks.
The Japanese transplants did not display fundamentally different characteristics from
their market competitors because even if their managements were disposed to
experiment with different work organizational forms in unfamiliar environmental
conditions, intense global market pressures do not provide the necessary space for
such innovation. Moreover, the presence of the Japanese in South Wales and
elsewhere in the European Union is primarily a reaction to the rising value of the yen
and EU market protectionism. The logic of their capital accumulation strategies in
these circumstances will always be to efficiently exploit these markets to the full
rather than venture into new 'empowering' labour processes and employment
relations.
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However, this author is not arguing that the predominantly young workers in these
Japanese transplants have the same employment conditions experienced by previous
generations of British manufacturing workers. Some things have changed. In the
economic and political environment of footloose capital, mass unemployment,
weakened trade unions and a pusillanimous left politics, many Japanese inward
investors have succeeded in exploiting their greenfield sites by eliminating traditional
rank and file controls over the labour process. Thus, as Tomaney (1990) has argued,
these firms have merely extended and redeveloped existing forms of labour control
and efficiency maximisation. And although these changes might constitute 'rather
more mundane management priorities than is generally applied by references to
Japanization' (Elger and Smith 1994b, pA .8), as we shall discover in Part Two of this
thesis, the workers on the receiving end of this less fundamental 'management of
change' might nevertheless be forgiven for viewing such developments with some
trepidation.
This is what unites Japanese manufacturing practice in South Wales. Despite the
complexity and variance in work organization resulting from the different sectoral
contingencies and traditions, the Japanese transplants, as employers of shop floor
operators above all else, are collectively driven by an ethos of 'management by detail';
that is, of little details such as labour utilisation, labour discipline, labour control,
labour cost and so on. These employers have acted to extend the leverage they
maintain over worker effort by the tight coordination and control of fragmented
assembly tasks; by running more highly stressed lean production control systems; by
eradicating union controlled job demarcations; by refusing to countenance union
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influence over job design and work rates; and by exploiting sophisticated direct
control systems which act to enhance operator performance in terms of output, quality
and attendance.
The next chapter considers the extent to which these highly disciplined production
regimes are supported both by ideological measures seeking worker cooperation and
commitment and by systems of non-adversarial industrial relations.
86
CHAPTER THREE
JAPANESE HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
IN SOUTH WALES
This chapter explores the demands which Japanese lean production places on the
management-labour relationship. It considers the extent to which distinctive human
resource management policies provide a supportive framework for sustaining the
intense exploitation of those who labour under Japanese transplant regimes in South
Wales. In this context, the term 'human resource management' (HRM) is preferred to
traditional 'personnel policy' because it denotes 'not just a capacity to think
strategically but some distinctive view of the strategic direction that should be pursued
(Guest 1991, p.42).
Managerialist writers and organization theorists tend to present this strategic direction
in terms of an explicit articulation between Japanese JIT/TQM ideal types and HRM
policy. For example, Oliver and Wilkinson argue that the fragility and high
dependency relations characteristic of lean production systems 'demand a workforce
that is dependable, hard working, flexible and unlikely to disrupt production' (1992,
p.331). And the point is often made that Japanese management cannot be understood
without considering 'hard' systems of production control together with 'soft' systems
of employee motivation and management leadership. As Trevor has put it, 'those who
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look only at either the 'hard' or the 'soft' are missing the point. 'Hard' and 'soft' are
not opposites but the two sides of the same picture; and they both serve the same
company ends' (1988, p.l't3).
However, there are three problems with these functionalist arguments. The first, as
outlined in the previous chapter, is that the notion of a paradigmatic 'empowering'
Japanese production system, which the new HRM policies are supposed to
complement, does not correspond with the more varied, contingent, but essentially
Tayloristic, work organizational forms found in South Wales. The second is the
assumption that 'soft' personnel management is not only the clever solution, but the
only solution, to the labour problems thrown up by 'hard' production management.
No consideration is given to the possibility that in an environment of mass
unemployment and weak trade unionism, 'hard' personnel management can be both
cheaper and more effective. Thirdly, these new management systems are often treated
as if they operate in a political vacuum, as if all management priorities and values are
uniform, and more fundamentally, as if workers are mere objects, units of labour, with
no capacity to resist management strategy.
In attempting to explore these questions further, this chapter provides a critical
overview of Japanese HRM policy in South Wales. It investigates the various
management practices which seek to secure worker compliance with the dictates of
lean production and the extent to which these provide a 'fit' with the transplants'
labour control strategies. It also considers their relationship with such broader factors
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as local labour market and industrial relations traditions, and how the firms endeavour
to exploit the latter to advance the accumulation of capital.
RECRUITMENT, SELECTION AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
POLICIES
The use of more rigorous and systematic recruitment, selection and performance
evaluation procedures appears to be a growing phenomenon in the UK, especially for
certain sections of the workforce, such as shop-floor workers, for whom this has not
previously been the case (Townley 1991). This development is often assumed to be a
corollary of management's need to develop sophisticated monitoring procedures in the
context of more flexible and autonomous work groups. However, although this may
be partially true of the IBMs of this world, and other such companies with distinctive
corporate cultures, for many others changes in recruitment policy should be viewed in
relation to the mass unemployment of the 1980s and 90s. In this environment,
management's demand for prime candidates from mass applications, and its interest in
employing shopfloor workforces of sufficient quality to withstand the pressures and
disciplines of intensified production systems, become entirely logical. It should also
come as no surprise that Japanese firms in the UK have become adept at exploiting
different types of recruitment and appraisal practices, each tailored to the needs of
individual firms, but displaying uniformity in their aims of securing labour
compliance, discipline and at least formal flexibility.
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The Japanese transplants in South Wales are no different. Although no obvious
association between particular recruitment policies and firm sector or plant size could
be discerned, the various practices followed stood in clear contrast to the more casual
hire and fire systems characteristic of many British firms in Wales (Morgan and Sayer
1988). The Japanese managements systematically assessed worker attitudes and
performance either during protracted selection interviews or by subsequent careful
surveillance of probationary and temporary labour. Similarly, once recruited into the
permanent workiorce, many employees in these plants were subjected to systematic
supervisory evaluation of their shop-floor conduct.
Selection practices
Calsonic's procedures exemplified one of the more thorough multi-stage screening
processes investigated. Decent jobs are both scarce and precious in the area
surrounding the plant's Lianelli location. Consequently, as one manager bluntly put it,
'any one vacancy receives mountains of application forms which are then vetted to
filter out the rubbish'. Selected interviewees must then overcome a daunting series of
obstacles in their attempts to secure paid employment. Preliminary interviews
assessed basic character and aptitude; more strenuous ASE-NFER Nelson tests
measured numerical, verbal, non-verbal and spatial abilities; extensive interviews
with functional and line management judged character and conduct against key
selection criteria; and following this, candidates often endured yet another aptitude
test. This brownfield auto sector company was leaving nothing to chance in its
attempts to reshape and control its shopfloor culture. Indeed, at the time of the survey,
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the company was on the verge of introducing a further hurdle in the form of a 16 point
personality test.
The selection process for the line feeders at Matsushita Electronic Magnetrons was
equally measured and protracted. In addition to a similar series of interviews and both
manual and aptitude tests, applicants are enticed into revealing their true selves during
informal walkabouts around the factory. Here, supervisors engaged them in apparent
'friendly chat' whilst noting their attitudes to work, commitment, flexibility and so on.
As one manager put it:
What we are looking for here is the whole person, correct attitudes, people who will fit into
our team ethos. And crucially they must be reliable people, reliable characters, the types you
would expect to have a good absenteeism record.
Not all of the firms utilised these relatively sophisticated techniques, however. Many
relied upon more rudimentary recruitment procedures. Nevertheless, by exploiting
both probationary systems and temporary labour they were able to reach the same
objective of securing recruits with acceptable work attitudes and adequate
performance and attendance records. For example, applicants for line operator jobs at
Matsushita Electric in Cardiff undergo just a brief interview and two basic aptitude
tests. The first of these was a simple colour recognition test. The second crudely
assessed manual dexterity. Applicants were given 20 metal washers and observed and
timed whilst they rapidly placed these over a matrix of pins protruding from a wooden
board. It was by monitoring probationary labour - and more recently temporary labour
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- that the Matsushita management were able to assess character and performance in a
more measured way. One personnel manager said:
To give you an idea of the selection process, we handled the last 100 applicants for the latest
batch of temporary vacancies in one Friday afternoon. It's when we've got them as temps that
we monitor their performance. That's basically, timekeeping, attitudes and work standards.
Good performers are kept on, the rest are discharged.
The traditionally intimate nature of the Welsh valley communities, and the ways in
which this sometimes placed character development under overt scrutiny, allowed
some managers to put more informal procedures into play. At the Sekisui plant near
Merthyr, for example, no formal recruitment policies existed. Instead, these matters
came under the sole control of the plant's paternalistic deputy managing director who
made his selection decisions purely on the basis of his first hand knowledge of local
people:
For most of the jobs we have on offer I only recruit individuals from the local community here
and I only recruit people who I myself know [said with a wry smile]. I'm not embarrassed
about this, it merely reflects the close-knit nature of out local Welsh communities. And what's
more, I'll only recruit blokes with a good steady attitude. I will not take on militants and
extremists. I'm only interested in good family men, men like carpenters and builders.
The selection criteria employed by these firms are shown in Table 3.1. These criteria
do place as much emphasis upon behavioural characteristics as technical skills; but
they were not used in the 'soft HRM' sense as part of a subtle monitoring process of
autonomous work groups (Townley 1991). Instead, attributes such as positive
attitudes to flexibility, work commitment and above all, timekeeping, were integral to
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the Japanese managements' demand for raw recruits who might more easily adapt to
the stress and disciplines of intensified production.
Table 3.1, Selection criteria
SELECTION CRITERIA 	 NUMBER OF	 PERCENTAGE




Attitude..to flexibility and teamethos
	 .. . S73
p jiours.7	 . .4?................
Absenteeism ...............................................................4 	 ..
General work attitude and commitment 	 10	 66
Education	 2	 13
Domestic background	 4	 26
Despite some firms' application of a plethora of aptitude tests described above, few
sought new recruits with specific manual skills. This was clearly a function of the low
skill nature of the labour process. Male workers employed as machine minders might
be asked how they would go about changing the oil in their car, whether they liked
tinkering about with machines, or whether they possessed any DIY skills, but that was
the limit to the technical proficiency required. Young women with experience of
rapid light assembly work in the clothing industry might be preferred for recruitment
on to the electronic production lines.
One third of the firms surveyed cited youth as an important criterion'. This was
particularly apparent in the larger firms operating in electronics and auto component
production where, traditionally, trade unions have been well organised and
On the basis of pure observation, this youth criterion appeared to be under-reported. Many of the
factories visited employed large numbers of young workers, most in their late teens and early 20s,
which suggests informal if not formal age discrimination practices.
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independent. For these firms, the recruitment of young workers constituted an
important prerequisite of a workforce socialisation process aimed at securing
compliance and even the acceptance of managerial prerogatives. This was a prime
objective at the brownfield Calsonic plant, for example, where the majority of
operators were aged over 40. Here, the plant management engaged itself in explicit
attempts to undermine collectivist attitudes and workers' rights by, as one manager
said, seeking 'flexible, committed workers who are prepared to work long hours and
accept new ideas'. As the first stage towards achieving this, the company now
operates an age bar restricting shop-floor recruitment to those aged under 25.
However, these profoundly ageist policies were not always congruent with the
Japanese obsession with maintaining a highly disciplined and committed workforce.
As Morris et al. (1994) discovered, the earlier Japanese investors in Wales
encountered significant labour retention and utilisation problems arising from their
mass recruitment of undisciplined young school leavers. It is for this reason that many
Japanese managements in South Wales now prefer to recruit younger workers who
also display some evidence of responsibility and discipline. Thus, many managers
emphasised their preference for married men aged between 20 and 30 whilst stability
in previous employment was a key criterion for young women.
Life on the shop-floor in these Japanese plants is harsh, regimented and stressful.
Continuous, lean production means what it implies. But if it is not to be subject to
continuous disruption, this form of production also demands a good degree of labour
retention. Therefore, questions of labour turnover and absenteeism became paramount
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concerns for production management and explained why the demand for workers with
acceptable timekeeping, attendance and work attitudes featured so strongly in the
selection criteria. Indeed, many of the management interviewees reported regular
recourse to formal disciplinary procedures to ensure that these attributes are
maintained. But in most companies, exploitation of temporary and probationary
labour served as the most effective filtering mechanism. New recruits who found it
difficult to accept the disciplines of attendance were abruptly shown the door if they
had not already voted with their feet. As a manager at Electronic Harnesses admitted:
The company is willing to be patient and wait for certain improvements in operatives who may
be lacking in skill but we're a lot firmer with anyone who dislikes the company culture and the
way we're used to doing things. I've got to admit, we do have some problems here. The
Japanese managers run this factory as a highly disciplined regime. They frown upon
operatives talking to each other too much, they greatly discourage people taking time off the
section, operatives always have to seek permission to go to the toilet, for example. As a result,
the shop-floor often get annoyed and irritated, they get fed up with being treated like children.
A lot of the new women just can't handle it. Many of them leave during the probationary
period.
Equal opportunity policies
As notions of 'empowerment' and 'egalitarianism' are salient features of Japanese
employment ideology, one might be forgiven for assuming that Japanese firms take
leading positions in supporting equal opportunity policies aimed at eliminating
various forms of workplace discrimination. The reality in South Wales was somewhat
different, however. Of the 15 firms which participated in the survey, only 5 managed
to produce a simple equal opportunities statement. More pertinently, none of these
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finns developed working procedures aimed at implementing the principles outlined in
their statements.
Not one of the management interviewees regarded equal opportunities as a particularly
important issue and few understood the term as one which addressed structural forms
of discrimination. In most cases, the question was met with a blank face, followed by
silence. One manager typically remarked that, 'equal opportunities should be a natural
practice rather than something which is formalised, not something run by procedures
which you are forced to think about'.
As far as both labour market and job segregation by sex are concerned, Japanese
employment policies in South Wales clearly replicate and reinforce existing
employment traditions in the region's manufacturing industry. Male workers tended
to concentrate in the engineering sectors, involving mechanical work and process
machinery. Women predominated in the electronics assembly plants. Similarly, as
the previous chapter outlined, a clear intra-plant segregation between male 'machine
operators' working on automated equipment and female manual assemblers obtained.
Furthermore, female operators tended to be trapped in the lowest shop-floor grades,
earning around £140 per week. Few were able to break out into supervisory, let alone
management positions. For example, at AIWA, where women constitute 66% of the
shop-floor workforce, just 3 women reached the supervisory grade. None had
achieved management status. At most plants, managers attributed this to a lack of
assertiveness and disinterest in career making. One typically commented:
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I don't believe that many women want to get on in manufacturing industry. We get little
enthusiasm from the girls when we do our career tours at the local schools. ..and the many
women we do employ don't want to get above the level of supervision anyway. They don't
want more than this because of their responsibilities at home with the housework.
However, in her analysis of the experiences of women workers in Japanese electronic
plants in Wales and Ireland, Saso (1990) found that in fact, many women operators
seemed to have a more positive attitude towards work than many of their male
colleagues. She attributes these gender inequalities to a combination of factors: the
high turnover rate of young women due primarily to childbirth and the lack of creche
facilities; the sexist assumptions of Japanese transplant managers (she might have
included the British as well); and the extra long hours of work expected of
supervisory staff.
Nevertheless, these gender inequalities are as much a product of capitalist social
relations and the Japanese firms' specific accumulation strategies as of patriarchal
relations. For instance, the electronic plant managements were keen to maintain the
recent convention of exploiting an endless supply of young, malleable female labour
from the depressed valleys rather than experiment with the employment of redundant
miners, whose record of militancy and solidarity during the major coal disputes of the
1970s and 80s was second to none. And, of course, economic conditions in these
areas ensures that labour remains particularly cheap. As one union official
commented:
The Japanese employers in this region will always set their pay rates in accordance with the
general rate at that particular moment for that particular area and industry. The rate which is
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being paid will be the rate that the Japanese company has researched. And in truth, these
companies, despite the low wages, are able to attract labour. I mean, the pay is pretty near the
bone. It comes close to what we're arguing for a minimum wage. But employers are saying to
us that if they increase the wage rate then we'll lose jobs. So in a sense, we're stuck in a
square pegged hole. We're caged in by unemployment. We've got no opportunity for arguing
and campaigning on pay. We can't say that there's a firm down the road that can pay more
because there just isn't one. They're all paying low wages.
Therefore, the logics of capital accumulation and patriarchal relations together
sustained the exploitation of large pools of low-wage female labour in those sectors
and occupations that are designated as a woman's domain of employment.
Consequently, most of the electronics firms in South Wales were quite content to
continue replacing departing mothers with younger girls from their captive labour
markets. Indeed, even Matsushita Electric's Cardiff plant preferred to bus many of its
female workers in from the valleys rather than recruit from immediately outside the
factory gates in the city's more temperamental labour markets. That is, with the
exception of one group. The company did venture into Cardiff's ethnic minority
communities to exploit these similarly segmented inner city labour markets. The plant
was the only one in the survey to employ a number of black workers (68 operators,
around 5% of the shop-floor workforce). Needless to say, not one of these occupied
any supervisory or management positions.
Finally, few, if any, of these Japanese firms paid any attention to the employment
rights of the disabled. When questions of continuous production, line discipline, bell
to bell working and absenteeism are paramount, disability rights just do not come into
the equation. And as with so much equal opportunity policy elsewhere, companies
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were more concerned with image than substance. For example, the Gooding Sanken
management at Abercynon were particularly keen to show off the plant's facilities for
the disabled such as special toilets and ramp entrances to all buildings. Only one thing
spoiled this set up. The plant employed not one disabled worker.
Performance Evaluation
Like the new recruitment procedures, the increasing use of performance appraisal
systems in British industry is often connected to employers' quests for more
sophisticated forms of developmental control over the 'flexible and autonomous'
workforces of the 1990s (Long 1986; Townley 1991). Whilst this may ring true for
certain industries and occupations, such a strategy might appear puzzling in relation to
the minimal levels of skill, autonomy and discretion characteristic of the Japanese
labour process in South Wales. In fact, the survey established that although personal
appraisal schemes are quite common within Japanese firms in South Wales, these are
used principally for assessing operator performance in terms of narrow, productionist
criteria. They are rarely employed in any 'empowering' sense of developing skills in
self-management, individual initiative and responsibility.
Of the 15 firms surveyed, 11 employed performance evaluation schemes. Of these, 8
firms applied their schemes to the whole workforce2 . Although typical assessment
2 Three firms restricted their evaluation schemes to certain sections of the workforce - in one case,
management and supervision only; in another, all employees except management and supervision; and
in the the third, probationers only. Of the four firms not employing evaluation schemes, one,
Matsushita Electric, recently abandoned their twice yearly evaluations as part of a cost cutting exercise,
whilst another, Calsonic, faced trade union opposition to their implementation.
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criteria did encompass such behavioural characteristics as cooperative attitudes and
initiative, individual contributions to output quantity and quality received precedence.
This clearly reflects the Japanese obsession with maximising productive efficiency but
it also highlights the extent to which the elimination of worker autonomy forms part
and parcel of the same process. At Electronic Harnesses for example, where
evaluation procedures formally afforded performance criteria three times the weight of
social skills, one manager admitted that 'on the shop-floor, initiative is such a difficult
quality to possess because, to tell you the truth, the factory tends to be so regimented'.
Linking evaluation results to the wage enhances the process of securing worker
accountability for performance. Although the relationship between the two was not as
significant as that achieved by the sate! system in Japan (Endo 1994), two thirds of the
firms operating evaluation schemes in South Wales used these to determine the
payment of individual merit increments over and above operators' basic pay rises.
Significantly, two of the larger firms, Sony and Hitachi, used their schemes in
conjunction with performance related pay systems so that the employee's performance
determined the entire annual wage increase. This represents a significant departure
from traditional practice within British manufacturing firms where shop-floor wage
systems are characterised by open, union negotiated rates for each grade. Effectively,
Japanese production supervision succeeded in encroaching into shop-floor wage
determining territory, which, in most indigenous manufacturing firms, is normally
occupied solely by shop stewards and plant management.
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When used in conjunction with the regulation of the reward structure, performance
evaluation schemes constitute blatant mechanisms of management control. However,
more subtle control methods may also come into play here. For example, much
Foucault-inspired analysis views the supervisor-worker interaction and discourse,
which is central to the evaluation process, as a clear managerial attempt to secure a
more individualistic, obedient and self-disciplining workforce. Indeed, in contrast
with the essentially unidirectional nature of the formal communications processes
outlined below, many of the managers interviewed stressed the importance of their
attempts to get employees to express themselves on questions of performance, 'to
think hard about the positive and negative aspects of their performance with the
company', and to reflect on how that performance might be improved.
However, the different Japanese managements were faced with a complication. For
this control strategy to be effective the process demands a certain depth of discourse
and two way discourse at that. It therefore requires an accommodating workforce. In
fact, a good number of the managers spoke of their concern about worker reticence
and apathy. Matsushita Electric recently abandoned its evaluation scheme for this
reason. The different union interviewees felt that most members prefer to opt out of
the pitfalls of one to one dialogue with supervisors by placing matters of individual
performance and discipline strictly within the confines of formal disciplinary and
grievance procedures. This passes the 'discourse problem' over to union
representatives. One union officer admitted that with the Japanese:
We're having to deal with individual disciplinary problems more than we've ever experienced
elsewhere. Its a never ending saga in these firms. The stewards and the full time officials are
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continually dragged into it. They're mainly about absenteeism problems, or even workers
missing off the line. Disappearing to have a quick fag is quite a common one because if the
member gets caught we find that the Japanese managements always invoke the procedure. The
Japanese are always trying to catch them out practising these old habits.
JOB SECURITY POLICIES
Despite their reported misgivings about certain aspects of Japanese work practices,
many workers in Western industrial countries, subject to continual job insecurity
themselves, might welcome the introduction of Japanese-style lifetime employment
policies. However, as a number of analyses of Japanese employment traditions have
demonstrated, the segmented hierarchy of the Japanese labour force, built upon a mass
of sub-contractors and temporary workers at its base, has ensured that job security and
welfare for the few are secured at the expense of low wages and insecurity for the
many (Kumazawa and Yamada 1988; Littler 1982; Mitsui 1987). Studies of Japanese
employment practices in the UK have found little evidence of any attempts to transfer
these structural arrangements into this country. Nevertheless, many Japanese firms do
attempt to display a measure of long term commitment to their workforces even
though job security is rarely drafted explicitly into the labour contract (Oliver and
Wilkinson 1992; Pang and Oliver 1988).
The Japanese transplants in South Wales followed this same trend. Although only one
operated a formal no redundancy policy, three quarters of the firms claimed to support
a general job security philosophy. This was something which many managers were
102
keen to contrast with the customary, stop/go, hire and fire habits experienced in many
British firms. And whilst, as might be expected, these firms' employment policies
articulated with British labour market realities rather than the traditions of their parent
companies in Japan, their impact upon the quality of the lives of their employees did
display some transnational similarities. That is, principally in terms ofjob insecurity
for temporary staff and long working hours for core staff.
Table 3.2 summarises the employment policies of the eleven firms which reported the
use of some form ofjob security measure. Apart from routine labour redeployment,
the three principal measures adopted were recruiting temporary labour; contractual
overtime; and annualised hours.
Table 3.2, Em ployment flexibility practices
COMPANY	 EMPLOYMENT FLEXIBILITY MEASURES
Calsonic	 Temporary workers (14% of directs); contractual
......9yçm.!1rredeploym.ent.
AIWA	 Temporary workers and extended probation (30%
of directs); contractual overtime.
Matsushita Electric	 Temporary workers (16% of directs); contractual
overtime; annualised hours.




Extended probation; contractual overtime; unpaid
periods...............................................................................
Electronic Harnesses	 Temporary workers (23% of directs); contractual
overtime.
Yuasa Batteries	 . Contractual overtime; labour redeployment.
Matsushita E.C.
	 . Temporary workers (8% of directs); contractual
overtime.
Matsushita E.M..	 Temporary workers (21% of directs); annualised
hours scheme.
Sekisui	 Labour redeployment.
Dynic	 Temporary workers (20% of directs); reduced
_________________________ working week arrangements.
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The employment of temporary labour featured strongly. As previously observed, the
careful monitoring of production line temporary workers serves as an effective staff
selection mechanism. In addition, of course, this type of employment contract allows
companies to swiftly lay off or top up sections of the workforce, in accordance with
product market fluctuations.
In some firms, this employment flexibility was achieved under the cloak of the
ostensibly inoffensive probationary system, which, conventionally, is supposed to
filter out incompetent recruits. At AIWA, for example, many of the plant's 300
temporary workers were classed as probationers. The least that can be said of the
fixed term labour contract is that its length has a measure of certainty attached to it. In
contrast, the tenure of employment for probationers can be cut or extended at the
whim of management and the market. As one manager admitted:
It can be increased to 6 months, 9 months, 12 months, sometimes 18 months. It will
partially depend on the state of the market. Temporary status may lengthen if the market is
uncertain but it may also lengthen if we're not quite satisfied with the quality of the
individual that we've taken on...and eventually if we're just not satisfied then I'm afraid we
get rid of them.
In Japan, manufacturing companies habitually extend working hours in order to
enhance flexibility in production, effectively substituting human buffers for the
material reductions introduced by just-in-time production (Endo 1991). In similar
fashion, nearly half of the Japanese firms in South Wales reported the use of
contractual overtime as an explicit component of their lean manning policies. At
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Electronic Harnesses, for example, overtime working clearly facilitated management
attempts to negotiate fluctuating product demand with a relatively small core
workforce. The personnel manager:
The size of the workforce is such that we work to the bone, there is never any surplus. The
downside to this is that when the company gets busy then overtime has to come into
operation and the company does have high overtime expectations. We insist that all
operatives work a reasonable amount of overtime as part of their labour contract.
A key question here concerns the definition of a 'reasonable amount'. At many
companies, a 'reasonable amount' corresponded to a considerable amount. At Yuasa
Batteries for instance, overtime accounted for 15% of payroll costs. Similarly, at
Calsonic, a demand that operators work at least 2 hours extra mid-week and 5 or 6
hours on a Saturday constituted a key recruitment selection criterion. And these were
minimum amounts. The Calsonic management admitted that some operators in the
plant's labour intensive manufacturing areas consistently work a 70 hour week.
This picture suggests that 'policy overtime' under lean production regimes has taken
on a new dimension. Nichols (1986) observes that many analyses of the decline of
British manufacturing industry have placed the blame fairly and squarely at the door
of trade unions and 'restrictive practices' such as both union regulation of working
hours and shop stewards' attempts to ensure an equitable distribution of paid overtime
amongst their members. However, whilst the Japanese in South Wales are quite
happy to exploit the tendency of British workers to clock up longer hours than their
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counterparts elsewhere in the European Union 3 , they have refused to countenance any
measure of union regulation of this, whether in the form of shorter working week
agreements or overtime distribution practices such as 'one in all in' and the use of
rotas. Therefore, what is distinctive here is not so much the explicit use of overtime to
secure consistently low manning levels against fluctuating product demand but the
ease with which this is now achieved within a non-regulatory framework. Put another
way, the relatively untrammelled extraction of absolute surplus value from
overworked though 'secure' core workforces has become the salient feature of
Japanese 'policy overtime'.
Ostensibly, flexible working arrangements in the form of annualised hours systems
seem a more innocuous form of the management of working time. They are currently
applied to around 9% of the UK workforce (Taylor 1994). Reshuffling the
distribution of total working hours over a one year period provides employers with
greater flexibility in matching workers' hours to market demands; in addition, it cuts
labour costs by eliminating payments for overtime and reducing absenteeism.
Accordingly, four of the Japanese firms exploited some form of flexible hours
arrangement, and of these, two used standard arinualised hours schemes. Whilst the
flexibility which accrues to employers may also be sold to workers in terms of
'personal control over time management', those on the receiving end of these policies
may not necessarily perceive them in such a positive fashion. When, in 1992,
Although between 1983 and 1992 average hours worked each week in European Union countries
declined by 4%, in the UK the fall was the lowest at 1%. Moreover, nearly half of the 7 million male
workers in the EU countries who work a 48 hour week are employed in the UK (LRD, Fact Service,
September 1994).
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Matsushita Electric in Cardiff attempted to introduce annualised hours, its workiorce
embarked upon a campaign of resistance focusing on both the unceitainty in working
hours involved and the principle of working unpaid overtime. Eventually, in the
depths of a recession, the company secured compliance by intimidation: it threatened
to sack any employee who failed to sign the new labour contract.
What these examples demonstrate is that 'job security' for those who labour under
different Japanese regimes in South Wales comes at a hefty price. The downsizing of
lean production depends on a core workforce which is subject to both long working
hours and the continual stress of intensive work methods. And it may also depend on
the employment of temporary workers who enjoy no job security or employment
rights but who still suffer the same intensified exploitation at the point of production.
EMPLOYEE COMMUNICATIONS AND SINGLE STATUS
Different management techniques aimed at consolidating the new balance of power at
the workplace have accompanied the recent decline of trade union influence in the
UK. New methods of direct communications, which seek to bypass trade unions as
the principal channel of information to workers, represent one example of these.
Another is the development of single status and harmonisation measures designed to
obscure fundamental class divisions and interests. Both techniques are commonly
associated with Japanese management practice.
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Small group-based communications, in the form of team briefings, constitute one of
the more common mechanisms of direct communications between managers and
workers. A number of recent surveys clearly indicate that team briefings are now
routine practice in British manufacturing industry (IDS 1992a; Marchington et al.
1992; and Millward 1994). Moreover, one author, on the basis of the latest
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey findings, has gone on to boldly assert that
whilst worker involvement via trade unions has declined, the new team briefings can
be viewed as 'the channel that increased in extent to the greatest degree (and) was the
one with the greatest potential for employees to play an active part (in their
companies)' (Miliward, 1994, p.86).
Surveys of Japanese firms in the UK have demonstrated that communications
structures such as team briefings are both common and well established. The
Japanese firms operating in South Wales proved to be no exception here with all but
one reporting the use of team briefings, the majority on a daily basis. A much smaller
proportion of these firms also organised factory conventions for the whole workforce.
According to management theory, the function of a team briefmg is to promote
employee involvement and team building by encouraging two way communications as
well as to impart management-approved information to subordinates (IDS 1 992a).
However, the picture to emerge from the survey is that rather than exhibit potential for
Miliward's (1994) notion of worker involvement, Japanese team briefings bear a clear
democratic deficit. Direct communications tended to be strictly top down processes,
focusing purely on narrow productionist issues rather than wider factory politics.
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Firm after firm in the survey stressed that the real purpose of the Japanese team
briefing system is merely to provide succinct briefs to production teams in order to
explain the day's production targets; to establish labour deployment to meet those
targets; and to address production and quality defects and any individual operator
performance problems. The following summary from an AIWA manager was typical:
Our line briefmgs are held at the start of each shift, they're led by the line supervisors and
last about 5 minutes. They will discuss the day's targets and of course questions of quality
and defects will also be dealt with, including who on the line has been responsible for any
quality problems. And if people need a telling off it's at these meetings that they'll get it.
A number of managers expressed concern at the lack of employee feedback during
these sessions, although this reticence was hardly surprising considering the
limitations of the briefing agendas. A GMB union official reflected on this:
Yes, I've seen these team briefings in operation. But I've never felt that they've been of real
value. The Japanese managers might think they are, but really, as they themselves will admit,
they're only used to help the workforce make sure that their 50 units of production go out the
door each day. Team briefings are used as a pep talk to make sure that production targets are
met. I certainly don't see them harming us. If that were true, then surely it should indicate that
the whole aspect of company policy and company news rather than these narrow production
specifics were on the team briefing agendas. But they're not. So I'm not worried about it
cutting across the information coming from the GMB because team briefings were never
designed to do that.
As we shall see in Chapter Eight, this view of the impact of team briefings on trade
union communications maybe somewhat overconfident but it does highlight the real
link between Japanese 'employee involvement' and the needs of production. Stressed
lean production systems have no requirement for experiments in worker self-
management and participation. They demand highly disciplined workers with minds
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focused solely on the day's production targets. Thus, as Morris et a!. have argued,
Japanese direct communication methods provide a further means of maintaining firm
discipline on the line, constituting another sense in which 'Japanese transplant
management might be considered 'strict' or 'autocratic" (1994, p.92).
Many Japanese firms incorporate single status conditions into their employment
contracts with the purpose of diminishing 'them and us' attitudes and class
antagonisms. This is not done for its own sake. Worker acceptance of single status
and the associated notion of membership of 'one big, happy and equal family' offers
employers clear advantages in terms of management surveillance of the shop-floor and
reducing resistance to work intensification. For these reasons, nearly all of the firms
in South Wales supported some form of harmonisation, although, as Table 3.3
suggests, for many firms the principle had less impact upon those more fundamental
conditions of work which attract major personnel costs or which impact upon
management control.
Table 3.3, SinIe status conditions














* 2 firms reported no pension scheme provision for any employees.
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The more cosmetic manifestations of equality, such as single canteens or the wearing
of uniforms, were indeed common; but unequal sick pay provision and other more
traditional distinctions between shop-floor workers and staff/management remained
intact. When these impacted directly on those concerns which are central to the
management of lean production, such as absenteeism, then the distinctions could be
extreme. For example, many of the companies paid full sick pay to their management
and salaried staff whilst their hourly paid suffered the hardship of SSP. And
ironically, this was excused by resort to the very status-based arguments that the
Japanese are supposed to be abandoning. As one manager said:
You have to remember that managers have a higher standard of living, they couldn't
survive, they couldn't pay their mortgages if they had to rely solely on the SSP scheme.
Okay, we apply it to everyone else but SSP is just totally inappropriate for managers.
Equality of status between managers, staff and workers, therefore, had little real
material basis in these firms. However, this did not inhibit their mobilisation of
egalitarian corporate ideologies. Many managers were keen to stress the importance
which their Japanese employers placed on the idea of regarding the company as 'one
team', comprising managers and employees willingly working together with unity of
purpose. A director at Gooding Sanken provided a typical example of this:
Our Japanese managers talk constantly of teams and team philosophy and all in terms of
the family, regarding Gooding Sanken as a family. There is a continual stress on the idea
that GSK employees should be pulling together as one team. Our idea of teamworking is
that everybody in the firm is a member of the same family and that there should be no
distinctions between individuals within this family.
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The Japanese managing director of this company produced a list of the key
management philosophies and slogans to be instilled into the British managers at his
Welsh transplant. These were printed in all management handbooks. He spelt out his
'corporate team philosophy' in the following idiosyncratic way:
OBJECTIVE 8
Two Families
Working place is another family.
Create sharing happiness and bitterness in family (workplace).
Have an attraction to be able to motivate and improve moral of family (work).
This was a company where members of the same 'family' could be disciplined for
talking to each other on the line and where most production operators earned just £140
per week. 'Happiness' and 'sharing' were therefore in short supply. The same
ideologies could also be enlisted to support the needs of production at particular times
of the year. At AIWA for example, habitual last minute management requests for
overtime during busy production periods often caused anger and resentment amongst
the predominantly female workforce. Apart from problems of fatigue, many women
with children encountered difficulties in arranging childcare at short notice. In order
to reduce this opposition, the AIWA senior management frequently instructed
managers and staff to themselves man the line and 'dirty their hands' in a symbolic
gesture of 'solidarity' with the women. Similarly, other staff workers were forced to
work on in their offices, unpaid, until the production line targets were achieved.
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In different ways, therefore, single status and direct communications often served on
the one hand to obscure real class inequalities and power imbalances at the workplace,
whilst on the other, to maintain management's leverage over worker effort.
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
The 'new realism' in the field of contemporary industrial relations, characterised by
the emergence of harmonious working relationships between compliant trade unions
and company managements (Bassett 1987), is often regarded as an essential support
for the highly stressed, low waste JIT/TQM production systems. This is because a
more adversarial form of industrial relations will inevitably cause periodic and severe
disruption to factory output (Milsome 1993; Morris et al. 1994; Oliver and Wilkinson
1992). This section considers the extent to which the Japanese transplants have
succeeded in maintaining the sanctity of continuous production on their assembly
lines by fashioning a new consensual relationship with their recognised trade unions.
Or, what Millward (1994) has defined as the construction of the Japanese pattern of a
'new industrial relations'.
Table 3.4 sunimarises the union recognition agreements and bargaining structures
within the 15 Japanese firms.
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Table 3.4. Reco2nised trade unions and negotiating arran2ements
COMPANY	 SINGLE OR UNIONS MEMBER- COMPANY 	 UNION
	




Calsonic	 Multi-union,	 TGWU,	 Manual and	 No	 Yes








Matsushita Electric	 Single	 GMB/APEX Manual and 	 Yes	 Yes
non-manual
	...................
Single 	 .AEEu	 ..4anua..... .Ye.
	...................




Single 	 . iwu	 ......... .Manu ..... . e.






Single 	 .AEEU	 ..Man... . xs 	 .......................................
	
...................
Single 	 ...... .Man....... .Ye.
ic	 ..None	 .Non.. .NO11 	None	 ..None
	...................
Single 	 .GM.. .Man... . yes	 ..e.
p....................................................................................................................................................... e.
Star Micronics	 Single	 GMB	 Manual	 No	 Yes
In a region notable for its union traditions, where, 'belonging to a union is as natural
as breathing' (Morgan and Sayer 1988, p.180), and given the tendency of some UK-
based Japanese inward investors to tolerate some form of union organization, it is not
surprising that 14 out of the 15 firms surveyed recognised trade unions 4 . Moreover,
in line with other surveys of Japanese HRM policies, nearly all of these firms operated
single union agreements. The brownfield Calsonic plant provided the one exception,
though even here the management persuaded the four site unions to merge into a
single bargaining unit.
' It should be noted that this propensity to recognise trade unions extended primarily to manual
workers. Only 2 of the 15 firms included white collar workers in their union agreements and one of
these was a multi-union brownfield plant.
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The practice of recognising single unions has a long history in the UK (Miliward
1994), but until the 1970s and 80s it was less common in manufacttwing industry.
And, in the context of declining membership, it was the introduction of single
unionism into these Japanese manufacturing plants that caused the greatest political
fallout within the Welsh trade union movement (Morris et a!. 1994; Munday 1990).
When Japanese multinationals set up operations in foreign countries they do not court
controversy. They prefer the low key approach, seeking an unobtrusive integration
into the local community. But in South Wales, the Japanese were prepared to become
uncharacteristically enmeshed in this particular conflict. Why was this?
Although single union deals facilitate the introduction of full labour flexibility into
labour contracts, this was not the only factor to shape the different transplants'
industrial relations policies. Of equal importance was their determination to fashion a
hybrid company unionism with an underlying objective of building company loyalty
and worker commitment at the expense of wider worker solidarity. According to the
General Secretary of the Welsh TUC 5 (one of the leading figures involved in
attracting the early Japanese investors to Wales):
They just couldn't understand the British practice of multi-plant unionism. Theyjust could not
accept the idea of recognising trade unions which also had members working in companies that
were in competition with them. They saw this as a question of conflicting loyalties. They
stressed that their employees, if trade union members, had to display just one form of loyalty, a
loyalty to their own employer.
Interview field notes, 28.9.94.
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So what developed was a compromise between the UK multi-union tradition and Japanese
'yellow unions'. This was that as long as the Japanese did not join the different employer
federations in the UK, then the recognised union would not involve itself with disputes outside
of the company. What emerged was a sort of red circling of industrial relations in the Japanese
firms which met their real concerns about the problems of extraneous factors and actions
common in British industrial relations.
The old EETPU - now the electrical section of the AEEU - is the union most
commonly associated with Japanese single union agreements in the UK. However,
prior to the mid 1 980s, these membership agreements were distributed fairly evenly
between the major engineering unions in South Wales. It was only after this period
that hostilities between the TUC unions in Wales erupted, ostensibly over the
controversial issue of no strike deals, though propelled by an obsession with signing
up new recruits within the context of a membership haemorrhage in the Welsh coal
and steel industries (Morris et al., 1994). And it was then that the EETPU started to
monopolise the signing of recognition agreements with the Japanese. The General
Secretary of the Welsh TUC again:
In 1984, the EETPU in Wales came out with a new, revolutionary view of themselves which
was about removing the image of the EETPU electrician. Instead, they saw themselves as
general workers. One newspaper described the new EETPU member as anybody who worked
under a light bulb. It was quite accurate and it became a major issue because they began
poaching members. What's more, between 1984 and 1986, which was the big period of
Japanese investment in Wales, the EETPU virtually got a full house. They had their own
intelligence units, they had a full time office in Japan, they developed sophisticated
presentational packages, they invested in new training facilities to upskill their members, and
they had their no strike sales pitch. Other unions hated it. They weren't getting their own
goodies any more, and they regarded the EETPU approach as short selling trade unionism and
as pushing the unions into the gutter. For most of them no strikes meant no rights.
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In fact, although many firms in the survey did have their own no strike agreements,
the management interviewees placed more emphasis upon the general decline in overt
labour militancy in South Wales. The actual agreements are not legally enforceable.
Consequently, they were regarded in a more limited sense as symbolising company
harmony and cooperation rather than enforcing it. Indeed, the union officers
interviewed stressed that the dispute record within the Japanese plants in South Wales
was no different to the suppression of strike activity elsewhere in British-owned firms
in the region. Sporadic walkouts have occurred at Hitachi, Sekisui and Matsushita
Electric; during the national engineering dispute over the shorter working week, the
Sony workforce walked out on strike only to be rapidly recalled by embarrassed
AEEU union officers who regarded their action as a 'mistake and a misinterpretation
of national directives'; and more recently in 1994, the Matsushita Electric workforce
maintained a solid 2 month overtime ban during a pay dispute.
Moreover, as with any unionised workplace, the propensity of the workers in these
Japanese plants to enforce their collective workplace rights, including the right to take
industrial action, was also a function of both national union policy and plant-level
union leadership. At the relatively trouble-free Sony plant for example, one union
officer claimed that the performance of the 'new realist' AEEU local stewards was
such that 'the company regarded the AEEU as their own union, they put their arms
around them, totally embrace them, and they couldn't be happier with their industrial
relations record'. And it is no coincidence that the majority of the 7 transplants which
placed their negotiating machinery within the confines of company councils, or
advisory boards, based on the consensus model pioneered at Toshiba in Plymouth
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(Trevor 1988), were those which recognised the AEEU. In these firms, management
control over council membership, management control over bargaining agendas, and
procedures which ensure that any disagreements can be 'talked out' until management
objectives are secured, all acted to assure the attainment of a decidedly one sided form
of 'consensus'. Consequently, as Broad's (1994) case study of one Japanese
transplant's Company Council demonstrates, the more independent-minded shop
stewards and workers rapidly become disillusioned at the realisation that those
questions which are central to shop-floor interests are defined as management
prerogatives.
That is not to say that those firms which negotiated with the more traditional union
controlled negotiating committees did not seek incorporation and acquiescence.
Indeed, in some of these firms, the same management objectives were secured by use
of more explicit forms of coercion. For instance, as the GMB convenor at Matsushita
Electric stated:
One of the methods the Japanese use in their industrial relations here is when there is a 'final,
final offer', and the Japanese put a lot of stress on the 'fmal, final', then the offer must be
recommended by the JSSC [Joint Shop Stewards Committee] even though you may have your
own personal misgivings. If the package is not recommended then they withdraw the whole
package. You all lose your pay rise. It's industrial blackmail frankly. The number of times
I've had to tell the stewards not to be obstreperous. You're forced into a position where you
have to accept, even if it runs against your principles.
Sometimes, however, distinctive national union policies and local steward activism
supportive of independent trade unionism can make a difference here. As Lucio and
Weston (1992) argue, trade unions are manifold and complex organizations and they
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react to different managerial strategies in a variety of ways. Just because the AEEU
choose the concessionary approach to Japanese management does not mean to say that
all other unions must follow suit. Thus, 'there can be no uniformity of inevitable
outcome of human resource management' (p.216). For example, union membership
densities within the surveyed firms varied from 35% to 95%, and although the higher
densities tended to obtain in the longer established plants, independent union activity
also impacted on this. A GMB Regional Officer argued that:
The GMB densities tend to be higher than the AEEU because we've always been more
aggressive, we've always worked harder on the basic union issues.. .and I have to admit that the
Japanese don't exactly welcome us with open arms. In fact they keep us at arm's length most
of the time, even at Panasonics [Matsushita Electric] where we're one of the oldest established
unions in any Japanese plant over here. Over the years we've had to take an aggressive
approach. We've had to continually try to prove to the management that the members actually
want us. And this was much easier in the 1970s when the Panasonics and the Al WAs first
came because we were operating under different political conditions then. But these days it's a
lot more difficult. We really have to be on our toes.
Thus, in some of these Japanese transplants, labour organization is maintained by
conscientious and committed union activists just as it is in many British-owned
factories. The GMB tended to bombard its members with leaflets and newsletters to
keep the union message alive. Union campaigns on such bread and butter issues as
wages, employment conditions and health and safety were all regular events.
Sometimes these were reinforced by strike ballots, even though they were rarely won.
A good number of the management interviewees reported likewise that although
strikes were a rarity, negotiations with their unions were conducted in a traditional,
combative atmosphere within an industrial relations that was certainly not as
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harmonious as the literature often suggests. As a Sekisui manager admitted, life on
the shop-floor is subject to continual local arguments and conflicts between
supervision and 'traditional union men, traditional union thinkers'.
The case of one such 'traditional union thinker', an ex-British Steel shop steward now
employed at the Matsushita Electric plant in Cardiff, is instructive here. It exemplifies
how personal courage, perseverance and deeply-held convictions can breed wider
collective support and resistance to Japanese managerial prerogatives:
When I first came here about 10 years ago I thought I'd walked right into a concentration
camp. The workers were treated terribly, they had no rights at all. They were just being
walked over by the bully boys. But we've come a long way since then. Idon't want to blow
my own trumpet but we've changed things quite a bit here now. The members stand up to the
management and we've won new rights, we've got a sick pay scheme now, bereavement leave,
and these things are important.
Needless to say, the application of traditional union principles coupled with strong
leadership incurred a number of personal costs:
Soon after I started work here I was always bumping into some of the men from the Lianwern
steelworks who'd also managed to get ajob here, and they used to continually get on at me,
urging me to stand, because to tell you the truth the union at this plant was next to useless in
those days. At this time I was a clerk in the personnel office of all places. It was my wife [a
shopfloor supervisor], who got me a job here as a sort of odd job man. But because I had a
few '0' levels I got offered this clerical position. Anyway, after a lot of thought I decided to
stand for the union, and I got elected.
Two days later I got called up by senior management and one of the directors said to me, "we
know you, we know who you are, you're a Llanwern man, a union agitator. We've got our
eyes on you. One false move and you're out, so's your wife". It was real blackmail. I got
chucked out of the department and they put me on cleaning duties, picking up litter from the
120
boundary fences, that sort of thing. I'm back in the factory now but I've been moved from shit
job to shit job ever since. But I'm careful mind. I won't let them get me. I always keep to
procedure, never break the rules. It's the only way to stay safe in this place.
Industrial relations in these Japanese firms, therefore, are more complex and
differentiated than the functionalist HRM paradigm suggests. Many of the plants are
unionised because such is the tradition in South Wales. And although the Welsh TUC
and a number of right wing union officials have acted to compromise the tradition of a
free, independent trade unionism, the harsh reality of life on the shop-floor under
these highly disciplined, intensive production regimes provides a countervailing force
here. As one union officer said, 'they really are stressed systems. And the work is
exactly the same day in, day out. It must get boring and frustrating. So people do get
comfortable with the idea that they have a union to call on, something to fall back
upon'.
In reaction to attendant problems of labour discipline and control, some of the more
recent Japanese arrivals have expended time and money on the construction of more
harmonious industrial relations systems based on management-driven advisory boards.
These aim to suppress the independent, collective articulation of rank and file
interests. In contrast, a number of the older - and larger - plants in this depressed
region are content to exploit, in a traditional manner, labour's structural dependence
on the employer for its livelihood. That is, by gaining broad acceptance of the
capitalist notion of managerial prerogative whilst seeking to manage local conflicts
over questions of reward distribution, labour discipline, and so on. And as we will
demonstrate in Chapter Seven, just as with British employers, the success of these
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different strategies is itself dependent upon coherent management, the relative
strength of plant labour organization and wider political and economic conditions
which impact upon the balance of power between capital and labour.
To conclude, some aspects of Japanese FIRM policy in South Wales represent a
marked departure from the more laissez faire, hire and fire approach to managing
workers characteristic of traditional practice in many older British finns in the region.
In these factories, personnel matters are rarely central concerns of corporate
management. By contrast, although the transplants' specific practices might differ in
detail, such as in recruitment and selection, their strategic objectives are always the
same. That is, the Japanese managements were quite consistent in their careful
attempts to recruit and regulate teams of workers with the attributes necessary to
sustain the highly intensive and disciplined nature of their production regimes. This
latter point highlights how remote from hard reality are some of the more
'progressive' business school evaluations of Japanese human resource management.
Few policies were detected that can be characterised as 'soft' in the sense of offering
real opportunities for employee involvement and significant two way dialogue with
management. The more distinctive HRM practices, such as performance evaluation
and direct communications, were notable for the ways in which they ruthlessly
attempted to secure individual and team accountability for productive performance
rather than open up any potential for meaningful worker participation.
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Moreover, some features of Japanese HRM policy replicate, indeed take advantage of
existing structural conditions in the South Wales labour markets. Thus, the abundant
pools of cheap, malleable, low skilled labour, unsocialised in the ways and traditions
of labour organization, and segmented in terms of gender and to a much lesser extent
race, served these companies well. And in the 'hot house conditions' of high
unemployment and intensified market competition (Morgan and Sayer 1988), to which
might be added the debilitating constraints imposed by the Government's anti-trade
union legislation, organised labour resistance to management control can be critically
restricted, though as the survey demonstrated, not completely suppressed.
In many respects, therefore, a 'fit' between Japanese work organization and human
resource management did obtain. This was not one of fashioning new, enterprising
work attitudes in a context of 'enriched' and 'empowering' labour processes. Instead,
the imposition of managerial prerogatives, the suppression of rank and file worker
controls, the extant fragmentation of production line tasks and the consequent
intensification of labour under lean production demanded a more prosaic, though still
strategic, personnel policy. That is, in the distinctive contemporary political and
economic climate, such measures as careful recruitment techniques, the disciplining
exploitation of temporary workers, the diligent control of company communications
and the different attempts to restrict independent trade union activity all contributed to
worker 'cooperation' and compliance on the shop-floor.
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This thesis will now consider, in more depth, the development of the same processes





The foregoing survey of Japanese management practice in South Wales established
three pivotal facts for this thesis. Firstly, that it is wholly inaccurate to ascribe to the
Japanese transplants the general adoption of some 'post-industrial', new management
paradigm built upon the ideal types ofjust in time production, mass employee
involvement through TQM, and the complementary 'soft' management of human
resources.
Secondly, that this so because for many firms involved in mass production, quixotic
management innovations are just not appropriate in an environment of intense global
competition and cost cutting. In any case, the particular characteristics of different
product markets, labour markets and process technologies - and different sectoral
market pressures and traditions - will inevitably militate against convergence towards
any single management paradigm. For example, global competitive pressures for
labour saving efficiencies in modular assembly production have provided the spur for
the introduction of teamworking in many UK auto plants. But the same pressures
have not prompted similar work organizational changes in the consumer electronics
industry where the high volume manufacture of a relatively narrow range of
interrelated equipment designs continues to require simple, labour intensive assembly
operations organised along traditional production lines.
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Thirdly, whilst generalised notions of a post-Taylorist 'Japanization of British
industry' are in fact groundless, this does not mean that there is nothing sufficiently
distinctive about Japanese management practices in the UK to warrant investigation of
their diffusion into indigenous firms. For, as the last two chapters have made clear,
despite their work organizational differences, Japanese firms in South Wales do share
certain similarities in their careful approach to the control and 'management by detail'
of capital and labour power resources. In all cases, this is aimed at securing greater
leverage over worker effort and worker compliance to boot. Therefore, although the
belief that changes within Japanese firms may herald a rupture with previous
manufacturing practice is in fact fallacious, this does not mean to say that the spread
of Japanese management techniques represents nothing new at all.
Two key questions arise from this. Firstly, if the sum total of Japanese transplant
operations in the UK is to assume a significance greater than that of constituting
merely a novel branch of MNC transplant activity employing only around 60,000
workers nation-wide, then we need to demonstrate clear connections between the
distinguishing features of these Japanese firms and changes in management practices
in similar British firms. Secondly, even if such a relation can be outlined, we need to
explore this diffusion further by explicating developments at the point of production.
That means seeking the views of managers, and above all, affected workers, whose
opinions must take centre stage in any critique of contemporary changes in capitalist
production methods. This requires switching methodologies by moving from the
survey to the in-depth case study approach.
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The following five chapters effect this by providing an analysis of both quantitative
and qualitative research data accumulated over nearly two years at a car pressings
plant located in Lianelli, South Wales. A full summary of the methodology employed
is provided in Appendix A.
The author makes no apology here for this focus on just one company. Apart from the
general point that such an in-depth approach often provides unrivalled opportunities
for exhaustive study of the processes of change, this particular factory offered two
additional benefits which could not easily be disregarded. Firstly, the plant
management was prepared to provide unhindered access to its shopfloor and white
collar workforce in terms of workplace observations, formal and informal interviews
and questionnaire distribution. Secondly, and this was crucial for the research, these
facilities were offered at the very same time that the factory was embarking on a major
exercise of transforming its working practices, a process which the plant management
explicitly attributed to Japanese competition and influence.
Therefore, at one level, what follows is an investigation of the similarities between
local Japanese management practice and the specific innovations introduced at a large
British manufacturing plant in South Wales. At another level, the accumulation of
data during a period of significant change for shop-floor workers provides evidence of
the ways in which capitalist social relations of production ensure that 'Japanization at
work', even in its more mundane form, is not unproblematic. That is, we explore the
contradictions, conflicts and class struggles which remain inherent to the
contemporary capitalist labour process.
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CHAPTER FOUR
LOCAL AND GLOBAL CONTEXTS TO
JAPANIZATION AT A BRITISH FACTORY
The case study firm, CarPress, occupies a 30 acre site on the outskirts of the old port
town of Lianelli on the Swansea Bay. Lianelli is a traditional working class town with
a proud industrial history built upon coal and steel. Although it has undergone a
metamorphosis since the end of the last War, involving the complete demise of the
latter industries, the town remains an important centre for employment in an area that
contains the largest concentration of manufacturing industry in Wales (Moreton
1990).
The substantial diversification of the local industrial base should not obscure the fact
that Lianelli and the surrounding area remain dependent on an economic demand for
hard metal in one form or another. Despite a series of rationalisations, the giant
British Steel works at Port Talbot still dwarfs other local enterprises. And a plethora
of autocomponent, general engineering and steel fabrication companies means that, if
they are lucky, the workers in these male-dominated industries will spend most of
their working lives using different skills and technologies in the process of shaping
and fabricating steels and other metals into a variety of forms for further capitalist
production.
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Lianelli, therefore, remains a working class town. Fifty five per cent of the heads of
its households fall into the Registrar General's manual class categories; despite the
exhortations and inducements of various Conservative Governments, over 20% of its
families live in council houses; and over 35% of its households possess no car1.
Moreover, regardless of recent attempts by the leadership of the Labour Party to free
itself from notions of class representation, the town's electors insist on voting as a
working class. In Lianelli, as in most other South Wales towns, votes for the Labour
Party are weighed rather than counted. The current Member of Parliament secured a
majority of 21,000 votes over his Conservative rival at the 1992 General Election.
Unemployment continues to overshadow and oppress many of the old industrial towns
and villages of South Wales and LIanelli is no exception here. As a number of the
comments from workers in the case study will testify, the fear of losing one's job is a
threat that remains at the back of everyone's mind, it is something that undermines
both the stability and aspirations of every household in the town.
The official unemployment rate fluctuated between 10 and 20% throughout most of
the l980s and early 1990s; and in 1991, 43% of Llanelli's 16-64 year olds were either
unemployed or economically inactive2 . However, bad as they are, the figures disguise
a more serious position for the younger inhabitants of the town. A cursory glance
through most editions of the local newspapers in recent years will find a relative
Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (1994), 1991 Census, County Report, Dyfed, Parts 1 & 2.
2 Welsh Economic Trends, 1982-1994; Anthony Moreton, Survey of Wales, Financial Times, 16
September 1992.
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decline in the number of headlines proclaiming the deeds of the legendary 'Scarlets'
(the Lianelli Rugby Club) compared to the regular angst-ridden reports of the use of
'Browns' (the youth culture's euphemism for heroin) and other such drugs. Youth
unemployment is a major contributory factor to this type of social problem.
At the time of the last Government Census in 1991, 36% of Lianelli's 16 to 20 year
olds were either unemployed or registered on Government schemes. This figure rose
to 40% of the town's young males. The figures improve only marginally once these
young adults move beyond the 'training age'; 33% of the town's 16 to 24 year old
males remained unemployed or on Government schemes 3 . These figures reflect the
fact that, recent inward investment notwithstanding, much of the restructuring ofjob
opportunities in Wales has not been helpful to the cause of youth employment. The
local diversification in the Llanelli area failed to generate sufficient new
manufacturing jobs to off-set the decline in coal and steel; only the service sector
enjoyed a significant expansion (Harris 1987). Moreover, although manufacturing
industry in Wales fared better than elsewhere in the UK during the two maj or
recessions at the beginning and end of the 1980s, this relative resilience failed to
translate into the creation of new manufacturing jobs for the youngsters coming on to
the labour market. The more fortunate of Llanelli's young job seekers, many of them
women, have managed to secure low paid, often casual employment in the area's
expanding service and tourism industries. But many others are either unemployed, or
are forced into worthless Government training schemes.
Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (1994), 1991 Census, County Report, Dyfed, Parts I & 2.
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The problems of unemployment in general, and youth unemployment in particular, are
important here. This is because, as we shall see, they contribute to an environment of
fear which the management at CarPress was able to adroitly exploit in its efforts to
introduce a number of new floor working practices which undermined the collective
interests of its shop-floor workforce.
THE CASE STUDY
CarPress Ltd is a body-in-white presswork and fabrications company. It operates
autonomously within the CarPress Engineering Group of autocomponent
manufacturers. CarPress Engineering is now itself owned by the German
multinational conglomerate Fried. Krupp AG/Hoesch-Krupp and forms part of the
group's automotive division which specialises in the manufacture of complete body
parts, crankshafts and car suspension components. Despite this foreign ownership -
which is a recent development - the case study remains 'British' in almost every other
respect. That is, in terms of management style, industrial relations traditions, union
organization, and so on.
CarPress's Llanelli factory started life in 1961 as part of BMC's Fisher and Ludlow
Division. It was set up as a satellite plant with the purpose of feeding pressed parts
and assemblies to the main BMC factories at Longbridge and Cowley. During this
period, large amounts of new manufacturing capital were invested well away from the
well organised, high-cost labour areas in the Midlands and the South. As with most
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investments on greenfield sites today, many employers were seeking to take advantage
of the vulnerability of labour in regions such as the North West and South Wales
where the decline of traditional industries and consequent unemployment placed
labour in a difficult bargaining position (Beynon 1984).
In those days, in contrast to the carefully planned and phased production at recent
Nissan and Toyota investments in the UK, green field site organization could be
chaotic. One manager and ex-apprentice reminisced:
I remember all of the schools in Llanelli were invited to send kids in for mass interviews for
apprenticeships. You won't see that sort of thing these days! Luckily, I was accepted for one
of these. It was a classic greenfield site. There was little local experience of the auto industry
apart from the Morris radiator factory next door. And people were interviewed by the
hundreds because the area was undergoing quite rapid industrial change with a lot of the older
industries dying out, coal and tinp late especially. When I started in May 1961, there was
hardly anything in the factory running at all. The administration was housed off site in an old
guest house, the press shop was built but it was empty of presses and I had to spend my first
year in a rented bakery which was used as a training shop.
By the end of 1962, initial production had commenced in the two main manufacturing
areas - the press and assembly shops. Press lines and multi-weld sections began the
fabrication of complete door sets for Alex Issigonis's new BMC Mini. Over the next
two years, line capacity was increased for the production of Mini sub-frames,
Austin/Morris 1100 door sets, Austin Maxi and Austin/Morris 1800 floors and a
variety of other pressed assemblies such as engine compartment valances and wheel
arches.
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In 1965, BMC merged with another body pressings company, Pressed Steel, to form
British Motor Holdings. Three years later BMH merged with the Leyland Group to
create British Leyland. By this time the Lianelli factory employed nearly 2000
workers, a figure that was maintained throughout most of the 1 970s.
However, bad times were around the corner. During the 1 980s, a combination of
recession, increased market competition and maladroit corporate management caused
a disastrous drop in the newly named Austin Rover's domestic and foreign market
share. As a result, a process of wholesale sacking took hold throughout the decade
(Williams et al. 1994a). The Lianelli workforce took its fair share of the redundancies
and between 1981 and 1988 suffered a reduction from 1723 to 928.
Even in these circumstances, nothing could prepare the workforce for the helter-
skelter of events that started in July 1988 when the Government completed its sale of
Rover to British Aerospace. Despite Rover's earlier public reassurances to the
contrary, British Aerospace announced the closures of Lianelli and the Cowley South
Works just four days after the privatisation (Lovering and Hayter 1994). Subsequent
union and community campaigns made little impression on the new BAe
management. Then, in January 1989, just two months before the closure of Llanelli
was due to come into effect, a new player arrived on the scene. A Stevenage-based
autocomponents supplier, CarPress Engineering, announced that it was holding talks
with BAe-Rover with a view to taking over the factory. Coincidentally , this company
also started life in the early 1 960s and through a process of acquisition rapidly
expanded its operations to 10 factories located in the South and South East of
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England. This expansion was partially driven by an explicit anti-union policy. As one
CarPress Director admitted, 'the principle concern here was the need to respond to the
union militancy which damaged the industry in the 1 960s. It was essentially a multi-
plant strategy for strike breaking'.
After two months of inter-firm negotiations, which were complicated by a series of
strikes and walkouts over questions of employment conditions and union recognition
rights, the sale was completed. The local media jubilantly reported that the factory's
remaining 750 jobs were safe. But within 12 months these were again under threat.
In May 1990, the CarPress Engineering Group succumbed to a hostile take-over bid
by a firm of property speculators named Markheath Securities, the British arm of
Australia's third largest conglomerate, the Adelaide Steamship Company. A number
of CarPress Directors resigned, convinced that Markheath Securities was poised to
carry out an asset stripping operation (Pearson 1990). In the event, financial scandals
within the Alan Bond empire in Australia caused the Adelaide Steamship Company to
incur multi-billion pound debts which, in turn, forced Markheath to sell CarPress
more or less intact to the German steel and engineering company Hoesch. And this
bewildering series of rapid succession, post-privatisation auctions of 'viorkers'
livelihoods was still not complete. In December 1991, the German multinational
Fried. Krupp aimounced the take-over of Hoesch in its battle for the control and
rationalisation of the mighty German steel industry (Parkes 1991).
134
Up to this point, rarely was the Lianelli factory anything more than an operation of at
most marginal interest to the main actors involved. However, once the plant was
integrated into Krupp's automotive division, contemporary global changes in the
autocomponents industry started to move in its favour. In contrast to the convictions
of proponents of flexible specialisation, suppliers to the auto industry are not
experiencing vertical disintegration and consequent local networking. The major car
assemblers are shifting towards single sourcing of supplies to control component price
and quality. At the same time, the benefits of economies of scale, along with the
assemblers' encouragement of suppliers to develop a presence in each of their global
markets, has combined to bring into effect industrial concentration and the emergence
of an international oligopoly of component suppliers (Amin and Smith 1991). Fried.
Krupp is one of these oligopolies.
As a result, the factory remained a maj or supplier to the Rover car assembly operation.
But it also succeeded in building up a European and Japanese customer base on a long
term, single supplier basis. In 1992, as much as 90% of the factory's output was
destined for Rover. Management aimed to reduce this to 40% over 5 years. By 1995,
the Lianelli plant had become a principal first tier supplier to Toyota in Derby and GM
Opel in Germany. It also secured important long term contracts for body-in-white
parts with Honda in Swindon and Mercedes Benz.
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WORK ORGANIZATION AND THE LABOUR PROCESS
During the period of the research, CarPress employed 718 men and 45 women4 , 763
managers and workers in all. A workforce profile is provided in Table 4.1. Since the
factory was principally a manufacturing unit, over 600 of these were hourly paid
employees: semi-skilled operators and skilled production support workers. The white
collar workforce approached nearly 150 in number, comprising managers and staff
employed in the finance, sales and marketing, quality assurance, engineering,
manufacturing and human resource functions.
Table 4.1, CarPress Workforce Profile
The low number of women employees exemplifies a gender bias which is typical for the auto industry
in the UK. Chapter Eight explores this in more detail.
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The shop-floor was 100% unionised. The TGWU represented semi-skilled production
operators whilst the AEEU covered all skilled workers. When CarPress acquired the
Llanelli factory it immediately derecognised MSF in the office areas. Despite this,
95% of MSF members retained their membership.
When the factory was built in 1961 it was regarded as one of the most advanced press
and assembly shops in Europe. The long, rectangular main production building
divided exactly in half between the press and the assembly shops. Bottlenecks and
buffers notwithstanding, it was designed to receive steel coil and strip in the goods
inwards bay at one end of the building and then, in the course of the production
process, material would flow through the two main shops eventually arriving as
completed assemblies on the despatch deck at the opposite end of the building. A
novel, underground scrap recycling system operated in parallel with this theoretically
perfect flow line process. With each press operation, scrap steel fell through machine-
side slots in the press shop's suspended floor. Then, by means of a Heath Robinson-
type arrangement of integrated V-channels and conveyors, the scrap was automatically
transported to a powerfiul 4-ram hydraulic baler which compressed it into large cube
blocks for re-cycling.
The Press Shop
The main press shop contained 109 presses. These ranged from 30 to 1100 ton
capacity. Smaller 30 ton presses were used for blanking operations, that is, cutting
steel coil to the required outline dimension for the subsequent full press operation.
The main machines were either motor and flywheel or hydraulic ram presses ranging
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from 250 to 1100 ton capacity. They were located along 3 bays and arranged in
groups of 4 or 5 machines along 17 straight production lines.
The process of manufacturing a complex pressed part, such as a car door, requires a
line of presses each set up with a different die designed to press the blanked steel into
a particular shape. As Williams et al. (1994b) have observed, this process has hardly
changed over the past 50 years. Each part travels once through the line of presses
receiving successive 'blows' from the hydraulic rams so that the required shape
materialises at the final press on the line. The CarPress shop also housed one line of
Swedish-made Dopper automatic transfer presses which can carry out these successive
operations within the same press. But most of the shop was organised along
traditional lines with each group of presses working in tandem and linked by portable
conveyors moving the steel parts from machine to machine.
The press shop operators worked an alternating day and night shift system. Each shift
comprised 85 operators supported by supervision. There are, of course, many
additional tasks to be performed in the steel pressing process by toolmakers and
toolsetters, maintenance workers, crane drivers, fork lift truck drivers and so on, all of
which are considered later. But the central labour process belongs to the press
operator. Their machines dominated the whole factory. They stood as towers of hard
metal and oil-based grime, generating a continual rhythmic din of muffled thuds and
metallic strikes as their rams cycled every 4 or 5 seconds of the working day.
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The shop typically achieved 1 million 'blows' on a weekly throughput of 800 tons of
steel. To accomplish this, operators worked with speed, consistency and efficiency.
Many of them performed in pairs. At the first press along a typical line of five,
operators standing each side of a conveyor would pick up the first blanked steel sheet,
place this into the bed of the press so that it sat correctly on the lower die (or 'tool')
and then activate the ram with a single push-button electrical switch. Immediately, a
metal safety bar would be released and come flying upwards to hit out of the way any
unlucky operator who might have absent-mindedly remained by the bed. Once the
ram cycled the operators pushed the pressed part out on to the next conveyor belt at
the opposite end of the press bed and repeated the whole operation by loading the next
blanked sheet. The same task routines were performed at each press down the line.
Williams et al. (1994b) argue that although the efficiency of press shops may differ on
an international basis because of variable machine set up and downtime performance,
the actual speed of the press operation tends to be a universal, as it is technically
determined by press design, and in particular, cycle time. However, although this may
hold for some automated presses, the argument generally fails to take into account the
impact of capitalist social relations and the accompanying capital-labour conflict over
the speed of work, as the next chapter will demonstrate. In fact, the speed of the
production operation in the CarPress press shop was a function of both the targets or
'scores' set by management and the variability of labour power, as well as cycle times.
But it was always rapid. Press throughput could vary between 100 and as much as
1000 parts per hour, according to the complexity of part design. A typical rate was
about 350. That is, 6 parts, or 6 of the above task routines every minute. Therefore, it
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would be misleading to describe the physical labour process of the press operator
purely in terms of the simple co-ordination of a few basic tasks. It is a process that is
characterised by a rapid tempo and consistent body movement; as the operators handle
heavy steel parts their bodies rhythmically sway in and out of the presses between
conveyor and press bed, at all times avoiding the bruising knock of the safety bar.
The work is degrading and de-humanising. It is the strength of organised labour rather
than any objective task assessment which enables the workers to defend their semi-
skilled status. The production operators themselves sardonically dismissed any
alternative interpretation of their work. The following view was typical:
So you people talk about job enrichment! What's that supposed to mean? You should come
down and work on our line for a few days and then maybe you'd see some sense. I mean, all
you're doing is feeding fucking parts into a machine and pressing buttons all day long. How
can you ever get any satisfaction out of that?
Marx (1976) wrote that, 'in the factory we have a lifeless mechanism {the machine]
which is independent of the workers, who are incorporated into it as its living
appendages' (p.548). Although few of CarPress's workers will have considered
reading this first volume of Capital, their working lives, to this day, are still reflected
in its pages. Many spoke of the physical fatigue caused by 'being on your feet all the
time' and a mental fatigue resulting from the boredom of being 'being married to your
machine'. Another press shop operator:
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You see, as an operator you're just an extension of the actual machine, you're not a person. As
soon as you clock in each morning you switch off, you just leave your brain at the clocking
station.
The operators continually complained of being treated as numbers. And this was not
just in the clichéd sense of your number on the clock card. Most presses were fitted
with clocks which register the hourly quantity of parts produced. These facilitate
calculation of operator and plant performance, and therefore serve as precise little
instruments of management control. Some CarPress managers were so obsessed with
production and productivity that their attitudes to the shopfloor workforce really were
conditioned solely by the numbers on these clocks. As another operator put it:
I'll tell you what I think of this company. This company treats people as numbers and it's
numbers we will always be. It doesn't care about me as a human being. The only thing that
this company and it's management are really concerned about is the number that's on my clock
at the end of the day. Nothing else.
The Assembly Shop
The organization of production and technology in a body assembly shop is more
complex than a press shop's simple arrangement of rows of presses. The basic
manufacturing process consists of welding together the different pressed parts and
components required for the manufacture of car body assemblies. For body-in-white
plants, 3 production stages are needed for this. Firstly, pressed parts are welded
together to form sub-assemblies; these sub-assemblies are then welded together along
with additional components, such as threaded fasteners, to form major parts like doors
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or sub-frames; and finally, these undergo different labour intensive metal finishing
processes, such as de-burring, smoothing and small dent removal, all performed with
the use of a variety of heavy hand tools.
Jurgens et a!. (1993) have identified three levels of welding mechanization in the
modem car industry: manual welding guns; robots; and multispot welding processes.
CarPress used all three of these. The assembly shop contained 60 VW pedestal
welders which were fairly small machines with changeable jigs using spot welders
activated by hand levers. It also housed 60 hanging gun spot welders. These were
suspended on the end of high voltage cables above the operators' heads and pulled
down to the jigs by hand. In addition, a series of welding technology investments in
the l980s and 1990s made available 20 multi-welders (which accomplish more than
one weld simultaneously); a robotic automated transfer line for high volume
production; and clusters of robots for smaller volumes. The shop also used standard
CO2 welding technology in a series of bays.
In their analysis of the restructuring of working practices in the industry, Jurgens et a!.
highlight, inter alia, the interrelationship between specific national and local corporate
technological strategies. In particular, they identify a tripartite division between a
German - and to a lesser extent American - reliance on investment in modern
automated transfer lines; a Japanese preference for the modernised organisation of
existing technologies; and a less coherent British position, which, lacking sufficient
resources to follow the German path, is therefore attempting to imitate the Japanese,
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albeit in piecemeal fashion. In a curious way, the CarPress assembly shop provided a
microcosm of this.
The most advanced technology in the plant was used exclusively for a multi-million
pound contract to manufacture dashboards for Opel in Germany. It consisted of a
dedicated robotic transfer line employing discrete groups of teamworkers welding
together different sub-assemblies and feeding these into the automated final assembly
system.
Two groups of teams responsible for producing different body-in-white parts for
Toyota and Honda provided the Japanese representation. Although the Honda team
relied on advanced, more flexible robot systems, emphasis in both sections was placed
on the rational organization of discrete welding units rather than automation.
Finally, the largest areas were 'British' and dedicated mainly to Rover production.
These comprised row upon row of the older welding machines, often manned by the
same operators day in day out. Apart from the Press Shop, it was in these areas that
the CarPress managers were particularly intent on introducing teamworking and other
new working practices.
This segmented work organization had little impact on the basic physical labour
processes in the assembly shop. Although the Opel and Japanese teamworkers took
on a number of additional tasks which will be considered in Chapter Six, the basic
task routines nevertheless remained constant across the different assembly sections.
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Once again, the work had a low skill content. Operators would simply pick up the
necessary pressed parts and metal fasteners from line side pallets, place these into
their machine jigs and then activate the weld by either hand gun, pedestal arm, or push
button switch. Management-set targets aimed to ensure that operators maintained this
cycle, typically, every 12 seconds of the working day. Although to the observer,
assembly work appeared less arduous than press shop work, most operators
experienced it as pure drudgery. As in the press shop, it was economic compulsion
and the crack of the foreman's whip that kept many on their toes, as the following
comments demonstrate:
No, there's no job satisfaction here. How can there be? We're not involved in the job at all. I
tell you, the management here are all flicking pigs. I mean, they say to you "right you go over
here and you over there and work". They don't care about you at all. All they want is the
score out, you do the score and that's it. Basically, they treat you like a machine, like a robot.
I'm afraid the style of work is totally monotonous and if unemployment was lower I'd be out
of here like a shot. And I'd work for less money.
And another:
I come in every morning and I'm usually on a dreamer. It often takes me 2 hours to get going
properly. It's the same job, week in week out, there's never any change. And it's a low skill
factor job. You know how to do it inside 10 minutes, all you need is speed and
synchronisation. So the satisfaction is in the pay and the knowledge that you've got a good
paying job. There's nothing else.
Sometimes, in order to balance production lines, the foremen would lend and borrow
labour across the press shop-assembly shop divide. However, the press shop workers
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were not keen on this; they tended to look down on their assembly shop colleagues
because for some men, heavy manual work carries a certain prestige. As one said,
'we're handling 10 tons of steel per shift and that's heavy work I can tell you.. .next
door they're doing women's work playing with their little nuts and little bits of metal'.
The lack of any dignity in mass production labour, the boredom and relentless grind of
the work, often gives rise to such irrational internal working class divisions. In fact,
the work in the assembly shop, like the press shop, was neither men's work nor
women's work. It was just hard work.
Plant Maintenance and the Toolroom
CarPress employed 189 skilled workers, all men, in its maintenance and toolroom
departments. Some of these tradesmen were specialist electricians, electronic
technicians and mechanics; others, over a number of years, were forced to bridge the
traditional electrical-mechanical divide by learning new technical skills outside of
their particular specialisms. During the 1 970s and 80s, such workers fought hard to
maintain some control over their specialist skills and through this to retain a certain
dignity of labour that is absent from the production line (Beynon 1984; Willman and
Winch 1985). But at CarPress, as we shall see in Chapter Six, de-skilling and multi-
tasking are now a greater threat than multi-skilling.
Indeed, for many of these workers, and even some of their sympathetic managers, the
changes were seen as a function of the growing domination of mass production over
the supportive craft functions. As the maintenance manager complained,
'unfortunately, in this place, production is the God that drives the whole thing. We
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seldom have any windows during the day that enable us to get on to the machinery to
do the essential preventative maintenance work'. Because of this, many CarPress
maintenance workers harboured increasing resentment over the resulting stress, work
intensification and irrational marginalisation of their essential work. One fitter put it
like this:
The work was more relaxed here years ago and there's a simple reason for that. There were
just more people working here. Now it's got a lot tighter. The company has cut down on the
workforce drastically. So the whole workplace has become stressed up due to a sheer drop in
numbers while at the same time our workload hasn't dropped at all. They're still running all of
the same machines flat out. If anything they're running them without breaks more than they
ever used to.
And it's a different firm now. It's more stressful being a maintenance worker because there's
no real preventative maintenance being done. We can't do it because we don't have the
materials or the men. So what we're doing is fire fighting rather than fire preventing. They
just expect us to come running when things begin breaking down.
In most auto plants, toolrooms are responsible for manufacturing and maintaining
press dies and welding jigs. The work demands a range of predominantly mechanical
skills in fitting and machining. At CarPress, the toolroom's main function was
restricted to the maintenance and installation of the plant's 1200 press dies and 600
assembly jig fixtures, rather than new die manufacture. For, in the interests of
capitalist efficiency and profit making, the factory, like many others, was now sub-
contracting die manufacture to engineering specialists. By depressing wages and
conditions, these firms were able to capitalise on their low prices. Not surprisingly,
many of the toolmakers resented the dilution of skills that accompanied these changes.
One commented:
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We used to be real toolmakers. That was our job, our craft. But these days there's no money
or investment going into the shop at all. The company's no longer prepared to invest in new
machinery because most of our toolmaking work is now sub-contracted. Don't get me wrong,
refurbishing has always been part of the job here but we've also had real toolmaking to do as
well. Now all it's about is re-grinding and first aid and this has resulted in a definite loss of
skills. I just think that nowadays we seem to be doing everything but toolmaking.
And another:
I think there's one sort of teamworking that's okay. When we were under Austin Rover we
were always doing everything for ourselves. We'd make new heads and other parts, we would
all chip in doing different jobs. But now all this work's being sent out, we've lost it. The
management are always telling us that it's only chicken shit but we know it's not, it's the
quality work that's going.
Many of these tradesmen felt that their jobs and skills were coming under threat from
internal sources as well. Since the Rover sell-off, the organization of technical work
in the engineering and quality functions had undergone some significant changes
involving a weakening of the demarcation between shop-floor and office. For
example, one of the more satisfying elements of the toolmaker's job is the testing of
die prototypes for new part designs, or 'tryout' as it is called in the trade. The careful
adjustment and modification of dies, jigs and machines involves a wide range of
practical and reflexive skills. However, despite all the fashionable talk of a post-
Taylorist synthesis of the conception and execution of tasks, many CarPress toolroom
workers were discovering that the restructuring of the relationship between shop-floor
and technical workers was, if anything, acting to reinforce the de-skilling process.
CarPress's engineers were colonising 'tryout' work for themselves. A toolmaker:
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It seems tome that the toolroom is just full of white coats and white collars these days. They
all seem totally unaffected by the cuts. Maybe it's because the managers are empire building, I
don't know. But it's also because the engineers are taking over the best of our work. They
are. They're taking the work that needs all the ideas and real skills, the tryout work. It's the
sort of work that needs a bit of creativity. But now we're losing that as well.
Engineering
These changes in the toolroom, and the accompanying restructuring of work in
CarPress's office areas did not necessarily confer enhanced skills and opportunities on
all 137 staff employees. Most of these were managers, supervisors and engineers
employed in production, engineering and quality functions with a small number of
supporting administrative staff. Despite the above shopfloor resentment, many of
these workers were also experiencing their own particular forms of loss ofjob control
and skill. The case of the engineering department was typical here.
Under the previous Rover management, the department was involved solely with part
design. In those days the drawing office was fairly large, housing mainly component
designers and jig and tool draughtsmen responsible for designing press dies and
welding machine fixtures. Associated questions of sales and project management
generated remote problems safely located somewhere in a Midlands office block. The
CarPress take-over changed all of that. The Engineering Director put it like this:
After the take-over we suddenly changed from being a large satellite manufacturer to being a
supplier to a range of customers. So we had to change our philosophy from one of volume
supplier to one of quality supplier. We had to suddenly start thinking about the customer's
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needs. And this involved a major cultural change in relation to both product and financial
questions. We had to become a commercial enterprise virtually overnight. Basically, it's now
about customer engineering.
For the engineering department, this meant assuming overall responsibility for the
management of the whole contract from initial conceptualising all the way through to
production and sales. What the business schools like to call 'simultaneous
engineering'. CarPress's design engineers became 'customer engineers', learning the
disciplines of contract, customer liaison and product management as well as the
prototype development and 'tryout' work described above. However, this did not
necessarily have a positive impact on skill and job content. Although the company
introduced CAD technology and other advanced information systems, the level and
quality of design work diminished. On occasions, the department would 'get the
envelope' from the customer, designer-speak for receiving the basic conceptual
parameters from which draughtsmen and women generate their drawings and
specifications. But increasingly, any design work of substance was being transferred
to external contractors.
Contemporary analysis of these types of changes tends to be driven by an assumption
that the demise of old craft skills, whether in the drawing office or on the shop-floor,
is a sign of the inevitable progress of advanced capitalism. This is not in the negative
sense of the 'progress' of capitalist accumulation and control outlined by Braverman
(1974); indeed, for some writers, it is not something to be regretted at all. Instead, we
are often asked to accept the restructuring of the work of core employees as an
accumulation of new responsibilities and new knowledge-based skills which more
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than compensate for the loss of traditional craft expertise. For example, Lash and
Uny (1994) have argued that in Japanese companies such changes bring workers into
an increasingly skilful interaction with different information intensive systems.
Through these reflexive processes, Japanese workers and their employers are held to
benefit from an 'accumulation of cultural capital' in the form of new training, new
skills and so on.
Although the work of the CarPress engineers underwent a similar transformation,
many did not see these changes in such a positive light. The following view of a
tooling engineer typified the general bitterness caused by the loss of draughting skills:
It's definitely changed over the years. We used to be far more involved in design. Previously
a lot of the design work would be done in house, or it would come straight from the customer
and we'd do some modifications. But now we're only working on the management of new
projects. These days, the tooling's designed by whoever, it's made by whoever and handed
straight over to production. As I see it, the whole thing's just turned into cheque book
engineering.
And:
I suppose it had to happen. A lot of firms seem to be getting rid of design these days. It's
being sub-contracted out all the time. Personally, I prefer it as it was. I was brought up in a
real drawing office environment. I've got nothing against the system, I suppose it works, but
there's much less job satisfaction now and a lot less skill. Our job used to be about starting the
job off on the board. We used to put ideas on to paper with drawing pencils and then you'd
gradually develop the job yourself and see the thing materialise. But not any more.
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This is not to say that CarPress's engineers dismissed out of hand the new ways of
working and the responsibilities that went with them. Like many engineers, they
enjoyed rising to the challenge of solving new sets of problems. It was just that they
felt the process had limits of acceptability. And whilst human interaction with new
computer information systems could be appealing, many nevertheless resented the de-
skilling which accompanied the loss of the primary interaction between engineer and
machine. They could not understand how anyone could be classed as a skilled
engineer without having a practical appreciation of machinery and tooling and a
knowledge of the technical parameters associated with the different production
processes. But as part of its internal restructuring, the engineering department began
to recruit such individuals, young 'customer engineers', well versed in the procedures
of contract management but lacking a basic understanding of practical engineering
principles. The experienced engineers were clearly disgruntled at the divestment of
'cultural capital' which this approach signified. As a project teamleader put it:
Most of these youngsters might have good qualifications, the HNCs and degrees, but none
have the formal engineering training and the skills that go with it. The skills involved in
actually understanding a process, understanding how a machine tool works, how a press works,
getting close to it and understanding the technical problems that you get with these types of
machines...I suppose it's a reflection of the way the job is changing. I've got to admit, many of
the youngsters may be sharper than us at costing and estimating. But they're not engineers.
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THE IMPACT OF JAPANESE MANAGEMENT
The foregoing preliminary account of the organization of work at CarPress sets the
local context for the process of 'Japanization' which unfolds over the next four
chapters. It also demonstrates that irrespective of the impact of Japanese management
techniques, the plant's work organization has not remained static since its inception in
1961. The advent of new technologies, new product markets and new customer
relationships along with competitive pressures for demanning and a
'commercialisation of the labour contract' (O'Connell Davidson 1993) through
external sub-contracting, have all made their impact on the labour process. So has
internal job re-structuring. But we also need to consider the wider environmental
context of the change process and how external contingencies at the global and
national level, particularly the growth of Japanese inward investment, have affected
the local factory and local attitudes.
The British autocomponent industry has for some time been caught between a pincer
movement. This consists of a general decline in the fortunes of the hand that feeds it,
the British auto assembly sector, and the simultaneous propensity of these assemblers
to both reduce local content and squeeze the prices of the remaining UK suppliers. As
Amin and Smith (1991) have outlined, since the early 1970s, the UK has gone from
being 'a sizeable manufacturer of cars which once dominated the domestic markets
and exported over a third of its output, to a significantly smaller actor in both the
domestic and export markets' (p. 174). At the same time, the auto sector
multinationals have rationalised capacity and restructured their operations to generate
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plant-based economies of scale through either task or car model specialisation. Amin
and Smith point out that this process of vertical integration put many British
autocomponent suppliers out of business during the 1 980s. But it also had a
fundamental affect on remaining suppliers of the likes of CarPress. The major car
assemblers reduced their supplier volume by awarding larger and longer term
contracts to an upper tier of prime suppliers. In so doing, they were able to exert
significant control over these suppliers by overseeing price reductions and insisting on
better quality, innovative capability and delivery. This is not a process of corporate
intervention that is peculiar to the Japanese, although they are particular experts at it.
For example, Opel, one of CarPress's largest customers, recently embarked upon a
major internal efficiency drive along these lines. It resulted in significant cost
reductions of bought-in parts (Parkes 1993).
Japan's phenomenal success in global car exports coincided with these changes.
Between 1973 and 1985 the Japanese auto industry expanded to such an extent that it
eventually controlled 29% of global output and totally dominated world
intercontinental trade movements (Bloornfield 1991; Jurgens et al. 1993). This
constituted a real threat to Western manufacturers. It contributed to the emergence of
an ideology of 'factory survival' in the West, where managements increasingly raised
the nightmare of superior Japanese productivity to expedite job rationalisation and the
introduction of new working practices. The history of low wages, work intensification
and exploitation of small sub-contractors that underpinned this Japanese 'miracle' was
conveniently overlooked (Garrahan and Stewart, 1992).
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Managerial apprehension of Japanese industrial expansionism also had a material
impact. For instance, in 1993, the European Union commissioned the influential
Boston Report into the competitive gap between European and Japanese
autocomponent suppliers. The report's conclusions, right or wrong, that a massive
productivity gap in favour of the Japanese required halving by 1999 if the European
industry was to survive (Done 1993), started to provoke corporate action. CarPress's
Operations Director commented on this and related influences:
Yes, Krupp are very heavy on the Boston Report at the moment. They were one of the driving
forces behind it in the EC and it's certainly having an impact here. And there are similar
influences elsewhere. For example, Rover with their RG2000 quality audits and Ford are the
same with Al. They're always trying to drive down our costs. They can be a bloody nuisance
as well. Particularly when times are bad in the industry you tend to get the representatives
from some of these customers coming in and crawling all over you, looking at your quality
procedures and working practices.
Perceptions of superior Japanese management performance, therefore, contribute to
the diffusion of management practice. Also of importance is the sheer presence of the
Japanese auto assemblers in the UK. It has been estimated that by the late 1 990s,
something like £2 billion worth of EC-sourced components will be flowing into the
three Japanese assemblers in the UK - Nissan, Honda and Toyota (Griffiths 1992).
But those British suppliers who are successful in gaining prime supplier contracts are
also paying a price. With the balance of power between these different capitals clearly
in favour of the Japanese assemblers, suppliers can no longer fix, or even negotiate,
component prices in the traditional manner. Instead, they are forced to open up their
books to the Japanese, allowing the latter to determine how costs and prices are
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calculated, and through this to set in motion a price lowering process. They are also
forced to accept the intrusion of the Japanese customer into the area of monitoring
quite intimate aspects of their quality and performance (Done 1990; Griffiths 1 992).
Too much of the contemporary debate on the 'Japanization of British industry' has
dwelt solely on the extent of Japanese management innovation without attending to
the pertinent practical question of how the process of c/f/fusion between Japanese-
owned or 'Japanised' firms and British firms takes effect. At CarPress, diffusion from
the likes of Toyota, Honda, Rover and Opel, was accomplished primarily through the
development of the type of close customer relationships outlined above. These
relationships were realised through determined sales strategies, persistent customer
liaison and the additional highly proactive role of such external agencies as the Welsh
Development Agency6.
This approach to the control of suppliers bears many similarities to current practice in Japan, where
suppliers are forced to relinquish their freedom and independence once a contract with any of the giant
Japanese corporations is signed. As Sakai puts it, suppliers are 'told what to make, when to put it on
the line, and how much it will get for delivery. If the company that placed an order feels a profit
squeeze, it can easily order the sub-contractor to reduce its fmal price. If hard times continue, the larger
company can demand yet another cut. If it gets to the point that the subcontractor is losing money on
each unit it's producing and has cut expenses and streamlined production to the utmost, the "parent"
company could demand that it buy some new piece of equipment to increase productivity' (1990, p.40).
6 Significantly, just as the British state has taken up a proactive role in enticing Japanese firms into the
UK in order to weaken organised labour, its Welsh arm, in the form of the Welsh Development Agency,
is equally active in securing the adoption of Japanese-approved new working practices in British-owned
suppliers in Wales. The WDA has now established a 'Source Wales' programme aimed at persuading
major manufacturers to source their components locally through the promotion of 'best practice' within
Welsh suppliers.
To achieve this, Source Wales has set itself up both as a broker for customers and suppliers and as a
management consultant. Its officials move on to the premises of an enlisted manufacturer and act as a
temporary procurement arm of that customer. Simultaneously, Source Wales acts as management
consultant to potential suppliers, advising on the restructuring of management practices and providing
the necessary resources, such as TEC management training. It then attempts to bring together approved
suppliers with enlisted customers on a long term contractual basis. Its officials stress that Japanese
companies tend to be as much interested in potential suppliers' quality of management as their quality
of production. That is, they take a particular interest in the ability of managements to push through
some of the changes in working practices necessary for achieving longer term quality and production
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Rover was the chief protagonist in this change process. The introduction of new
working practices at CarPress, like many other British companies, has been slow,
incremental and subject to both management incoherence and periodic trade union
resistance. But certain defining moments in the Lianelli factory's recent history did
represent significant catalysts of change. Paradoxically, one of these was Rover's
decision to sell the plant. This was not done in response to any overcapacity of capital
in relation to product demand; apart from securing immediate financial gain, the sale
acted to commercialise the Llanelli labour contract, squeeze unit labour costs and
thereby, both reduce Rover's overall production costs and increase its profits.
A post-privatization, long term customer-supplier relationship was forged. Although
Rover remained CarPress's largest customer, the nature of the commercial
relationship changed. CarPress's Production Manager summed this up in the
following way:
When we were a Rover plant we produced no budget accounts to speak of. We were dealing
purely in wooden dollars, supplying parts to Oxford and Swindon. Now things have changed.
Everything has got to be justified. We're accountable for all our budgets and costs and we're
all far more commercially aware than we used to be. Now the site is a profit centre and each
section within it is a cost centre so we've had to become more open with our figures. It also
means that we've been forced to keep to tighter profit margins which Rover and the rest of our
customers enforce on virtually every contract. The result of all is that we now have to get
smarter in the way we manufacture.
standards. (Field notes, interview with the Director of Source Wales, Welsh Development Agency,
2.3.94).
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Rover took a keen interest in the methods used to achieve these cost reductions. As
the firm at the forefront of the 'Japanization of work organization' in the British car
industry (Oliver and Wilkinson 1992), it followed the Japanese practice of demanding
surveillance of CarPress's attempts to introduce changes on the shopfloor. Various
mechanisms were used to accomplish this. CarPress managers and engineers attended
many routine meetings with Rover liaison staff to discuss matters of product and
process quality including 'cost-down', the euphemism for reducing part prices by
intensifying work effort. As we shall see in Chapter Seven, Rover's interventions
even extended to direct interference in shop-floor disputes.
The increasing use of a new style of factory audit, extending far beyond matters of
product quality, constitutes another significant supplier control device. Rover applies
its RG2000 audit to every one of its prime suppliers. The company's audit personnel
regularly visit firms like CarPress every year, armed like industrial bureaucrats with
their packs of assessment forms, audit criteria and interview notes and making critical
judgements on working practices, personnel policy and business performance 7 . They
are allowed to wander around the shop-floor at will and to interrogate who they think
fit. The auditors wield a significant influence even though their stringent demands for
change may not always correspond with the independent business aspirations of their
These audit criteria encompass a variety of different indicators of the restructuring of work and
employment relations each of which are marked on a 0 to 3 score. For example, there are sections
covering: the risk of discontinuity of production (which includes available means of strike-breaking);
personnel policy matters which include health and safety, the behaviour and appearance of employees,
single status, the physical integration of management with the workforce locations, company
communications and employee involvement; and work changes which include wider questions of the
development of coherent strategies for organizational change as well as particular work practices such
as teamworking. (Source: Section 5, Rover RG2000).
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suppliers. Not surprisingly, the audits are viewed with some ambivalence by the
CarPress management. The Personnel Manager said:
Yes, I must admit the Rover people have had a major impact because they make you do things
you probably would not otherwise do. The strength of this influence often depends on the
ability and perceptions of the auditors. The Rover auditors are of course particularly
influential because they are our major customer and we're therefore subject to regular in-depth
checks of company practices.
But I do find them annoying sometimes. They tend to display this patronising, holier than
thou, follow my model attitude. And in a sense, all they're doing is giving you all of these
building blocks to satisfj their own audit criteria but there aren't any connections. Sometimes,
too much of the change here is being driven by an obsession with the need to comply with the
customers' quality audits. Unfortunately, we're not being allowed to sit back and take a look
at what changes are really necessary for this company to succeed.
ATTITUDES TO JAPANIZATION
CarPress's Japanese and German customers applied similar instruments of
surveillance and control over the factory's product quality, process and business
organization. As a result, the density of interaction between these maj or customers
and CarPress managers and technical staff reached relatively high levels. This
enabled many senior staff to formulate their own subjective assessments of Japanese
management style and innovation. Dialogue with representatives of the customer was
commonplace, not only on CarPress's premises but just as frequently at the
customer's factory. Apart from regular meetings at different Rover plants, most
managers and technical staff visited Toyota and Honda's British factories at some
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time; many did this on a routine basis to address both substantial problems and some
of the minutiae of contractual, engineering and quality matters. A relatively high
number of engineers and managers also visited parent factories in Japan itself.
The diffusion of ideas and ideology followed further parallel routes. Some managers
were real bookworms, avidly devouring the latest business school offerings on the
'Japanese miracle'. Many had the seminal works of Dr Deming and the more quixotic
Tom Peters on their bookshelves. In addition, the majority of managers and senior
staff, and even some shop stewards, had at various times attended local seminars on
Japanese management practice organised by the WDA and other business agencies.
More recently, as we discuss in Chapter Six, CarPress established a series of 3 day
courses on teamworking and other new working practices for managers and a minority
of shop-floor workers. These were organised by a local brand of the ubiquitous
British management consultant with additional input from Honda and Toyota.
Although many managers and engineers expressed admiration for certain aspects of
Japanese management performance, and most accepted the drive for a restructuring of
work and employment relations on the CarPress shop-floor, one could nevertheless
discern an irritation with the notion that British companies should blindly follow the
Japanese path. On the general level this was often expressed somewhat crudely in
cultural and nationalistic terms. For example, a Production supervisor complained:
Okay, maybe some Japanese companies have got some good ideas, though I suspect as many
of them are American as Japanese. But I would have thought that this country, as pioneers in
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the industrial revolution should have some ideas of its own rather than follow the lead of some
old third rate country. Where have our ideas gone?
And a project engineer:
No, I wouldn't want to see a 'Japanization of industry' as you put it. No, we're a different
race, we're different people. We couldn't accept all the regimentation that you get over there.
They're all "yes men". They like taking their orders. And they don't complain or offer any
resistance. They don't seem to be the type of people who can take decisions as individuals.
Everything's done in groups and all their decision making takes a hell of a long time.
One could also discern a resentment of any implication that British managers were
inefficient and weak 'labour pushers' by comparison. The different CarPress
managers consistently criticised the generally held view that Japanese plants are more
productive than their British counterparts in terms of profit performance and both
capital and labour utilisation. Many demanded to know why the profitability and
productivity figures for the UK's Japanese transplants are not in the public domain.
Similarly, many provided anecdotal evidence of underutilisation of capital in the
Japanese plants they themselves had visited.
Moreover, with almost universal conviction, these managers and engineers rejected as
pure myth the idea that Japanese firms are structured around flat hierarchies. They
argued that Japanese managers benefited from a superior number of staff supporting
the function of control over the production process. This, of course, is congruent with
the evidence provided in Chapter Two. In contrast, it was the understaffed British
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managements, rather than their Japanese counterparts, who suffered stress and
overwork. The CarPress Production Manager expressed it this way:
In any case, not all the Japanese firms are lean producers. As far as I'm concerned many of
them are mob handed. Take Toyota for example. The management seem to have 3 or 4 levels
of staff to back them up. Far more than we have here. And they're certainly not as efficient as
they make out. Personally, I don't believe from what I've seen at Toyota and from what I've
learned elsewhere that the Japs work their men as fast as the equivalent CarPress worker.
And a similar view from a robotics engineer:
Well, I've visited a number of plants in Japan and they all tend to give me the same
impression. You talk about lean production but there's always plenty of people doing the
same job. They never move out of the company and they never seem to change jobs. In some
respects I don't suppose you can blame them. Their kids go to the company school, they went
to the company school and they all live in their company houses. So they start with a company
and never leave it. But many of them seem overmanned to me. When I was there for meetings
with the customer I'd be covering 6 or 7 disciplines. Electrical work, electronics, welding and
so forth. But they couldn't understand this approach. They always had the same men strictly
covering the same narrow range of disciplines.
Despite these caveats, the management seemed convinced that shop-floor working
practices and employment relations required a shake-up if CarPress was to rise to the
challenge of Japanese greenfield, hi-tech investment. Throughout most of its history,
capital investment in the British car industry has suffered at the expense of corporate
demands for immediate profits and dividend payments (Greenhaigh and Kilminster
1993); and despite recent waves of international modernization, many British plants
have retained their low investment records (Jurgens at al. 1993). In keeping with this
tradition, the CarPress board of directors consistently refused to consider long term
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capital investment on a coherent, strategic basis, preferring the cheaper option of
organizational change and specific technological investments when demanded by the
customer. Needless to say, CarPress's shopfloor managers resented this. Many
wistfully reflected on the Japanese propensity to carefully plan and financially support
the introduction of sophisticated dedicated capital equipment. As one quality manager
said, 'in this place, things are antiquated in comparison...what we need is an injection
of modem technology and Japanese philosophy'. But in truth, the management was
more envious of the Japanese capacity to exploit young, malleable labour on its
greenfield sites.
Although, on the basis of their regular visits to different Toyota and Honda plants,
Japanese transplant workers were variously described as, 'brainwashed, vacant and
empty', 'fully indoctrinated' and 'behaving as robots', this does not mean that things
would be any different if these workers were placed under the control of the CarPress
management. Far from it. In reality, any expressions of 'pity' merely translated into
regret that the CarPress workforce could not be equally subordinated. Indeed, one
objective of the change process was to undermine the defensive, collectivist culture on
the CarPress shopfloor. As the Operations Director expressed it:
We need to change our shop-floor culture by getting the workers out of this plant, by taking
them to some of these Japanese factories. They've never left it in their lives, they've never
seen anything else. And the problem we have is that our younger recruits are always gradually
contaminated by the older workforce, they rapidly get 'queered' so to speak. In the past, any
evidence of individual initiative has always been swamped by an attitude of "protect your
brother".
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What were the attitudes of the shopfloor workers to notions of 'Japanization' and
change at the workplace? Were they as uniformly unyielding as the above comment
suggests? In fact, as we shall see, although they revealed a clear sense of collective
interests, in terms of the demand for equality and greater control over their working
lives, initially there existed no consensus on whether 'Japanization' might support or
hinder this. Why was this?
Beynon's (1984) description of the 'factory consciousness' displayed by shop
stewards at Ford suggests that whilst these activists did not always cut themselves off
from political action outside of their immediate work environment, their class politics
and ideology were nevertheless essentially factory-based. This analysis can also apply
to the CarPress rank and file. And it has a particular bearing in the context of the
1990s, where the temporary demise of radical left wing politics and extra-
parliamentary working class activity leaves little for factory workers, or their stewards,
to cut themselves off from. Since the Rover sell-off, the CarPress shop stewards
enjoyed few opportunities for joint plant campaigns or even political discussions with
fellow car workers from other plants. Similarly, unlike the management and technical
staff, their members had virtually no contact with the workers employed by the
different customers who were intent on changing CarPress's shop-floor culture. Apart
from one or two employees who had friends or relatives working for a Japanese
company, the only information on the nature of Japanese practices came from the
media and the internal tendentious source of formal company communications.
Therefore, although the introduction of Japanese management innovations had
damaging implications for working class interests on the CarPress shopfloor, many of
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the recipients of these changes accumulated little of the required knowledge for
developing a coherent and united political response. The extant 'factory
consciousness' was starting to work against them. A quite critical example of this is
discussed in Chapter Seven.
Despite this, a good number of the workers interviewed did display a clear antipathy
towards the idea that their working lives should become 'Japanized'. It reflected a
fear and resentment of any imposition of an 'alien Japanese work ethic' which might
merely compound the existing levels of stress on the shop-floor. Like some of their
bosses, this resentment would sometimes be dressed explicitly in racist terms. As one
operator cynically remarked, 'you talk about hard work, loyalty, discipline, but the
Japanese ale like that aren't they? They all like to get on a daily sweat for a bowl of
rice. But that sort of life is not for me, this is Wales not Japan!' Others held equally
unambiguous views on the nature of Japanese work intensification and discipline. An
assembly shop operator felt that:
We're told that the Japanese way is the only way to work, that people are happier working for
Japanese companies. But I'm not so sure that's the case. They've got this teamworking and
they work just as hard, if not harder, than we do. The Japanese are the worse taskmasters of
all, they're worse than here. As I see it, in these Japanese finns everything has to be done their
way or else. If you don't like it then you either shut up or they show you the door.
And a crane driver:
I don't know what the Japanese working practices are about What I do know is that they're
continually cutting manning. I know about lean production, it's bad news, it's what they're
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trying on here. It's all threat, threat, threat. As far as I'm concerned the Japanese way is about
screwing the maximum amount of work from the minimum amount of men.
However, prior to the introduction of the new working practices, a surprising number
of other workers were less critical on these questions. This ambivalence could be
partially attributed to a lack of acquaintance with the class-based nature of the
'Japanization' process and to a blind hope that anything might be better than the
existing production regime. Such attitudes are not unusual amongst those whose
working lives have become grotesquely disfigured by the de-humanising hard work,
drudgery and monotony of traditional Taylorist forms of mass production 8 ; and they
become entirely logical in the context of the coercive forms of management that
accompany this.
The relationship between the CarPress management and the shopfloor was indeed
characterised by threat, intimidation, fear and antagonism. When given the chance to
express themselves during interviews, through discussions on the shopfloor, or
through questionnaire comments, time and again these workers referred to being
treated as 'animals', as 'cattle', as 'slaves' and as 'Jews in a concentration camp'
Many spoke of management in brusque, contemptuous terms, like the following two
assembly shop operators:
Yeah, I'm talking about fear. A fear of management and a fear of losing yourjob. I mean the
management here are a bunch of fucking liars. You can't trust 'em any further than you could
toss 'em. They tell us one thing and you get the opposite.
Parker and Slaughter (1988) discovered similar attitudes amongst workers confronted with new
management techniques at the GM-Toyota NUMMI plant in California and at different USA Chrysler
plants; the literature suggests that they are also common in Japan itself (Milkman 1991).
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And another:
These managers are pigs. They'll screw you into the ground. All they're interested in is
getting blood out of you.
These were not the comments of a small group of marginalised dissidents. They were
the views of the majority. One foreman expressed the fear that continually aggressive
and arrogant management attempts to exert greater control over the shopfloor were
creating 'an evil simmering of hatred'. And so, as we shall discover, they were, to the
extent that the most hardened outsider might be shocked by its intensity. But this
hatred had meaning and purpose; it did not hit out at everything in its path. It was
certainly not 'anarchistic' as some managers liked to refer to it. One toolmaker
commented that, 'I suppose if I was a manager I'd probably be the same as them, I'd
try and make as much money in the shortest time possible. That's just the system isn't
it?' Similarly, another said, 'I know that at the end of the day we have to rely on the
man upstairs, I understand that, I accept that. It's just that the man upstairs is a
clown'.
These people were not rejecting capitalist managerial prerogative; after all, decades of
labourism had seen to that. They did reject the explicit coercion and exploitation that
accompanies direct management control but at the same time they recognised that
factory production has a social basis in which management has a co-ordinating role.
As Beynon (1984) puts it, workers' views on management can have both structural
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and moral dimensions, 'the one structural, which places the action of management
within the structure of the large capitalist corporation; the other moral, which involves
a criticism of the action management takes in the plant and a moral judgement of the
managers as men' (p.112). At CarPress, the workers understood that complex
production processes require professional management. They did not believe that this
was forthcoming from their own managers. Neither did they believe that these
managers aspired to any sense of collective morality and decency as the following cry
of despair makes clear:
You just wouldn't believe the attitudes of the management here. They're so defensive.
Sometimes, you know, we would like to discuss our work problems with them, we're open to
that. But they can't do it, they're not capable of it. They retreat into a sort of defensive shell
and not only refuse to talk to you but they end up treating you like shit.
You'd be appalled at some of the things they say to us. You might be working away, sweating
like hell probably, and the boss [Operations Director] will walk past you down the gang way
and shout out, "I know you're only putting on a show because I'm here you Welsh wogs!"
They say dreadful things like that, dreadful language. Outsiders just wouldn't believe it.
So how can you have teamworking here? You know if this were a rugby football team it'd be
like your team captain giving you a right dressing down or a kick in the teeth minutes before
you're due to run on the pitch. It's not the workforce, it's the management who's got the
wrong attitude for teamworking.
In these circumstances it was not surprising that some workers clearly supported the
notion of introducing a new style of Japanese management at CarPress. A typical
reaction from this group was, 'I like the Japanese way, I like the way the Japanese
management and workers are all at one'. Two women in the assembly shop similarly
believed that, 'they all work together don't they? They do seem to have a good way of
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working, I think it will come here one day, I do hope so', and, 'I honestly feel that the
Japanese would look after you better because they treat you all the same'. But these
were vague egalitarian aspirations based on hope rather than substance. They were
also tempered by a cynical realism, itself conditioned by weary experience of
membership of a subordinated producer class in the Western system of consumer
capitalism. As a shopfloor inspector put it:
But the Japanese are a different breed to us, they're brought up in a different way. We're not
like that and never will be. Everybody's talking about the Japanese. What's that place called
over there? Toyota Town? Where all the workers get their houses, their schools and the rest
of it. And all we get is a fucking lousy wage packet and redundancy. And when we get made
redundant our managers always get promoted, they never lose their jobs. So as I say, we'll
never be like the Japanese, we'll always be different.
In the context of the 'classless' 1990s, some people might be forgiven for thinking
that factories like CarPress represent curious anachronisms, abandoned by the new
'soft management' and the supposedly consensual industrial relations environment
that goes with it. But, as will become clear, this is too simple a view. The remaining
chapters will demonstrate that the politics of production in this factory are not
outdated. Its management's attempts to restore the 'right to manage' and exert greater
leverage over worker effort bridge a continuum of coercion and control; a continuum
spanning the crude macho management of the likes of Michael Edwardes in the 1 980s
to the more refined contemporary Japanese techniques. It is a contemporary politics
of production still characterised by class conflict over the universal managerial






There's two of us in this room who've been working at this plant for 18 years doing the same
actual job as we were doing under Austin Rover. But although the job's the same it's become
that much harder. Manning levels have got worse for a start and the plant's still being asked to
do the same amount of work with the same old machines. So when they cut the manning you
then have to cover for A, B and C personnel who have now gone. The effect is that they give
you more to do in target hours. And on top of this they give you extra tasks to fit in where you
can. For example, during the old days under Rover you'd have quality men walking around
doing regular quality checks on your work. And you'd have other admin staff coming around
to write up the buy-off ticket to sign your job off. But now we have to do all that sort of extra
work ourselves and they still expect you to get your pieces of work out per hour. In fact, you
have to get more pieces out per hour. So when the management start to talk about "back to
basics" what they really mean is "more work, more pain, less gain". (Press Shop Operator).
There's certain aspects of the Japanese way I like and certain aspects I don't like. In some
respects it's a total culture shock compared to what was going on under Rover. And I mean a
real culture shock. I often find that I'm saying to myself, "God, why have I got to work all
these long hours? God, why can't I switch off for just 5 minutes during the day and have a
chat with somebody?" (Project Engineer).
The seductive maxim 'working smarter rather than harder' has become a mantra of the
various apologists for the new management techniques of the 1 990s. In fact, as the
above comments testif', workers in manufacturing industry, subject to an increased
exercise of managerial prerogative in the distinctive political and economic conditions
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of the past 15 years, are now working harder as much as smarter. Over this period,
British manufacturing industry has displayed a clear tendency towards a reduction in
the porosity of the working day which is not always overtly strategic but which instead
may occur slowly and steadily, often in an uneven and piecemeal fashion (Nichols
1991; Elger 1990a, 1990b).
Elger's overviews of a number of British case studies suggest that rather than aim for
a fundamental workplace restructuring through either technological innovation or
work re-organization, employers are attempting to improve productivity through de-
manning and task flexibility. These types of changes exhibit a bias towards 'the
horizontal enlargement rather than multi-skilling ofjobs and towards an
intensification of labour, especially via the reduced porosity of work routines' (l990b,
p.38). Similarly, in their analysis of contemporary changes to working practices in the
auto industry, Marsden et al. (1985) argue that different reports of people working
harder are neither here nor there; what is more pertinent is the evidence of additional
time people are working, that is, the additional time they actually spend on their feet
performing labour, which thus closes up the porosity of the working day. Although
such an approach runs the risk of discounting subjective assessments of effort, it does
highlight an essential point. That is, what is central to the intensification of labour
and therefore more important than the exact nature of the different management
attempts to improve productivity and their impact on worker perceptions is, as Nichols
puts it, 'that more labour is squeezed out in a given time, or - the same idea looked at
the other way around - that the porosity of the working day is closed up as more
labour gets squeezed into it' (1991, p.573).
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Nichols goes on to suggest that the more mundane, piecemeal changes to
manufacturing working practices impact upon general work rates to, if anything, a
greater extent than the crude increase of effort brought about by a fear of macho
management. That is, as well as raising output per worker by 'speed-up' and multi-
machine minding, these new practices act to close up the porosity of the working day
by reducing break times; by reducing any idle time in production periods; and by
introducing task accretion.
At CarPress, both the macho and the incremental approach to management served to
induce a progressive increase in work rates. Some changes were effected by a slow
process of chipping away at custom and practice; some were subject to negotiated
agreement; and others were enforced by managerial threat and coercion.
During the 1980s, de-manning and the compensatory development of labour flexibility
practices constituted principle features of this process as they did in many other
British manufacturing plants. But following the change in status of the plant from a
satellite pressed part manufacturing operation to an independent first tier supplier
feeding a number of JIT final assemblers, the CarPress management faced new
pressures to exert greater control over labour utilisation and work rates. In particular,
the new demands of the customer, shifts in the nature of the plant's production control
system, the inadequacies of ageing machinery and persistent internal and external
pressures to drive down unit labour costs all warranted an explicit attack on the
production operators' ability to partially control their own working time. This chapter
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provides an analysis of the meaning of these changes at the point of production.
Chapter Six extends the enquiry to the impact of labour flexibility and new practices
such as teamworking on all sections of the CarPress workforce. Rather than treat
these processes as unproblematic, the analysis draws out the contradictions and
conflicts that accompany the 'Japanization' of work effort.
THE PRODUCTION CONTROL SYSTEM
Production control at CarPress contained elements ofjust in time organization.
Ostensibly, the system did appear to conform to Ohno's (1988) well known
supermarket analogy, where the exact quantity of the necessary materials arrive at the
factory gates just in time for consumption in the process of production and the
required type and exact quantity of finished parts are despatched to the customer just
in time for further productive consumption.
The plant developed close, long term relationships with its main steel suppliers in
South Wales. Consequently, tightly co-ordinated order/supply arrangements ensured
that the necessary sizes and specifications of steel coil and strip arrived at the factory
just 4 hours before they were needed for production. At the opposite end of the
operation, exact quantities of the required pressed assemblies were despatched to
customers such as Rover, Toyota and Honda, four times a day, five days a week.
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The external appearance of the CarPress factory production system evoked an image
of smooth, flow line, JIT control. However, the process of investigating the inner
workings of this black box exposed certain technological, organizational and labour
relations arrangements which were more complex, imperfect and troublesome than the
business school text books suggest.
Apart from a small number of cell enclaves manufacturing parts for Toyota, Honda
and Opel, the main press and assembly shops did not conform to ideal type SIT
production principles; most lines operated on the basis of 3 or 4 week cycles. That is,
batches of typically 10,000 parts, sufficient to cover 3 or 4 weeks of supply. Machine
downtime was the principal constraint here.
In Japan, JIT systems function to provide low cost, low stock production control
which is essential for the financial viability of the Japanese multi-model marketing
tradition. This in turn relies on small batch production, whose efficiency, as Williams
etal. point out, 'rests not on a mastery of production but on a mastery of unproductive
time. More exactly, the Japanese do not seek reduced unproductive time for its own
sake; instead they try to minimise the wasted breakdown time while what we may call
the 'contributing downtime' of set-up is used constructively to secure the downstream
objective [of process efficiency]' (1994b, p.64 .). In their study of different Japanese
press shops, Williams et a!. found that although machine utilisation time varied
between 68% and 85% what united the different plants was their effective use of
residual unproductive time, principally to ensure rapid die changes over single shifts.
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As a result, the Japan-based manufacturers are able to secure small batch production
through technological means.
In the auto industry, Toyota pioneered these flexible manufacturing techniques by
implementing Single Minute Exchange of Dies (SMED). Evoking Taylorian
principles of rationality and efficiency, Shingo, the founder of the SMED system,
argued that it is 'a scientific approach to set-up time reduction that can be applied in
any factory to any machine' (1985, p.26). By rationalising the process through a
combination of incremental improvements to manual die changing, the introduction of
new working practices and the more recent employment of automated die side-
loaders, Toyota and eventually many other Japanese manufacturers were able to
reduce the set-up time frame from one of hours to minutes (Shingo 1985; Cusumano
1985).
For a large autocomponents plant that was attempting to compete in a highly
competitive global market, the performance of CarPress was poor in comparison.
Typical machine utilisation rates measured just 49% in 1994. Although long-
established continuous improvement SMED meetings contributed to a reduction in the
proportion of total working time expended on die changes this was more than negated
by managerial incompetence on questions of investment in tooling, machine allocation
and labour deployment. The time lost due to faulty machines and tools, machines
awaiting new jobs and labour shortages together amounted to 27% of total working
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hours in 1993 and 34% in 1994; they accounted for 52% of downtime in 1993 and
74% in 1994'.
Therefore, as these figures suggest, although the CarPress management was
attempting to improve machine flexibility, a lack of both capital investment and
coherent planning militated against the process. Consequently, the machine set-up
process was relatively backward compared to Japanese automation. For most presses,
die changing was a matter of transporting dies from toolroom to machine by a
combination of slinging devices, overhead cranes and fork lift trucks; the same
equipment was then used to load the dies on to the machine bolsters; finally, teams of
toolsetters would carefully assemble and secure the die in a slow process of trial and
error, ensuring that it was exactly centred in the bolster and that its shut height was
sufficient to yield acceptable pressed parts.
Many of the managers interviewed contemplated these problems with some
ambiguity. Few were actually interested in operating a full blown JIT system. In a
factoiy where 'production is God', the manufacturing people perceived such
innovations as annoying impediments to output. As one superintendent observed:
Car assemblers like Honda can be set up to demand say, 100 parts on certain hours each day.
But if the Press Shop were to comply in just in time fashion we'd be spending all day setting
up machines and not producing anything! It's unworkable. We just haven't got the technology
that the Japanese use.
'Press Shop Downtime Analysis Sheets, Materials Dept., CarPress Ltd.
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In similar vein, CarPress' s Operations Director, the man in charge of production, had
little positive to say about JIT and other Japanese production control innovations. For
him, downtime certainly constituted a problem but it was nothing more and nothing
less than lost production:
Our current downtime adds up to something like 1/2 million blows a week. That's a lot of
downtime. It falls into 2 main categories, toolroom problems and physical machine setting. If
these times could be halved we'd put in another 300,000 blows per week, no problem.
However, despite these technological complications, both the general impact of global
competitive pressures and the particular interventions of the plant's major Japanese
and British customers described in the previous chapter forced the management to
effect simple cost reductions aimed at improving plant efficiency. Between 1989 and
1993, plant employment declined by 20% and output per worker almost doubled. At
the same time, stock and in-production buffers were being considerably squeezed.
CarPress managed to double its stock/turnover ratios from 10.0 to 20.6 over this
period; work in progress reduced from £1.1 million to £642,000; and WIP/turnover
ratios almost trebled. In the context of lean production, stock/turnover ratios
constitute significant indicators of productive efficiency and buffer levels (Cusuinano
1985, Williams et al. 1992). As Williams et al. have argued, this is because, 'low
stocks are an important indicator of the physical integration of manufacturing
operations and measures the manufacturer's ability to realise smooth continuous flow
in multi-process manufacturing; flow is an important influence on productivity and
costs because smooth flow takes out indirect handling labour and allows direct labour
to work continuously and efficiently' (1992, p.22).
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In a number of ways, therefore, these changes in production control at CarPress were
congruent with arrangements in the Japanese transplants in South Wales. The
systematic reductions in manning, stocks and line side buffers could validly be
described as producing something leaner and, as we shall see, more work intensive,
than a customary 'Fordist' mass production operation.
The severe manufacturing constraints generated by the plant's poor record in the
management of capital employed contrasts sharply with these statistical indicators of
productive efficiency. This contrast will be addressed in due course. For the moment,
what should be recognised is that the CarPress management succeeded in raising
labour productivity and factory throughput to a significant degree. This was not
operationalised in an overtly corporate strategic sense; production control managers
introduced their stock control measures and other cost reductions at the behest of
external customers rather than CarPress's most senior manufacturing managers who
remained obsessed with output quantities. But the crucial point to appreciate is that
although the production control system was developing in a piecemeal way and could
not be described as 'text book' just in time, the process of stock and buffer reduction
had clear implications for the intensification of labour, for the worker's capacity to
take an unofficial breather. That is, as Nichols has argued, neither the debates about
what exactly should count as JIT (see for example, Jenkins 1994; Wood 1991) nor
certain representations of these changes in British manufacturing as improvements in
the technical efficiency of management should be allowed to 'distract from their
significance for the closing up of the pores of the working day/labour intensification'
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(1991, p.589). The impact of these changes upon the shop-floor will now be
considered.
LABOUR INTENSIFICATION AT THE POINT OF PRODUCTION
During the course of the research, two questiormaire-based attitude surveys were
carried out at the plant (see Appendix A). The first of these (October 1994) asked
respondents whether they believed they were working harder compared to 10 years
ago. Of the 236 respondents with more than 10 years service, 69% replied 'yes', 27%
'no' and only 4% were undecided. The shop-floor operators perceived management's
attempts to exert greater leverage over work effort as a multifaceted threat which
materialised in a number of different ways. Many complained of a gradual but
inexorable tightening of production targets and the unchallenged use of traditional
work study methods to re-time jobs and remove 'excess' operators from the line.
Others spoke of management's attempts to mobilise the disciplinary pressure of
competition from harder working colleagues to extract greater work effort; and for
many workers, perpetual management surveillance could sometimes effect a
compulsion to relinquish informal breaks and to persevere on the line, as the
following comment from one operator exemplifies:
I've been working here for 17 years and for the last few years Ijust haven't enjoyed life at all.
It all boils down to the attitude of management. These days I come to work and I feel like I'm
in a concentration camp. I tell you, I dread coming in on nights, you're on your feet all the
time and you get knackered, there's a real need for regular breaks. But we don't get them
178
anymore. The management just treat you like kids, they keep looking at you, checking up on
you all the time.
On a general level, there was nothing particularly distinctive about these personal
accounts of work intensification. Within the context of social controls o'ver the length
of the working week they typically embody a process that is inherent to capitalist
production. As Marx (1976) observed, 'capital's tendency, as soon as a prolongation
of the hours of labour is once and for all forbidden, is to compensate for this by
systematically raising the intensity of labour, and converting every improvement in
machinery into a more perfect means of soaking up labour power' (p.542). However,
the contradiction alluded to above, between the constraints of CarPress's inefficient
technological organization of production and the flexibility necessitated by the
piecemeal development of lean production, resulted in the employment of new labour
intensifying methods which corresponded to the tightly supervised, highly disciplined
bell to bell practices described in Chapter Two. If the CarPress management was
either incapable or unwilling to modemise the plant's capital assets then it insisted
that labour should take up the slack instead.
This was not necessarily a question of vindictiveness. At least not for some managers.
Under circumstances which were partly of its own making, management exhausted all
other options; it had no alternative but to squeeze labour. Many middle managers
complained of an absence of modem production planning instruments and indeed, a
lack of corporate commitment to long term planning for the site. For example, at the
time of the research, the company was investing over £1 million on a new computer
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integrated information system but this could only be used for financial control
purposes rather than production planning. And these financial controls inevitably
militated against the emergence of coherent production policies. One Assembly Shop
superintendent remarked bitterly on this:
My main problem is the fmancial restrictions on the budgets needed to keep the equipment
running. It's like a noose continually tightening around your neck.
The responsibility lies with senior management. They're obsessed with the idea that if you
meet your budgets then you'll satisfy your customer. But this is crap. Because whatever we
do here we seem to get ourselves into bad situations, logjams, all sorts. And we don't seem to
understand how to get out of them. That's because there's insufficient production planning.
There's never any detailed production planning from the top and there's never any long term
production planning either.
Faced with reducing material buffers and machine downtime problems, many UK
managers would be expected to rely on the safety valve of human buffers, usually in
the form of overtime. But at CarPress, the rule of the customer had reduced this
option2 . As the Chief Production Manager expressed it:
Our new concerns about productivity are now about complying with customer schedules and
meeting strict budgets. The main rule now is that we must produce 'x' units of parts for the
customer in 'x' period of time. Therefore, the pressure is on continually to perform to budget
levels. Because of this, overtime has become the last option for us. It's a major cost. So all
alternative avenues must be explored before we resort to it. We have to continually look at the
question of more efficient labour utilisation, labour redeployment, more flexibility, and so on.
2 The problems of machine reliability and poor set-up times ensured that budgetary cost constraints
against overtime working did not extend to CarPress's craft workers and white collar engineers both of
whom worked considerable amounts of extra hours. See Chapter Eight.
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So the situation on the shop-floor was this. Most materials were delivered to the plant
just in time for production; in-production buffers were subject to systematic reduction;
and corporate parsimony on capital investment in combination with ineffective
production planning were producing unfavourable capital utilisation rates.
Accordingly, in the light of the customer's multi-requirement for a more flexible
supply system, increased output and reduced costs, the only remaining option was to
run the serviceable machines flat out and to squeeze 60 minutes of productive work
from every worker in every hour. As one manager said, 'we had nowhere else to go.
With no stores and not enough machines up and running we could not switch to
alternatives. All we could do was put pressure on the supervision to crack the whip on
the men, crack the whip on idle time'.
This attack on idle time was two pronged. Firstly, in the autumn of 1994,
management sought to dismantle a payment by results bonus scheme which it had
insisted on introducing at the time of the acquisition of the plant from Rover but
which eventually came to bestow significant levels of individual operator control over
working time. Secondly, it sought to introduce a more disciplined continuous
production system through tightly supervised, measured day, bell to bell working.
Both of these processes will now be considered in more detail.
Payment By Results
In general, the principal difference between piece-rate bonus systems and flat-rate
systems such as measured day work is that, 'in a piece-rate factory the workers are
disciplined by the rate. In a time-rate factory, where men are paid by the hour or week
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at the same rate, no matter how much work is produced, work discipline has to be
established through organization' (Nichols and Beynon 1977, p.133). However, this
statement disguises important qualitative differences in the degree of discipline, the
degree of control, that can be exerted over the labour process. For example, although
Burawoy's (1979) detailed analysis of the process of workers 'making out' in a piece-
rate engineering factory in the USA makes the central point that such activities can be
useful to capital in that they contribute to a process of simultaneously obscuring the
creation of surplus value and securing worker consent, it also highlights the different
ways in which workers exploit their tacit skills to maintain a degree of individual
control over their work. As a result, 'workers control their own machines instead of
being controlled by them, and this enhances their autonomy. They put their machine
into motion single handedly, and this creates the appearance that they can, as
individuals, transform nature into useful commodities. The system of reward is based
on individual rather than collective effort' (1979, p.81).
In fact, pure piece-rate systems are now a rarity in manufacturing industry. Instead,
many factories operate payment by results (PBR) systems where, typically, basic
wages are topped up by individual payments made on the basis of time allowedltime
taken to produce a job (Conboy 1976). Measured day work (MDW) systems differ
om this in that output and productivity are determined wholly by management
organization rather than worker incentives. With MDW, it is the prerogative of
management to specify the level of daily plant performance required and to supervise
work measurement, the monitoring of performance and shop-floor order to ensure that
this specified level of performance is achieved. Such systems are indispensable to
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highly disciplined, low buffer, continuous production regimes; they demand controlled
worker flexibility rather than autonomy and strict management supervision rather than
collusion with workers over practices such as 'making out'.
In the early years of the British auto industry, piecework functioned as a system of
control exactly as Nichols and Beynon describe it. Workers were rated for each
individual operation performed and if they produced their parts they were paid; if cars
could not be sold and the track was stopped then they would be laid off. It was a form
of casual labour that served management's interests well (Thornett 1987). However,
during the 1 960s and 70s, a period when organised labour in the industry steadily
grew in confidence and militancy, piece-work systems increasingly became subject to
both individual and union negotiation. As Brown (1973) observed, ratefixers were
forced to haggle over piece rates rather than impose them, whilst the piecemeal
growth of custom and practice, such as the periodic re-observation of work whenever
the operator found the going tough, acted to mitigate the degree of management
control exerted. Thus, with the balance of forces between capital and labour in this
period sometimes favouring the latter, the tendency of piecework was to drift in the
direction of 'managerial indulgence' as managers became obsessed with getting work
out the door and avoiding strikes.
Inevitably, management launched a counter-offensive in due course. Their attempts to
effect a transition from piecework to MDW became one of the major causes of strikes
in the vehicle assembly industry during the 1 970s, particularly at British Leyland and
Chrysler (Friedman 1977). The BL management embarked on a long drawn out
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campaign to implement MDW at the end of the 1960s. By 1971, after many sessions
of troubled negotiations interrupted by periodic walkouts and strikes, agreements were
signed for its introduction at all of BL' s Pressed Steel plants, including what was to
become the CarPress factory in South Wales. However, the strength of the BL unions
at this time ensured that even though piecework was lost, the work rates governed by
the new MDW systems were still subject to union negotiation and varying degrees of
mutuality (Thornett 1987).
This is an important point to note in the context of the CarPress acquisition of the
Rover plant. At the company's other UK factories, unions were at best suffered rather
than treated as equal negotiating partners; the principal personnel policy objective was
to marginalise effective trade union organization. The management's more unitary
style of industrial relations ensured that the weakly organised CarPress workforces in
the South East were unable to take full advantage of incentive bonus systems in the
ways described above; indeed, at these plants, payment by results continued to deliver
significant levels of management control over work rates. The inherited MDW
system in South Wales was perceived as a conspicuous threat to this control. With
Rover, workers were expected to reach individual production targets commensurate
with required plant performance but strong trade union organization ensured that
management only rarely took disciplinaiy action against individuals who failed to
perform satisfactorily. Moreover, although, writers such as Marsden et al. (1985)
point out that the more macho Rover management of the I 980s partially succeeded in
untying the hands of the company's industrial engineers, in fact the process of setting
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production targets was still subject to significant trade union influence. One CarPress
industrial engineer recalled:
Under the Rover management the rule was that the steward could always be present to stand
with his member, to safeguard the union member against the possibility of the time study
setting too high a standard. And of course the emotive thing was always the performance
assessment. We used to get some really serious arguments over this. Mark, my mate on the
next desk, used to get dreadful problems, he literally couldn't move around the factory without
a steward tailing him all the time. It used to frighten him to walk into the assembly shop. He
virtually needed a day pass to get into the place!
Mark, a staff union representative himself, had no hesitation in endorsing CarPress's
drive to restore managerial prerogative on the shop-floor:
It didn't matter what I was doing, setting up equipment, setting a standard, doing a study, it
made no difference. They would always stand behind me, watching me. But when the
CarPress management came they knocked all of that on the head. The management saw shop
stewards standing around, not producing, and watching me sweat, watching me do all of the
work. So now the union influence has declined, they certainly don't exert any control over me
any more. As far as I'm concerned their days are over, and good riddance.
To accomplish this, at the beginning of 1990 the new CarPress management decided,
against the grain, to jettison MDW and introduce its own trusted payment by results
scheme based on targets set solely by management. Rather than countenance the
endurance of Rover's system of partial mutuality, the company was prepared to
concede to its South Wales workforce the limited degree of control that accompanies
any individual PBR system but without allowing shop stewards any influence over the
work measurement and target setting process. Now the hands of the industrial
engineers really were untied and an explicit process of work intensification ensued as
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the production standards established under the outgoing Rover management were
systematically discarded in favour of more challenging targets.
The engineers under both Rover and CarPress managements assessed effort
expenditure at 100 per cent B SI 3 . However, departing from British Standard work
measurement practice, the CarPress management refused to include in their new
standards what is known as 'outside work'; that is, time taken for tasks such as
material handling operations, loading steel coils and so on; or even components of
relaxation allowances, such as going to the toilet4 . They were only interested in
paying out bonus for pure productive labour time. Therefore, once the management
secured agreement for its new bonus system, the CarPress industrial engineers set
about using classic time and motion work study techniques in the process of
establishing new, tougher standards for new jobs. The lack of an effective shop
steward challenge enabled the engineers to mobilise their quasi-scientific methods of
The BSI 0-100 rating scale is based upon the notion that a typical worker should produce x standard
units of work per hour for his/her time work rate of pay and x + y units of work per hour at the expected
incentive performance level. Translated into a ratings scale, it is assumed that the normal performance
of time workers is 75 standard units per hour and 100 standard units per hour at the expected incentive
performance level. In other words, leaving aside inconvenient factors such as macho management,
labour subjectivity and particular class conflicts on the shop-floor, Britain's work study engineers,
working under the auspices of the British Standards Institute, decided that the normal performance of
time workers was three-quarters of that of workers operating under incentive. (Source: BS3 138: 1979).
The BSI 100 scale is now the standard for the engineering industry. However, other scales which
equate to, and operate under the same principles as the BSI 100 scale, are also in use. CarPress used
the 100/133 scale which corresponds to the BSI 75/100 scale.
Basic work cycle times (used for the purposes of both incentive payment calculation and production
line balancing) normally comprise three components. 'Outside work' consists of work elements which
must necessarily be performed by a worker outside the machine controlled time, such as material
handling; 'inside work' consists of elements which can be performed by a worker within the machine
controlled time (that is, machine operation); and a relaxation allowance which includes a fatigue
allowance and attention to such personal needs as going to the toilet. Machine controlled time is
defined as the time taken to complete that part of the work cycle which is determined only by factors
peculiartothemachine. (Source: BS3138: 1979; BS3375: 1985).
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effort assessment to translate human motion into machine motion in a 'professional'
quest for maximum labour utilisation. But the management was also faced with
literally hundreds of existing standards which required uprating. Lacking sufficient
engineers to re-time these jobs, prevailing cycle times were adjusted by a standard
factor to remove unproductive labour time. On this basis, new cycle times, issue
times and production standards were generated. Of course, 'outside work' was not
mysteriously removed from the real labour process; material handling, the removal of
scrap and pallet changes remained routine tasks. The effect was to ratchet up the
effort required to reach target scores.
However, although the management succeeded in securing greater leverage over the
effort exerted during productive labour time, it simultaneously forfeited a degree of
control over idle time. Like many individual incentive schemes, the CarPress bonus
system was designed to intensif' the extraction of relative surplus value from the
shop-floor workforce. If a typical job received a 'standard performance' rating of 300
parts/hour then by hitting the 133% target of 400/hour the scheme paid a premium of
£1.50 per hour; hitting the 150% target of 450/hour paid £1.75 per hour; and operators
reaching the 200% level of 600 parts/hour enjoyed a bonus of £2 per hour. One
industrial engineer commented:
Some of the operators would regularly go for the 200% target which was brilliant because,
okay, you'd be paying out £2 for every hour achieved at this rate but at the same time yQu'd be
getting twice as much work out of them for the price of one man!
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The problem for management was that although this was certainly true for one or two
shop-floor mavericks, the vast majority of production operators maintained their own
informal collective discipline over target attainment. A characteristic of the bonus
system was that if a job received a 'standard performance' rating of, say, 300
parts/hour, then over an 8 hour working day an operator working at the 133%
incentive performance level of 400 parts/hour would complete the day's quota 2 hours
early. The operator would then have the choice of accumulating bonus, taking a long
break at the end of the shift (or periodic breaks during the shift), or a combination of
the two. Despite the constraints imposed by the tightening of standards, the operators
found that they still retained sufficient discretion and control - a simple control of
speed of movement - to vary their work rates to achieve these various ends. And a
collective shop-floor discipline ensured that most operators did not earn excessive
bonus or finish their jobs too early, thereby exposing this control to the watchful eyes
of the industrial engineers. One Press Shop superintendent expressed this as follows:
Although there was never a ceiling, most of the operators created their own ceiling of 133.
They'd go like the clappers to achieve it and then sit on their arses in the Wendy house [tea-
room] playing cards or reading papers. I'd say, maybe about 10 to 15% would go for above
133, a few might even go for 150 but you'd get a shop-floor reaction.. For example, we used to
have a policy of taking on a lot of temporary workers who had a tendency to go for gold. But
the culture on the shop-floor was that you didn't go flat out or you'd do yourself out of a job.
So the permanent operators used to lean on the temporary workers and threaten them if they
didn't change their ways. And it worked of course.
Antagonism over work effort, between workers on the one hand endeavouring to
create their own portions of time and supervision and industrial engineers on the
other, insisting on the maximisation of working time, has been described as a
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customary 'game' in capitalist mass production, involving elements of both conflict
and collusion (Burawoy 1979; Jones 1994). But in an environment of lean
production, this 'game' rapidly becomes dysfunctional; it transforms into a more
explicit class struggle. For example, the panopiy of Government and employer
restrictions placed on the ability to strike induced the CarPress shop stewards and their
members to implement alternative effective sanctions against the management.
Almost as a matter of routine, the bonus system would be turned against the company
during a 'work to rule' when the whole of the shop-floor steadfastly refused to work
above the minimum 100% standard performance level. Constraints on output caused
by machine downtime presented further possibilities for shop-floor resistance to
managerial control. In the face of union opposition to the removal of unproductive
labour from the new production standards, the management was forced to concede the
payment of average bonus for any periods of inactivity that were beyond an operator's
control, that is downtime. Of course, management assumed that whenever a machine
became disabled the operators concerned would be immediately switched to
alternative lines. In fact, the mediocre machine utilisation rates outlined above often
hindered this. And the shop-floor knew this. The general resentment at the
implementation of tougher targets and reduced manning was sometimes channelled
towards certain disabling actions. Despite management warnings, operators would
often throw teabags and other rubbish into machine oil sumps or toss coke cans into
press beds. They also possessed a portfolio of other more clandestine tricks which
had an immediate effect on production. One ex-shop steward explained:
It's the easiest thing in the world to fuck up the company if you know how. I'm not saying
what, but we could make certain adjustments to our machines, you know? Then the foreman
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might come up to you and ask, "Dai, how's your score, why's your machine not running?"
And I'll tell him "well I'm on downtime boss, my machines broken down and I've tried but I
can't find a spare fitter." In fact, they've cut down in the tool room that much that sometimes
you might not get a fitter for weeks! So you'd end up getting your Nett up [target] and your
bonus money while the Company's losing production!
In the context of the economic and political conditions of the 1 990s, which favoured
capital in so many ways, a further management counter-attack was inevitable. The
withdrawal of MDW in favour of PBR during 1990 might have intensified shop-floor
labour to a degree but it failed to compensate for low machine utilisation rates by
increasing labour utilisation to the extent required by the evolving lean production
regime. Production operators continued to forge their own versions of 'enrichment'
and 'control'. As Beynon observed during his research at Ford, when given the
chance workers will 'work slower; they work back the line; they share out jobs; they
mess around - all to create that bit more space, that bit of room to lead "a normal life".
Yet it is precisely this space, (call it autonomy or independence; call it control or
humanity) which the march of capitalist expansion seeks to regulate and ultimately
deny' (1984, p.389). The CarPress management became obsessed with denying their
own shop-floor workforce this private space. The Personnel Manager:
The working system we had then was like the old flat earth syndrome in that people demanded
that it must never be challenged. The underlying principle was that people would not work
unless they had a target, an hourly target in terms of parts, money and breaks. But my
argument was that our shop-floor workers are defined as hourly paid employees which means
they're paid by the hour for their labour time. And when we pay an hourly rate our expectation
should be for the full 100% effort in every hour and not 45 minutes in every hour which was
the attitude of most of them.
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To win this objective, the management secured a new working practices agreement in
the summer of 1994, following a six month dispute with the shop-floor unions (see
Chapter Seven and Appendix D). The agreement assured the introduction of practices
such as teamworking and kaizen; it also re-imposed measured day work coupled with
the gradual implementation of strict bell to bell working, Japanese style5.
The Restoration of Measured Day Work
Effective MDW systems require effective management. At CarPress, the demands of
the customer were synchronized with available capital by traditional production
planning methods; these demands were synchronized with available labour by crude
coercion. The incentive bonus scheme was discarded in favour of a plant performance
scheme which paid just £7.50 per week provided plant efficiency exceeded the agreed
minimum of 133%. However, the management was well aware that this would not
compensate for the loss of individual incentive. Consequently, the new agreement
stipulated that individual target performance must still be measured and any operator
falling below their previous average performance would be subject to formal
discipline administered by supervision. Effectively, in a move reminiscent of Marx's
description of nineteenth century factory despotism6 , the rhythm of the machine was
The withdrawal of PBR in favour of MDW should not be construed merely as a process of the
CarPress management catching up with its competitors. PBR systems are not anachronisms in British
manufacturing industry. As Beaston (1993) has established, around 30% of workers in British industry
are still covered by individual PBR arrangements; and 51% of firms in metal goods, engineering and
vehicles use variations of individual incentive pay. However, Beaston also points out that since the
1970s, the number of worker covered by both collective and PBR agreements has gone into decline in
favour of performance related pay, merit pay and financial participation schemes. This concerted
management attack on workers' control over pay determination and associated work effort is now a
general trend in British industry. In the context of the requirements of continuous lean production, it
also constitutes a particular, though quite fundamental, aspect of the 'Japanization' process.
6 K Marx (1976), Capital Volume 1, pp.548-550.
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supposed to overshadow the self-control of the worker; and the self-policing of work
effort surrendered to the superintendence of production.
Although some foremen displayed satisfaction at this apparent return to 'the old days'
when, as one reflected, 'you used to be an overseer as opposed to a supervisor, those
were the days when the bully boy was king, the bigger the mouth you had the better',
many foremen, in truth, cast themselves as reluctant despots. Most were ex-shop-
floor operators themselves. The new disciplinary arrangements offended their
political sensibilities and resulted in an intensification of their own labour. One
younger foreman, who admitted to being completely exhausted after just three years in
the job, commented:
You see, it's all about making me flilly accountable for the whole performance. And to put it
simply, that's to get a minimum of 133 out of every operator every day. The pressure can be
unbearable. Most nights I go home, have a shower, have some tea and then just fall asleep
because I'm totally knackered. The wife's always complaining that whenever I'm home I'm
asleep. But even when you're awake you take work home in your head, your head's buzzing,
you're writing mental notes all the time. It's just crazy! That's how I feel. When I was an
operator at least I used to be able to go home and switch off. But not any more.
Another commented on the policing of work effort:
My instructions are to push them to the limit. Just this morning my manager marched up to me
and said he'd seen one of my men talking to a mate down at the other end of the plant. And he
wanted to know what I'm going to do about it, why aren't I disciplining him? That's the key
change in my job. It's gone from one of using the skill of talking and coaxing people to the
use of pure discipline all the time.
I reckon this has all been caused by the downfall of the trade unions. They've got no power
any more. It's all about Maggie Thatcher. Believe me, our management used to say to us
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"well now we've got Maggie, she's doing her stuff for us, let's take advantage of it, let's kick
'em in the balls". And that's exactly what they're doing and I'm afraid I'm stuck in the
middle.
Not long after the disposal of payment by results, bell to bell working was introduced.
This was not bell to bell in the conventional sense of gradually eroding such traditions
as washing-up time or the relaxation of work at the end of each shift. Instead, the
explicit aim was to secure the highly disciplined working time arrangements
established at the various Japanese transplants in the region. But rather than
precipitate a major dispute over this, the management decided to take a more careful
incremental approach to its introduction; bell to bell by stealth so to speak.
Normal day-workers clocked in to the factory at 7.00am and clocked out at 3.3Opm for
an 8 hour working day punctuated by a half hour lunch break and two ten minute tea
breaks. Under the bonus system, operators were also allowed a 4 and a half minute
rest each hour in addition to the longer time buffers accumulated if individual targets
were exceeded. The initial objective of the company's bell to bell system was to
remove these longer discretionary breaks; all supervisors were instructed to confine
their operators to the line whether or not they were working.
Two months after its introduction, in the early autumn of 1994, the management
announced that all informal tea breaks must cease forthwith. Although operators
could still stop work each hour for an 'unofficial' rest, they were banned from taking
cups of tea or from chatting together in groups. The official four and a half minute
hourly relaxation time was effectively discarded. The intention at this stage was to
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squeeze these little portions of time by forcing the operators into a state of ennui for
which more production work was the only remedy. As the plant Operations Director
put it:
At the moment, with bell to bell continuous working we're not actually getting more parts out
the door, the operators are taking longer to churn the stuff out. But we're hoping that will
change. We're hoping that if they know they were capable of getting 8 hours worth of output
in 5 hours with a 3 hour break then with continuous working they can now go for 9 hours
output in 8 hours by going a bit faster, going like they used to do. Okay, this will be without
the breaks, but we're hoping this will come about due to the boredom. It is boring work. I'm
convinced that gradually under the new continuous working system they'll start to go faster.
At this stage, the attitudes of CarPress's production operators were mixed. The
withdrawal of PBR was bound to give rise to divisions on the shop-floor since such
systems are characterised by clear inequities in effort and pay between individuals.
They also contribute to uncertainties amongst shop stewards whose principal aim is to
secure collective objectives for their members, such as general pay rises (Brown 1973;
Conboy 1976; Tolliday and Zeitlin 1986). The CarPress management sought to build
on these divisions and pre-empt an open dispute by carefully implementing the system
in stages. But this did not entirely succeed. As one ex-steward explained:
I'm just totally against bell to bell. The old system worked. You had decent incentives there
to make the bits the company wanted. You also had the incentive to earn your break. With the
sort of work we are doing you need a break and you need it regular. And iii any case we've
been brainwashed for 30 years into accepting the idea that you have to get the job done and if
things are getting behind to pull back that downtime, to speed up if need be. But what the
company has done with introducing bell to bell, they've just imposed it on us, they've totally
aggravated the workforce into slowing production down. We've been coerced into accepting a
deal and it's been done by intimidation at the highest level.
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During the few months following the introduction of the measured day bell to bell
system, plant efficiency fell from the agreed minimum of 133 to 128%. In the Press
Shop it fell to 1 25%. The new system was producing unintended outcomes; a
resentful shop-floor was managing to maintain a measure of discreet control. Under
these circumstances, some workers displayed a degree of preference for the system's
steady, consistent tempo of work over the spasmodic cycles they had become
accustomed to. As one older worker admitted:
Sometimes I actually prefer bell to bell because, in the assembly shop at least, it can be easier
on the body, though I've got to admit it depends on the job. For some jobs it's much harder
standing up all day under bell to bell. But the old system could be just as bad. It was giving
some people heart attacks, stop go, stop go, going flat out half the time. If you pace the work
that way some people are bound to have health problems. So I suppose you can't win either
way can you?
However, a clear majority of operators interviewed resented the disciplines that
accompanied the new system. Younger workers were more firmly opposed than their
o'der colleagues. Many expressed bitterness at their loss of the right to make money
or time; the loss of individual choice and control. Some had not been long out of
school and were hoping to experience a more adult and equal supervisor-subordinate
relationship at the workplace. They were of course disappointed. Although these
younger operators were generally more likely to acquiesce to changes in working
practices than older workers, they still resented the constant surveillance that comes
with bell to bell working, the 24 hour vigil of production management. Some
Management's counter-attack against individual workers who were blamed for this deteriorating shop-
floor performance is discussed in Chapter Seven.
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youngsters in one group of interviewees were recently disciplined for having the
temerity of going to the toilet without permission. One of these remarked:
I was already on 150. I'd already made up the time, the ten minutes needed to allow me to go
to the toilet, so I wasn't going to lose the company any production was I? So I nipped off to
the toilet at 7.50 and came back at 7.52 and as a result I got a fmal warning. So did 20 of my
mates that day. We were all totally cheesed off...they treat us like school kids all the time.
They're just bastards.
For different reasons, many women workers opposed the changes. As we shall see in
Chapter Eight, the relatively few women employed on the CarPress shop-floor were
offered little in the way of assistance from management to compensate for their
relative lack of height and strength that are prerequisites for some press and assembly
operations. Consequently, the regime of steady, continuous working merely
exacerbated the levels of toil and drudgery experienced. One woman in the Press
Shop complained:
I've got to admit that on the big presses I really hate it. I mean, it's hard work and you do have
a need for regular breaks, you need to sit down and take a rest. But with bell to bell you're on
your feet all the time. And on nights it's worse. We all dread nights. You're on your feet for
even longer, for 8 and 1/2 hours a shift.
And another:
I just don't like it at all. Before bell to bell individual operators had some control at least. We
could do the job at our own pace, within reason. We could do the scores, take breaks when we
needed them and wind down at the end of the day when you do need a rest.
You really need that period to unwind. The work in this place will always be hard and
monotonous but at least when you worked at some speed you felt better. It might sound
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strange but you just felt better in mind and body. Your body felt better and your mind felt
happier because by working fast you could give yourself something to aim for. You knew if
you kept it up and completed your score you'd earn your break. But now with bell to bell it's
slower but also harder and even more monotonous.
When the management consultants and business writers enthuse over the ideas of
Japanese management pioneers Olmo, Shingo and the like, we must remember that
they are articulating a management ideology, a particular class interest, rather than an
objective appraisal of the implications of technical efficiency in capitalist production.
Ohno wrote that, 'manpower reduction means raising the ratio of value-added work.
The ideal is to have 100 percent value-added work. This has been my greatest
concern while developing the Toyota production system' (1988, p.58). It has also
been the concern of the workers of CarPress. But they have different class interests.
For most, the reduction of 'human waste' and 'idle time' amounted to growing
fatigue; working without breaks; working under constant surveillance; seeking
permission from the boss to go to the toilet; 'being treated like school kids all the
time'; and 'being married to your machine'. And they were trying to fight back
because they knew the intensifying pressures could only increase. One Assembly
Shop operator said:
We all know it's not going to be like it is now forever because the company is not going to be
interested in the steady pace of the Japanese. They'll be wanting us to go flat out all the time.
That's the bottom line. They want you to work at the rate that you used to do when you were
chasing your target but instead of doing it from 7.00 until 1.00 and then taking a breather
you'll be doing it all day, going flat out from 7.00 to 3.30. That's the management's bottom
line.
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In November 1994, a month after this particular interview, the Company again turned
the screw. It announced that all informal breaks and unofficial rests on the line must
stop. Operators not working at their machines any time between official breaks would
be subject to the disciplinary procedure. Operators not reaching the individual
performance levels achieved under the old incentive system would also be disciplined.
An authentic Japanese bell to bell system had been constructed, piece by piece.
This chapter has focused upon one significant feature of the trend towards labour
intensification in British manufacturing industry today. That is, management's drive
to eliminate idle time, to maximise labour utilisation, and to reduce individual worker
control over the pace and rhythm of work by the introduction of more disciplined
production control systems.
Elger (1990a) notes that the distinctive political economy of the 1980s and 90s has
provided a definite impetus to the exercise of managerial prerogative, one result of
which has led to intensifying pressures on the shop-floor. However, as this chapter
shows, despite this supportive environment, the process of change is not
unidirectional or trouble-free. Although, as we shall see in Chapter Seven, some
CarPress managers were clearly keen to take full advantage of the anti-union
conditions established by successive Conservative governments, most senior
manufacturing personnel were reluctant to take the initiative for this reason alone;
they found themselves forced into the position of confronting labour over idle time by
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the general pressures of intense global competition in the auto industry and the
particular cost-cutting interventions of the major vehicle assemblers.
For the workers at the receiving end of these changes, increased effort in the harsher,
more disciplined manufacturing environment of the 1990s is not just about speed-up,
or meeting tougher targets, or de-manning, or labour flexibility, important as these
pressures still are. The attack on idle time is an attack on workers' own time; an
attempt to undermine the ways in which workers' tacit skills are put to use to create a
breathing space, a few moments to take your mind off the job, an opportunity to
become temporarily divorced from the machine. It is a working class form of
'empowerment' and 'enrichment' that does not sit happily with the fashionable
sermons of the business school writers and management consultants. As such, it is an
empowerment that workers will seek to defend. For this reason more than any other,
managerial attempts to exert greater leverage over work effort in the 1 990s remain




THE DISEMPOWERMENT OF LABOUR
Japanese managements do not deploy labour flexibility innovations in order to
surrender control of the labour process to teams of multiskilled, 'committed',
'responsible' workers. Low waste, intensive, lean mass production requires, if
anything, more scrupulous and intense forms of management control than the
traditional 'Fordist' ideal type. As the survey of Japanese manufacturing transplants
in South Wales indicated, in contrast to the empowering rhetoric of labour flexibility
and involvement, for reasons of efficiency, lean production operates on the basis of
narrow, controlled flexibility coupled with only limited worker participation in
continuous improvement of the production process.
Although teamworking and continuous improvement represent additional, sometimes
more subtle mechanisms for securing managerial leverage over labour power than the
coercive methods described in the previous chapter, they can still constitute forms of
direct control. And as Lichtenstein (1988) argues, looked at in the context of the
development of mass production this century, these latest innovations bear remarkable
similarities to past attempts by capital to undermine workers' collectivistic visions of
a fair and decent shop-floor order. By attacking workers' lines of defence such as job
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demarcations, job classifications and seniority rights, contemporary labour flexibility
strategies seek to return workers to the days of full managerial prerogative, when
labour utilization was unhindered by union organization and when foremen had an
unimpeded right to allocate labour to the different shop-floor tasks.
This chapter provides a descriptive analysis of the CarPress management's attempts to
effect a more efficient extraction of surplus value by expanding the process of
functional flexibility in production. It will consider the principal objectives of
managerial strategy here along with its impact on the workforce. Although the
analysis focuses upon the shop-floor as the epicentre of the process of change, it will
also consider the ways in which the white collar technical workforce colluded with
management in order to secure sectional interests and in so doing, contributed to an
increase in management's control and leverage over work effort on the factory floor.
LABOUR FLEXIBILITY AND 'OWNERSHIP'
The new working practices agreement came into effect during the the summer of
1994'. Although multifaceted in approach, it embodied the company's foremost
objective of securing the workforce's commitment to the principle of 'total customer
satisfaction' by ensuring that, 'outdated industrial relations practices that restrict or
The implementation of the agreement was accompanied by hostile shop-floor opposition. This is
described in Chapter Seven.
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threaten the interruption of customer supplies will be eliminated' 2 . Teamworking was
considered the primary institutional means of achieving this.
As we shall see, a minority of the shop-floor operators had been working in teams
since 1992. The new agreement stipulated an immediate plant-wide introduction of
both teamworking and kaizen (continuous improvement) together with the
simplification ofjob classifications and the gradual implementation of various
harmonisation and single status conditions. All employees were expected to perform
any job or function for which they possessed the relevant skills whilst traditions such
as seniority-based labour deployment were prohibited.
Although the organizational principles enshrined in the agreement constituted a
radical departure from existing practice for most areas of the shop-floor, the theory, if
not the application, of these Japanese flexibility techniques was not completely new to
the CarPress workforce. As Marsden et al. (1985) document, during the 1980s many
senior managements in the British automobile industry attempted, often
unsuccessfully, to attack union protected job demarcations by seeking the introduction
of teamworking and other new labour utilisation techniques. The Rover Group placed
itself at the forefront of these management initiatives; but despite winning agreement
for the introduction of teamworking on its main production lines and cross-trade skill
flexibility in plant maintenance areas, rank and file trade union opposition combined
with middle management cynicism to ensure a distinctly limited degree of labour
flexibility in practice (Marsden et al. 1985; Willman and Winch 1985).
2 
'The Way Forward', Team Working and Continuous Improvement Policy Agreement, CarPress Ltd,
1994.
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Biding its time, Rover eventually took advantage of a malleable labour organization
demoralised by mass sackings in the industry when it introduced authentic
teamworking and controlled labour flexibility on a systematic multi-plant basis
towards the end of 1992 ('A Cowley Worker' 1993). Following this, Rover's actively
interventionist stance towards its first tier suppliers provided an important impetus to
the introduction of the new working practices agreement at CarPress. However, the
close assembler-supplier relationship was not the only influencing factor here. As the
previous chapter demonstrated, lean production measures such as minimal material
stores and low in-production buffers combined with poor capital utilisation rates to
compel the new CarPress management to maximise labour utilisation rates. The way
in which continuous bell to bell production subordinated workers both to their
machines and their supervisors represented one major aspect of this. But it was not
the sole one. CarPress also sought a more flexible and efficient consumption of
labour power; not only did it require complete control over the time workers spent on
the job, it also demanded full managerial prerogative over the allocation of workers to
their different machines and tasks.
The management confronted two major obstacles here. Firstly, job demarcations on
the basis of seniority. Secondly, job demarcations on the basis of craft. Both of these
will now be briefly considered.
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Seniority - the 'ownership' ofjobs
Workers' seniority rights are most commonly associated with post-war labour
deployment practices in the American steel, automobile and electrical manufacturing
industries. During the 1950s and 60s, unions in these industries succeeded in securing
complex plant seniority systems based on the principle of offering first choice to
longer serving workers on questions of selection for lay-off, promotion and both intra-
departmental and intra-plant mobility (Lichtenstein 1988; Stone 1974; Tolliday and
Zeitlin 1986). Ironically, before the war, some of the major American corporations
sowed the seeds for this by creating their own job classification and seniority
procedures with the intention of building a sense of company loyalty and commitment
amongst their workforces. But these early systems did not infringe upon managerial
prerogative to any great extent. They operated within the context of close supervision
and strict discipline. Foremen still had the final say when it came to selection for lay-
off and redeployment; 'troublemakers' and 'militants' were always excluded from the
benefits of this form of company paternalism (Lichtenstein 1988; Tolliday and Zeitlin
1986).
This management control was gradually limited during the 1 950s and 60s as trade
union organization started to flex its muscles. In the auto industry, a series of union
campaigns and labour disputes succeeded in enshrining seniority-based labour
deployment in mutually agreed constitutional arrangements. These placed significant
constraints on the foreman's ability to frustrate workers' job choices through arbitrary
discharge in relation to either selection for redundancy or j oh allocation. And by the
1980s, seniority constituted a major obstacle in the path of management's quest for
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labour flexibility and more extensive shop-floor discipline (Tolliday and Zeitlin
1986).
In the British auto industry, prior to recent corporate attempts to restore managerial
prerogatives, the principle of fair labour deployment was protected by custom and
practice and the strength of shop steward organization rather than bureaucratic
regulation. This resulted in a system which was thin on specific shop-floor rules and
regulations but which instead relied upon the defence of a set of rights residing in the
'collective memory' of different groups of shop-floor workers and their elected
stewards (Jurgens et a!. 1993). But the effect was similar to the American experience
in the sense that British car workers were led to expect an equitable and morally
acceptable shop-floor order. For example, at CarPress the normative principles of
seniority and ownership of preferred jobs and machines formed a central part of the
'collective memory' of the more experienced shop-floor workers. An assembly shop
steward reflected on this:
This seniority was always a sacred cow especially for the older operators here and it was one
of the main reasons that we fought hard against signing the new agreement. You've got to
understand that it's wrong that an older man aged say, between 55 and 60, could be asked to
move from the Assembly Shop to the Press Shop where the work is heavier and more stressful.
You could have someone suffering from angina and those presses would just kill him. Over
the years the scores have become harder and anyone with any common-sense could see that the
Press Shop scores are just too hard for the older men.
I'm not saying that we never allowed some form of labour mobility mind. We used our
common sense. We would often agree to labour redeployment but not always the way
management wanted it. You see, before the new agreement was signed you might be a senior
operator working on a decent job and churning out the parts, earning your bonus and at the
same time helping the company meet it's production targets. That's fair. You'd have earned
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that position. Then along would come someone like Les Williams [Production Manager]
who'd try and do a double shuffle. He'd say we've got a new job that's needed urgently and
so he might try and move the senior operator onto the new job and get him to sort out all the
problems and lose his bonus into the bargain while the younger operator would end up with the
easier job. Well, we used to be able to stop that sort of practice. We used to be able to stand
up to management and say, "hey, flick off! That's not mobility of labour that's just an abuse of
labour!".
Therefore, from the older worker's standpoint, the claim to seniority at CarPress
amounted to the avoidance of disadvantage rather than an assertion of positive rights.
This principle influenced three areas of labour allocation: plant Sernont',! gcvemed
selection for redundancy, in effect, 'last in first out'; departmental seniority governed
the movement of labour between the assembly and press shops; and the more serious
restraint on flexibility considered here, line seniority, governed the movement of
workers between different production lines and machines.
Line seniority was less common in the press shop where machine breakdowns and
lengthy set-up times warranted continual movements of groups of operators across
machines. In any case, disparities between the different jobs, press machines and
targets were slender. Work in an assembly shop is another matter. Some jobs are
clearly harder than others; the 'science' of time and motion work study rarely takes
full account of every machine idiosyncrasy or every manual difficulty associated with
the more complex assembly operations. As a result, the assembly shop stewards
would invariably invoke seniority rights to protect their members against the whim
and prejudice of production management. This tradition bred a sense of 'ownership'
amongst the older operators. Not the iniquitous form which the new management
ideologies like to emphasise, conjured up to achieve individual accountability for
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performance, but a more benign 'ownership', a means of securing a degree of personal
control over the quality and pace of work on the factory floor. It constituted a serious
handicap for the management's demand for more efficient and flexible labour
utilisation practices. As the chief production manager remarked:
In the assembly shop you've got rows of fixed machines but you've also got the men fixed to
the same machines. The challenge here is to overcome the rigid mentalities in this area where
the men tend to regard the machines as their own, they really think they own the machine as it
were. Now, thank heavens, the new agreement counters all this rigidity. Now, if you've been
trained to do ajob and you're capable of doing it, then no matter who you are, you will do it,
no argument.
Prior to the new agreement then, the foreman's options for labour deployment,
particularly in the assembly shop, were shaped primarily by the operator's length of
service. Consequently, in similar ways to Burawoy's (1979) description of the
seniority-based 'bumping' system in the USA, the more experienced CarPress workers
enjoyed enhanced job security arid control over their work. According to one
manager, 'the logic here used to be that the older men always tended to gravitate
towards the easiest jobs whilst younger operators were shunted towards the jobs with
the harder targets'. It was a system of shop-floor control that was far from perfect;
and in the context of the contemporary relaxation of collectivistic convictions,
seniority will always be subject to a degree of internal working class discord. For
example, the second questionnaire survey (November 1995) indicated that only 15%
of assembly shop operators with less than 5 years service supported it compared to
64% of the largest group, operators with over 10 years service. Yet compared to the
despotism of the foreman's prerogative, this system of ownership is at least
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transparent and equitable in the long term. And as we shall see in Chapter Seven, the
conflict between management and labour over questions of control and fair play is
something over which some workers are still prepared to risk their jobs and
livelihoods.
Craft demarcation - the 'ownership' of skill
During the 1980s, Rover took a leading position in the car industry's attempts to
undermine traditional craft demarcations in the maintenance and tooling functions.
The company sought to improve machine breakdown response times by rationalising
the maintenance trades and establishing two new broad groups, mechanical and
electrical, members of which would then form on-line maintenance crews (Marsden et
al. 1985). Following trends elsewhere in the engineering industry, this did not result
in the creation of teams of new multi-skilled craftsmen; the intention was to secure
cost savings by reducing the size of the skilled workforce and ensuring that
assignments were expedited by way of low skill task accretion (IDS 1 994b).
The skilled workers at the Llanelli plant feared these developments, not so much
because their bargaining position within external labour markets might be weakened
(Hyman 1988) but more fundamentally, because the local market for their skills had
all but disappeared. In such circumstances, the ownership and collective defence of
tangible skills, which historically protected engineering tradesmen against the
iniquities of Taylorised mass production work, came under real threat. Many skilled
men foresaw a looming encounter with Hobson's choice: accept deskilling and the
208
degradation of work that goes with it, or face the dole. These fears were exacerbated
upon the arrival of the new CarPress management.
CarPress was not satisfied with the limited degree of cross-trade flexibility secured by
Rover. In 1991, the company introduced a new group working agreement which
deepened the process of task accretion. Traditionally, teams of slingers, crane
operators and truck drivers performed the difficult task of transporting and
manoeuvring 25 ton dies around the factory floor. Although the work was not classed
as skilled, it contained many potential safety risks and entailed the employment of a
number of tacit skills which could only be mastered over time. The new agreement
sought a reduction in downtime and a further intensification of the craft labour process
by expecting the various skilled groups to take on much of this work themselves. The
affected workers were forced to accept the agreement or suffer the consequence ofjob
loss.
In fact, the changes contributed to further job insecurity. As one crane driver
complained:
Our people didn't vote for the flexibility agreement, they voted for their jobs. But as a result
you can be doing any job now.. .just two years ago they gave the toolmakers a 10 point test.
The management said that if they completed it then their jobs would be guaranteed. It was all
about trying to get them to work flexibly. They asked them to do just about anything, from
toolsetting to slinging, to driving, to cleaning toilets, to cleaning the boss's arse. The
management said it was all done to save jobs. And has it? Has it hell! Since then half the
men have lost their jobs. Flexibility is a con. It's all a con man! You just can't believe
management.
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The same worker expressed heartfelt bitterness at the company's hazardous
devaluation of his own tacit skills:
And now they're putting people to work with you who've got no idea of safety at all. I needed
a 6 week training course to train for my job but all the toolsetters are getting is 8 hours. But 8
hours of training won't make you a crane driver. It's impossible, how can it? You can't learn
to drive a car in 8 hours. So why a bloody crane, lifting 30 ton tools across the factory floor?
It's a skilled job, you're working in confined spaces. And the problem is, they're asking these
men to work the cranes, but they're not doing the job regularly. If you don't do it as a full time
job you lose your feel for the equipment and you lose your competence.
And I find it so galling to find some of these youngsters doing my job and telling p what to
do, telling. And of course I end up saving their necks. I end up shouting at them, "don't
move it that way, you'll lose your arm, you won't be sticking your hand up at the bar buying
your 5 pints again!" But why bother? I should just shut up and let 'em learn the hard way.
The slingers and drivers lost self-esteem; many lost their jobs . And the craft
workers did not gain any corresponding tacit skills of their own. This process of
multi-tasking, in the absence of extra time allowances, merely intensified rather than
enriched the labour process. A toolmaker made the following typical observation:
The job itself has changed a lot in that we're now being asked to do far more than we used to.
We have to clean the tools as they come in, the company used to employ separate workers to
do that. We have to do all the slinging now whereas previously we'd have teams of slingers
doing that. We have to do a lot more machining. We have to drive the stacker trucks
ourselves to move the dies around in and out of the shops. And we're now being asked to
operate the cranes. So the job's been upturned altogether but with no reward. It's not been,
what do they call it, "enriching"? You're not talking about additional skills here, we're just
doing other people's jobs.
During the 1970s, the plant employed around 40 drivers and slingers per shift. By 1994, most shifts
employed just 4 drivers.
210
The subsequent new working practices agreement represented a higher stage in the
continuing process of undermining the skilled groups' defensive practices. The
management sought further flexibility and efficiency in the consumption of labour
power by introducing the expectation that all workers should accomplish any task for
which they had the relevant skills and training. For production operators this meant
working the different machines more intensively; for many skilled workers it meant
performing virtually any job on the factory floor. The agreement replaced the plant's
complex system ofjob demarcations and classifications with a simple four grade
structure. Placed into the supposedly liberating organization of teamworking, higher
graded skilled operators were expected to add the tasks of machine operation, cleaning
and labouring to their routine skilled work whenever the 'needs of the business'
demanded it.
Job demarcations, flexibility and seniority at CarPress were therefore governed by the
traditions of shop-floor custom and practice; these in turn are a function of the
prevailing balance of power between capital and labour. During the 1980s and 90s,
mass unemployment, state attacks on trade unionism and a barrage of new
management ideologies combined to swing this balance firmly towards capital.
Exploiting these conditions, the CarPress management sought a phased eradication of
worker control over labour deployment. Ironically, this reached its highest level under
the guise of 'self-management' and teamworking. The processes by which this was
achieved will now be looked at in detail.
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TEAMWORKING
As indicated in Chapter 2, teamworking can be a nebulous concept, having various
meanings and concrete forms in different manufacturing and technological settings.
In the car industry, although it has not always been emulated, the Toyota team system
constitutes the ideal type. At many Toyota factories, machines and labour are
organised into cells to effect a redistribution and reduction of workers' motions, job
cycle times, idle time and buffers. Production flows steadily and continually; labour
works flexibly and more intensively (Cusumano 1985; Oliver and Wilkinson 1992).
Much of the management literature emphasises the development of multiskilled
labour processes as a job-enriching compensatory factor for effort intensification (for
example, IDS 1992b; Kenney and Florida 1993), although a number of analyses of
Japanese auto transplants in the UK and USA have suggested that this often amounts
to little more than systematic job rotation around a limited range of cognate tasks
(Garrahan and Stewart 1992; Kumon et al. 1994; Kawamura 1994).
Competitive market pressures, the cost cutting interventions of key customers such as
Toyota, Opel and Rover and senior management's continual demand for more output
from a leaner workforce, together compelled CarPress to gradually adopt similar work
organizational changes.
The company's stated objectives varied, chameleon-like, in accordance with the
different class interests at stake. Changes in working practices which intensify both
work effort and management Control of the labour process must be presented to
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workers as delusions, or as Hayter puts it, as 'promises, or moral inducements, which
management hopes will secure the cooperation of workers and weaken their trade
unions' (1993, p.54). Accordingly, in the few years leading up to, and during, its
plant-wide introduction in 1994, CarPress launched an ideological campaign in
support of teamwork, envisaging the changes as entirely desirable and emphasising
notions ofjob enrichment, employee involvement in management and a new
consensus between managers and workers. The discourse was often patronisingly
frivolous - reflecting the management's mistrust of its workforce - as the following
company newsletter extract exemplifies:
Listen to the roar of the crowd at a cup final. That's the roar of the people who appreciate
teamwork. Individual star performances blending as a team is the key to outstanding success;
that's why teamwork is coming to the CarPress Group.
The team members, initially, may not feel they can produce as many parts as they did under the
old system and so the target is set lower. But then after a few days, one of them makes a
suggestion for better working and the target can be raised. A few days later the same thing
happens again. Soon the target not only reaches the original figure but begins to gallop past it
to the wonderment of all concerned. '
Wonderment indeed. When their views were directed towards other ears the
management became more candid in their convictions. For example, although the
head of personnel used the terms 'empowerment' and 'ownership' quite freely in his
speeches and articles for the workforce, he accepted in private that they made little
sense in the practical context of the disciplines of mass production:
'It's team spirit that makes teams work', CarPress Group News, Summer 1994.
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To be honest, how can you have empowerment when you've got a man dragging himself into
work every morning, working 5 machines every day instead of the one and then going home
again? All we're doing is breaking down the demarcations, giving the man a bit ofjob rotation
but making sure we've got all the management controls in place first. I think that's the key to
it, that's what we've been concentrating on over the past year, getting the controls in place.
And 'self-management'?
It's like management pushing a boulder up a mountainside. It's hard work getting people to
change but once you get to the top the boulder can quickly fall down the other side and the
whole thing runs away from you. For that reason I don't accept this idea of team autonomy.
There will be no question of total self management. The teams might not like it but they're
going to need some controlling.
The senior managers agreed that, where technology permitted, teamworking should be
operationalised in the fashion of the Toyota model to improve shop-floor efficiency,
increase output and reduce manning levels. They also sought to cement recent gains
on the issues of seniority and job demarcations by institutionalising the principles of
labour flexibility and worker accountability within the team organization. In this
sense, teamworking represents nothing less than a union-busting strategy and a means
of weakening the long-standing culture of shop-floor unity. Even the more novel
aspects of worker accountability should be viewed in these terms. In the absence of
strong union organization, individual accountability for performance constitutes a
classic disciplinary measure; but as we shall see in Chapter Seven, team accountability
to the customer can have a more subversive and pernicious impact on worker
solidarity. As one production superintendent enthused:
The idea of accountability to the customer is important to us. I believe that operators would
become more obligated and committed to the team by dealing with their customer on a face to
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face basis. You're not going to get the militancy, the continual working to rule and overtime
bans that we've had in the past. Think about it. When the team members get on the phone and
speak to the customer direct and the customer's complaining, "you can't let us down, we need
these parts today", then that will start the men thinking, they'll start to get guilty about the idea
of slowing production down.
CarPress also injected substantial levels of time and resources into constructing new
team communications and employee involvement structures (described in Chapter
Eight). The company therefore established a clear 'human resource' agenda: to
simultaneously boost labour productivity and secure worker commitment by
significantly reshaping the technological and ideological components of production.
Prior to the plant-wide introduction of teamworking, the shop-floor workforce divided
into two discrete modes of work organization: a large majority group of operators and
skilled workers organised by function along classic production lines and a much
smaller group organised into different teams. For the moment we will focus on the
majority group, the 'backward obstructionists' as some managers liked to call them.
In fact, these workers did not reject the notion of change at the workplace. Many had
experienced the icy winds of global competition and recession, the slow but continual
process of shop-floor redundancy in the fashion of 'salami slicing', and the waves of
factory closures elsewhere in South Wales. In these circumstances, they had been
forced to accept the management's cry that in order to survive, 'you have to change
your ways, think smart as well as work hard at all times'. But they also displayed a
world weary cynicism here; a distrust of management's ability or disposition to
introduce the types of changes that would meet their own objectives of achieving a
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measure ofjob security and a decent quality of life. As one senior shop steward
remarked:
Many of the men have worked at CarPress for 30 years or more, and you've always been told
by management what your job is, you've been told what to do, to stick to the same job, your
job's never changed. I feel it's not the men but the management that's has been backward in
coming forward. Nobody here is saying that we don't accept change. It's management that's
the problem, they're always saying something and doing nothing. They've been talking about
change for 20 years now but nothing ever happens.
A press operator commented on his questionnaire form:
The management always blame the workforce for not trying to make things work. When
really, the workers who have "hands on" experience should have the opportunity to air their
views. Over the years, the shopfloor workers have seen finances and resources wasted by
management who seem hell bent on carrying out their ill thought out ideas come what may.
And when production comes to a halt through incompetence of horrendous proportions, which
has happened many times, the buck is passed. The same mistakes are being made time after
time, year after year. Surely somebody can see this happening?
A similar degree of scepticism characterised attitudes to the introduction of
teaniworking. These also reflected a clear perception and defence of fundamental
workers' interests. Some of the replies to the first questionnaire survey (October
1994) provide an indication of this; they are summarised in Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3.
The different responses of the Honda, Opel and Toyota teamworkers will be
commented upon later but for the moment it is the general response that concerns us.
216
Table 6.1 Shop-floor workers' attitude to the introduction of teamworkin g in principle








Skilled workers	 39	 21	 38
Table 6.2 Shop-floor workers' attitudes to teamworkin2 and job security at CarPress
(Percentage by row; N = 319)
Teamworking	 Teamworking	 Teamworking
will lead to	 will have no	 will help to
















Skilled workers	 68	 22	 10
Table 6.3 Sho p-floor workers' assessment of CarPress's motives for introducing teamworking
(Percentage by row; N = 319)
The proposition that no worker would suffer compulsory redundancy as a result of the
changes formed an intrinsic element of the company's pro-team propaganda
campaign. Indeed, the new working practices agreement provided written assurance
of this. Nevertheless, the majority of workers viewed the management's mollif'ing
statements with suspicion and disbelief, as well they might, since a fundamental
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aspect of labour flexibility within team organization is the steady reduction of team
manning levels through multi-tasking and 'continuous 'improvement'. For this
reason, many believed that redundancies were inevitable, that, as one press operator
put it, 'what it boils down to is that you'll be sending a brother down the road, if they
start to ask you to do the job of 3 different people then some people will go, its
obvious'. And if some operators, rightly or wrongly, regarded themselves as less
vulnerable than their skilled colleagues this did not subvert the ethical basis of their
shop-floor solidarity. As one female assembly shop operator expressed it:
I will not accept teamworking. Take the toolsetting. If the foreman asks me to change the
tools on my machine, then okay, I think I could do it with a bit of training. I know how to do
it, I've seen it done enough times. All you're doing is lifting a tool out, lifting a new tool in,
adjusting and clamping it. But when you do that you're putting another man out of work, Dai
and Thomas, our toolsetters for instance. I'm just not prepared to do that. That is morally
wrong.
However, as Table 6.1 suggests, the majority of the shop-floor did not oppose the
general principle of teamworking. Compared to the de-humanising fragmentation of
Taylorist work organization, the idea of working in co-operation with mutually
supportive colleagues carries a manifest seductive appeal. And it sits particularly well
with the communitarian ethos of the South Wales valleys. As one operator remarked,
'all the steel workers and miners around here used to be teamworkers. So in that
sense we have no fear of it at all, we certainly don't regard it as alien'. But
teamworking becomes both alien and alienating when it is placed into the context of
capital accumulation in mass production. In these circumstances, many people on the
shop-floor understood that despite its ostensible appeal, teamworking was unlikely to
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enhance an already limited level ofjob satisfaction or indeed, to liberate the workforce
from capitalist subordination under the guise of 'self-management'. As one operator
commented:
Personally, I'm cynical about job enrichment. The nature of this job is that it's monotonous
work. At the end of the day, the management here want their production schedules out at fast
speed and as far as I'm concerned more responsibility equals more monotonous jobs and more
problems for shopfloor workers. I'm not interested in more responsibility. I just don't want it.
All it means is pouring more and more of management's problems on to my shoulders.
And a toolsetter:
Empowerment? How? There'll always be someone looking over your shoulder, someone
watching you. There's nothing wrong with teamworking itself. It might be okay in terms of
helping each other out and mucking in together. But it's when people 	 you have to work in
these ways that we start to get stubborn. Because the plans this management have for
teamworking here don't include allowing us to be totally responsible for the job. You're
joking aren't you? Somebody will always be monitoring us. They'll be monitoring our output
and efficiency because at the end of the day we'll be paid on results. Somebody somewhere
along the line has got to look down on you. So maybe you do need management here. But I
tell you what, if I had to give this lot marks out often I'd only give 'em a flicking one and
that's just for keeping the plant open.
The Trojan horse strategy
During 1992, CarPress secured large contracts to supply pressed assemblies to Toyota
and Opel; two years later a similar deal was struck with Honda in Swindon. True to
form, these new customers insisted on determining the supplier's technology and work
organization.
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With the help of the CarPress engineering department, a team of Toyota engineers
appropriated a section of the assembly shop and reorganised space and machinery into
a discrete cell. They situated different manual, semi-automatic and robotic weld-
assembly units around a team leader's control room and operators' self-inspection
area. The section was therefore redesigned to provide a cell of strategically placed
standard weld-assembly equipment on a multi-functional, single product family basis.
In contrast, Opel's German engineers required CarPress to invest heavily in 'state of
the art', dedicated robotic transfer line technology designed to manufacture 300,000
car dashboards a year. This comprised a series of discrete teams of welders using the
latest weld-assembly technology to manufacture various sub-assemblies which were
then placed into rotary carousels feeding a fully integrated weld, paint and seal
transfer line.
In both cases, the new work arrangements, by necessity, represented cell-based
technological enclaves within a greater Fordist territory of more traditional work
organization. But the company's attempt to reshape shop-floor social relations and
reinforce management control was not driven primarily by technological change; it
intended to introduce teamworking on a plant-wide basis without any substantial extra
investment and, in some areas, without any significant adaptations to existing work
layout. The work organizational changes demanded by Toyota and Opel were an
explicit function of capitalist social relations; they accorded exactly with the CarPress
management's longer term political aims. The new technological enclaves were also
political enclaves, set up in a strategic sense as centres for the wider unilateral
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diffusion of new working practices and worker attitudes. And in order to effect this,
the management needed to do two things. Firstly, recruit workers to the teams who
displayed a commitment to company objectives and a willingness to change.
Secondly, if only on a temporary basis, the team-based labour processes required
refashioning so that they displayed some ostensible wider appeal.
Under normal circumstances, operators would be allocated to new work areas on the
basis of seniority and availability. But the traditional approach was jettisoned for
recruitment to the teams. Instead, the management sought to create greenfield
conditions within a brownfleld setting by establishing groups of less experienced but
committed workers and then shielding them from the 'contaminating' influence of the
main shop-floor. Some managers perceived the latter factor as a poisonous constraint
to the change process. For example, one superintendent commented:
I took on a new man in the press shop not so long ago who initially got on really well, he
actually jIicd taking the initiative and he jjid a bit of responsibility. But what happens? This
started to cause resentment amongst his fellow operators, they ended up hounding him out of
the shop. I remember him coming to me in tears. I felt very sorry for him, so much so that I
had to move him into the assembly shop.. .So what I'm saying is, we needed to help along the
new attitudes, but it had to be done in small groups. We need to keep out the influence of the
trouble-makers.
The company sought volunteers off the main shop-floor and then carefully screened
each individual, testing for commitment to the ethos of teamworking and positive
attitudes towards the company. The chosen few were not necessarily those operators
with little experience; indeed, the management were particularly keen to enlist those
with a certain history of experience, as one manager enthused, 'the experienced
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unemployed, the people who have a real fear of it, the ones who are therefore willing
to change'. As a result, nearly 50% of the operators in the team areas were aged under
30 compared to only 18% in the main shops; and almost 60% had worked at CarPress
for less than 5 years and only 25% for more than 10 years, compared to 22% and 68%
respectively, elsewhere.
Having selected favourable human ingredients, the management introduced an
induction programme to prepare the operators for the new working methods. Small
groups of recruits were sent to a local hotel for three day cathartic attitude-shaping
sessions with a team of management consultants. Some of the operators out on the
main shops were appalled at this blatant attempt to weaken their collective shop-floor
consciousness. One cynically remarked, 'I saw one group go in, they went in normal
and came out with their brains addled. They could only see things the way the
company wanted them to see them, they were just totally brainwashed'. Brainwashed
maybe, but the process had a seductive appeal in the context of the low skill/no
training Tayloristic environment that most operators had suffered for years. Even an
experienced shop steward, who had gone through the process himself, admitted:
They were good fun. You'd do some exercises together, like one we had was to work out how
to get a giraffe from Llanelli to Scotland in a truck without using a motorway. It might all
sound silly but we did build a good team spirit among our group. And you were taught team
management ideas like how to organise job rotation and new tasks such as maintenance, all
that type of thing. I liked the sound of it. We all did. It seemed to add a bit of interest to your
job.
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However, this ideological approach was not by itself sufficient to catalyse attitude
changes elsewhere in the plant. People wanted more concrete evidence ofjob interest
and enrichment under teamworking. The management provided this by taking the
extraordinary step, in the context of past practice, of temporarily removing all
management controls from the teams, particularly in the Toyota and Honda areas
In many respects, the resulting style of work organization resembled Swedish group
working more than Japanese teamworking; rather than being subject to direct control,
Swedish groups enjoy sufficient autonomy to influence questions such as goal
formation, performance monitoring, production methods, labour allocation and choice
of group leaders (Ramsay 1992). Moreover, both Berggren (1993) and Thompson and
Sederblad (1994) have emphasised the extent to which the Swedish system allows
group control over work pace through the presence of buffers and the absence of
supervision.
At CarPress, the teams were advised that as long as they fulfilled their customers'
daily just in time supply schedules then they would be left alone. Consequently,
although the basic labour process of operating assembly and weld machinery remained
unchanged, the work underwent enlargement and to an extent, enrichment. Team
members moved from machine to machine rather than 'owning' a single machine;
they became involved with inspecting and testing their work, ordering materials and
inputting information into the plant's computerised stores system; and they habitually
Self-management was less advanced in the Opel teams where the complexity and cost of the
automated technology necessitated a good degree of supervision from the maintenance and engineering
functions.
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liaised with representatives of the customer, engineers and managers at the likes of
Toyota in Derby and Honda in Swindon. Although the teams had their own 'informal'
team leaders they were not subject to formal supervision; the day to day part
requirements of the customer maintained the discipline and intensity of work and even
here the process was mitigated by the existence of human buffers in the form of
relatively generous manning levels.
Taking into account the joint impact of the company's recruitment strategy, the new
attitude shaping courses and the concrete attempts to enrich the team-based labour
processes, it was no surprise that the attitudes of the teamworkers indicated in Tables
6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 were significantly more favourable than their colleagues elsewhere on
the factory floor. Brainwashed or not, many team workers really did feel positive
about their work. One commented:
There's no doubt that my job satisfaction has improved under teamworkmg. Two years ago I
was working outside of the cell and the work was so monotonous. I was in a rut. But now I do
get a lot ofjob satisfaction. Before you were just a number, a number producing parts. But
now, it's not just about getting bits out the door, it's about interest. We've got these new
responsibilities that make the job more interesting. It's all about total ownership.
Not all displayed such animated enthusiasm but most did at least convey a clear sense
of appreciation for the injection of an element ofjob conception into the previously
Taylorised work routines. A young operator remarked:
It gives you a bit more knowledge and more responsibility. So I reckon it's better than
standing up pressing buttons all day long. You have to think a bit more, you have to be more
cautious, because you're making parts and sending them straight out the door. And if they go
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out wrong then there's a come back on you and the whole team. So that's the main difference.
You have to think about what you're doing.
The Trojan horse is dismantled
In his overview of the complexity of changes in skill patterns in the contemporary
capitalist labour process, Thompson (1989) argues that rather than taking sides in a
polarised and simplistic flexibility debate between, on the one hand, those who argue
that multiskilling constitutes objective skill enhancement and on the other, those who
regard it merely as low skill task accretion, we should instead recognise that the new
management techniques may represent something less rudimentary - a partial break,
rather than a full rupture with Taylorist work organization. CarPress added a further
twist to this argument: the political strategy of temporary upskilling aimed at
strengthening management control in the longer term.
By the autunm of 1994, two years after its introduction, CarPress decided that self-
management should be curtailed. It had served its purpose. The workers in the main
shops had became accustomed to the presence of the teams; as we shall see in the next
chapter, their fears and opposition weakened without altogether disappearing.
Moreover, the management had by then secured its new working practices agreement
and the idea of extending autonomy on a plant-wide basis was just unthinkable.
Therefore, different managers and engineers suddenly became interested in the
performance and efficiency of their existing teams. They began asking questions that,
for political reasons, were previously conveniently deferred. Although self-
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management contributed to each team's fulfilment of its contractual obligations to the
customer, the company forfeited control over the performance of each team member,
control over the extraction of surplus value. This was the principal concern. An
industrial engineer put it succinctly:
If we did a full investigation of the Toyota cell I suspect we'd probably find that they're only
working a fraction of the normal working day. So are they fuliy utilised? Who's to say if they
are or not? They won't tell you that's for sure. And that's the problem with self-management.
You've lost control.
During this period, the thorny issue of dismantling team autonomy enjoyed a clear
consensus of opinion between the production and engineering functions. Many
production managers and foremen deeply distrusted the operators' motives on the
shop-floor. They perceived team autonomy as a recipe for shop-floor anarchy and an
opportunity for workers to divest themselves of the disciplines and daily grind of mass
production. Indeed, from the standpoint of the overseer, the only pressure workers
ever respond to is the dull economic compulsion of wage labour. 'Workers don't need
self-management, they need real motivation, management targets and the wage
incentive', was the typical ciy. But of course, self-management also threatens the self-
preservation of traditional superintendence. Many production managers rightly
regarded it as a manifest threat to the survival of the conventional machinery of
production control and the supervisory role that accompanies this.
Similar concerns obtained in the engineering function. Smith (1991) cautions against
making generalisations about the nature of white collar technical labour processes. He
argues that engineers' attitudes and actions are differentially conditioned by discrete
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industrial sectors, technologies and training histories, and in particular, following
Cooley (1987), by the coexistence of two engineering ideologies: craftism and
professional scientism6 . Aspects of both ideologies influenced events at CarPress.
Most engineers perceived themselves as 'disinterested professionals', favouring
neither managers nor workers, an identity which, as Jones (1994) argues, still aligns
the engineer with corporate interests. Plant 'efficiency' was regarded unquestioningly
as an objective concept; it could not embody different political interests for capital and
labour. Indeed, working in an environment of mass production, many CarPress
engineers understood shop-floor workers in similar terms to those expressed by
Smith's engineers at Cadbury's, as 'a flexible, efficient and malleable commodity' to
be put to use for maximum production (1991, p.1 94). Consequently, they repeatedly
expressed misgivings over the 'inefficiencies' that resulted from the management's
lax attitudes towards labour management within the teams. The following conmient
from a project engineer summed this up:
What happens of course, if you're not careful, is that the team gets isolated from the plant.
And we lose complete control over what's going on within the cell. Our Toyota team was
doing everything we asked of it, the men did tiy to manage it, but we tended to lose track of
the balance between the volume of parts that the customer required and the number of
operators required for the job. So you can give them too much independence. We believe in
here that they still need targets and some control. Management from above I'm afraid.
6 The craft ideology is characterised by a more co-operative, fluid relationship between engineers and
shop-floor workers. Smith suggests this is a reflection of a number of factors: the historical origins of
engineering as a practical craft; the wage labour condition of engineers and their common bond with
other workers and differentiation from management; and the apprenticeship method of training, which
supports a definition of engineering as a holistic, integrated labour process, with cooperative manual
and mental components that are not easily divorced.
The more Taylorian professional-scientific ideology reflects the integration of engineers into
management and support for capitalism; the professionalisation of engineers through indirect,
university-based training systems; and the development of new technologies such as CAD which
facilitate the Taylorian fracturing and compartmentalisation of the holistic engineering labour process.
(Smith 1991, pp. 190-191).
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You see, what's been going on inside these teams is that they've been spending too much time
on non-production activities whereas their time could be more productively spent. That's what
we need to be moving towards in the future. Basically, it's about measuring their production
time and ensuring that in the future their working time is being used for production and not
much else. I think that's the efficiency of teamworking.
For 'professional-scientific' reasons, the engineers therefore supported the company's
intention to reintroduce traditional management controls. But this was not the sole
reason. Additional job security interests were at stake. Chapter Four described the
process by which the engineering department was stripped of much of its design
function. In response to this deskilling, the more experienced men sought to maintain
a craft component in their new project management role by colonising shop-floor
activities such as prototype 'tryout' work. In so doing, they increasingly encroached
npon sntp-1\ooi tethiory. XI is in this sense that the engineers mobilised an ideology
of craftism as a defensive strategy against loss of skill and status. But, in an
environment of lean mass production, craftism can be a double edged weapon. Some
men spoke of the stress and overwork that such task enlargement entails. And
although they were interacting with their beloved machines, it was not always on a
craft basis. One tooling engineer complained:
A lot of our time, especially overtime, is spent doing things that should be done on the
shopfloor. For instance, we spend a lot of time carrying equipment about the plant, unbolting
parts, fitting them elsewhere and wandering around like progress chasers. We're constantly
walking around with different hats on. I'm supposed to be an engineer. But sometimes I'm an
operator, sometimes I'm a supervisor. What's happening is that there's no restrictions
anymore on doing some of these jobs and slowly you tend to get sucked into it, you do more
and more of it. As a result, you lose more of your old technical skills.
To give you an example, the other day I went to see my grandmother on my lunch hour. When
she opened her front door she said to me, "good God John, have you changed jobs? I thought
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you were an office worker now!" You see, I was just covered from head to toe in grease and
muck off the shop-floor. As I see things, if that's flexibility then you can stick it.
Craftism, then, had its problems. But at least it provided the men with work. Seif-
management by shop-floor workers jeopardized these white collar jobs; it was also
regarded as an impediment to productive efficiency. Elsewhere, production managers
were afraid that worker autonomy would usurp their traditional supervisory role and
even subvert the shop-floor work ethic. And for senior management, the idea had
outlived its usefulness once the company secured its new working practices
agreement. The Trojan horse had served its purpose.
Plant-wide teamworking
Therefore, in November 1994, industrial engineers entered the different team areas.
Employing the usual work study techniques these 'objective', 'professional' men re-
balanced the lines by establishing tighter manning levels to meet the customers'
increasing daily production schedules. At the same time, the teams were placed under
the overall control of production supervisors. These changes reduced the level of
worker autonomy previously enjoyed.
Meanwhile, in accordance with the new agreement, team organization spread
thoughout the main assembly and press shops. The managerial logic behind these
changes was simple. Teamworking would institutionalise multi-tasking; it would
engender a sense of worker accountability for team output; and, as we shall see in
229
Chapters Seven and Eight, it would secure a gradual fragmentation of shop-floor
solidarity.
The teams were named units. The press shop housed 8 units organised along
dedicated product lines; some of these contained nearly 50 operators. The assembly
shop housed 15 units, each dedicated to a particular external customer; they contained
anything between 6 and 30 operators. A typical unit comprised a group of production
operators, toolsetters, technicians (including maintenance and project engineers), a
fork lift truck driver (though toolsetters also performed this operation) and a quality
inspector.
The management originally wanted to recruit a team leader for each unit from the
shop-floor workforce, seeking enterprising individuals who displayed a strong
commitment to corporate objectives. This issue proved highly contentious. In
Japanese factories, team leaders are pivotal figures in the system of worker control,
enjoying a pervasive power and influence over other team members and a central role
in the implementation of management policy (Fucini and Fucini 1990; Kenney and
Florida 1993). But what really distinguishes them from the traditional foremen is their
class ambiguity; their fallacious claim to represent the joint interests of management
and team members in the single 'company team'. When managerial power lies is in
the hands of the foreman it is an overt and contestable power; the shop steward and
the worker might not always regard the white coat as legitimate but at least they can
see it. With team leaders, things are different. One shop steward commented:
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The general relationship between the operators and the foremen here is okay. I mean, yeah,
they represent management but they're only doing their job aren't they? And at least we know
how far we can go with them. But it's different with team leaders. How can we trust them?
Take Tony in the Toyota cell [one of the old 'informal' team leaders]. Everybody's thinking,
can we trust him or not? Can we talk to him or not? We're all thinking, is he with us? Is he
with the bosses? Or where is he?
In the event, mounting opposition from the shop stewards and the foremen themselves
forced the management to back down, temporarily at least. Instead of team leaders,
each unit was supervised by a 'unit manager', acting as a 'mini-superintendent' and
responsible for the maintenance and deployment of labour, machines and materials
and accountable for output, defect levels and general team performance. In every
case, the unit managers were selected from existing foremen.
Although the management attempted to sell teamworking to the shop-floor on the
basis of positive attributes such as 'empowerment' and 'job enrichment', most
workers soon discovered that this supposedly radical departure from the old ways of
working merely constituted an intensification of their drudgery. In the main assembly
and press shops, 81% of operators felt that teamworking either had no impact on, or
even reduced, their already minimal interest in the job (second questionnaire survey,
November 1995). And as Table 6.4 shows, over 60% of operators believed they were
working harder compared to the previous year, a significantly high number for such a
limited time frame.
The shopfloor workers' assessment of different aspects of teamworking, collected
during the second questionnaire survey (November 1995), is summarised in Table 6.5.
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Table 6.4 Shop-floor workers' assessment of work intensification7
(Percentage by row; N =471)
Table 6.5 Shop-floor workers' assessment of the impact of teamworkin8
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Operators	 . .5	 ......
Team Technicians	 9	 73	 18
Maintenance/Toolroom Operators	 13	 70	 17
Prior to the new agreement, machine operators were formally classified as semi-skilled workers; other
non-craft groups such as truck drivers, stores assistants and labourers were classified as unskilled. The
new agreement grouped all of these workers together as bottom grade process operators qualified to
NVQ Level One. As this group is dominated by the machine operators, for analytic clarity, they have
been defmed as 'semi-skilled operators'.
See Note 7.
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The semi-skilled team operators were so accustomed to their low skill, degrading,
Tayloristic work environment that almost any change in work organization might be
expected to enrich the job. Yet, the majority (55%) of these operators in the new
teams believed that teamworking generated low skill task enlargement rather than
multiskilling and only 17% felt that teamworking conferred new skills. Furthermore,
although most respondents had experienced teamworking for just a year, a good many
felt the pressure of individual accountability already. This was particularly acute in
the longer established Honda, Opel and Toyota team areas; and on other issues, the
workers in these original teams - who were hand-picked for their positive attitudes
towards their work - were moving towards the dominant view in the main shops. The
more generalized indicators of initial shop-floor attitudes towards teamworking shown
in Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 do not have the same precision as those provided in Table
6.5. Nevertheless, a comparison between the two sets of statistics suggests that these
original teamworkers were becoming disenchanted. One shop steward in the Opel
team complained:
I thought teamworking was supposed to be about job rotation and managing your own work.
You know, being your own boss. But teamworking on the Opel section is nothing like that.
Okay, we swap from machine to machine but we've got no control over it. We're still
controlled by the management. So that's why we're all getting confused. I'm not so sure that
we're ever going to get teamworking here. It all sounds like a bit of a con to me.
Some workers were understandably confused but the management was by now
transparent about the company's objective: teamworking amounted to an institutional
means of permanently eradicating the traditional shop-floor controls over the
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utilisation of labour. As the personnel manager stated, 'for the majority unskilled
groups it's just a realisation that they have to work where their unit manager tells them
to work, that no machine belongs to them anymore, that they have no birthright to
certain jobs because of age, experience or whatever, that they take on new tasks such
as a bit of simple machine maintenance and cleaning when requested, and that they
need to develop a bit of loyalty and accountability to the team'.
The low skill groups therefore experienced effort intensification through task
accretion. The skilled groups experienced something qualitatively different; effort
intensification through deskilling. The new working practices agreement introduced a
simplified shop-floor grading structure which established an expectation that workers
should perform any task of which they were capable, from machine maintenance to
machine operating to sweeping the floor. The team technicians and craft workers in
the maintenance and toolroom areas were only partially affected by these changes
because the plant's low capital investment record and lack of planned preventative
maintenance ensured that their traditional skills were in constant demand to keep the
machinery running. They tended to float from team to team, combating the more
complex technical problems and machine breakdowns as they arose - not like a new
breed of "supercraftsmen" (Turnbull 1986) but instead, combining their accustomed
specialist mechanical or electrical work with additional rudimentary tasks in other
craft disciplines. In contrast, in order to both reduce idle time and improve the
flexibility of production, the too lsetters and press fitters allocated to the teams found
themselves routinely assigned to machine operation and cleaning during the
intervening periods between machine set-up. The result, as Table 6.5 indicates, was
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deep disillusion with teamworking. Over 80% of this group indicated that their work
had undergone both task accretion and deskilling; and 86% suggested resentment at
the style of management of the change process.
This is most explicitly exemplified by the management's attempt to force the
toolsetters to perform production work when 'the needs of the business' demanded it.
And 'the needs of the business' ensured that over the years individual targets had
gradually been ratcheted upwards, 300, 400, 500 pieces an hour, and with buffers and
breathers simultaneously removed. Consequently, some of the older men found
themselves suddenly confronting the punishing grind of 8 hours bell to bell operating
work on a press machine. Many of them objected. A press shop superintendent
described his method of resolving this:
I had one fitter about a month ago who refused to operate a press when requested by his unit
manager. So I said, "right let's have him in this office and sort him out". He told me that he
had a health problem, that his knees swelled up if he stood up all day on the presses. I ask you,
if he can crawl over the presses fitting tools then he can bloody well operate them can't he?
So I said, "well that's just tough isn't it. I want you on the presses." But I agreed to get
external medical advice so I sent him down to a doctor in the town. The next day he comes
back with a doctor's note saying that he could operate a press but only for a maximum of 2
hours a day. Well, that was like a red rag to a bull for me. I told him we're not having that.
So I got him examined internally this time, by the company doctor. He told me that he should
be able to operate a press but not for the whole shift. Okay, I said, I'll accept that. So now
we've got him working for 7 hours out of the 8 hour shift. Sounds tough, but that's the way
you've got to fight these boys.
Textbook teamworking, according to the business schools, confers significant new
skills and autonomy on an empowered workforce as well as delivering efficient
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working methods to capital. It is also assumed to quintessentially embody the decline
of class loyalties in industry, to reflect the supposedly joint interests of capital and
labour in the new enterprise culture of 'post-industrial society'. The above analysis
suggests a different picture. In the enduring environment of class struggle at the point
of production on a traditional factory floor, teamworking, no matter how it is dressed
up by its apologists, constitutes a straightforward and rational attempt by capital to
exert greater, unfettered control over labour utilisation, and through this, an
intensification of both work effort and the rate of extraction of relative surplus value.
Looked at in this way, it is no wonder that in the second questionnaire survey
(November 1995), two thirds of the shop-floor said that they were 'still treated as
numbers rather than human beings', that 'the factory is worse than jail' as one worker
typically commented. However, the 'Japanization of work effort' does not end there.
At CarPress, management-controlled teamworking provided the prime levers for
labour flexibility and intensification; but a further development, management-
controlled kaizen, ensured that the continual refinement of the change process would
only be effected on capital's terms.
KAIZEN
The growing emphasis upon the rights of the consumer in recent years has
significantly affected the car industry in both ideological and concrete terms. Many
companies attempted to redress the historic Fordist imbalance between quantity and
quality by building quality into the production process. As Jurgens et al. have put it,
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'a new customer-oriented quality policy was proclaimed. "Quality is number one!"
became the new slogan; and an appeal was made to the workers: "Produce it as if you
were buying it! " (1993, p.1 26). Despite the resistance of the shop-floor, the
pervasiveness of the new ideology resulted in incremental moves towards the
integration of the indirect quality function into production; operators assumed certain
responsibilities for maintaining quality, such as self-inspection. Moreover, some
companies attempted to secure a deeper commitment to quality, and indeed, wider
corporate goals, by introducing - often unsuccessfully - 'Japanese' practices such as
quality circles and briefing groups. Rover was one such company. During the late
1980s, as part of its 'Working With Pride' campaign, it introduced a package of
measures aimed at greater employee involvement in process quality and other matters
(Smith 1988; Storey 1992).
At CarPress, both the workers' experiences of these developments under the Rover
management and their lack of trust in the current regime had a major influence on
their attitudes towards new quality programmes. Although Smith (1988) argues that
Rover's zone (quality) circles eventually failed due to a combination of trade union
opposition and worker apathy, the Llanelli shop stewards recalled that they also
collapsed under the weight of management indifference and incompetence. Few
supervisors were trained in the arts of discussion management; few details of the
principles of quality circles were ever communicated to the workforce; and few
production managers felt obliged to turn their attention away from moving parts out of
the factory gates.
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However, the shop-floor also understood that both Rover and CarPress managers had
no appetite for offering them the trust that accompanies worker involvement in the
management of production. In the past, some operators attempted to mobilise their
own experience in suggesting improvements to work organization but they were
always rebuffed, so that, as one operator said, 'the management just don't want to
know. So we've given up. Nowadays, we just walk in the gate, clock in and leave our
brains at the clocking station'. The fundamental class division on the shop-floor and
attending fears and conflicts over status and reputation partially accounted for this. As
another press operator sardonically remarked:
We're the ones with the experience. We know what the real problems are on the shop-floor
and we have the answers. But the management won't listen to us, they never do. They don't
even think that we should have the knowledge. You see, they're afraid of us, they just can't
handle the idea of us having some input, some control. They know nothing. It's like barrow
boys trying to run a supermarket.. .And you know the shopfloor managers are just the same.
They're afraid to ask us to sort out their problems because they know their own bosses will
start to ask questions, start to ask why they hadn't sorted the problem out in the first place.
These people will never come to us because they know that they'll end up getting their own
arses kicked.
This comment also suggests something else. Rather than choosing to submit to the
hegemonic control of Japanese management systems by giving up their own little
'parcels of knowledge' in the interests of the continuous improvement of management
control (Garrahan and Stewart 1992), workers may instead opt to challenge its
legitimacy. Partly in reaction to the boredom of Taylorisation but also out of
contempt for the inaptitude of their managers - and a firm conviction that given the
chance, they could do things much better themselves - they may opt for involvement
in continuous improvement in the mistaken belief that it offers a route into self-
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management and greater shop-floor influence. Although many CarPress workers
sought extra pay for this influence and would never countenance the idea of
participation in kaizen groups in their own time, over half of those questioned in the
first survey (October 1994) indicated their support for continuous improvement in
principle. But not on management's terms. Worker after worker commented on the
lack of congruence between the objectives of the management and the shop-floor, that
'teamworking will be introduced by them but it will not succeed until their ideas come
into line with ours', that, as another pointed out, 'in past years we've pulled the
company out of trouble by hard work when the management said the factory was
going to close but we've got together and made the job work for us, it wasn't the
managers it was the workforce, we did it on our own', and that, therefore, as another
wrote, 'I would be in favour of having meetings to criticise management, or of
meeting regularly to discuss ways of improving management'.
Of course, this was not management's idea of kaizen at all. Firstly, the shift in the
balance between quantity and quality was not so great as to counter to any extent the
principle that most shop-floor workers are employed to perform productive labour for
the direct creation of surplus value 9
 rather than walking off the line to participate in
discussion groups. The pressures of lean production militated against the idea of full
worker involvement in the continuous improvement process. The Personnel Manager
explained:
I must admit, a lot of the earlier ideas we were looking at were based on the idea that
everybody would be encouraged to spend time-off production on kaizen activity. But I'm
K Marx (1976), Capital Vol. 1, Appendix, 'Results of the Immediate Process of Production',
pp.1038-1049.
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afraid that's not reality is it? Life isn't like that. We still want involvement from the shop-
floor but our 100% priority, and I stress 100%, must be making parts. Therefore, the direction
we're moving in now is that the team leaders, the unit managers, will be the problem solvers
and they will just involve team members in more of a consultative manner through more
effective communications with the employees.
Secondly, just as the CarPress workers had no faith in the ability or intent of their
managers to support shop-floor interests, the management in turn had no real belief
that their workforce might begin to act in support of the employer's interests. As one
industrial engineer - who had a keen interest in this conflict - triumphantly observed:
Look, supposing kaizen awareness was high in a cell. And let's suppose you had a 3 man team
and suddenly one man says, "hold on a second boss, we could do that job with 2 men if we
tried it this way." That's how kaizen and improved efficiency is supposed to work isn't it?
But I tell you, it will just never happen here! The attitude is, "that's my job, I do that and
nobody else touches it." I've been working on continuous improvement for years, that's really
what my job is about, and the operators have always viewed me as the "big bad wolf'. You
don't really imagine that they'll become the "big bad wolf' themselves do you? They will
never take on a labour saving attitude. So they need some sort of control, it's as simple as that.
Consequently, although the new working practices agreement stipulated full employee
involvement in kaizen activity, the idea was eschewed, in the short term at least, in
favour of management-led kaizens. Following the practice of a good number of the
Japanese transplants in the South Wales survey, and indeed, many other manufacturers
in the UK (IDS 1 990b) along with Japanese transplants in North America (Fucini and
Fucini 1990; Milkman 1991; Rinehart et a!. 1994), production and engineering
management took full control of the process of re-organizing and continually
improving manufacturing practices, job assignments and cycle times in the quest to
eliminate waste and idle time.
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The business consultants have coined a new euphemism for this management-driven
process - 'reengineering'. Essentially, teams of engineers accountable to the demands
of senior managers select core processes for reorganization and set about performing
value-added analysis to eliminate non-productive tasks and waste; this often results in
"downsizing" and cost reduction, combined with increasingly Taylorist job designs
for operating the redesigned processes' (Conti and Warner 1994, p.101).
The kaizen activity at CarPress followed similar principles. The management
prioritised the organizational problems and then directed cross functional teams of
engineers and production supervisors to 'brainstorm' their way towards cost-cutting
solutions. In this way, top-down kaizen transferred any notions of 'ownership' from
the worker to the controlling engineer. As the Engineering Director put it, 'our
engineers do regard many of these cells as "their baby", they do regard themselves as
owners'. So they did. And they also ensured that the ideologies of craftism and
professional scientism combined to exclude their shop-floor subordinates from any
aspect of the 'ownership' process. A robotics engineer:
Kaizen is inbred into this department...On the Opel line, for instance, we hold weekly meetings
between engineering and maintenance to discuss things like kit performance and efficiency
levels, looking at ways to push efficiency up, 60%, 61%, 62%, and discussing improvements
over the week and searching for new ideas. So this thing kaizen is not new to me. But to be
honest it will always be unlikely that we'll suck the operators into the process. In my opinion,
if you get these people around a table, okay they'll talk, but it won't get you anywhere, it
would just be a forum for waffling. These things need to be controlled by experts who know
what they're talking about.
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The second questionnaire survey (November 1995) explored the impact of this
approach on a group of experienced operators in the assembly shop. One section in
the shop, employing around 40 operators and producing car doors for Rover,
consistently fell below the plant's average efficiency levels. To resolve this, the
management engaged the services of a leading industrial consultant, the Kaizen
Institute of Europe. Working in conjunction with a team of CarPress engineers, which
included the token involvement ofjust two carefully selected operators, members of
the Institute executed a transformation of the old Rover production line. Different
weld and assembly machines were reorganised into semi-circular cells; line-side store
compounds were dismantled; non-value added process steps were reduced; full
flexibility enabled manning level reductions and increases in production targets; and
operators were cajoled into performing continuous self-inspection routines to cut
down waste and defect levels. The reorganization decreased the superfluous
expenditure of quantities of obj ectified labour in the form of wasted materials and low
machine utilisation rates; it also maximised the consumption of labour power and the
extraction of surplus value.
Table 6.6 summarises the impact of these changes on the workers concerned.
Whether considering questions of work effort, skill levels, worker accountability,
worker involvement or relationships with management, the statistics indicate that
these 'kaizened' operators suffered more subordination and degradation than their
colleagues elsewhere on the shop-floor. Two thirds of this group felt that they were
working harder; three quarters confirmed that teamworking merely increased the
number of tasks to be completed rather than offering new skills; and virtually all
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respondents had insufficient time to complete extra tasks such as self-inspection.
Ironically, in the context of the ethos of employee involvement associated with the
business school versions of kaizen, over 70% of these operators also maintained that
their managers would ignore worker suggestions to improve plant performance.
Table 6.6 The impact of reorganization on operators in the Kaizen area
(Percentage by row; N = 471; Kaizen operators = 35)
One protagonist in the kaizen movement has argued that its philosophy is a benign
way of thinking and acting that constantly improves our quality of life, to the extent
that, 'the moment we start talking about kaizen, the whole issue becomes
breathtakingly simple. First of all, nobody can dispute the value of improvement,
since it is generic and good in its own right. It is good by definition. Whenever and
wherever improvements are made in business, these improvements are eventually
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going to lead to improvements in such areas as quality and productivity' (Imai 1986,
p.9). The above results expose this seductive doctrine as crude managerial ideology
designed to obscure the fact that 'improvements made in business' tend to be very
much one-sided in nature. The 'kaizened' operators at CarPress ended up working
harder, working more intensively, working without buffers and informal breaks,
suffering multi-tasking rather than multi-skilling, suffering the stress of individual
accountability rather than autonomy, suffering a rejection of their knowledge rather
than its incorporation, and suffering virtual imprisonment in the new forms of work
organization rather than liberation from the old.
From labour's standpoint then, kaizen is not so much a 'benign corporate philosophy',
encouraging the improvement of quality, but a practical means of furthering the
advance of capital; a pernicious instrument of efficient capital accumulation. And
looked at in conjunction with lean production control, bell to bell working and
teamwork, the 'Japanization' of work organization at CarPress amounts to a cruel
denial of the enriching and empowering ideologies propagated by capitalist managers
and their agencies. The shop-floor experienced disempowerment rather than
empowerment; not just because, as Ramsay puts it, 'part of the attraction ofjob
reform, as distinct from some other forms of participation, is that it is "soft on power",
affording little or nothing in the way of concessions on business decision-making and
canying little danger of getting out of hand' (1985, p.74 .), but also in a more
detrimental sense. Over a period of five years, distinguished by a combination of
incremental and occasional radical changes to the labour process, the workforce lost a
number of its collective and individual controls over day to day working time, labour
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deployment and both effort and skill levels. The outcome was further worker
subordination, more extensive managerial prerogatives and an inevitable
intensification of the work process.
The developments in work organization and shop-floor power relations at CarPress,
therefore, bear marked similarities to the working practices and levels of management
control identified amongst the Japanese manufacturing transplants in South Wales.
The extent to which the changes were matched by shifts in the company's personnel
and industrial relations policies is considered in the following two chapters.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
JAPANIZATION AND THE NEW INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
Advocates of the 'Japanization' process claim that the introduction of lean production
control, new flexible working practices and other changes to work organization have
an 'enriching' and 'empowering' impact on labour. The new management techniques
might represent instruments of efficient capital accumulation but they are also
assumed to provide workers with new skills, new responsibilities and greater personal
control over the labour process (Imai 1986; Fukuyama 1995; and Womack et al.
1992). The three previous chapters provided concrete evidence to refute this. The
'Japanization' of work organization at CarPress was a disempowering, exploitative
process, designed to increase the extraction of surplus value by weakening shop-floor
controls over the labour process, maximising labour utilisation and intensifying work
rates. Not surprisingly, it generated widespread rejection, bitterness and resentment, a
kind of 'spirit of opposition' on the shop-floor.
Although these developments demonstrate how changes in capitalist work
organization continue to disadvantage workers by displacing the jobs of some and
intensifying the labour of others, they also contain an opposite in the sense that, like
many other forms of technological change, they offer the worker a potentially
powerful industrial weapon to use against the employer (Cooley 1987). That is, in the
246
context of the fragile, contingent nature of lean production, the traditional weapons of
collective labour organization such as the strike, the work to rule and the overtime
ban, can have immediate and damaging consequences for capital. Consequently,
many writers argue that the dynamic of the Japanization of work organization also
requires a Japanization of the employment relationship comprising both a fundamental
transformation of shop-floor attitudes and the curtailment of independent trade union
activity. If, as Turnbull (1986) puts it, the managers of lean production 'require the
positive application of discretion, initiative and above all effort on the part of the
workforce if labour productivity is to be improved' (p.196) and if through new
management techniques such as teamworking, 'the production system itself is to be
the principal work motivator rather than the payment system' (p. 199), then
'Japanising' companies may seek to eradicate those aspects of traditional British
labour organization which threaten both the production of goods and the production of
worker commitment.
The preceding three chapters deliberately excluded these problems by abstracting from
their industrial relations setting the CarPress management's attempts to secure
advantageous changes to work organization and an intensification of production.
Such an approach enabled the analysis to focus on the impact of these developments
on the labour processes and work attitudes of different groups of CarPress employees.
This chapter places the Japanization process back into the context of institutionalised
industrial relations. It addresses the ways in which the shop-floor's 'spirit of
opposition' assumed concrete forms of collective resistance alongside the
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management's attempts to both subvert this and fashion a more accomodating trade
unionism.
The chapter also analyses this conflict in the context of the distinctive economic and
political conditions of the mid-i 99 Os. It considers the different ways in which
particular manifestations of these conditions - for example, the Government's
multifaceted anti-trade union laws, enduring mass unemployment, and the new power
of the customer - have constrained shop-floor resistance to the 'management of
change'.
MANAGERIAL INCORPORATION AND STATE CONTROL: THE
BEGINNINGS OF A NEW INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
When CarPress's Lianelli plant formed part of BL and Rover, its management-labour
relations were marked by a combination of low trust and guarded mutual respect.
Although the factory was not especially militant in respect of its record of official
strikes, the shop-floor unions still exerted considerable control. In the post-war
British car industry, the growth of trade union power, and in particular local shop
steward power, was based on buoyant employment levels and a high consumer
demand for cars. Shop stewards and rank and file members were able to exploit this
as they became accustomed to management's obsession with avoiding strikes
(Marsden et al. 1985). Managers were forced to make concessions on questions of
fair wages, parity and 'job property rights' in return for high output, the costs of which
were passed on to the consumer. Accordingly, as one CarPress convenor commented,
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the real power of the unions lay in their ability to exploit their collective
organizational strength by keeping the rank and file in work and maintaining control
over their work by periodically executing the 'in-house strike', that is, the go-slow, the
work to rule, the overtime ban or the brief sectional walkout.
In March 1989, the new owners of Rover, British Aerospace, sold the Llanelli plant to
CarPress. The old Rover management gave way to a qualitatively different regime;
the new style was more assertive, more aggressive and more congruent with Fox's
(1974) ideal type of unitarist management. The concept of argaiuiti,
with trade unions was abandoned in favour of minimal consultation. The shop-floor
responded in appropriate fashion with a series of short strikes and walkouts over job
security, pensions rights and union recognition'. Then, in February 1990, again with
only minimal negotiation, the CarPress management introduced a new 'agreement'
which harmonized Llanelli's basic wages and conditions with those operating at the
company's other UK plants. This had the effect of reducing most basic rates and
cutting back on redundancy terms, pensions payments, overtime premia and sick pay.
This distinctly 'macho' management therefore intensified the low-trust relations
inherited from Rover. Attacks on union rights and working conditions generated
increasing militancy. A war of attrition continued until September 1993 when
CarPress recruited a new Operations Director and Personnel Manager whose single
objective was to secure a radical overhaul of shop-floor working practices.
'Lianelli plant row is resolved', South Wales Evening Post, 24.2.89; 'Plant hit by series of rows',
South Wales Evening Post, 5.4.89; 'Walk-out as take-over is delayed', Lianelli Star, 6.4.1989.
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These two new men were guided by principles which embody the contradictions
inherent in contemporary 'human resource management' theory. They regarded any
challenge to their right to maintain control and order on the shop-floor as anathema,
yet they were also keen to build a new ethos of shop-floor co-operation and
participation with an emphasis upon joint interests between manager and worker. In
other words, they envisaged an industrial relations of 'sophisticated unitarism' (Scott
1994) aimed at inhibiting rather than suppressing any dissension. From this
standpoint, the social relations inherited on the CarPress shop-floor appeared to be on
the point of inducing insurrection. The Personnel Manager:
When I first arrived here I couldn't believe it. I found worker militancy, the site came under
total trade union control and the managers were continually walking on shells. As far as I was
concerned, the site was completely out of control. My goal was to change the culture of the
place and bring in the new working practices necessary for the site to survive.
But I've got to admit at first I was quite taken aback. I didn't think the things that were going
on in this place really happened any more, I thought I'd walked back into the 1970s. Virtually
as soon as I stepped into my office I was faced with immediate unofficial industrial action,
what we call "throwing your teddies into the corner". And I knew that my first job was to
force the unions to behave legally.
Even if it were possible, the new management had no intention of dismantling the
plant's existing machinery of collective bargaining; instead, the objective was to
ensure that the machinery worked in the company's interests. The managers were
faced with an autonomous rank and file control, which, as Hyman has argued,
provides the means for workers to more effectively resist the intensive exploitation of
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labour which develops from the 'rationalisation' of management in modem
capitalism. In these circumstances, formal bargaining and disputes procedures deliver
important advantages to capital by effectively disarming and demobilising trade union
members and imposing a 'peace obligation' which leaves management the prerogative
of initiative (1975, p.159).
Resurrecting the 'peace obligation' required a number of initiatives aimed at different
levels of the union organization. Incorporating the senior stewards came first.
Traditionally, the senior stewards maintained a distant relationship with their full time
officials, a situation that reflected the enclosed 'factory consciousness' shaping social
action on the CarPress shop-floor. Working with a union bureaucracy sometimes
means complying with constraining rules and regulations, complying with policies on
trade union law for example, that undermine rank and file control. The new managers
desired a shift in attitudes here. They became agents for building a new tripartite co-
operation between the company, the senior stewards and their officials. Regional
officers were drawn into a regular dialogue with senior management; meetings were
organised between officers and stewards to enable discussions on matters such as
national agreements and legal procedures for taking industrial action; senior stewards
participated in management workshops; and as a result of such activity, the officers
and stewards were drawn together towards management's agenda for securing the
survival of the plant.
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In this way, incorporation into management accompanied incorporation into the union
bureaucracy; and for a senior steward, the act of making positive contributions
towards company performance and responding favourably to the manager's viewpoint
involves the reshaping of more than one social relationship. Unlike his predecessors,
the CarPress Personnel Manager began meeting the stewards on a daily basis,
sometimes for formal negotiating sessions but more often for informal discussions and
'friendly chats'. This subtle process of soliciting for union co-operation had the effect
of usurping rank and file democracy and reversing the steward's line of accountability.
CarPress sought a new style of shop steward; somebody who was prepared to act as a
transmission belt for management policies and who had the determination to maintain
control over the rank and file. In other words, a shop steward representing something
akin to business unionism. The Personnel Manager summarised the effect of this:
We inherited a group of senior stewards who used to be a law unto themselves. They spent too
much time doing what the members wanted and they ended up becoming their members'
mouthpieces. They failed to carry out their responsibility of member management. But over
time, they've become more committed to the management's viewpoint.
Previously, the stewards used to come up to meet me in this office and it would all end up in a
slanging match with a lot of shouting and hot air. They used to get a lot of flack from us and
we used to get a lot of flack from them. So there would be arguments alright and then they'd
go back to their members parading their victories. But nowadays there's less argument up here
and much more downstairs between the stewards and their members.
'Downstairs' on the shop-floor the senior stewards did not exactly warm to these
changes. Despite a series of Government measures aimed at weakening union
membership densities, virtually 100% of the CarPress shop-floor belonged to a
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union2 . These 600 members annually elected 17 TGWU and 13 AEEU shop stewards
to the Joint Shop Steward's Committee (JSSC) - a steward-member ratio of 1 :20.
The JSSC then elected four convenors or senior stewards. Since the Lianelli plant
opened in 1962, this local union hierarchy provided the lines of accountability and
democratic rank and file control which so disturbed the new management's vision of a
trouble-free industrial relations. The company's attempt to fracture it placed the four
senior stewards in a difficult position. Their hearts remained close to the members but
they realised they would have to make unpopular decisions if they were to stay within
the law, stay within the management's agenda and fight for the survival of the plant.
Three of them, Barry Edwards, Gethin Rees and Neil Rolfe discussed this with the
author:
Neil:
The members have always viewed us with some suspicion, mind. That hasn't changed. But
yeah, things have got worse. We're placed in a difficult situation. The members think that
we're the bastards who sit up here, doing nothing, just sat on our arses. And they think we've
all been bought off. So we can't do right can we? We're wankers whatever we do.
2 The Government launched a legislative assault on the closed shop in the 1980, 1982, 1988 and 1990
Employment Acts. It is now illegal (Marsh 1992). The Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights
Act (1993) attempts to reduce both membership densities and union finances by forcing unions to
secure their members' approval for continuance of check-off payments every three years. The
Government assumes that some members will stop paying because of administrative shortcomings,
apathy or personal fmance problems (Labour Research, August 1 993b).
The numbers of trade union members per union representative in British workplaces varies directly
with the size of the establishment. In 1990, stewards in establishments with 500-999 employees
represented, on average, 27 employees (Miliward et al. 1992). The 1:20 ratio at CarPress reflects the
strength of union organization at the plant.
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Gethin:
That's right. And we're now having to police our members a lot more and keep them in check
with respect to the law. Many of our members still want to walk out at the drop of a hat
whenever there's a problem. But you can't do that anymore and we have to tell them. I know
they don't like it but we have to tell them that we're putting ourselves at risk.
Bany:
But don't forget there's been dramatic changes around here. For a kick off the plant capacity
is down from a peak of 2000 to 800 and that affects your strength. And the Government's
legislation has attacked us. But we still have to try and work within it. That's just the reality
of it. We have to be careful to protect the union and to protect the members' jobs as well and
make sure that the union organization survives.
All three of us have got kids at school. And I for one would not like to see any of them
employed in some of the cowboy outfits around Llanelli where the conditions are terrible.
CarPress is one of the few major employers left and if it went down it would have a disastrous
effect on the town.
Protecting jobs, protecting the union and working within the system. These
responsibilities have always characterised the ambiguous position of Britain's senior
shop stewards: they are dependent on management, they operate against the
background of managerial power and to keep their jobs manageable they have an
inevitable interest in 'orderly' industrial relations (Hyman, 1975, p.1 68).
Nevertheless, in the current context of 'Japanization', it is misleading for some
authors to argue (for example, Bratton, 1992, p.2 17) that determined managerial
attempts to incorporate shop stewards represent no real threat to their authority or to
their trade union organization; as if it were the mere existence of organization that
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mattered rather than its qualitative nature. The CarPress rank and file were all
supportive union members but many perceived their own unions as increasingly
impotent in the face of the management's introduction of new working practices
aimed at increasing the rate of exploitation. In the first questionnaire survey (October
1994), 59% of the workforce indicated a belief that their unions were ineffective.
Many commented on this during interviews and informal discussions. A toolmaker
complained:
The unions here just don't support us anymore, especially the AEEU. All they're doing is
looking after the company's interests. They sgix gceemerits ith the company without
consulting the members at all.
You see I thought everything was supposed to be negotiated but nothing is these days. Now if
the company wants changes to any of our agreements then they change it. All they do is give
us 10 days notice and it's done. That's it. Full stop. The union just has no power.
And an assembly shop operator:
The Tories have taken a lot of the rights away from your union. These days, before you can
take any action the convenors we've got in the plant just put the fear of Christ into you before
you take a vote. It's not their fault, they're forced into it. They have to tell us before we vote
that under the law the company can sack you, the company can do this, that and the other to
you. And of course it puts the fear of God into the youngsters.
Some advocates of 'Japanization' attempt to fashion benign alternatives to such
disillusion by presumptuously arguing that business unionism and innovations such as
'no strike deals' are becoming popular with trade union members and employers alike
because they offer a measure ofjob security and the prospect of stable, consensual
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industrial relations (Bassett 1987; Trevor 1988). The problem here is that such
arguments tend to ignore workers' accumulated experience of the stark, concrete
nature of exploitation in capitalist mass production. As Hyman comments, 'strikes
are, quite simply, a challenge to the autonomy of managerial control. They are the
means by which labour refuses to behave merely as a commodity (1972, p.151).
Accordingly, in the first CarPress questionnaire survey (October 1994), although 46%
of the small groups of specially recruited young teamworkers supported the idea of
'no strike deals', only 12% of all other shop-floor workers did so; 74% opposed the
idea. During discussions on these issues, different shop-floor workers articulated
strong convictions that particular manifestations of this 'business unionism' represent
a transparent threat to customary collective safeguards against the commodification of
labour. As one worker typically put it, 'it all means that you jump on your shovel, you
do what they tell you to do, and you lose your liberty'.
Nevertheless, the point was also consistently made that the whole debate is becoming
academic: in the workers' own experience, the state has effectively provided British
capital with a nation-wide 'no strike deal' through the cumulative obligations
contained in the Government's employment and trade union reform legislation.
Of course, some writers would reject such a notion. For example, drawing primarily
on different sets of quantitative data, Marsh (1992) and Edwards (1992) suggest that
the impact of the legislation could be limited compared to determinants such as the
business cycle, the political climate and changes in the occupational structure.
Conversely, Brown and Wadhwani (1990) maintain that, although the laws governing
256
strike ballots force union leaderships to act more judiciously than hitherto, the widely
perceived legitimacy of a positive result often strengthens the hand of organised
labour. However, such arguments only consider part of the picture; in particular, their
reliance on quantitative analysis obscures the qualitative impact of the changes.
Firstly, they overlook the implications for workers of the highly restrictive definition
of what constitutes a legal trade dispute in the 1 990s. Secondary action, solidarity
action, political action and crucially, in the context of worker attempts to maintain
customary local controls over their work, unofficial action, are all outlawed4.
Moreover, the sheer complexity of balloting regulations is increasingly making the
strike weapon both prohibitive in terms of costs and an impractical means of resolving
the many problems that demand immediate action (Labour Research February 1993;
August 1993a). Secondly, as Nichols argues, just because the laws are not used
regularly - in the sense of daily appearances of trade unionists before the courts - does
not mean that their impact is slight. Injunctions against some of Britain's most
powerful unions and the sequestration of funds might be rare events but when they do
occur they make a 'public clatter', so much so, that just the threat of using the law can
have a critical psychological effect on organised labour (1990, p.45).
The 1990 Employment Act seeks to prevent unofficial industrial action by forcing unions to take
positive steps to bring such action to an end. In addition, the 1990 Act and as we shall see, more
detailed amendments to the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, allowed employers to selectively
dismiss individual employees who participate in such action (Welch 1991; IDS Employment Law
Handbook).
New definitions of a legal trade dispute established in the 1980, 1982 and 1990 Employment Acts
outlaw secondary, solidarity and political action. Together these constitute the most devastating of the
Conservative's legal changes. The total prohibition of solidarity action is in breach of the International
Labour organization's Conventions on labour standards and is unique in the Western industrialised
countries (Hendy 1991).
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These factors inform us of the need to take into account the impact of the
Government's anti-union legislation on social action on the shop-floor. In the case of
CarPress, the legislation engendered feelings of impotence and defeatism, to the
extent that many workers believed the intervention of the state had provided
management with a decisive set of controls over institutionalised collective resistance.
The following remarks were repeated consistently throughout the factory. A Press
Shop Operator:
I support the unions and I always will do but these days their powers are non-existent. These
days we're all governed by the law aren't we? Everything must go through procedure, and
even when we've managed that we can't win, the stewards just bring in the full time officials
and they never do anything. All these laws, they're all on the company's side.
An Assembly Shop Operator:
I believe every individual should have the right to strike. It's a basic right. But nowadays
strikes seem to be a thing of the past. Not because they are wrong but because there are so
many procedures you have to go through before you're allowed to go out. I mean with these
Government laws the management just can't be touched, everything seems to be in
management's favour. If you put a foot wrong they can seize all your union's assets. It just
seems like taking action now is virtually impossible.
Defeatism in some quarters converted into a caustic, trenchant anger in others, an
anger which would soon spill over into more 'unofficial' forms of opposition. One
worker complained that, 'the management in this plant are nothing but industrial
thugs. They've got the law on their side and they use it to the full'. A woman in the
assembly shop was more discriminating: 'we've got no union anymore what with the
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stewards being bought off and with all Thatcher's laws. There just doesn't seem to be
anything we can do about it, we've got nothing left. What we've got here is not
Victorian times it's bloody Thatcher times. All the management are just Thatcher
clones'.
Shortly after his arrival, the CarPress board of directors considered a proposal from
the personnel manager for a pendulum arbitration-type 'no strike deal'. In a mirror
image of shop-floor sentiments, the board rejected it, believing that the combination
of strong management and supportive employment legislation is more likely to
provide the prized 'stable industrial relations' than a pendulum that can swing both
ways. However, by themselves, these conditions do not completely suppress
resistance, they only reshape it into alternative forms. The CarPress management
soon realised that fostering a more pro-company, law abiding attitude amongst the
senior stewards would be ineffectual without also addressing the plant's historical
legacy of rank and file control on the shop-floor. The senior stewards represented the
members during the formal collective bargaining process but the members and their
local stewards exerted their own controls on the production line. It is in relation to
this more informal wielding of collective power that many CarPress workers were
keen to stress that, 'we are the union - not the officials or the stewards - the shop-floor
is the union'.
The new Operations Director provided his own commentary on this tradition by
spelling out his anticipation of an alternative trade unionism that would function more
in the company's interests:
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In my view, there's nothing wrong with unions, what's wrong is the people who join them.
The officials and the senior stewards work well with the company and are on our wavelength.
But the normal stewards strut around as if they own the place. They're power mad.
But I don't think there's a need to introduce Japanese industrial relations here. Let's face it,
we are where we are - we're not a greenfield site. Ideally, I'd like to have one union and one
bloke to speak to. But the problem is not the union, it's the individual members. They think
it's a malingerer's charter. In saying that, people do need some organization to represent them.
Many do feel insecure. Indeed, I'd rather have a decent union here than no union at all.
Because you have to remember that when people sign an agreement here they're generally
loyal and they'll stick to it. The agreements just need managing properly, that's what's been
missing in the past.
In the winter of 1993, the company inserted into the annual wage bargaining process
the package of new, labour intensifying working practices. The management was
confident of dissipating senior shop steward resistance to these innovations through
careful, assiduous negotiating but it recognised that it faced a serious oppositional
challenge from the rank and file, chiefly from the more experienced workers. Chapter
Six described the processes by which the general resistance to teamworking was
partially eroded by the astute introduction of work organizational changes on a
piecemeal, sectional basis. However, a change in shop-floor attitudes of a more
substantial nature was needed to secure compliance with the new production regime.
Drawing on the plant's historical traditions of low-trust relations and conveniently
leaving aside its pretensions to 'sophisticated unitarism', the management opted to
induce this change through a mobilisation of fear, and in particular, by publicly
punishing a number of individual scapegoats for the shop-floor's 'spirit of
opposition'.
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TRUST, TREACHERY AND CLASS STRUGGLE AT THE POINT OF
PRODUCTION
First and foremost of these scapegoats was an assembly shop senior steward named
Ieuan Thomas. Ieuan had been a TGWU representative in the plant for 23 years,
culminating in 8 years as a convenor. He came to union activism out of an intense
concern for the health and safety of his workmates. In the 1960s and 70s,
compensation for industrial injury in manufacturing tended to be restricted to the more
tangible and immediate impairments; slow developing injuries, such as those
associated with continual limb movement or work on constantly vibrating machinery,
often went unreported. Ieuan became increasingly disturbed about the rising incidence
of recurrent debilitating limb conditions amongst his colleagues, conditions such as
vibration white finger and repetitive strain injury, and he resented the cynical way in
which his shop-floor managers turned a blind eye to this. He became a health and
safety representative, immersed himself in the fine print of the laws and regulations
governing industrial injury and compensation, and then commenced filing claims on
behalf of his members. Over the years he achieved many notable successes through a
combination of scrupulous research and personal representation at meetings with
management and union lawyers and with doctors at medical appeal tribunals.
This was the original basis of Ieuan's union activism, a resolute attachment and sense
of duty to his members and his class, a relationship that was sustained during his later
role as a shop convenor. It provides the quintessence of something that Beynon
(1984) refers to as a dialectical social process involving the construction of strong
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mutual bonds of respect and understanding between the steward and the member. He
attracted none of the cynicism recently encountered by other senior stewards in the
plant, indeed, many members revered him, variously describing him as, 'a clever man,
just too clever for this management, but also too good for them', 'a man you could
depend upon, he would always look after your interests', and, 'a real shop steward,
someone who stuck up for all the members in the plant not just his own'.
In the context of the company's attempts to insert a divide between the senior
stewards and the more militant rank and file - by incorporating the former - Ieuan
Thomas constituted a problem for management. He was able to mobilise principled
and authentic legitimising arguments in the negotiating process which consistently
opposed company interests. This was not the new 'business unionism'.
Management's idea of a virtuous union activist is now any individual who is prepared
to break the link of accountability between the member and the representative. In
contrast, Ieuan's motives, interests and personal vocabulary fully corresponded with
the rank and file's; he perfectly encapsulated the model shop steward, an individual
who is able to act in spontaneous rapport with his constituents (Armstrong et al. 1981,
p.36). This conflict of interests came to a head during negotiations over the new
working practices.
As we saw in Chapters Five and Six, a number of elements in the company's
proposals were antithetical to shop-floor interests. As well as further eroding
conditions of employment such as sick pay and holiday pay, the company proposed to
substitute continuous bell to bell working for payment by results, it proposed to
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introduce management-led kaizens to continually improve rates of labour exploitation
and it sought a deepening and widening of the labour flexibility process, primarily
through teamworking. As the latter practice constituted the most significant change,
the management spent all of 1993 pursuing the consent of the senior stewards through
informal discussions and joint management-union workshops on the subject. This
strategy proved effective for some but it had little impact on Ieuan Thomas. He
understood that teamworking amounted to little more than the redistribution of
additional tasks amongst fewer workers. This knowledge erupted into aiigry
confrontation during a negotiating session in December 1993:
I remember facing up to the Managing Director, head on, nose to nose. I tell you, a cigarette
paper couldn't have separated us. There was this real heat being generated between us. And I
remember saying to him, "I'm telling you straight, teamworking is not coming to this plant if it
hurts my members. I'm not selling my members' jobs". And that's how it ended. The MD
just stood up, smiled, held out his hand, shook mine and said, "it's been a pleasure doing
business with you Ieuan". The next thing I knew I was given an ultimatum - stand down or be
sacked.
The following day, an indignant shop-floor held a mass meeting and voted
overwhelmingly for strike action. But this threat was soon incapacitated in the face of
authentic management warnings of widespread dismissals, the lack of support from
some other senior stewards, and crucially, Ieuan' s personal reluctance to place his
members' jobs in jeopardy. He therefore decided to stand down from office. Despite
this, many of his sympathisers in the assembly shop maintained an unofficial overtime
ban for 3 months.
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Six months later, in the early summer of 1994, after a long period of intensive
negotiations, the senior stewards felt confident enough to recommend a draft working
practices agreement to the membership. However, both TGWU and AEEU members
rejected it by four to one and attempted, section by section, to implement a plant-wide,
unofficial overtime ban. The new management was incensed at this explicit rejection
of its authority but it also realised that without the support of the senior stewards and
the union bureaucracy the fragmentary, disorganised nature of the shop-floor's
resistance rendered them easy meat. The Operations Director belligerently explained:
They didn't have the brains to come out and have a go at the company en masse. If they'd
done that we wouldn't have known what to do. But instead they came to us in groups. The
maintenance group came to us saying they were refusing to work to the new contract and
threatening to implement their overtime ban. So we immediately turned around and gave them
a 15 minute warning to withdraw the threat or they'd be sacked. Of course they all capitulated.
Then what happens? The toolroom workers came in, they came out with the same threats and
so we gave them the same 15 minute warning and they capitulated. Consequently, the
operators were left by themselves and they had to give up because their strategy was to leave it
to the skilled groups to come out and halt the whole of production. But I'm afraid the skilled
groups were stupid enough to raise themselves above the parapet and they got their heads shot
off.
The company then turned the screw decisively. The Group's Managing Director spent
a week at the plant 'counselling' small groups of workers and urging them to abandon
their resistance; representatives of Rover threatened the shop-floor with the
withdrawal of work and immediate redundancies; and finally with the explicit
connivance of right wing union officials, the plant management sent to the home of
every employee a written ultimatum to sign the new labour contract or face instant
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dismissal. The workforce had no choice but to submit. The agreement was signed in
August 1994.
The company's problems did not end there, however. Signatures placed on contracts
under duress do not denote support for their contents. Workers in many areas of the
plant remained bitterly resentful at the management's dictatorial and arrogant stance.
This manifested itself in a variety of different forms of informal resistance: some
sections maintained discrete 'go-slows' and 'work to rules'; individuals might refuse
to work overtime on the basis of sudden personal or medical problems; machines
would develop mysterious disabling faults; quality defects would go unreported; and
so on. The management created a cycle of discontent by responding in kind with
frequent threats of dismissal and the repeated use of the disciplinary procedure.
In consequence, manufacturing performance deteriorated. The plant used a 'break
even' gross efficiency bench mark figure of 133% as a basic performance target. By
October 1994, this figure had fallen to 128% for the first time in many years.
CarPress decided to act swiftly to reverse this decline.
CarPress had expropriated Ieuan Thomas's union position yet he retained a significant
influence. In his own assembly shop, many members still came to him for advice and
to discuss ways of combating management's actions. He remained a kind of
'champion of the rank and file', if no longer an elected one. As well as causing
continuing displeasure in management circles, Ieuan' s sway and popularity on the
265
shop-floor generated resentment amongst some senior stewards. For example, during
a Welsh Regional TGWU inquiry into the circumstances surrounding Ieuan's removal
from office, held in May 1994, two of these stewards complained that his continuing
participation in union affairs was resulting in their being 'hounded by the membership
to secure concessions which were almost impossible' 5 . This rank and file pressure
clearly constituted a problem for management yet its severance from the union
hierarchy, something the management had assiduously cultivated, also provided
propitious conditions for the isolation and destruction of its protagonists.
The problem of overtime provided the flashpoint to precipitate this. Beynon (1984)
observed that on the assembly lines of the 1 960s and 1 970s, the allocation of overtime
became an important aspect of the conflict of control between the shop steward and
the supervisor. Put crudely, workers in general needed their extra hours for extra
money to help control domestic debts; foremen also needed extra production hours but
they liked to exercise control over who worked it. In many plants, this contradiction
was subsequently managed through informal agreement and evolving custom and
practice. However, the same conflict of control has again become acute in the 1 990s.
Whilst the contemporary mass culture of credit card consumerism intensifies worker
debt and the general demand for overtime, the simultaneous trend towards a more
immediate factory production for consumer demand places a higher premium on
managerial control over the allocation of working time.
Notes and Findings of the TGWU Regional Enquiry into Union/Company Relationships at CarPress
Ltd, 1994.
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Prior to the new agreement, overtime on the CarPress shop-floor was distributed on a
rota system managed by the shop stewards. In normal circumstances, no production
operator could be offered more than 'two shots' of extra working during any one
week, thus ensuring general equity and protecting individuals from overwork.
Management disliked this system for three reasons. Firstly, it interfered with
managerial prerogatives; secondly, it prevented foremen from choosing their favoured,
most productive workers; and thirdly, it frustrated the new principle of working extra
time - just in time - for immediate market requirements.
Accordingly, the new working practices agreement placed overtime allocation firmly
back into management's hands. And as a result of this, extra working hours became
the exclusive property of both the 'blue-eyed boys' and other more reluctant workers
who, against their will, were routinely requested at short notice to work on at the end
of their shift.
During the last week of October 1994, the rank and file tried to put a stop to this
development by implementing another unofficial overtime ban. By midweek, the
management responded in turn by asking all individuals on the shop-floor to indicate
in writing whether or not they were prepared to comply with their new contract of
employment. In the resulting indecision and confusion, a group of 105 assembly shop
operators decided to hold an impromptu shop meeting. There was nothing unusual in
this. Historically, whenever the shop had a specific problem, the operators would
meet together to openly discuss it. In some circumstances the company might
sanction either a paid or unpaid meeting in advance but far more common was the
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unofficial, spontaneous assembly where the members would finish their business in a
matter of minutes and then send their senior steward to gain retrospective managerial
authorisation for an unpaid meeting. By giving their tacit consent to this tradition, the
shop-floor managers became assimilated into it, to the extent that they could read the
minds of their operators, they always knew when a meeting was likely to be called.
Things were no different on this occasion, they filly expected the operators to gather
together. What was abnormal this time, however, was that the management was rather
pleased to see it happen.
An amendment to the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act introduced in 1992
established that an employer wishing to dismiss an employee who is taking part in
unofficial industrial action no longer has to be concerned about selective dismissals or
re-engagements6 . As Income Data Services have confirmed, 'he can select those
employees he considers to be organisers of the strike or general trouble makers in
order to get rid of them. Furthermore, there is nothing in the Act to prevent him from
deliberately provoking unofficial industrial action in order to bring these dismissals
about'. The same amendment also prevents unions from defending members
dismissed in this way by removing immunity from proceedings in tort in respect of
industrial action7.
6 Section 237, Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidated) Act 1992.
IDS Employment Law Handbook, Series 2 No 7, 'Industrial Action'.
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These changes became engrained in the minds of certain CarPress senior managers,
particularly so since they also came to realise that, under the terms of the law, the
shop-floor's tradition of holding short unofficial meetings constituted unofficial
industrial action. The time had arrived to translate this knowledge into action.
Two minutes after the CarPress assembly shop operators assembled together, the Head
of Production suddenly arrived on the scene and demanded that they go back to their
machines. As they began doing so he bellowed out instructions for all 105 operators
to go home under suspension. Over the following three days they were each called for
interrogation before a disciplinary hearing in a local hotel. As a result of this
'kangaroo court' - as many workers described it - the management decided that the
decision of some workers to exercise their traditional right of collective discussion for
just two minutes constituted unofficial industrial action and 'gross misconduct'. Forty
seven workers, mainly shop stewards, rank and file dissidents, women and disabled
workers were dismissed; the remaining 58 were handed final warnings.
The workforce was stunned. Not surprisingly, Ieuan Thomas was one of the
dismissed. A week later he told the author:
This was a management set up - it was an entrapment. I hate to use the word but I was
watching a programme on the telly last night about prostitution and the word entrapment kept
being used, it hit me in the face, that's what happened with us. It was like policemen catching
prostitutes by asking favours, asking for sex. The management knew the concerns of the plant,
they knew our traditions and they knew people would respond with a meeting. It was all over
in 2 minutes. The management set us up, they pounced and sent us home in disarray.
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The Personnel Manager was interviewed during the same week. In normal
circumstances, these managers of factory politics tend to act as 'dealers in ideology'
(Nichols and Beynon 1977), seeking to obscure the harsh fact of capitalist exploitation
by smooth talking those who have the patience to listen into believing that life in a
factory is essentially harmonious and trouble-free. But on this occasion the factory
had reached a state of crisis; nerves were on edge, adrenalin was flowing and the mask
dropped:
I know you outsiders think that these disputes happen by accident, that they're all the result of
individuals making unfortunate mistakes. But you're wrong I'm afraid. They're often
planned. We plan these battles and so do the other side. I tell you, some of the operators
down there are anarchists, they believe that they are the ones to control the shop-floor. We
were determined to take these groups out. I don't like talking about industrial relations as if
it's a war, but this is a war as far as we are concerned. And this was the big one, this was the
big battle, it was the final Alamein for both sides. And we had to win.
This wasn't any accident. It was planned strategy, we were planning it and so were the
anarchists. This factory is not a mini police state but it was absolutely essential that we got rid
of the militants, the obstructionists. You cannot implement change, you can't have progress
with these people around.
We knew they'd go off on an unofficial dispute, and of course we knew that their union
officials couldn't support them on this any more. And they're fools. If it were an official
dispute we could still have sacked them but we would have been forced by law to sack the lot
of them. And maybe we would have done. But the laws on unofficial action allow you to
select who you want back and who you want to dismiss. And we don't have to say why!
They're all fools, and they walked right into it. But I'll tell you something. It's concentrated
minds down there all right. We've got the bastards working at last!
The 47 dismissals were subject to a final appeal procedure. The companY appeared to
prejudge this by immediately employing 60 young temporary workers, who, after a
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two week period of intense coaxing and heavy-handed supervision, were proclaimed
in Stakhanovite fashion as paragons of effort and high productivity. Needless to say,
all 60 were shunned as 'scab labour' by the rest of the workforce. During this period,
21 appeals failed 8 . CarPress reluctantly re-employed 26 workers in order to dissipate
the potential for strike action and, since a good proportion of these were women, to
avoid tribunal applications for sex discrimination. However, it made sure that the
remaining 21 were useful scapegoats. Ieuan Thomas headed these. They also
included four shop stewards and some of the more vocal dissidents amongst the rank
and file. Others were workers with an absenteeism record due to intermittent
disabilities sustained by the continuous operation of heavy metal finishing machinery
for most of their working lives9.
As little as ten years ago, such an attack on the shop-floor's moral order would have
been countered by immediate strike action. But this is not 1984, it is 1994. If you are
a trade unionist attempting to defend yourself, 'Big Brother' really is watching you.
Two days after the initial sackings, a meeting of the plant's TGWU membership voted
overwhelmingly for an all-out strike if any one of the appeals failed. But the intimate
collectivism of the mass meeting is qualitatively different to the loneliness of the
secret ballot. The essential logic of the Government's balloting legislation is to
A copy of the Notice of Disciplinary Appeal is provided in Appendix E.
Many of this group were metal finishers. Different individuals suffered from vibration white finger,
cervical spondylitis and carpal tuimel syndrome. These injuries were sustained by, in some cases,
working for over 30 years with constantly vibrating, heavy hand tools, such as linishers, orbital sanders,
201b mop machines and pneumatic hammers. Despite the fact that the most common prescribed
industrial disease, vibration white finger, can involve painful paralysing attacks, the state rarely assesses
individuals as being 14% or more disabled which qualifies them for industrial injuries benefit (Labour
Research, March 1996). Of the 21 workers dismissed, 8 were metal finishers with 8-10% registered
disability.
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debilitate the collective power of the mass and extinguish the immediacy of workers'
anger. It removes men and women from the collective security of the mass meeting
and places them, after a suitable cooling off period, into individualistic insecurity, into
the domestic environment of the debt-ridden consumer.
The cumulative practical ramifications of the legislation ensured that the CarPress
rank and file would not get their legally sanctioned, heavily scrutinised, individualised
vote for nearly 3 months. Firstly, the legal imposition of postal ballots in 1993 placed
decisive time consuming state and employer controls over union organization and
strategy 10 . Secondly, support from the TGWU regional officials was, in any case,
lukewarm. They were well aware that the union faced possible fines and the
sequestration of funds since the law no longer gave immunity against organizations
supporting workers who are dismissed for taking unofficial action. Moreover, despite
the protests from some groups of its rank and file, the AEEU Executive Committee
decided that since none of its 200 members were sacked they could not offer any
traditional solidarity action.
During the second week of December 1994, the plant's 421 TGWU members had
their first secret ballot. In keeping with contemporary management's perverse notions
° As Labour Research (February 1993 and August 1993a) describes, the Trade Union Reform and
Employment Rights Act (1993) places significant new constraints on unions: all ballots must be postal;
employers must be notified twice before a ballot is held (the first being the formal notice of intention to
ballot, the second being a copy of the ballot form); employers must be notified again after the ballot to
give them at least 7 days notice of when the strike will take place; this notice must also inform the
employer whether the union's action will be 'continuous' or 'discontinuous', thus virtually giving away
all of its action strategy; unions have to appoint expensive independent scrutineers to oversee the
ballot; and finally, following a later ruling from the Court of Appeal, unions now have to provide
employers with the names of members being balloted.
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of what counts as legitimate workplace democracy, the membership was bombarded
with continual warnings of the likely loss of contracts and jobs in the event of a strike.
Immediately before the vote, each member received a personal letter from the
CarPress Chairman threatening the loss of Rover contracts and instant dismissals if
any strike went ahead". And it was Christmas. Ieuan Thomas was pessimistic:
These laws are so clever. You'll have the members receiving their ballot forms at home,
they'll have their wives and husbands looking over their shoulders, they'll have their kids
bawling for Christmas presents and they've got their mortgages. And worst of all they've got
fear.
Despite these intense pressures, a small majority of members voted to strike. But it
counted for nothing. The state-approved scrutineers discovered that some ballot
forms had been despatched to a number of retired members. The result was nullified.
In a rearranged ballot in mid-January, a full 3 months after the sackings, a dispirited
CarPress TGWU membership produced a tied stalemate; 83, by this time apathetic
members, did not even bother to vote. Amidst anger, despair and resentment at what
many activists perceived as growing evidence of collusion between union officers and
management, a relieved union bureaucracy announced that the dispute was over.
A copy of this letter is provided in Appendix F.
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STRUCTURAL IMPEDiMENTS TO COLLECTIVE RESISTANCE
We have seen how the capitalist state can profoundly influence the processes by which
employers seek advantageous shifts in the nature of contemporary employment
relations. Most conspicuously, the sheer weight of Government legislation has
created an ideological power sufficient to decisively reduce worker self-confidence
whilst its particular concrete interventions may seriously undermine rank and file
attempts to maintain a sense of moral order on the shop-floor.
However, this is not a solitary influence; anti-trade union legislation can be
debilitating because it is exploited within distinctive contemporary political and
economic conditions which are advantageous to capital in so many ways. These same
conditions also provide the framework for an interplay of important additional factors
which together may further influence the outcomes of class conflict in capital's
favour. At CarPress, the most significant of these were management's manipulation
of the perpetual fear of unemployment in South Wales; the political ramifications of
the new customer-supplier relations; and both the political isolation of, and divisions
within, the shop-floor rank and file. Starting with the latter, these factors will now be
briefly considered.
Isolation and division
Virtually since the CarPress plant opened in 1962, the shop-floor's ideology of
resistance derived exclusively from the practical experience of local class conflict,
struggles over work rates, seniority, discipline, and so on. It constituted a classic
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example of Beynon's (1984) 'factory-class consciousness', bolstered by expanding
product markets and the self-assurance that comes with job security. Autonomous
shop stewards ruled the roost, they felt no need to build relationships with the union
bureaucracy, with external political organization, or even with shop stewards in other
plants.
This sense of separateness was given a further twist by its Weishness. For example,
when Lianelli senior stewards attended the old BL/Rover combine committees in the
1970s and 80s, they would sometimes communicate privately with each other in the
Welsh language to prevent their English colleagues from eavesdropping on their
independent strategic discussions; when they supported the miners during the 1984
strike they were essentially supporting Welsh miners; and when the new CarPress
managers arrived in 1989, they were not regarded as typical agents of control but as
something more alien, as 'English barrow boys', as people who, as another operator
put it, 'being English have no regard for the Welsh and it's culture'. These Welsh
identities were therefore built on a strong sense of difference as well as pride. As one
woman commented when asked about teamworking: 'all that is putting worker against
worker. The bosses don't understand that we're not like that in Wales. We're real
workers, we're Welsh workers and we stand up for ourselves!'
In consequence, when its rights at work and union organization came under intense
management attack in the more competitive and insecure market conditions of the
1990s, the Llanelli workforce found itself isolated; it had no established means of
securing solidarity support in any decisive form from outside the factory gates.
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Crucially, the Joint Shop Stewards Committee failed to build constructive links with
stewards at other CarPress plants in England. Moreover, its customary rejection of
close relations with the union officialdom in South Wales and beyond was only
eventually reversed on management's terms, yet as Spencer (1989) argues,
contemporary political and economic conditions dictate that shop-floor organization
will not successfully engage in struggle without the support of official union
structures, despite the political constraints involved. The corollary of this was that
solidarity support was restricted to the well meaning petitions and speeches of local
Labour MPs, local authority dignatories, trades councils and church leaders. But as
the miners discovered in 1991, an outbreak of public moral indignation is no
substitute for action'2.
Traditional Marxist analysis insists that the trend towards homogenisation of work
increasingly unifies the working class, an argument that tends to minimise the
resilience of intra-class divisions and the impact upon work of the wider social
division of labour concerning race and gender (Thompson, 1989). Although CarPress
employed no ethnic minority workers and as Chapter Eight describes, the most
significant gender conflicts were those between male supervisors and female workers,
2 The local media were particularly sympathetic to the plight of the sacked workers, as were local
politicians who made a number of attempts to intervene on their behalf. For example, in December, the
local Labour MP, mayors, other leaders of local councils and the Vicar of Felinfoel sent letters to the
CarPress Managing Director and the Head of Hoesch-Krupp in Germany appealing for a gesture of
'Christmas goodwill' and 'an act of imagination and generosity' by reinstating the workers with no
strings attached. Their pleas were rejected.
The LIanelli Trades Council also pledged unanimous support for the CarPress workers, stating that 'the
management were attempting to destroy the trade union movement, sack the activists and castrate [sic]
those remaining members'. The Trades Council also said it was mindful of the fact 'that the attacks on
the Trade Union movement would continue and that an injury to one is an injury to all.' Despite these
bold words, no practical support was offered. ('D-Day for the CarPress Crew', Lianelli Star, 1.12.94;
'Unions Blast Plant Chiefs', Lianelli Star, 29.12.94).
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other less conspicuous divisions emerged on the shop-floor sufficient to weaken
unification and solidarity.
The two workforce attitude surveys (October 1994 and November 1995) detected
attitudinal differences between older and younger workers and particularly, between
workers with different lengths of service, on issues associated with seniority,
teamworking and industrial relations (see Appendix B). Less experienced workers
tended to be less oppositional; and although their attitudes rarely completely
contradicted those of the more experienced workforce, the relatively higher number of
'undecided' respondents amongst this group reflected a greater degree of apathy and
passivity towards change. The view of a young Honda teamworker was both typical
and instructive here:
I think there's one big difference between younger people like myself and the older workers at
CarPress. The older men are all too set in their ways. They've been used to coming here for
three basic reasons: marriage, kids and mortgages. They've been used to nothing else,
nothing's ever changed in their lives for twenty years or more. But me, I'm young, I'm not
interested in that crap, I'm interested in other things, you know? The three things I'm
interested in are cars, beer and women. That's all. So to tell you the truth, I don't worry about
changes at work here, it really doesn't bother me. I'll do anything to get the money into my
hands. The only thing that bothers me is that I'm able to spend it to have a bit of fun before
it's too late!
Such values reflect the relative lack of class awareness amongst young people in the
1990s which in turn is a function both of contemporary adolescent youth cultures and
the growth of youth unemployment (Bradley 1996). Of course, these values also
create a new set of headaches for managers; but their immediate problem, in the
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brownfield context of the management of change, is to separate the 'experienced
obstructionists' from the 'inexperienced submissives'. The CarPress toolr000m
manager commented:
Of course it's easy for them [the Japanese] with their teamworking on greenfield sites, they're
working with new, young, green people who will do what they're told to do. But in the older
factories people will feel part of the old workers' culture with all the demarcations that go with
it. And I don't believe it's a case of bad individuals necessarily, it's really the case of the type
of factory that these individuals walk into which then changes them.
The management therefore purposively created age and experience-based shop-floor
divisions by concentrating recruitment on young people, whether on a permanent or
temporary basis, separating these workers off into discrete teams and then nurturing
pro-company, pro-customer attitudes by, as one quality manager put it, 'coaxing them
all the time, bringing them along, keeping our eye on them, making sure they are
looking at the customer's needs'.
The historically fragmentary nature of autonomous shop steward control contributed
to further divisions. Craft and seniority demarcations, the disparities of piecework and
the different personal qualities and political positions of the stewards, together impart
different degrees of local control over work. At CarPress and elsewhere in the auto
industry it created a situation where, 'work groups were thus competing against each
other to maintain their pay positions as well as against managerial control, so that their
aspirations were sectional and fragmentary' (Marsden et al. 1985, p.145). For
example, the divide between the CarPress assembly and press shops was not merely
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technological or spatial. The press shop workers tended to display a more macho
image and looked down on their assembly shop colleagues, 'the press shop employs
real men, we're handling 800 tons of steel a week', one operator typically explained.
Increasing labour mobility was beginning to undermine this divide but even so, the
two groups rarely communicated with each other. This even extended to union
organization. Although both groups of operators were TGWU members, for historical
reasons they insisted on maintaining two separate union branches. One senior steward
commented that, 'sometimes it's like a "Berlin Wall" between the two branches'.
Political divisions such as this continually hindered the attempts of the more
progressive shop stewards to mount effective plant-wide campaigns.
Management by fear
Shop-floor isolationism and division therefore undermined the construction of a
disciplined, broad collective resistance necessary to oppose managerial prerogatives
and particular acts of management aggression. But the attendant discord and
defeatism were also a consequence of an environment of fear. CarPress exploited two
particular aspects of this: a fear of the dole and a fear of the customer.
Chapter Four began with an account of the restructuring of employment opportunities
in Lianelli. The town has suffered consistently high levels of unemployment for
nearly two decades. The fear ofjob loss, particularly among CarPress's young
workers, was acute. Hardly an interview or more informal conversation went by
without the subject being raised in one form or another, particularly in relation to
managerial attitudes. A toolmaker characteristically remarked:
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Yeah, unemployment's had a real impact here. As far as we see things the days of full
employment are going fast. A lot of the youngsters in LIanelli have never had ajob at all.
We've been lucky here mind but we're fighting to keep ours now. And really all these changes
and practices that have been forced upon us all boil down to that. They all boil down to the
threat of unemployment. That's how the company has got away with it.
CarPress exploited local labour market conditions in a number of ways in its attempt
to secure a compliant workforce. Firstly, although for some the fear of unemployment
may remain abstract for as long as the jobless remain outside the factory gates (Fevre
1989), attitudes change if the gates are opened. Following the example of a number of
Japanese transplants in the region by increasingly utilising young temporary workers,
CarPress harnessed the fears and hopes of Llanelli's 'experienced' young unemployed
whilst simultaneously undermining the security of its permanent workforce in the
pursuance of higher labour productivity. Secondly, the proposition that any workers
displaying the temerity to oppose managerial prerogatives would be likely to join the
ranks of the unemployed became part of the natural vocabulary of the shop-floor
supervisors. In some respects, this was little different to the employers' use of Roy's
(1980) 'fear stuff' tactics to prevent organised labour opposition in the American
South, twenty years ago. As one woman in the assembly shop said, their habitual
retort that, 'you either work the way I tell you or it's down the road for you - there's
another 500 where you came from' tends to sap shop-floor self-assurance when
repeated often enough, especially inside factories that are continually fighting for
survival. Thirdly, this is particularly so when management has sufficient confidence
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to prosecute the threat. As another worker commented on his questionnaire
(November 1995):
Since the termination of employment of2l individuals the company has ruled by fear and is
inflicting a dog eat dog atmosphere on the shop-floor. All attempts to make the operator feel
more a part of the company are an atftont to our intelligence. You are a clock number full
stop. When they shout "shit!" you jump on the shovel.
Product markets also connect with managerial control strategies in ways which
restrain worker resistance. Since CarPress's Lianelli plant opened in 1962 its
organizational ethos was built around the belief that 'quantity is king'; success was
measured in tenns of consistent fulfilment of a weekly quota of parts to Rover's main
car assembly plants. Intense global competition, contractualisation and a more
accurate synchronization of product supply with demand undermined this ethos and
placed a new onus on the 'needs of the customer'. The impact of these changes on
work organization and the labour process is described in various parts of this thesis.
Here, we consider their impact on worker consciousness. It was profound. The
CarPress Personnel Manager:
If we'd sacked 21 operators from this plant as near as 12 months ago we would have seen an
all out strike here, with a 100% vote, there's no doubt about that. It just shows how attitudes
have changed. We really have worked on that. We've made the shop-floor far more aware of
what it means to break your employment contract. And I think we've successfully bred a new
culture of customer awareness, we've made the shop-floor aware of where the customer lies in
the chain and we've made them start to think about being responsible for their actions.
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Chapter Four described how final assemblers in the chain of mass production
intervene in the management of their first tier suppliers in order to secure maximum
quality, minimum prices, acceptable working practices and crucially, a risk-free,
continuous supply of parts. If the latter is placed in jeopardy, their interventions may
become more threatening. For example, during a number of the overtime bans
described above, Rover sent teams of purchasing, supplies and logistics personnel to
the CarPress plant to organise contingency plans for maintaining production. These
personnel also spent time on the shop-floor cajoling operators into submission,
warning them they were placing their jobs at risk. During the crucial new working
practices dispute in 1994, Rover managers suddenly arrived in the press shop and
threatened to permanently remove their press dies. This decisively affected its
outcome. One operator told the author:
The management told us that unless we accepted the package on the same day our pay rise and
jobs would be taken away. Arid they'd done a good job you see, bringing the Rover boys
down. They were really putting the frighteners on. We've taken on about a hundred new
young lads here and they threatened them all with the dole.
So the strike-breaking interventions of the customer can have a sobering effect in
particular circumstances. But such actions are merely single, albeit unfamiliar,
manifestations of a more pervasive and malignant customer influence. Many CarPress
workers blamed management's aggression, its introduction of new working practices
and their own inability to frustrate this on the new customer prerogatives. Indeed, as
one inspector intimated, the ramifications of the contemporary imbalance of power
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between the producer and the customer were embedded in the shop-floor's collective
consciousness:
Attitudes have changed on the shop-floor airight. There's this real realisation that if you go on
strike your customer will get hit and just get up and go somewhere else. This is a real change.
There's definitely a strong awareness of this especially among the younger workers on the line.
Moreover, the construction of an additional, more intimate social relationship between
the teamworker and the customer provided another corrupting influence on shop-floor
solidarity. CarPress sought to pervert customary notions of workplace democracy and
instil a new sense of personal discipline by substituting team responsibility to the
customer for traditional collective accountability. The views of two young
teamworkers supplying Honda and Toyota reflected the success of this strategy
amongst some groups:
I've built up a sort of loyalty with Honda, I don't know, it just seems to come down to pride. I
am much happier here, I'm more involved. And loyalty makes you feel guilty some times if
you make a mistake, it kind of makes you feel more responsible for the job.
Another:
Oh yeah, we're directly involved with the customer all the time. I mean if there's quality
problems with the parts the Toyota management might ring us up direct, senior management
sometimes, and we might ring them. And they call us by our first names. So this makes you
very careful about the job. You don't want to let them down. You're always watching what's
going on, watching what you're doing, because it's obvious , it's your job that's on the line.
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This ideological dimension to the enhancement of management control follows
contemporary developments elsewhere in industries subject to 'Japanization'
(Deibridge et a!. 1992; Oliver and Wilkinson 1992). Moreover, it is not in itself
especially new. For example, Pignon and Querzola's analysis of work organizational
changes in the American telecommunications industry two decades ago discerned
evolving team-based principles aimed at modifying the social form of work in ways
which both provided workers a measure of trust and induced a new accountability to
the customer. In this environment, 'employees are no longer confronted with the boss
as the person they are responsible to but rather with their customers and with the
market' (1976, p.75). However, qualitative ideological differences emerge when these
new relationships are placed into the highly disciplined, closely supervised, low trust
social relations of lean, mass production. As the above examples testify, a worker's
perception of the customer may take on a new dimension in the context of the
different ways in which contemporary customer-supplier relations act to circumscribe
shop-floor resistance. Significantly, despite the plant's immediate legacy of a classic
Tayloristic culture, 81% of CarPress's shop-floor workers indicated in the second
questionnaire survey (November 1995) that they thought about the requirements of the
external customer as they carried out their work; 52% indicated 'most of the time',
only 13% indicated 'never'. Perhaps this does denote the emergence of positive
attitudes towards product quality but such customer awareness also reflects the power
of a new alienating hegemony on the shop-floor: a customer hegemony thriving on
fear of retribution as much as customer satisfaction. The participative ideology of
TQM may seek to obscure these processes but it is this real fear and insecurity which
underlie the current fashion for 'customer care'.
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This chapter provides evidence that the employment relationship of the 1 990s is not
conflict-free and that in particular, the 'Japanization of work organization' is not
unproblematic. If the new management initiatives constitute rational attempts to
intensify rates of labour exploitation then we must expect worker resistance, including
traditional collective forms.
The social relations of this Japanization process, therefore, contain a paradox. Whilst
lean production regimes may, theoretically at least, depend on cooperation and high
trust relations through teamworking and kaizen, workers' actual experience of effort
intensification, stress, fear and insecurity will ensure the reproduction of the same low
trust relations and conflict inherited from Taylorist work organization. The next
chapter considers the methods by which CarPress sought gradually to mitigate these
inherent tensions by mobilising ideologies of consensus and shared interests.
However, the company came to realise that in the short term, securing shop-floor
cooperation does not always require trust-building measures; 'cooperation' through
coercion may suffice, provided environmental conditions are favourable. The
distinctive economic and political conditions of the current period provided such an
environment. It allowed management to exploit the different processes of shop
steward incorporation; the legal interventions of the capitalist state; pervasive job
insecurity; the new customer relationships; and internal class divisions, all in ways
which profoundly weakened shop-floor resistance.
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The 'management of change' at many brownfield plants progresses on this basis. For
a good number of workers, this is the reality of 'Japanization' and the 'New Industrial
Relations'. It may involve a systematic suppression of rank and file dissent, and for
those who do not respond to this treatment, the removal of certain basic rights: the
right to work, the right to participate in decision-making at work and the right of
freedom of association. Until the balance of power between capital and labour begins
moving towards the latter, some collective forms of working class resistance to these
changes will remain critically restricted, whilst other, more covert forms will emerge.
In the meantime, the underlying managerial tensions that accompany the contradiction
between the contemporary ideology of 'worker empowerment' and the harsh reality of
labour exploitation in lean production will continue:
All changes have been forced through in an atmosphere of threats, intimidation and above all,
fear. All talk of teamworking, co-operation, etc., has proved to be nothing but empty rhetoric.
The sad fact is that management now behave in a way that is draconian, dictatorial and anti-
union. This of course they are able to sustain with the support of oppressive labour laws and
with a workforce that is captive owing to mass unemployment. The sad fact is that a
management that is unchallenged will be unchallenged in making bad decisions. (Press Shop
Operator, Questionnaire Comment, November 1995).
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE IMPACT OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
The introduction of lean production control and new management techniques at
CarPress undermined the shop-floor's traditional defences against the imposition of
managerial prerogatives. The last chapter explored how the company responded to the
attendant worker resistance by embarking upon a process of incorporation of union
officials and senior stewards and by mobilising a number of explicitly coercive
measures against the rank and file. The efficacy of this strategy depended upon a
propitious external environment of control. However, this factor alone meant that a
sole reliance on coercion could be self-defeating in the longer term; the distinctive
economic and political conditions which made the strategy possible would not hold
indefinitely. Moreover, the required investment in the various concrete mechanisms
of coercive management control can be both prohibitive and inefficient compared to
measures aimed at building worker commitment. As Thompson and McHugh put it,
domination by coercion requires 'constant reinforcement of coercive pressures and
extensive monitoring of reactions to them. Domination of the individual through self-
limitation and constraint is far more effective. This is engendered through individual
assimilation of, and accommodation to, dominant workplace cultures and ideologies'
(1990, p.294).
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Most managerial analyses of Japanization emphasise this more sophisticated form of
worker subordination. For example, Oliver and Wilkinson argue that, 'many
Japanese-style manufacturing practices require willing cooperation, not mere
compliance, on the part of the workforce' (1992, p.l'75), a willingness to perform
extra tasks and take on new responsibilities. These authors argue that the introduction
of Japanese practices into the UK will be problematic unless employers
simultaneously mobilise new, employee-centred strategies based on the kind of
principles outlined in Guest's (1987; 1991) paradigm of human resource
management'. Similarly, Kenney and Florida (1993) maintain that Japanese
'innovation-mediated production', involving wider worker responsibilities as well as
more intensive basic labour processes, relies on various managerial instruments of
social control and socialization to secure workers who identify as closely and
completely with the company as possible (p.274).
Theoretically, therefore, creating authentic worker commitment and loyalty constitutes
an important facet of successful Japanese work organization. Yet, the survey of
personnel policies in the South Wales Japanese transplants demonstrated something
less straightforward than this facile functionalist fit between 'soft' HRM policies
supporting 'hard' production control techniques. New workplace cultures and
ideologies did obtain in many of these firms; but these were not built upon the
principle of extensive employee participation, and through this, a close affinity for the
Guest (1987; 1991) provides four central FIRM policy goals: integrating HRM issues into corporate
strategic plans; attaining both high employee behavioural commitment to pursue agreed management
goals and high attitudinal commitment towards the enterprise in general; raising both the quality of
management behaviour towards employees and the quality of employees' skills and qualifications; and
finally, introducing workforce functional flexibility and an organic, organizational flexibility capable of
meeting the challenge of market-led changes.
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enterprise. The pace and intensity of lean production rarely provide the time, space or
material conditions for anything so adventurous. Instead, the various social control
and socialization measures employed, such as distinctive recruitment procedures and
direct communication techniques, were designed primarily to maximise individual and
team performance, to secure accountability for performance and to engender an
awareness of responsibility and commitment to the customer. These measures
contributed to a dominant workplace culture which aimed to build a collective
understanding of the relationship between performance in production and the
disciplines of the capitalist market.
This chapter investigates the extent to which the same ideological processes of social
control took hold at CarPress, once again focusing on their impact on the workforce.
Following a similar pattern to Chapter Three, it considers recruitment, selection and
equal opportunity policies; job security and labour retention policies; employee
involvement, new communications and single status; and finally, worker loyalty and
trust.
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A NEW RECRUITMENT POLICY: THE PURSUIT OF COMMITMENT
Recruitment and Selection
When it acquired Rover's Lianelli plant in 1989, CarPress inherited a casual,
unsophisticated recruitment system reflecting management's perception of labour as a
cheap commodity to be recruited or discarded in accordance with the immediate
demands of product markets. These principles held for many traditional British firms
operating in Wales (Morgan and Sayer 1988), where managing numbers took
precedence over monitoring individual performance and attitudes.
The plant utilised a recruitment method called the 'family' or 'community' system.
Labour requirements would be posted up on notice boards so that names of potential
recruits could be submitted by the workforce. These would invariably be family
members or close friends living in the vicinity. The system relied upon the intimate
connections that characterise close-knit communities and entailed minimal
administrative costs for the personnel bureaucracy. It was also, of course, effectively
controlled by the shop-floor.
The restructuring of work under the new CarPress management placed fresh demands
on the workforce: greater effort, a willingness to work more flexibly and a willingness
to take on extra tasks when requested. As we saw in the last two chapters, the
management attempted to create the conditions for compliance with these changes
both by fostering pro-company attitudes amongst the less experienced members of the
workforce, some of whom were separated off into discrete teams, and by gradually
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breaking down the resistance of the experienced majority. In quantitative terms, this
segmentation of experience was heavily skewed towards the latter more 'troublesome'
group2 . Consequently, in late 1993, following a dispute with the plant's TGWU
membership, the company succeeded in taking back full control of the recruitment
system and commenced selecting only those individuals who, by virtue of their age or
employment history, had little experience of working in a traditional unionised firm.
A lack of personnel resources prevented CarPress from using the same cautious and
scrupulous selection techniques utilised in Japanese auto transplants located in the UK
and USA3 . Instead, the personnel department initially screened basic biographical
data on application fonns. Candidates then performed 3 aptitude and manual ability
tests and attended just one interview with production and personnel management.
Apart from employment history, the most important selection criteria were manual
ability, physical ability, attitudes towards flexibility and change at the workplace, and
above all others, attitudes towards absenteeism. Successful candidates were closely
monitored for performance and attendance during a 3 month probationary period.
This important shift in recruitment strategy took a further turn after the sackings
dispute described in the previous chapter. The proposition that manufacturing firms
are beginning to exploit temporary labour in a coherent, systematic manner continues
2 Of the 533 respondents in the second questionnaire survey (November 1995), 63% had more than 10
year's service with the company and 78% were aged 31 or above. Only 26% had 5 years service or
less.
At Toyota's new vehicle assembly plant in Derby, the selection process can take between 2 to 6
months. It comprises a daunting series of interviews, psychometric tests, observation quizzes and
different days spent at an assessment centre (Bailey, 1995). Similar techniques allow Japanese auto
plants in the USA to weed out 'troublemakers' and dissidents and to select group-oriented workers who
identify with the company (Fucini and Fucini 1990; Kenney and Florida 1993).
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to attract doubts from some academics (see for example, Cumbers 1996; Fowler and
Bresnen 1991; Marginson 1989; Pollert 1988, 1992). Yet one recent survey of union
representatives in 1,000 establishments found that whilst temporary contracts continue
to be used to manage fluctuations in product demand, 52% of firms were increasing
their numbers of temporary workers at the expense of permanent jobs (Labour
Research Department 1995). Moreover, the survey of Japanese transplants in South
Wales demonstrated that the use of temporary contracts facilitated many of these
firms' lean maiming strategies whilst simultaneously providing a cheap and effective
screening mechanism for new recruits. CarPress began using temporary labour in a
similarly strategic fashion.
Since they left school, many of the 60 young temporary workers employed during the
sackings dispute had drifted from one meaningless training programme to another,
from one low paid job to another. When they walked onto the CarPress shop-floor
they recognised an opportunity for engaging in something potentially much better than
this sordid cycle of human waste and they worked as if their lives depended on it. The
management was impressed. The Personnel Manager commented at the time:
It's been marvellous! You know the Mini door section in the Assembly Shop? Everyone
knows that it's the easiest job in the shop. The men have always reached their targets with
ease and of course they've always been the older men due to the effects of the seniority system.
Well guess what. Of the 105 operators we suspended, we managed to inc'ude every operator
from this section and we were then able to replace them immediately with temporary labour,
young kids the lot of them. And now, after just 3 weeks on the job, those boys have broken all
productivity records. They've literally beaten every record set by the older men, men who
have been in this plant for 30 years some of them. And that's just after 3 weeks!
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Not only that, the fitters have told us that mysteriously these kids never get any machinery
breakdown times, even though they're working the same line and the same machinery as the
older men used to. Machinery downtime has virtually disappeared on this section. Now
doesn't that say it all?
The unions had a long-standing agreement with the company that any temporary
worker employed for more than 3 months must immediately be offered a permanent
contract. The agreement was important because it provided the shop-floor some
protection against wage-cutting and job insecurity. Accordingly, in the summer of
1995, after already conceding one 3 month extension, the shop stewards insisted that
the company make the 60 youngsters up to permanent employees or release them.
Amidst much public acrimony, in which the unions received most of the blame, the
company cynically dismissed all sixty. But it also exploited this episode to replace the
agreement with a new policy. From January 1996, every new recruit would be
employed as a temporary worker. Labour contracts could be cancelled or extended at
the whim of management whilst individuals who showed themselves to be
outstanding performers with pro-company attitudes might be taken on permanently,
workload permitting. In preparation for this, CarPress advertised for nearly 200 new
temporary workers towards the end of 1995.
Fevre (1989) argues that in the loose labour market conditions of South Wales and
other depressed regions in the UK, temporary workers' attitudes are shaped by the
disciplinary experience of temporary employment as well as unemployment. They
possesss the certain knowledge that they are likely to become unemployed again in a
short time: 'they are always looking for work, and always act as if they are outside the
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factory gates, hammering to get in, even when they have employment' (p. 151). In
these circumstances, such workers will always constitute an acquiescent and malleable
pool of labour. Moreover, in offering a minority of carefully selected workers the
tantalising prospect of breaking out of this life of relentless job insecurity, CarPress,
and many of the neighbouring Japanese transplants, exploited the large pools of
unemployed labour in the region for purposes additional to maintaining their lean
manning strategies or boosting labour productivity. That is, the careful selection of
prime candidates for permanent work formed an important component in their
construction of new corporate cultures of cooperation and compliance. Therefore,
attempts to categorise different workforces simply in terms of segmented core and
periphery groups (Atkinson 1985) conceal some of the internal ramifications of a
firm's flexible employment policy. CarPress embarked upon a strategy of using
periphery temporary workers to interact with the core not merely to produce a
disciplinary effect but to help catalyse changes in attitudes and culture within the core
itself.
Equal Opportunities
In keeping with the currently pervasive corporate ideology of granting 'respect' and
'opportunity' to all employees, as enunciated by literally thousands of company
mission statements throughout the country, CarPress claimed to be an equal
opportunities employer. In practice, the company employed no ethnic minority
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workers4 ; as we saw in the last chapter, it readily dismissed disabled workers with
inferior absenteeism records in a quite amoral fashion; and as we discuss below, rather
than encourage the employment of women workers, it relentlessly victimised them.
At the end of 1994, the company employed just 45 women out of a total workforce of
767. None were managers, supervisors or engineers; 27 were clerks and
administrators; the remaining 28 were employed on the shop-floor as semi-skilled
operators. Although no longitudinal data were available, the management admitted
that this represented a substantial decline. One operator remembered that in past years
there were 50 women employed in the press shop alone, an area where the manual
work could be particularly arduous.
The macho culture that often accompanies heavy metalwork partly explains this
decline. For many of CarPress's male managers, engineers and shop-floor workers,
this was 'real men's work'; working lives were dominated by the continual lifting and
shaping of heavy steel sheet and by the grime, noise and rhythm generated by giant
metal presses and welding machinery. In this sense, the men had appropriated the
technology for their masculinity, the work had become gendered (Cockburn 1985).
As an MSF representative commented:
I'm not against equal opportunities but it's difficult in some environments. This is a
predominantly masculine workforce, many of the machines are historically masculine if you
In 1991, members of ethnic minority groups comprised only 0.4% of the total residents in the Lianelli
travel to work area (Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, 1991 Census, County Report, Dyfed,
Parts 1 & 2). Despite this, at the end of 1994, the CarPress Personnel Department confirmed that a
small number of the 1000 job applications in the firms 'waiting file' came from members of these
groups. However, they had never been considered for interview.
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see what I mean. The thought of my wife hauling bits of steel around doesn't exactly fill me
with joy. She'd end up with arms of Samson. In fact there are few women in any significant
position here. It's sad, I've no doubt some of the women are sharper than the men but even in
the offices there's a strong male culture. We all swear a lot. We all like our men's talk, you
know? There's nothing wrong with that is there?
Although these attitudes provided the cultural context for gender inequality at the
factory, they do not fully explain why this inequality deteriorated further. In the past,
some women had survived and even thrived in this masculine environment. As a
clerical worker, who eventually moved off the shop-floor, reminisced:
I tell you, in my day, the shop was far more physical than it is now. 1 used to work on the
Morris bonnet assembly lines and in those days you were dealing with thick steel, not the
flimsy stuff you get nowadays. And us girls were faster than the men. I was faster and I had to
work out of necessity. I needed the work and I worked hard I can tell you. We all worked
faster than the men, so don't tell me women can't do it.
Despite the fact that women were perfectly capable of performing many tasks on the
shop-floor, most CarPress managers remained reluctant to employ them. When
quizzed about this, these men offered a number of excuses. Women workers were
incompatible with the new flexibility because they were 'physically incapable of
performing the more arduous jobs'; too many women displayed 'a pin money
mentality'; or, since the Equal Pay Act came into force, the company enjoyed no
advantage in employing women who possessed the 'wrong temperament for heavy
factory work'. Even the senior stewards were not particularly sympathetic. One
remarked:
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To be honest, looking at things from management's point of view, this is not the sort of place
where you can come in sick. You have to be on your toes all the time or you'll end up having
a serious accident. That's the problem for the women. They're different aren't they? Their
bodies are different for a start. They've got the monthly problem and they can't keep going
out sick every time.
Thus, the men in different positions of authority defined women in terms of
domesticity. Following similar processes to those identified by Cockburn's (1995)
recent studies of gender inequality at the workplace, women's 'natural' attributes were
articulated with domestic ties and maternal responsibilities and then constructed as
drawbacks in the sphere of production. Once these ideological assumptions were
placed into the material context of capitalist rationalisation, demanning and
consequent lean production - where maximum labour utilisation, attendance and effort
were at a premium - then, for many managers, the retention of women became a
'problem'. A number commented that women were no longer suited to the stress and
speed of work on the shop-floor. And if any women complained they were not likely
to receive sympathy. As one superintendent said:
We have to tell them straight, "you're all supposed to be into equal pay aren't you? If you
can't do the work then you'll have to get out, it's as simple as that. I'm supposed to be running
a press shop here not a kindergarten you know".
Sex discrimination law prevented management from overtly selecting women for
redundancy. However, to maintain its lean manning strategy, CarPress operated a
long-running voluntary redundancy scheme. In response to the increasingly harsh
treatment from their foremen and managers, and an indifference to their problems
from many senior stewards, a good number of women left the company. Those who
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remained needed an especial toughness and tenacity to preserve their hold on a living
wage. For example, some were sectioned off into an area that the shop-floor
appositely named 'Bosnia'. It was cold, it had no proper heating system, winter
draughts would blow through cracked windows and roofing sheet, and yet in this
environment the women were expected to perform rapid light assembly work with
targets of up to 1000 pieces per hour. One 'Bosnian' woman protested:
We've been fighting for years to get heating but the management have ignored us just because
we're women. If it gets cold in the main shops the management bring in the heater cannons for
the men. But not here. Not likely. Some winters I've been working in here wearing 4 jumpers
at a time and we're always wearing them out. Sometimes we even work in our coats. Can you
imagine it? It got so bad, I was off sick last winter with chilblains. I could have got bloody
frost bite! But the management didn't care. They didn't believe me. My boss rang me up and
told me to come in immediately or I'd be sacked. It's just like slave labour.
The exigencies of capitalist mass production combined with managerial patriarchy to
abuse women's bodies in the main shops as well. Annette, another 'Bosnian' woman
who transferred out of the press shop, spoke at length about this:
When we worked the big presses some of the metal guards would quite regularly spring up and
hit you on your breasts if you didn't have your wits about you. It could give you a real nasty
knock with bruises to show for it. And just as often we'd be put on machines which were too
difficult for us to operate. We couldn't reach into the tools [dies], we just weren't tall enough.
So we'd complain to the foreman but all he would say was, "if you can't do the job then we
don't want any more women in here do we?" Then he'd have a good laugh at us. It used to
feel degrading. Sometimes you actually had to bend right into the machines arid the men
standing behind you on the line would be laughing and catcalling while you were on tiptoes
trying to reach in.
And we've been involved in some nasty accidents too. Some of those presses can develop
faults. Sometimes they go into a double cycle with no warning at all so that the safety bar
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would come up the first time when you're expecting it but then suddenly spring up for a
second time when you're not. And it knocks you right back. The bar will then knock you in
the chest and give you some right nice little bruises.
These women were not seeking preferential treatment or even 'positive action' on the
shop-floor; they merely demanded protection from the harmful concrete ramifications
of a managerial system that is obsessed with production, output and profit. They
were, of course, refused.
Such managerial behaviour constitutes the antithesis of equal opportunity policy.
Lean production is a highly efficient, low-waste system of surplus extraction and
capital accumulation demanding workers who are most likely to consistently fulfil the
strict attendance and performance criteria of the employer. As we discovered in
Chapter Three, the interaction between capitalist social relations and patriarchal
relations in the Japanese electronic transplants in South Wales ensured that these
workers may be young women with the necessary dextrous skills who also display the
'commitment' that naturally accompanies their need for a basic family income. And
at factories like CarPress, increasingly, they may be the 'experienced unemployed',
men with the obligatory stamina for continual production work on heavy machinery
who similarly display the 'commitment' that follows the desperate quest for a first
decent job. Either way, questions of equal employment rights, parental leave, sick
leave, the needs of women, the needs of older workers and special measures for
disabled workers become marginal matters. Lean production regimes enlist ideologies
of equality which often mask enduring forms of structural disadvantage for many
workers. Their recruitment and selection techniques may be more proceduralised and
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scrupulous than hitherto but these will not necessarily incorporate the principle of
equal opportunity at work.
MARRIED TO THE COMPANY, IN SICKNESS AND IN HEALTH: LABOUR
RETENTION AND JOB SECURITY
Between the years 1978 and 1985, as in many UK manufacturing firms, the BL/Rover
workforce was butchered; a series of rationalisations and plant closures caused the
combine's employment to fall by 114,000 (Williams et al. 1994a). During the decade
following 1981, as part of this process, CarPress' s Llanelli workforce halved in size.
In this context, the author's attempts to discuss with different employees Japanese
notions of 'jobs for life', were plainly inopportune. Job security was central to the
workers' concrete interests, yet in the barren environment of mass unemployment it
remained merely an aspiration, a desire for a basic right that could be cruelly
manipulated by management's demand for change. A press shop operator:
Look, we're all in the same boat here, we're no different to anybody else. If you're a worker
you've got the same interests wherever you are. You go to school, you try to get yourself some
qualifications, you try and get yourselfajob, you go to work and then you want your job
security. You need job security in order to plan your life, to get a home for your family, to get
a car and other things in life. They're the concerns of all of us. And because of that, the fear
of losing these things, the fear of losing the dignity that you have in work, the real fear of
redundancy, they're in your mind all the time.
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One quality inspector knew only too well the effects of managerial manipulation here:
The management are clever. They'll often issue a redundancy notice just before the annual
pay talks start up and then they don't tell you who's got to go. So it's issued as a general
threat, to sober us up, you know what I mean? It leads to a lot of uncertainty. Then the
management will wait a few months and they'll re-issue the same redundancy notice. Again,
no names, so it creates greater uncertainty. It's all about playing on your nerves. It's the
company playing with your life all the time. It becomes a life of fear. You can't plan for
anything. You can't plan for a home, for your mortgage, nothing. So what do you do? I'll tell
you what you do. You either give in or you turn into a militant.
I used to be a toolmaker. Do you know, during my time in the toolroom I received 11
redundancy notices in 6 years. Notices telling me I'll be outside the gates in a couple of weeks
time. Then at the last moment they're suddenly withdrawn. Now how can you live like that?
Me, I did end up a militant. And the company repaid me. I got thrown out of the toolroom
and dumped on inspection.
The new working practices agreement attempted to temper shop-floor opposition with
a commitment of no compulsory redundancies. However, like the Japanese
transplants in South Wales, and indeed, Japanese transplants in North and South
America, workers were forced to trade an acceptance of greater numerical and
functional flexibility in return for ajob security that market conditions could
periodically undermine (Black and Ackers 1994; Humphrey 1994; Kenney and Florida
1993). As the plant's chief production manager commented:
There's no God given right for anybody in any company to have ajob for life. We all hope for
the best of course, many of us hope for a long stay at CarPress, but nothing in life is forever.
And if there is such a thing as "jobs for life" it's only there if the company is making a profit.
We're not a registered charity you know.
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Nevertheless, during the 1 990s, CarPress did eschew the traditional 'hire and fire'
employment methods inherited from BL and Rover. Instead, by means of voluntary
redundancy programmes and natural wastage, the ageing core of the workiorce was
only gradually reduced and then replaced by judiciously recruiting younger, less
experienced workers; higher workloads were maintained by the redistribution of tasks;
whilst the exploitation of temporary labour helped the company manage product
market fluctuations.
Moreover, as we saw in the last chapter, management succeeded in appropriating the
distribution of overtime from the shop stewards. Now, production variations could
also be realised by extending working time, without hindrance from the unions.
Although overtime premia costs prevented management from extending hours on a
continuous, plant-wide basis, particular groups of process operators and skilled
workers did experience acute labour intensifying pressures in this way, none more so
than the plant's maintenance fitters.
Between 1984 and 1994, cost reducing labour flexibility measures caused the plant's
skilled maintenance staffing levels to fall by 50%; in addition, all general hands and
fitters' mates were made redundant. Manufacturing and maintenance labour costs
were further reduced when the plant moved from a standard 3 shift to an alternating
days/nights plus twilight shift system in 1994. At the same time, as we saw in Chapter
Five, the plant's worn-out machinery was consistently pushed beyond the limit to
meet customer demand in an environment of continuous production and low buffers.
The combination of frugal resources, no preventative maintenance, perpetual machine
breakdowns and managerial coercion forced many of the remaining maintenance staff
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to virtually double the length of their working week. In such circumstances, these
workers enjoyed a fimny sort of 'job security'. Two electricians angrily reflected on
this:
In the last 6 months the press shop's been operating flat out. It's been going all day, all night
just keeping up with the customer's requirements. Everything is driven by the customer these
days. That takes precedence over everything else. So you've got your maintenance staff
working an extra 3 hours every day to cover overtime on production. Then on Saturdays we're
working from 6.00 in the morning to 6.00 in the evening. On Sundays we're doing the same
and often straight through to the night shift.
Some of us have been doing this for 6 months continuously. And things are getting so bad
with the maiming that we're only getting 2 electricians on each shift. So, on average, the
maintenance people now, we're working 65 to 70 hours per week. And it's all virtually
compulsory. If you say no you get threatened with the sack.
Another:
And these alternating days and night. It's fucking terrible. I'm never at home, my wife never
sees me. I've got no social life whatsoever. The alternating shifts are bad enough. But when
the plant has been on a 3 shift system for 20 years then those shifts become part of your
working life. Your body gets used to it. And now we're suddenly get taken off it and forced
to work one week days, one week nights, plus an extra 30 hours on top! You end up with
health problems. Sometimes it just gets unbearable.
In more favourable external labour market conditions, many workers subject to such
stress and pressure would seek alternative employment elsewhere. However, in the
mid 1 990s, these conditions favoured capital not labour; they reinforced the high level
of labour retention necessary for CarPress to successfully operate its system of
continuous, lean production.
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Labour retention has other facets as well. Although the plant's labour turnover was
low, the absence of generous manning levels and high buffers exposed poor labour
attendance as a potential threat to production. Therefore, like its neighbouring
Japanese transplants in the region, CarPress placed a high premium on reducing
absenteeism. To this end, the management introduced new disciplinary measures
against absence due to both sickness and injury.
In 1990, CarPress diminished the sick pay scheme inherited from Rover by setting
payments below basic rate earnings and restricting these to 40 days in any one year
(the Rover scheme paid basic rates for a full year). Furthermore, the company sought
worker accountability for absence by introducing measures such as strict return to
work interviews and regular home visits. Although, on the surface, this latter
approach was little different to contemporary management practice elsewhere5,
CarPress followed it with an especial determination. An assembly shop
superintendent:
The control of sickness is a perennial problem here. For example, I was called in recently by
my director to discuss deteriorating absenteeism in the assembly shop. Now, I had to explain
to him that for some reason an unusual number of my operators were off sick with a variety of
broken bones. Legs, arms, shoulders, you name it, they broke it. God knows what they'd been
up to. None work-related but real sickness, nevertheless. The response of this director was to
A recent IDS Study based on CBI data found that many employers are currently focusing their
attention on employee absenteeism because of the costs of both sick pay and disruption to production.
Many are attempting to secure worker accountability for absence using measures such as the return to
work interview more scrupulously than hitherto (IDS 1994a). Another recent TUC survey of 171
workplaces found that employers were reducing the costs of sickness absence by tightening their
absence control policies and sick pay schemes and taking health more into account in the recruitment
process. Women, older people and disabled workers suffered particular discrimination here (Welfare at
Work, 1996).
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say, "well you'll have to go out and sack the lot of them!". And he was serious! Now I can be
quite hard but I have a heart. Some of our directors have no logic and no heart either.
The operators were not sacked in this case, but they received a severe reprimand upon
their return to work. Individuals suffering work-related injuries - and these were
habitual at CarPress - were treated in similar fashion. The most common injuries were
lacerations from handling sheet steel (some of which could be severe); knocks, bruises
and sprains from the press safety bars; damage to eyes from metal splinters and
welding flash; and general welding burns. More serious injuries such as fractures and
amputations occurred much less frequently. An AEEU health and safety
representative commented on the company's safety record:
The problem we've got is that half the machines in this plant are falling to bits. Some of them
are in a terrible state. In the old days they always used to be repaired and maintained at
weekends but now that's all stopped because of lack of money. These days we're told
everything's down to the customer. Nothing must get in the way of meeting the customer's
needs. So yeah, the customer rules here airight. But all this talk about a customer philosophy,
it can actually end up hurting people. People get hit. But I don't think the management are
bothered to be honest. They're totally obsessed with production, it's all they think about.
This managerial obsession extended to treating absence through injury as a threat to
production rather than a consequence of it. Stage by stage, the management
introduced measures which forced all but the most seriously injured to report for
alternative work. This culminated in a detailed procedure which established that, 'a
collective effort must be made to ensure that employees are not sent home from their
workplace whilst they can be gainfully employed in work outside their normal range
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of duties' 6 . A good number of workers provided personal anecdotes of how they or
their colleagues were forced to report in for light production duties with severe
lacerations, damaged eyes, even broken limbs. And this was not just a matter of
managerial vindictiveness against certain individuals; it was another manifestation of
a coercive management control on the shop-floor. CarPress was intent on sending out
a more general message that absenteeism would no longer be tolerated.
The success of this strategy is presented quantitatively in Table8.1.
Table 8.1, Total Accident and Lost Time Accident Record, 1991-1995
YEAR	 TOTAL NUMBER	 ACCIDENTS PER	 LOST TIME
OF ACCIDENTS*	 EMPLOYEE**	 ACCIDENT
.FREQ. .ENCY .RATE .
1991	 2516	 3.82	 82
1992	 2032	 3.04	 54
1993	 2040	 2.95	 44
1994	 2236	 2.91
1995	 2203	 .	 2.96	 21
* Accidents treated at the company's medical department.
** Total number of accidents divided by the number of employees at the end of the year.
*** Lost Time Accidents are those where an employee loses at least one day's work as a result of
industrial injury. The frequency rate is the number of Lost Time Accidents for every million man hours
worked during the year.
Between 1991 and 1995, the total number of accidents fluctuated relatively
moderately around a mean of 2205; with the exception of year 19918, the total
number of accidents per employee also remained constant. In contrast, the LTA
frequency rate, in other words, the rate of absenteeism through industrial injury which
6 
'Employees Sustaining Injury at Work Policy', CarPress Ltd, 7.2.95.
CarPress Accident Statistic Reports, 1991-1995.
Due to the implementation of plant redundancies during 1991, the end of year employment figure
used to calculate accidents per employee does not reflect total plant employment over the year.
Although it cannot be accurately calculated, the true number of accidents per employee during 1991 is
more in line with the constant rate over the following years.
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CarPress was determined to reduce, declined by a dramatic 74%. Moreover, the
company's personnel department confirmed that overall absenteeism also fell by 50%;
from 12% in the late 1980s to around 6% in 1994.
These statistics, and the actions which prompted them, demonstrate that analyses
which stress novel aspects of Japanese management practice, such as the disciplinary
effect of peer pressure and management attempts to capture this to the benefit of the
employer (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992, p.309), sometimes miss the more significant
impact of the conventional. As Edwards and Whitston (1993) discovered, there is
little empirical evidence to support the idea of a move towards 'self-discipline' at the
workplace. Instead, shop-floor discipline, order and attendance are currently
maintained through a mix of measures, including, in the contemporary context of
loose labour markets and weak trade unions, a return to more traditional, coercive
forms of managerial authority.
EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT: MAINTAINING A DEFICIT IN WORKER
PARTICIPATION
So far then, CarPress's HRM strategy, consisted of 'hard' measures aimed at building
a more acquiescent, malleable and disciplined workforce. Even the benefit of
improved job security came with a sting in the tail in the form of a relentless pressure
and stress that accompanies labour intensification in the 1 990s. However, in parallel
with this approach, the company introduced ostensibly 'softer' socialization
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techniques aimed at cementing a more durable form of control by incorporating the
shop-floor into managerial doctrine. Essentially about building trust, acceptance and
conformity, the impact of different employee involvement measures such as open
communications and single status will now be considered.
The new communications
During the 1 980s, the practice of direct communications between management and
employees became increasingly common in British firms (IDS 1 992a; Marchington et
al. 1992; Townley 1989). Although the rationale for this was more complex than
many business writers suggest (Townley 1989), things were more simple at Rover.
Management perceived direct communications as the only way 'to win the hearts and
minds of the men at all levels' and to bypass the company's more militant shop
stewards (Edwardes 1983, p.87). Malcolm Edwardes instigated the practice of
sending letters direct to employees homes and regularly issuing factory briefing
sheets. Later in the decade, as part of its 'Working With Pride' programme, Rover
introduced more refined techniques such as zone (team) briefings. However, as Smith
(1988) discovered, the limited, top-down nature of the communications system soon
engendered disillusion and disinterest on the shop-floor.
'Working With Pride' had perished by the time CarPress acquired the Lianelli plant.
The new management's communications style was both ad hoc and minimalist. Team
briefings became more infIequent, management cascades were only used in
exceptional circumstances and company newsletters petered out; the notice board
became the principal official means of communicating information whilst the
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'grapevine' remained its most fruitful source. Although, by the time of the first
questionnaire survey (October 1994), the company had re-introduced a site journal,
84% of employees indicated their dissatisfaction with company communications.
This was not just a function of the paucity of information, it was also a consequence
of a widespread distrust which some workers realised was inherent in British industry.
A toolmaker typically commented:
We get nothing from head office, they tell us nothing about how the company's doing, new
investments and that sort of thing. And when they communicate at the local level, well, there's
so much distrust, you just don't know whether the management are misleading you or not.
Because at the moment, the way things are, what's always at the back of your mind when your
local manager makes some announcement is that he's lying again.
And a cranedriver:
I don't think there's any British company in this country which is really copying the Japanese.
I mean, getting changes through that are pushed up from the bottom to the top. And I'm not
blaming that on British workers. It's the fault of the middle and higher classes. They'll never
change in this country...if anything, the best management communication policy for this bloody
place would be distributing books on stress at work.
This antipathy to management was not a matter of lack of interest in the company per
Se, Ot in change at the workplace. After all, CarPress provided work and a livelihood;
it established the context and organization for different activities which shaped the
lives and identities of every one of its employees. Another driver reflected the
position of many on the shop-floor in aspiring to become more involved, to utilise his
skills and knowledge, to enrich his working life in ways which might form a radica'
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departure from the passive drudgery and discipline which accompanied direct
management control over the capitalist labour process:
I don't know anything about teamwork. The management here are shocking, they won't
involve you with anything. As I see it you've got one team up there and one team down here.
Okay, they might have all the qualifications going, you know, their '0' levels, 'A' levels,
degrees and the rest of it. But we've got our hands. It's hands that do the work in this place.
We know how to make things in the plant, we know all about the problems you get with
changing the jigs and tools. But they wouldn't dream of asking us. They're too scared too ask
us for one thing, and in any case, they think they know it all.
During the war of attrition which preceded the shop-floor sackings in October 1994,
CarPress realised that incorporating its senior stewards would enjoy limited success
without also addressing independent rank and file militancy. It sought a more
pervasive process of incorporation. Accordingly, management devised a new direct
communications strategy of 'employee involvement' to complement the introduction
of teamworking. It was implemented in the immediate aftermath of the sackings
dispute.
Strategically planned monthly teambriefings formed the linchpin of the new policy.
Every month, a sub-committee of the board, comprising representative directors and
senior managers, drew up a cascade of company and customer information which
would form the basis of team discussion. At each teambriefing, unit managers fed
their teamworkers a wide range of company statistics and general information
concerning: plant performance; plant profit levels; part reject rates; performance in
fulfilling customer time delivery schedules; absenteeism rates; lost time accidents;
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new projects; kaizen activity; and customer visits to the plant. The personnel manager
also stressed that, 'employees are made particularly aware of the needs of the
customer, of areas of work where CarPress is failing to meet the customer's needs,
and it's possible consequences'. At the end of each presentation, time was set aside
for questions and answers and shop-floor input.
The company also established Quarterly Business Reviews which provided the same
type of information but in more depth. Forty individuals attended each review in a
plush management presentation area. These comprised 20 permanent representatives
from management, the unions and non-steward shop-floor workers, along with 20
different shop-floor and office volunteers.
The author visited CarPress a number of times during this period and encountered a
quite profound transformation in the quality of public displays of information. Each
team had its own large display board providing different team performance
parameters; each provided photographs of team members and their taskfNVQ
credits9 ; the longer established teams even included birthdays and hobbies. The press
and assembly shops also housed two much larger displays containing colourful
The company's new shop-floor grading scheme corresponded with the operators' NVQ ratings. At
the bottom end of the scheme, all Grade 4 operators (the majority) were assessed at NVQ Level 1 and at
the top end, Grade 1 skilled workers were rated at NVQ Level 4. At the time of the research, the
company had embarked upon a major investment in training its semi-skilled operators to NVQ Level 2.
This involved limited technical skills training; it was more an exercise in changing attitudes. For
example, different units covered customer supplier relations, involvement in communications,
teamworking skills, presentational skills and 'self-analysis', 'a kind of continuous improvement of the
self', as one NVQ Facilitator expressed it. In the second questionnaire survey (November 1995), only
10% of shop-floor respondents believed the NVQ programme was introduced to 'develop technical
skills'; 13% felt it 'served no useful purpose at all'; 18% believed it was introduced to 'develop more
positive attitudes to change at the workplace'; whilst 45% believed the programme was merely 'window
dressing put on to impress the customer'.
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graphical presentations of plant performance, absenteeism, defects, sales, and so on.
In addition, the company began installing 'Toyota-style' overhead electronic displays
of daily team performance.
Along with the plethora of posters and other displays urging maximum performance,
ostensibly, this new approach to information management exemplified both strands of
Townley's (1989) analysis of contemporary employee communication programmes:
communication as a process of education and communication as a strategy of
commitment. CarPress sought to dampen rank and file aspirations by inculcating a bit
of 'economic reality' and understanding of market discipline; it also aimed to build
greater employee commitment to corporate objectives in respect of company
performance.
Analysing changes in the prominence of different sources of information at work
provides one measure of the impact of the new policy. In both the 1994 questionnaire
survey (which was completed immediately before the changes) and the 1995 survey
(completed a year after), shop-floor and office workers were asked to select their three
main sources of information concerning 'what is going on at work'. The results are
summarised in Table 8.2.
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Table 8.2, Three main sources of information at work, all employees
N = 384 (1994) and 514 (1995)
PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS















Although the numbers relying on the grapevine remained high (and in most large
social organizations this will always be the case) and the Quarterly Business Reviews
made little impact, there were major shifts towards supervisors and team briefings as
salient sources of information. At the same time, the relative impact of union
communications substantially deteriorated, a decline which could also be attributed to
the incorporation of a number of senior stewards.
However, what appears to the outsider as a considerable improvement in the
quantitative and qualitative provision of company information may not be regarded in
quite the same way by its recipients on the shop-floor. Many CarPress workers
remained both frustrated and discontented. In the second questionnaire survey
(November 1995), although 29% of shop-floor workers felt that company
communications had improved, 35% believed they were no better whilst 36% felt they
had actually deteriorated. In the same survey, 58% of shop-floor workers indicated
that they did not believe most of the information they received from management. A
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similar picture emerges when we look at the particular impact of team briefings.
Table 8.3 summarises this for shop-floor workers.
Table 8.3, Shop-floor workers' re plies to the question,
'What impact do you think your team briefin's have had on the foiowinR:'
(Percentage by row; N =471)
INCREASED DECREASED NO CHANCE
	............................................................(%)	 .(%)(%)
The amount of useful information you 	 41	 7	 52
..........................................................................................................................................................
Your understanding of management 	 18	 21	 61
decisions
Your commitment to the company 	 25	 11	 64
Management's openness 	 13	 32	 55
Opportunities for you to have a say 	 18	 22	 60
about what's going on at work
Although a substantial minority of respondents felt that team briefings improved the
provision of useful company information, and a smaller minority believed they had
increased their commitment to the company, the overall impact was negative. The
already low levels of understanding of management decisions, of perceptions of
management's openness and of opportunities to have a say about changes at work, all
deteriorated further. One foreman, now unit manager, wryly admitted:
Listen, these briefings are a flicking joke, even I'll admit to that. My manager gives me a
written brief, I'll read out a load of figures and that's it, it's all over. Figures such as latest
profits, sales, monthly defects and plant efficiency. All interesting stuff eh?
When we started the briefings there was some interest from the boys at first. You'd get some
sort of dialogue going. But that's because it was new. Now they're bored stiff with it. You
read out your brief, look up, and you're confronted with a sea of blank, bored faces. Nobody
ever asks you a question. But with these briefs, what do you expect?
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Most CarPress workers, therefore, were not fooled by these new developments. Many
had little time for a policy which under the benign designation of 'employee
involvement' represented a distinctly 'top-down' approach to communications, a one-
way transmission belt for both instilling a sense of discipline in production and
promoting capitalist market ideology and the employer's interests. And they had little
time for a mechanism which frustrated the propagation and advance of their own class
interests.
Single status
The new working practices agreement committed CarPress to creating 'a single status
company' where all distinctions between monthly staff and hourly paid employees
would be ended. However, as the Persoimel Manager admitted, 'this doesn't mean
that we're going to get caught up with moving everyone up to the staff level...there's
going to have to be compromises'. Indeed there were, for the concrete benefits of this
commitment proved hard to identify. For example, a year after the new agreement
was implemented, clocking distinctions between monthly and hourly paid employees
remained, whilst the rationalisation of grades and the introduction of credit transfer
did not prove particularly popular on the shop-floor. Neither did management's
approach to the harmonisation of sick pay which insisted that shop-floor absenteeism
fall below 4.5%, and remain there, before the operators could enjoy the same sick pay
as their office colleagues.
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CarPress was more interested in mobilising the idea of single status as an ideology of
spurious benevolence rather than as a mechanism of reducing real class inequalities at
the workplace. And in the context of antagonistic management-labour relations, the
policy represented an extraordinarily weak facade for disguising the concrete
manifestations of labour exploitation in capitalist production. This is exemplified by
the Group Chairman's message to his employees in 199510:
My view of what a good company looks like is one - that attracts the best people; that pays the
top rate for the job; that offers the best working conditions; where everyone is involved in
achieving continuous improvement; where all stakeholders, employees, shareholders and
customers are satisfied.
For this, managers should not have the attitude of wanting the most out of employees for the
least pay, nor should employees strive to get the maximum out of the company for the least
effort. I see a future where harmony and consensus reign in an environment in which
everybody wins. I want responsibility and authority devolved to the extent that everybody
feels involved in the decision making process relative to their function in the company. Why
shouldn't CarPress be like that?
A better question is, which of us are going to actively work towards achieving this and which
of us are going to obstruct the process? I ask every CarPress employee - which camp will you
be in?
The second questionnaire survey (November 1995) reversed this assertive challenge
by asking respondents whether managers and workers should be members of the same
team, and secondly, whether they thought their own managers believed they were in a
separate team to the workforce. The results are summarised in Table 8.4.
'° Extract from 'The Chairman's Platform', CarPress Chronicle, Summer 1995.
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Table 8.4, Shop-floor workers' assessment of mana2erial 'team spirit'




'I believe that all managers and employees should be members of the same
,., ..................................................................................................................................................................
A..shop-floor workers
	 . 76	 ... . 12
'I think that the management here believe they are in a separate team to the employees'.
All shop-floor workers
	 88	 5	 .	 7
The figures speak for themselves. Invariably, when the subject of single status was
raised with shop-floor interviewees it would be met initially with a quizzical look,
then amusement, then anger. When they eventually expressed themselves, these
workers demanded far more substantial changes in both material and class relational
terms than that provided by mere managerial platitudes or the superficial benefits of
single status canteens, car-parks and the like. A cranedriver:
All single status means for management is that I don't have to clock in and that type of thing.
But does that make us all equal? Yeah, I understand the fact that you need leaders but if it's
real single status then why can't we have the same money? If the general manager and the
manufacturing manager, and the rest of 'em, didn't turn up for work today would the factory
stop running? Of course it wouldn't. It would keep going. But it would stop like that if the
shop-floor didn't turn up. It's the workforce who should have the top status here. And the
management should come down to our status then they might see for themselves what we've
been suffering over the years. No, the production workers are the real breadwinners for the
company. All these others are just hangers-on and pussy cats.
In any case, all this talk about single status it's a dream man, it's a dream! You don't think the
Japs have got single status do you? All they've got is flicking canteens and uniforms. And
they'll tell you that, "right lads we're all equal now!" But some people are more equal than
others. Believe me, we need a revolution here. And it will come.
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Many workers spoke in similarly trenchant terms about their aspirations for more
dignity and equality at work. But aspirations they remained, for few believed that
management at CarPress, or elsewhere for that matter, would be prepared to dilute its
status, power and control. A woman from the assembly shop said, 'we should all be
on the same rates and benefits, but if you're talking about getting rid of"us and them"
I can tell you the "them" would never give up their status'; in the same vein, a
foreman commented, 'I really think single status is an impossibility here. Our
managers strive to become one of "them" rather than one of "us" and they'll defend it
to their death'; and a toolmaker felt, 'there is, there's a definite class distinction here
and in British industry generally. And I think over recent years the distinction's got
worse, we've gone into reverse'.
Workers on the shop-floor, therefore, well understood the duplicitous nature of the
single status rhetoric that has become fashionable in business circles. They recognised
a confidence trick when they saw one. And on occasions they could also mobilise
their collective humour to 'get even' with management. A press shop operator
recounted a recent example of this:
Single status? That's a laugh! Not so long ago we had a mass communications meeting with
senior management about the introduction of the new agreement. After a while, one of the
managers starts to talk about single status and he started everyone off sniggering. Then
Mervyn, one of my mates on the next table, stands up and shouts, "I tell you what, if we've got
single status coming here, you can take my Honda 50 and I'll have one of those management
Rovers out there." We all roared with laughter at this and banged the tables and of course, the
management quickly moved on to another subject. Angry they were too. But d'you see what I
mean? Single status is one big joke in this factory.
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Drawing together the 'egalitarianism' and 'equal involvement in decision making'
commonly associated with single status, the 'participative workplace democracy'
associated with the new communications policies and the 'self-management' of
teamworking, CarPress's shop-floor workers were asked in both questionnaire surveys
whether they felt they had 'enough say' in decisions made at work affecting different
levels of the organization. In this way, the surveys provided a rudimentary indicator
of the overall impact of the new employee involvement initiatives a year after their
implementation. The results are summarised in Table 8.5.
Table 8.5, Shop-floor workers' assessment of em ployee involvement
Percentage by column; N = 316 (1994) and 471 (1995)
The results demonstrate the presence of a profound democratic deficit on the shop-
floor of the 1990s. Workers' influence over changes to their own jobs and working
conditions improved only moderately' ; their involvement in the decision-making
process at the sectional level - which teamworking and the teambrief are supposed to
Even this result was distorted by the length of service factor. In 1995, eighty percent of the majority
group of workers with more than 10 years service indicated that they did not have enough say on
decisions made about their own job and working conditions compared to 69% of workers with less than
5 years service.
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especially enhance - remained abysmally low; whilst at the factory level it was almost
non-existent.
These statistics should surprise nobody. The exigencies and driving logic and
intensity of contemporary capitalist mass production do not provide sufficient margin
for anything approaching meaningful worker autonomy. More than ever, CarPress
workers remained subordinated to management, to the customer and to the machine.
What is surprising is that some managers really believed that their programmes of
specious employee involvement, of ideological control, would actually deceive their
subordinates; some were even seduced by it themselves. But on the shop-floor, where
only the hard experience of capitalist social relations counts, real 'empowerment',
'enrichment' and 'autonomy' remained both abstract and elusive.
TRUST, LOYALTY AND SHOP-FLOOR CULTURE
High-trust management-labour relations in contemporary capitalist production are
assumed to arise from a post-Taylorist work organization which induces a new
common purpose between managers and workers. Trust, loyalty and respect may then
develop through the processes ofjoint-problem solving, sharing information and
devolving discretion, responsibility and autonomy (Fox, 1985). To put this another
way, 'a Taylorite factory deskills blue-collar workers and removes the need for trust;
an un-Taylorite factory would tend to improve worker skills such that workers could
be trusted with a higher degree of responsibility for both the design and
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implementation of the production process' (Fukuyama, 1995, p.234). Unconsciously
or not, these 'enlightened' managerialist writers use the same kind of arguments
which, ironically, Frederick W. Taylor himself employed to support his vision of
cooperative and participative employment relations in factories organised on scientific
management principles (Bendix 1956). Taylor believed that low trust relations and
antagonism in industry could be dissolved by securing a complete mental revolution
on the part of both managers and workers: 'the great revolution that takes place in the
mental attitude of the two parties under scientific management is that both sides take
their eyes off the division of the surplus as the all important matter, and together turn
their attention toward increasing the size of the surplus until this surplus becomes so
large.. .that there is ample room for a large increase in wages for the workmen and an
equally large increase in profits for the manufacturer' (Taylor 1947, cited in Bendix
1956, p.276).
Notwithstanding these ideological similarities, using the managerialist theses of Ohno
(1988) and Womack et al. (1990), Fukuyama goes on to place his analysis into the
context of Japanization. He argues that 'un-Taylorite' Japanese production methods,
and in particular teamworking, are dependent on the commitment, participation and
knowledge of the workforce and that the experience of working in teams itself
engenders trust, loyalty and commitment. Thus, in Japanese lean production, we have
a more 'humane, communal factory system'. Without digressing into the possibility
that wider cultural and political supports may also determine worker commitment
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(which in any case, some writers refute' 2 ), the main emphasis is placed upon the
relationship between contemporary shifts in the nature of the capitalist labour process
and shop-floor values.
At CarPress, although most individuals enjoyed little autonomy, they nevertheless
worked in teams, they worked more flexibly and they were expected to use their
initiative for the benefit of the company. The preceding four chapters have placed
much emphasis upon the shop-floor's reaction against the consequent loss of
traditional controls over the labour process. To what extent were these significant
changes also accompanied by the emergence of new, more individualistic, even
enterprise-based shop-floor values, built upon the trust that the business writers
associate with teamwork?
To investigate this, the 1994 and 1995 questionnaire surveys asked shop-floor and
office workers to select from a list of eleven options, three aspects of work which
were most important to them and three which were least important. In both years, the
majority of workers manifestly prioritised 'decent working conditions', 'good pay'
and 'job security' as being most important, which is not in itself surprising. But they
also shunned options more associated with the pro-company values of teamwork such
as 'getting on well with supervision', 'plenty of overtime', 'good promotion
' As noted in Chapter One, Dohse et a!. (1985) argue that the weakness of Japanese trade unions; the
dependence of Japanese employees on a single employer; and their dependence on both the
individualized wage system and the goodwill of the supervisor together constitute the more decisive
factors in the 'committed worker' syndrome.
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prospects', 'having responsibilities at work' and 'opportunity to use initiative'. The
results are presented in Appendix B.
Both surveys also explored the question of trust. In 1994, respondents were asked
whether or not they agreed with the statement that, 'the Company treats me with trust
and respect'. Seventy one percent of shop-floor workers disagreed; 40% strongly
disagreed. In the second survey, a year after the introduction of teamworking and the
various accompanying instruments of ideological control, although the question was
operationalised in a slightly different way, this low trust relationship clearly hardened;
89% of shop-floor workers indicated low levels of trust existing between managers
and the workforce. The results of the second survey are displayed in Table 8.6.
Table 8.6, All employees' assessment of the level of trust existing
between management and the workforce
(Percentage by row; N = 533)
COMPLETE TRUST MOST NOT MUCH NO TRUST
TRUST	 OF THE TIME	 TRUST	 AT ALL
...................................................................................................I ......................................................................
	
dOpators I..................................................................................................... 40 	 . 58
Semiskilled Operator	 12	 52
Staff	 2	 23	 56	 19
Teamworking, the new communications, single status and other management
initiatives together, therefore, failed to dent the traditional, low-trust values of
instrumentalism on the shop-floor. Moreover, the cynical, but trenchant and emphatic
worker denials of the notion that things could be different at CarPress suggested that
the low-trust management-labour relations which accompany the intensification of
labour exploitation in lean production would endure in the longer term. A press fitter
typically commented, 'this factory is just a place of work, nothing more. It's just a
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place where we happen to come into work and where management dictate to us all the
time. You've got no rights here any more'. When asked about loyalty to the
company, workers replied that the only loyalty they extended was their allegiance to
the pay cheque every Thursday. And an assembly shop operator spoke for many when
he replied:
No, it's not the British way, it's not in our culture. And in any case, management here don't
actually want loyalty. All they want is for us to work harder. It's the same old Tory
philosophy: "if the rich man works harder pay him more, if the poor man works harder pay him
less"...And I'm not loyal to this lot anyway. They seem like a bunch of crooks to me.
Even some of the more recent recruits felt the same way. A press shop operator:
No mate, I'm telling you, there's been no change in attitudes here. It's as bad as ever. I've
only been here for 2 years. I used to be keen when I started mind, I wanted to get on. But now
I've learnt, what's the point? The company never invests in new machinery. These presses are
30 years old, they're clapped out. They're always breaking down. But the company doesn't
care. As long as they're making money out of us, that's the only thing they care about. We
can never make money out of them. No. I've had it up to here. My attitude now is "fuck the
lot of'em". Nowadays, every morning Ijust clock in, keep my head down and try and earn a
wage. I don't think about the job, Ijust turn off. When my 8 hours are up Ijust clock off and
go home.
If anything, these comments suggest a reinforcing of the instrumentalist base of
worker 'commitment' with absolutely no evidence of the diffusion of 'pro-company'
attitudes which many business writers tend to emphasise. However, other facets of
traditional shop-floor values did change. This study emphasises the increasingly harsh
nature of labour exploitation which was intrinsic to CarPress' s implementation of
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'Japanese-style' management initiatives in the 1 990s. Nevertheless, in earlier times,
stress, boredom and drudgery also characterised the labour process, despite the
presence of local rank and file controls. But at least this human degradation was
mitigated by a shop-floor culture which embraced the intimate values of mutual help,
comradeship, warmth and crucially, humour. At various times, different workers
provided their own fond anecdotes of manifestations of this. To provide just one
example, Ieuan Thomas remembered the antics of one character in the assembly shop
who came to be known as 'the Mohican':
I remember, not long after I started in 1964, the metal finishers used to have their benches
arranged in lines, row after row of them. And no kidding, at the end of every line, without
exception, you'd have a foreman watching over you all the time. Real bowler-hatted stuff.
There used to be hundreds of 'em. One man, I can't remember his name, he got really pissed
off with this. One night, he went home and had the whole of his head shaved, except for a line
down the middle. Just like a Mohican. The next day, he came in to work with a pick axe.
Then, no word of a lie, he chopped up his bench into firewood with his axe, put the wood into
a neat pile and, no kidding, he stripped off bollock naked, lit the wood and danced around the
fire waving his pick axe around like a spear. And he was chanting, "too many chiefs, not
enough Indians! too many chiefs not enough Indians!"
We couldn't believe it. We just stood there laughing our heads off. Next thing, the
superintendent comes along and screams, "flick me, what's wrong with him? Someone take
him away!" So they did. He ended up in a mental hospital for a couple of days for
observation! Mind you, he was soon back at work.
Here was an idiosyncratic form of resistance to management control which embodied
a distinctively working class comic humour. One difference between life on the shop-
floor during this era and the present is that contemporary management will no longer
tolerate any form of worker insubordination, irrespective of the shape in which it
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comes. And in particular, it will not tolerate insubordination that questions the
method of operation or rationale of capitalist mass production. The new management
techniques, therefore, do not allow for 'Mohicans' or other manifestations of working
class opposition. Neither do they respect the humanitarian values of working class
solidarity. At the end of one interview, Annefte, a woman from 'Bosnia', delivered
the following parting shot of dejection:
The way things have turned out here now, this continual fear for your job, it's resulted in a
situation where we're all competing against one another. We're all saying, "yeah, I could do
this job, I could do that job". But there's no longer any consideration for others. What about
those who can't do the hard jobs anymore, those who can't keep up with the speed and the
pressure? In the old days we'd help them out but I'm afraid it's not like that anymore. The
company has made sure that we're all on our own, that we're by ourselves. There's just no
togetherness anymore.
This factory used to be a happier place. There used to be a time when we all mucked in and
helped each other out. But now we're all forced to rush our own jobs. We rush every job.
And some men are struggling with nobody there to help them anymore. Personally, I try to
help people out, I'm still striving to get this better atmosphere but to tell you the truth it's all
gone. Most people in this factory now hate the place. They come in for the money and get out
as soon as they can.
This poignant commentary on the shifting nature of shop-floor social relations in the
1 990s injects a final human element into this chapter's analysis of the different
management techniques that may be employed to build new corporate cultures of
cooperation and market awareness. Like many of the Japanese transplants in South
Wales, CarPress was not so much interested in quixotic notions of 'worker loyalty'
and 'total commitment to the firm' but more in securing personal responsibility,
personal discipline and a sense of obligation to production, the market and the
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customer. The case study demonstrates that in fact, a pervasive mood of compulsion
and fear on the shop-floor can drive these sentiments rather than any sense of true
commitment.
Moreover, as a number of the above comments testify, the same pressures are forcing
workers to substitute the principle of individualistic self-protection for the ethic of
mutual support. This raises the possibility that although shop-floor instrumentalism
remains dominant, other aspects of the customary 'factory-class consciousness' are
now under threat. In a penetrating climate of fear, and a wider economic and political
environment which itself critically undercuts effective rank and file resistance, the
imposition of managerial and customer prerogatives - aimed at maximising surplus
extraction and capital accumulation - is acting to pervert the virtue and integrity of
traditional shop-floor solidarity. The process that we call 'Japanization', therefore,
impairs not just the material condition and collective strength of those who labour but




Throughout most of this thesis, the analysis has investigated the impact of Japanese-
style management ilmovations on the interests of shop-floor labour. The author makes
no apology for this. Industrial sociology is becoming consumed by managerial
questions; for example, the extent to which new management techniques in the UK
are different from old management techniques; or different from practice in Japan and
other competing capitalist economies; or, whether the emerging restructured work
organizations are fully functional, part-functional or dysfunctional. Such a managerial
bias is a corollary of the academic world's current tendency to exclude labour from
society. The notion that a fundamental conflict of interests between capital and labour
remains central to the organization of work in the factories of the 1 990s has
succumbed to the new egalitarian ideology of 'empowerment'. Consequently, both
the articulation of separate class interests and the mobilisation of working class
resistance in its various collective and individual forms are no longer subjects of
interest. Where the standpoint of labour is considered it is more often placed into an
analytical framework of advanced modernity rather than advanced capitalism; here,
subjectivity and conflicts over individual identity count for more than conventional
resistance against a subordinating capitalist class.
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In contrast, this thesis demonstrates that by putting labour back into industrial
sociology and recognising that the essential conditions for resistance and
misbehaviour are still present at the workplace (Thompson and Ackroyd, 1995,
p.629), we find that the 'Japanization of British industry' is not unproblematic. If the
new management initiatives constitute rational capitalist attempts to intensify rates of
labour exploitation then we must expect worker resistance, including traditional
collective forms.
Analysts who are primarily interested in management systems and organization theory
would discover much material in Parts One and Two of the thesis to reject the
universalistic, paradigmatic approach to Japanization followed by many business
school writers. Pure JIT/TQMII-IRM ideal types have no factual basis because, inter
alia, the existence of different corporate logics, different sectoral traditions, different
technological constraints, different product markets, different labour markets and
different industrial relations traditions together produce diverse, often more mundane
work organizational outcomes. However, when the management innovations are
looked at from the standpoint of the many individuals who bring their labour power to
the shop-floor of Japanising factories, then taken together, the transplant survey and
case study data reveal a more uniform, significant, and indeed, pernicious series of
changes. In particular, once the impact on labour's interests becomes the focal point
of the analysis, then a marked congruence emerges between the different management
practices, modes of work organization and human resource management strategies
followed in both the Japanese transplants in South Wales and in CarPress.
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Operating within an economic environment of intense competitive pressure, the
managers of lean mass production in these firms were not particularly interested in
enriching the lives of their employees; during many discussions with the author on
this subject they regarded the notion that assembly line workers could enjoy
meaningful 'empowerment' and 'self-management' as both incomprehensible and
bizarre. Their labour control priorities were somewhat more mundane than this,
reflecting the timeless capitalist exigencies of efficient surplus extraction and capital
accumulation. But from the workers' perspective, these priorities represented a
fundamental threat to traditional forms of rank and file control and shop-floor
autonomy. It is in relation to this order of change that a 'model' of Japanese practice
begins to emerge. This is summarised in Table 9.1.
Whether organised on the basis of cells, teams or conventional long assembly lines,
the work of most production operators was intense, limited in skill, and lacking in
autonomy. The gradual dismantling of rank and file controls over the labour process
in the British case study, and their suppression in the greenfield Japanese transplants,
imposed stricter managerial prerogatives and a more flexible and productive
consumption of labour power. And this distinctively disciplined approach to
production was matched in the ideological sphere. The different firms in this study
displayed little interest in cultivating new, innovative and enterprising workforce
attitudes. Instead, they sought to instil something more prosaic but fundamental to the
needs of the 'capitalist spirit'. That is, a sense of responsibility in production and
accountability to the customer, and this, as a stark substitute for those facets of
working class loyalty and solidarity which threaten capitalist interests.
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Table 9.1, A 'Japanese model' of labour control in South Wales
ORGANIZATION OF THE LABOUR PROCESS
Lean Production Control: workers more completely subordinated to the machine and to the intensive
pace of production by reducing production line buffers, stocks and work-in-progress; by more
accurately synchronizing output with customer demand; and by the maintenance of strict bell to bell
working.
Labour Flexibility and Teamworking: labour utilization maximised and idle time minimised by
dismantling/prohibiting traditional job and skill demarcations; maintaining a fragmentation of tasks; and
enlarging jobs by task accretion, either within team organization, or by management-controlled
flexibility on conventional assembly lines.
Worker Accountability and Teams: workers organized into 'teams' or groups to create manageable
units for accountability to both management and the customer.
Industrial Engineering: trade union and rank and file influence over the processes ofjob design and
work measurement eradicated.
Supervisory Control: strict, close supervision of the production worker, and where appropriate, direct
customer surveillance.
Continuous Improvement: labour productivity systematically raised by operating strictly management-
controlled kaizen schemes with limited worker participation.
SOCIALISATION PROCESS
Employee Recruitment: exploitation of sophisticated recruitment techniques and/or temporary labour
to build workforces sufficiently malleable to meet the strict demands of lean production.
Job Security: job security philosophies - rather than guarantees - offered in return for worker
cooperation and compliance. Job security for core workforces maintained on the basis of lean manning;
labour intensification; reduced absenteeism by attacking workers' sick leave rights; extended working
hours for core workforces; and perpetual job insecurity for temporary workers.
Direct Communications: unidirectional employee communications techniques used to undermine
independent trade union information; to instil an understanding of economic and market discipline; and
to develop employee commitment to corporate objectives.
Single Status and Equal Opportunity Policies: used to promote corporate egalitarian ideology rather
than address concrete inequalities at the workplace.
Industrial Relations Policy: promoting non-adversarial industrial relations by subverting conventional
trade union democracy. Involves incorporating trade union officials and shop stewards within company
councils or more informal bargaining arrangements; and both fragmenting rank and file resistance and
weakening traditional values of sho p-floor solidarity.
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This uniformity of practice did not emerge naturally or by accident. A number of
different catalysts and forces came into play to connect the process of change at
CarPress with the various labour control techniques operating in the Japanese
transplants both in South Wales and elsewhere in the UK.
The first of these is the effect of the sheer density of Japanese transplant activity in
South Wales. Although only one firm operated in the same sector as CarPress, the
collective presence of so many salient factories - a good number of them large
employers - in such a relatively small industrial area impacted upon the consciousness
of management. And particular local activities and encounters strengthened this. For
example, the Welsh Development Agency, different Training and Enterprise Councils,
different Chambers of Commerce and other similar agencies regularly organise
seminars, conferences and more informal meetings which bring together managers in
Japanese and British plants with the explicit purpose of facilitating the diffusion of
ideas.
Moreover, this contact, in a region of high unemployment, which plays on the fears of
managers as well as workers, heightens the ideological threat of Japanese competition.
Many writers emphasise the symbolic significance of the Japanese model in Britain
which managements often mobilise against workers in pursuance of traditional
agendas of labour intensification (Elger and Smith 1994b). Notions of 'the Japanese
productivity miracle' and 'factory survival' are central here. But perceptions of
Japanese superiority also impact upon managerial consciousness and social action, to
the extent that, as we saw in Chapter Four, many CarPress managers genuinely
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believed that a more fundamental restructuring of shop-floor work organization and
social relations was necessary if their factory was to successfully compete.
The intensity of market competition, on a global scale, is therefore central here. The
new relationships between Japanese 'customer' assemblers and their suppliers in
particular product markets constitutes an important facet of this. The de-
industrialisation of the British economy over the past two decades has left surviving
British suppliers in cars, electronics and other sectors, desperate for new contracts
with the incoming inward investors. So desperate, in fact, that they are forced to
concede to Japanese transplant management, influence and direct intervention over
their labour costs and labour control strategies. As we saw in Chapters Four to Seven,
this 'rule of the customer' had a profound impact on both the reorganisation of work
at CarPress and the shop-floor's ability to resist this. It also of course increases the
density of interaction between managers in British component suppliers and Japanese
assemblers, a factor which helps sustain the process of change.
Lastly, the distinctive contemporary economic and political environment oils the
wheels of the diffusion process in a number of ways. The introduction, into a
brownfield, unionised car plant, of many aspects of the new labour control and
exploitation policies described throughout this thesis would have been unthinkable
twenty years ago. During the 1970s, organised labour in British industry was not in a
position of control, despite the alarm and foreboding of many right wing political
commentators at the time of the 1979 General Election. However, the balance of class
forces was more in its favour at that time than at any subsequent period. Indeed,
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during the 1 980s and 90s, the cumulative effect of de-industrialisation, mass
unemployment, anti-trade union legislation, and the high profile defeats of such
seemingly invincible groups of workers as miners, shipbuilders, steelworkers,
carworkers, dockers and printers, has left an indelible mark on the spirit of resistance
of British workers. In this context, many British managers have acquired sufficient
confidence to effect a restructuring of work which significantly shifts the frontier of
control on the shop-floor in capital's favour.
The British state has also played a more particular and interventionist role here,
despite the laissez faire ideology of successive Conservative Governments. As we
noted in Chapter Four, at the regional level the Welsh Development Agency now acts
both as broker in matching British suppliers to different inward investors and as
management consultant in helping the former introduce acceptable working practices.
At the national level, the state has offered substantial fmancial incentives to Japanese
firms who locate in the UK. Hiding under the benign cloak of dynamic 'job creation',
the Thatcher regime of the 1 980s was more interested in using Japanese inward
investors to catalyse significant changes in British industrial relations. Thus,
mobilising the symbolism of the no-strike deal, and the dominant perception of
consensus-based relationships between workers and managers in Japanese firms, the
Conservatives sought to decisively weaken the bargaining power of British unions by
explicitly supporting Japanese enterprise unionism (Mcllroy 1988).
It has become fashionable in the 'post-labour' labour process debate to de-emphasise
and even marginalise the different strategies of managerial control over labour power.
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As Thompson (1989, pp.231-234) has observed, some writers reject the privileged
moment of extraction of surplus value in the circuit of capital, whilst others question
the idea of control strategy completely, stressing instead the salience of managerial
contradictions, complex contingencies and 'negotiated preferences'. This author's
analysis of both management practice in Japanese transplants and the political process
of change at CarPress demonstrates that such postmodern obfuscation and obsession
with appearances should be disregarded. When asked the appropriate questions, the
managers at CarPress enunciated an explicit discourse of labour control. They talked
incessantly of their inability to shape and control the views of older workers; they
became obsessed with undermining traditional rank and file controls over labour
allocation and the pace of work; they wistfully reflected upon the efficacy of Japanese
control strategies on greenfield sites; their constant fear of losing control determined
their exclusion of the principle of self-management from the practice of teamworking;
their fear of losing control also determined their rejection of full worker participation
in kaizen; the introduction of bell to bell working constituted an emphatic direct
control over workers' time; their new industrial relations policies embodied their
resolution to dissipate rank and file control; and their various socialisation practices
were aimed at cementing a more endurable labour control. Managerial social action
was saturated in the politics of control.
Of course, this was not control for its own sake. As Thompson points out, those who
criticise the emphasis upon control confuse 'the goals of firms and managers with the
means of achieving them. Control is seldom relevant to the former, but essential to
the latter' (1989, p.234). Thus, at CarPress, and in the Japanese transplants, different
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techniques of control over labour power merely ensured a more efficient process of
surplus extraction and capital accumulation.
The model of labour control summarised in Table 9.1 is notable for the
comprehensive repertoire of techniques applied at the point of production. However,
external forces are also important here. Just as economic and political developments
facilitated the introduction of these measures, they also help sustain their effective
operation. Indeed, as we shall now discuss, once the politico-economic elements of
both the state and the rights of the consumer are incorporated into the analysis then
these Japanese and 'Japanised' management regimes take on distinctly hegemonic
characteristics.
Burawoy (1985) periodizes developments in the process of capitalist production on
the basis of changes in the political apparatuses of production, that is, the shifting role
of the state in reproducing the social relations of the labour process through the
regulation of struggles. This periodization comprises three phases: despotic regimes;
hegemonic regimes; and hegemonic despotism.
In the first phase, Marx's (1976) conceptualisation of factory despotism, under which
workers are subordinated to the merciless dictates of the foreman and the machine, is
supplemented by the dull force of economic compulsion - the worker's dependence on
cash earnings for a livelihood. This 'market despotism' was, therefore, a wholly
coercive system of labour exploitation. In the face of crises of underconsumption and
periodic worker resistance it gave way to the second phase of the hegemonic regime in
336
which the mobilisation of the labourer's consent to continuing exploitation prevailed
over coercion. Here, two forms of state intervention broke the ties binding the
reproduction of labour power to productive activity in the workplace. Firstly, social
insurance legislation provided workers with a guaranteed minimum income
independent of their participation in production. Secondly, the state placed limits on
managerial domination and coercion by establishing a legal framework of workers'
rights. Burawoy argues that in these new conditions, management could no longer
rely on the economic whip of the market to sustain factory discipline, instead,
'workers must be persuaded to cooperate with management. Their interests must be
coordinated with those of capital' (1985, p.126).
Burawoy characterises contemporary developments in capitalist production in terms of
a transition to hegemonic despotism. According to this analysis, the state regulation
of factory conflict in a context of global capitalism eventually laid the basis for a
further crisis of profitability. The emergence of new, coercive factory regimes in
semi-peripheral regions of the global economy exposed the costs and rigidities of
Western hegemonic regimes. At the same time, Western multinational companies
could more easily exploit the large pools of cheap, malleable labour in both peripheral
countries and peripheral regions in the advanced countries. These global operations
became possible because the fragmented labour process can now be effectively
coordinated and re-integrated by exploiting advanced transport and communications
technologies. Burawoy argues that, as a result of these structural changes, worker
consent under hegemonic regimes gives way to the coercive pressures of hegemonic
despotism. The tying of workers' interests to the survival of their factories leaves
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them defenceless against the new challenge of global capital. Workers are forced to
make concessions on wages and employment conditions in order to maintain relative
plant profitability and to limit the possibility of a transfer of operations. Thus, the
new hegemonic despotism is 'the "rational" tyranny of capital mobility over the
collective worker....The fear of being fired is replaced by the fear of capital flight,
plant closure, transfer of operations, and plant disinvestment' (1985, p.150).
The interaction between the political apparatus, market relations and the Japanese
control techniques outlined in Table 9.1, established a distinctive variant of this new
despotism in the factories of South Wales. During the 1 980s and 90s, the state
enforced a series of policies which together established a quite pervasive and coercive
climate of fear. Workers' rights came under a ruthless assault from successive
Conservative regimes. Effective minimum wage provisions in the form of Wage
Council settlements, unemployment benefits, social security benefits, strike benefits
and so on, were either discontinued or significantly cut back. For many workers, such
employment protection rights as safeguards against unfair dismissal and victimisation
also disappeared. At the same time, as the events described in Chapter Seven
exemplify, the Government significantly undermined trade union rights and
immunities. And both capital and the state used the new anti-union legislation to
prosecute a number of significant victories against some of Britain's most powerful
umons.
The state also played a central role in both creating and sustaining mass
unemployment throughout most of this period. In South Wales, as we saw in the last
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chapter, employers are able to adroitly exploit large pools of young, more acquiescent
workers both to manage their new lean manning strategies and to weaken traditional
shop-floor solidarity.
These quite profound state interventions partly repaired the ties which bound the
reproduction of labour power to the labour process under market despotism.
However, a new development in the form of close, 'cooperative' customer-supplier
relations has added a further twist to this picture of market coercion at the workplace.
Burawoy's conceptualisation of hegemonic despotism emphasises the ability of
footloose global capital to sap the confidence and weaken the resistance of collective
labour. In contrast to this, although the outcome is the same, different capitals in the
lean production chain are now quite prepared to commit themselves to their suppliers
and customers - and to their workers and local communities - on a long term basis.
But this commitment only stands provided their workforces are also prepared to
submit themselves to the dictates of market relations within production. That is, as we
have seen in various parts of this thesis, those workers who resist in the supplier
factories of lean production may soon find themselves subject to the job threatening
interventions of the customer. And many of those who labour within the final
assembler in the production chain are also subject to the dictates of the consumer as
embodied in the unrelenting pressure of just-in-time assembly.
We have arrived, therefore, at a 'Japanese model' of labour regulation in South Wales
bolstered by distinctive politico-economic conditions which critically constrain labour
resistance. It constitutes a particularly coercive form of hegemonic despotism which
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sits in stark contrast to the spurious business ideologies of worker empowerment and
autonomy. However, this author is not suggesting that these developments in coercion
and control have effectively banished resistance from the shop-floor of the 1990s.
The case study material in Chapters Four to Eight provided a wealth of evidence of the
tenacity of different forms of worker opposition to the process of 'Japanization'. And
although the CarPress management eventually succeeded in puffing into place its work
organizational controls by mercilessly sacking workers and thereby defeating general
rank and file opposition, the resulting shop-floor defeatism did not translate into total
submission. If the introduction of new management techniques is a function of the
dynamic of class struggle then so is their continuing application. As Holloway
comments on the 'new reality' of the car industry epitomised by Nissan in Sunderland,
'but for capital, the struggle to subjugate and exploit labour is endless. And
oppression by capital daily meets resistance from labour. The world of Nissan is
suffocating, but occasionally a scream of protest breaks the silence' (1987, p.163).
At such brownfield plants as CarPress, the organization of 'screams of protest'
remains central to the politics of production. Six months after the process of sackings
and shop-floor demoralisation described in Chapter Seven, the CarPress management
attempted to implement a pay deal which involved a minimal pay rise, a worsening of
the hourly paid sick pay scheme and a withdrawal of the unions' temporary workers
agreement. The rank and file rejected this in a secret ballot by 22 to 1 and, against
their shop stewards' recommendations, voted by 4 to 1 for a strike ballot. In
customary fashion the management then threatened to close the plant and sack the first
person to go on strike. After regional union officers beseeched the membership to
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back down - again in customary fashion - the members voted narrowly against a
strike.
The significant point here is that despite their despondency, despite their lack of
effective leadership, and despite their knowledge that management was likely to win
this particular fight, these shop-floor workers were still prepared to display overt
defiance. Their actions demonstrate that although the process that we call
'Japanization' in capitalist production exacts from labour a more complete
subordination to management and, through this, an intensification of its exploitation,
this new despotism still cannot suppress the worker resistance and conflict which
remain inherent to the capitalist labour process. The dynamic of class struggle in
capitalist factory organization - including too, struggle initiated from above - ensures
that the restructuring of work and employment relations will always be problematic.
And it follows that the process of change will be subject to more fundamental
tensions, inner contradictions and open conflict once the current imbalance of class




The thesis analyses the process of 'Japanization' at work by exploring the connections
between distinctive managerial innovations in South Wales-based Japanese
manufacturing transplants and the impact of similar innovations within an emulating
British firm. As made clear in Chapter One, in order to redress the current bias in
industrial sociology towards managerial concerns it places particular emphasis upon
the impact of workplace restructuring on factory workers.
In order to operationalise this, the research design was divided into three phases,
which although discrete, involved some overlap in time periods:
Initial exploratory phase (November 1993-January 1994)
• Survey of Japanese transplants (January-June 1994).
• The CarPress case study (January 1994-November 1995).
The methodologies employed for each of these will now be described in detail.
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1. Initial exploratory phase
This initial phase had two objectives. Firstly, interviews were sought with
representatives of different state and industrial agencies in South Wales in order to
build a rudimentary industrial profile of the region; to procure their views on the
impact of Japanese Foreign Direct Investment; and to gain an understanding of the
roles of the different agencies in the change process. Secondly, interviewees were
asked to discuss their own experience of dealing with particular Japanese transplants
and emulating British firms. Through this, the author gained an appreciation of the
problems of access; a recognition of the most appropriate firms to approach; and an
initial ad hoc list of individual contacts within these firms.
Interviews were carried out with senior managers and directors from the following
organizations. Each lasted 2 hours on average, the total interviewing time amounting
to 23 hours in all.
The Welsh Office, Industry Department, Cardiff
The Welsh Development Agency (WDA), Economic Office, Cardiff
The Welsh Development Agency, Source Wales, Treforest
The West Wales Training and Enterprise Council (TEC), Swansea
Welsh Glamorgan County Council, Economic Development Unit, Swansea
Wales Chamber of Commerce, Cardiff
Newport and Gwent Chamber of Commerce, Newport
Swansea Chamber of Commerce, Swansea
The Confederation of British Industry (CBI), Cardiff
Engineering Employers (Western Association), Treforest
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2. Survey of Japanese transplants
This phase of the research aimed to establish the nature of any distinctive managerial
innovations in the organization of the labour process and employment relations in
Japanese transplants operating in South Wales. It therefore depended on the survey
method. To effect this, basic information on all Japanese transplants employing more
than 25 workers was collected from different local authority contacts and academic
reports'. Letters were then sent to senior managers within the 17 Japanese firms so
identified, summarising the objectives of the research and requesting interviews.
In response to these, I received four letters of rejection - for the reason that Japanese
firms are habitually flooded with interview requests from different academics and
students - whilst the remaining 13 firms appeared to ignore my correspondence
completely. From this point on, gaining access became a question of perseverance,
pleading and nuisance-making. Fresh letters were sent to each firm and 'gatekeepers'
were literally bombarded with telephone calls every week until the different plant
managers could be persuaded to speak to me.
As a result of this arduous process, 15 of the 17 firms approached eventually agreed to
participate in the survey. Of these 15 firms, 10 consented to plant visits, interviews
with managers and shop-floor observations which in some cases involved whole day
visits, and in the case of Calsonic, extended to four days. The remaining 5 firms
Of particular use here were Morris, Munday and Wilkinson (1992) and Munday (1990).
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would only agree to complete a basic questionnaire 2 followed up by extended
telephone interviews. This unequal access was an inevitable function of the 'closed
access' nature of some of these firms 3 . Indeed, a number of managers expressed the
view that whilst their employers wished to offer general support to their local
communities, for the academic world this only extended to those researchers who
generally supported the objectives of Japanese management. Therefore, more critical
sociologists had to display a good measure of social sensitivity and tact - in terms of
both dress and discourse - in order to gain even the more limited access required by
the survey method.
In all, 18 managers were interviewed for, on average, two hours each. The total time
expended on interviewing amounted to 39 hours with many additional hours used for
factory observations. Interviewees comprised: 11 Human Resource Managers; a
Deputy Managing Director; a Site Manager; a TQM manager; a Product Assurance
Manager; a Production Control Manager, a Finance Manager; and a Manufacturing
Manager. In addition, interviews were carried out with the GMB Regional Secretary
for South Wales, who was responsible for trade union members at AIWA, Diaplastics,
Matsushita Electric and Star Micronics, and with a group of GMB shop stewards. A
two hour session with the General Secretary of the Welsh TUC was also incorporated
into the survey's examination of new industrial relations strategies.
2 This questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix C.
Hornsby-Smith describes 'closed access' groups as those 'able to erect discouraging barriers against
the intrusive outsider or, in some other way, to achieve invisibility and evade detection' (1993, p.53).
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Each interview was structured around a standard schedule. This covered the
following basic questions: products and product markets; factory output figures;
workforce profiles, including employment of temporary labour; and hours worked,
overtime and shift systems. It then moved on to particular aspects of work
organization and employment relations: shop-floor labour processes; nature of
technologies employed; production control systems; labour deployment and flexibility
practices; TQM practices; employee recruitment techniques; equal opportunity
policies; job security policies; employee communications; single status policies; pay,
job grading and job evaluation policies; training policies; and industrial relations
issues.
Once these data were collected, the interviews became more semi-structured, allowing
participants to express their views and ideas more freely. In this way, in contrast to
the conventional, highly structured quantitative survey method, the investigation also
incorporated a more in-depth, qualitative approach to data accumulation.
The following Japanese firms participated in the survey:
Calsonic Radiators Ltd., Llanelli
Aiwa (UK) Ltd., Newbridge, Gwent
Matsushita Electric (UK) Ltd., Cardiff
Sony Manufacturing (UK) Ltd., Pencoed, Bridgend
Gooding Sanken Ltd., Abercynon
Electronic Harnesses (UK) Ltd., Liantrisant
Yuasa Batteries (UK) Ltd., Ebbw Vale
Matsushita Electronic Components (UK) Ltd., Port Talbot
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Matsushita Electronic Magnetron Corporation (UK) Ltd., Cwmbran
Sekisui (UK) Ltd., Merthyr Tydfil
Dynic (UK) Ltd., Cardiff
Diaplastics (UK) Ltd., Bridgend
Takiron (UK) Ltd., Newport
Star Micronics Manufacturing (UK) Ltd., Tredegar, Gwent
Hitachi Consumer Products (UK) Ltd., Aberdare
3. The CarPress case study
The final - and longest - phase of the research sought to analyse the implementation of
different Japanese-style labour regulation practices at the British case study, CarPress,
and the impact of this process upon different workers. This involved monitoring
developments at the company's Llanelli factory over a period of nearly two years.
Gaining access to the factory during the critical period of the change process was a
combination of chance, good luck and research planning. I first entered the plant in
November 1993, when, along with a small group of local journalists, indusirialists,
academics and students, I was given a 2 hour tour of the shop-floor, as part of Lianelli
Borough Council's 'Industry Week' promotion. At the end of the tour I managed to
spend a few minutes with one of the plant's production managers and persuaded him
to grant me an interview in the new year. After this meeting - and a second factory
tour - in January 1994, the company allowed me to return in February and spend a day
with its Toyota cell, observing the various labour processes and interviewing different
production operators and superintendents. It was at this point, following a fairly
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heated debate with one of the plant's senior shop stewards - who regarded any
research into new working practices as a potential threat to shop-floor opposition -
that I became convinced that the factory represented potentially valuable case study
material.
Accordingly, after securing the agreement of my production manager contact, I
submitted a formal proposal to research the attitudes of CarPress's shop-floor and
office workers towards such new working practices as labour flexibility, teamworking,
and kaizen. My hopes appeared to be dashed when two weeks later my contact
suddenly left the company. However, early in March, I received a telephone call from
the factory's Personnel Manager requesting an urgent meeting. Here, I was informed
that as a result of a recent Rover RG2000 quality audit4 , CarPress had been instructed
to carry out a workforce attitude survey along similar lines to my research proposal.
In return for accomplishing this for the company I was offered unhindered access to
all areas of the factory for the purposes of carrying out my own research. I then
visited the plant a number of times in the spring of 1994 to interview managers and
shop stewards and carry out documentary research, a process which culminated in
three separate and formal presentations of the research programme to the plant's
senior directors, its middle management and its senior shop stewards and office
representatives.
See Chapter Four for further details of the impact on autocomponent suppliers of the Rover RG2000
auditing system.
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My hopes were again dashed in early May, when, two days before the attitude survey
was due to commence, I received a telephone call from the CarPress Personnel
Manager informing me of a postponement due to a shop-floor industrial dispute over
the company's new working practices proposals. As a result, the process of
interviewing a cross section of employees and surveying the whole workforce did not
start until September 1994.
Many interviews and shop-floor observations took place between September and
December 1994. Further groups of workers were interviewed on certain days during
the following year, culminating in a second survey of the workforce in November
1995. I also paid separate visits to the sacked union convenor, Ieuan Thomas (a
pseudonym), during 1994 and 1995 for the purposes of both semi-structured
interviewing and informal discussions.
Nearly 150 shop-floor workers, office workers and managers were interviewed in
total. These comprised company directors; senior managers; line managers;
production superintendents and foremen; production operators; toolmakers; press
setters and fitters; electrical and mechanical maintenance fitters; project engineers;
tooling engineers; industrial engineers; a robotics engineer; a CAD engineer; different
quality assurance personnel; different administrative and clerical staff senior shop
stewards; staff union representatives; health and safety representatives; and the site
safety officer.
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I prepared 16 different interview schedules appertaining to the various functions and
jobs involved. All schedules raised the issues of teamworking; labour flexibility; bell
to bell working; labour intensification; kaizen and other TQM practices; company
communications; single status and equal opportunity policy; company loyalty; and
industrial relations. They also contained a number of prompts to initiate discussions
about job satisfaction; job security; the impact of unemployment; the impact of
Japanese firms in South Wales; and finally, the extent to which both the job and
CarPress had changed over the years. Additional questions varied in accordance with
the nature of the interviewee's occupation. For example, industrial engineers were
asked a series of questions on the nature of workstudy in the 1 990s; foremen were
prompted to discuss the problems of policing bell to bell working; and so on.
Both the management and the Joint Shop Steward's Committee refused to allow me to
tape interviews for fear of causing a general walk-out on the shop-floor. I therefore
had to minute each interview by taking detailed notes. Apart from this, full facilities
were provided in terms of time off for interviewees and secluded interview rooms
where individuals could talk openly and freely. Some employees were interviewed in
small groups, some in pairs and others singly. The interviewing process was long and
arduous; a typical day comprised continual interviewing on the shop-floor between
8.00am and 3.30 pm followed by sessions with management between 3.3Opm and
6.00pm. When I returned to my bed and breakfast accommodation I would then relive
each day by dictating my notes and personal reflections onto tape, a process which
occupied most of the evening.
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However, this part of the research was relatively trouble-free compared to the
execution of the two workforce surveys. Part Two of this thesis describes how, in
various ways, fear and managerial coercion accompanied the process of change at
CarPress. It also describes how the introduction of new working practices was subject
to intense hostility and shop-floor resistance. The provision of unhindered access to
the factory in these circumstances constituted a rare opportunity to research the
complex politics of class struggle at the point of production. Nevertheless, these were
not the most propitious conditions for carrying out such practical research tasks as
distributing and collecting questionnaire forms. As many workers indignantly
protested, they were not numbers to be quantified by company accountants - or social
researchers; they were human beings.
The first questionnaire survey was accomplished during October 1994. The original
research design - endorsed by CarPress - required the distribution of questionnaires by
myself and shop-stewards to a controlled sample of between 300 to 500 employees.
The management confirmed a number of times that participants would be granted time
off from work to complete the forms. In the event, on the planned day of distribution,
the company reversed its decision and insisted that employees complete the
questionnaires in their own time. It also insisted that all employees receive a form.
Consequently, it arranged to distribute 700 questionnaires attached to wage slips on
October 12th. I was also forced to concede the extension of the collection process to a
5 day period, during which time participants would voluntarily place their completed
forms into one of nine union ballot boxes placed at various locations in the factory.
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The outcome was predictable. Although the senior stewards spent some time urging
their members to complete the forms, few initially did so. Many individuals took their
forms home and just forgot about them. The nightshift appeared to take an informal
collective decision to boycott the survey completely. I took sole responsibility for the
keys to the ballot boxes. The wages department confirmed that 651 questionnaires
were eventually distributed because of a 7% absenteeism rate that particular pay day.
At the end of the first day of the survey, just 96 forms were placed into the boxes, a
response rate of 13%. At the end of the second day - after the nightshift had received
their forms - the figure remained unchanged. By the end of the 5 day period, a total of
112 forms were collected; not one was received from production workers on the
nightshift.
I then decided to take matters into my own hands by embarking on a three day tour of
the production dayshift, walking from machine to machine and pleading with each
operator to trust me and complete the form. As a result of this, the number of
responses increased to 249, a response rate of 38%. The many conversations with
operators during this process of persuasion also exposed how the low response rate
was a function of the pervasive climate of fear - rather than apathy - on the shop-floor.
Despite my insistence that I would be the only individual to read and analyse the
questionnaires, few workers believed me. The following two comments were typical:
It's obvious. You don't think we're stupid do you? The management have got the keys to the
boxes and they go around at night emptying them and reading them. (An assembly shop
operator).
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The shop floor's afraid to fill in those forms. The management are so vindictive here the boys
honestly believe that their cards will be marked and it will lead to sackings.
Some of them honestly believe that because the forms were attached to the pay slips then that's
allowed the company to secretly mark the forms with clock numbers. You know, invisible ink
that can show up under a light. That's the latest rumour. Some of the men really believe it.
That's how afraid they are. (A maintenance worker).
These two comments appeared on the questionnaire forms:
Firstly, the reason I have not filled in all the questions - the company would be able to fmd out
who I am. Knowing them as I do they would then take action against me. Despite what you
say in your statement the company will be able to see some of these surveys.
I have not filled in the first page because from these facts my name can be established, and I
do not trust this management or anyone that deals with them.
Some workers, such as this press shop operator, saw participating in the survey as an
act of surrendering to management:
I'm not filling this in if the company won't give me time off. They've pushed bell to bell down
our throats, they've taken our time away, so don't expect me to give them any of my own.
The missing nightshift also had to be tackled. Following a heated discussion with the
CarPress personnel manager I secured the company's agreement to redistribute 160
questionnaires to a large sample of nightshift production and craft operators. This
time, participants were granted 10 minutes time off work in a highly controlled
fashion. At 11 .00am on the appointed day (when the original nightshift had alternated
to the dayshift), production foremen distributed the questionnaires under the
surveillance of myself and a number of shop stewards. Participants were instructed to
commence filling in the forms at 11.40 am, ten minutes before their 11 .SOam lunch-
break. The foremen and accompanying stewards stood by a number of boxes until the
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end of the lunch-break, during which the operators could voluntarily hand in their
forms. As a result of this process, 140 forms were returned.
The final response rate was calculated at 68%. Subtracting the whole nightshift of
239 employees from the first distribution of 651 left 412 questionnaires delivered to
the dayshift and to office workers. Adding the second sampled nightshift distribution
of 160 questionnaires to this figure produced an overall distribution of 572 from
which 387 were returned: 68% of the total..
The second questionnaire survey in November 1995 was marked by a similar degree
of managerial chicanery and shop-floor suspicion. On this occasion, the company
reverted to refusing to allow time off for completing forms. However, it did agree to
provide 15 minutes of the 30 minute monthly team briefing sessions for this purpose,
a decision which pleased many employees who by this time had become both
disillusioned and bored with the briefing system. Once again, the shop stewards
insisted that they be allowed to monitor the collection of forms in response to shop-
floor fears that foremen were likely to read and mark them.
I arrived at the factory on 30 October 1995 and spent all afternoon and part of the
following morning arranging the questionnaires into different piles for allocation to
each team and section. Unfortunately, I was unable to meet the shop stewards until
one hour before the team briefings were due to commence. At this point, they
informed me they had been called to an 'urgent meeting' with the head of personnel.
Consequently, no stewards were available to monitor the collection of forms.
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A number of workers spoke to me of their unease at handing their forms direct to
foremen; and no ballot boxes were available this time. Feeling angry and somewhat
uneasy myself, I decided to remain at the plant all evening to be present at the
distribution of questionnaires to the nightshift rather than collect them the following
morning. Although a small number of shop stewards were available during the shift I
did not feel happy at the thought of piles of completed forms sitting tantalisingly in
different foremen's offices. Consequently, as each nightshift team briefing session
came to a close I immediately collected the forms myself.
On the day of the survey, I arrived at the factory at 8.3Oam and left at 2.3Oam the
following morning - an exhausting process! However, my perseverance proved
worthwhile. Due to both sickness absenteeism and workers being temporarily absent
from workstations, 630 questionnaires were eventually distributed. From these, a total
of 533 completed forms were returned, an overall response rate of 85%. The rate on
the shop-floor reached 87%; in office areas it was lower at 69%.
The two survey questionnaire forms are reproduced in Appendix C.
355
APPENDIX B
STATISTICAL INDICATORS OF WORK ATTITUDES AT CARPRESS
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* = significant at the 0.00 1 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level
= first survey (1994; N = 316)); the remainder are extracted from the second survey (1995; N =
471)
Table B.2, Differences in perceptions of trust relations by len2th of service
(shop-floor workers only)
Assessment of overall level of trust existing between management and the workforce
Complete Trust	 Trust Most Of	 Not Much	 No Trust
The Time	 Trust	 At All
	
............................................()....................................(.)..................................(%) 	 ................
All Operators, <5 yrs	 2	 15	 39	 43
service
All Operators, >5 yrs	 2	 7	 .	 33	 58
service
x2 = 12.562, d.f.3*
* = significant at the 0.00 1 level
N =471
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Table B.3, As pects of work most and least important to shop-floor and office workers
PERCENT	 PERCENT
1994	 1995

















•0p•ortun..................6 	 . .7....................
Good industrial relations 	 14	 12
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................................................................................. 72	 .. 5
.9PP.'......................................................................................... 	 ..
Good industrial relations	 16	 .	 21
Good promotion prospects	 59	 57
Respondents were asked to choose 3 aspects of work which were most important to them and three
which were least important.
lathe 1994 survey, N 383 for replies to aspects of work which are most important and 355 for aspects
which are least important; thus, there were 4 and 32 sets of missing values respectively.
In the 1995 survey, N = 498 for replies to aspects of work which are most important and 423 for aspects
which are least important; thus, there were 35 and 110 sets of missing values respectively.
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APPENDIX C
JAPANESE TRANSPLANT AND CARPRESS SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES
Figure C.!, questionnaire supplied to 5 Japanese transplants
(Note: This was used as a basis for follow-up telephone interviews).
1. Flow many people are employed at the factory?
2. Of these, how many are employed in the following functions?




3. Numbers or percentages of male and female employees:
Male
Female
4. Numbers of temporary staff?
5. What production technology is utilized on the shop-floor? Please tick one or more of the following,
if applicable:
Automated/robotic assembly
Flow line manual assembly
Assembly at unitary workstations
Cell working
Other (please spec/5i)
6. Which of the following best describes the production control system?
Just-in-time production
Reduced inventories through tightly controlled production schedules
Traditional production control with buffer stocks
7. Does a teamworking system operate on the shop-floor?
Yes	 No
8. If teamworking does operate, what is the typical size of each team?




10.Which of the following are used to achieve labour flexibility on the shop-floor?
Each operative carries out different tasks anywhere in the factory
Each operative carries out different tasks only within the team
A minority of floats' carry out different tasks
11.Are any of the following Total Quality Management practices used at the plant?
Kaizen/Qualhy Circles in employees' own time
Kaizen/Qualily Circles in company's time




12.Does the company operate team briefings?
Yes	 No
13.If the answer to Question 12 is yes, what is the frequency of these meetings?
14.Does the company operate a Company Council or Advisory Board?
Yes	 No
15.Does the company recognise any trade Union(s)? If so, which one(s)?










Other (please spec jfy)
17.Does the company operate ajob security or no redundancy policy?
Yes	 No









19. Does the company operate a formal equal opportunity policy?
Yes
No






Any other form of bonus (please specify)
21. Does the company operate an employee performance assessment scheme?
Yes
No
22. Does the company operate formal grievance and disciplinary procedures?
Yes
No












Figure C.2, CarPress workforce attitude survey,
first questionnaire (October 1994)
CARPRESS LTD. WORKFORCE ATTITUDE SURVEY
OUESTIONNAIRE
All answers are strictl y confidential. Please attempt all questions in each section by ticking the
appropriate answer box or by writing down your answers when requested.
SECTION 1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
1. What is your job title?..........................................
2. What is your grade?.............................................
3. What section or department do you work in?.............................................
4. Are you ............MALE...[]	 FEMALE...[]
5. How old are you?.....................
6. How many years have you worked for the company? ..........................
7. Are you a member of a trade union..... . YES
 [] NO []
8. If so, which trade union?..................................
9. Are you weekly or monthly paid?.... . WEEKLY [1
	
MONTHLY []
10.Ifyou are weekly paid, what is your approximate weekly take home pay? .............................
11.Ifyou are monthly paid, what is your approximate monthly take home pay? .........................
12. On average, how many hours of overtime do you work each week9 ...................
13. What is your highest educational qualification? (Please tick one of the following):
No qualifications []
Skilled apprenticeship []
CSE, or GCSE grades D to F [1








14. Are you personally in favour or against the introduction of teamworking at this site?





15. Do you understand how teamworking is likely to operate at this site?
Yes[]	 No[]
16. What effect, f any, do you believe teamworking will have on long term job security at the site?
Teamworking will lead to redundancies	 [1
Teamworking will have no effect	 []
Teamworking will help to create jobs 	 [J
I 7a. What is your view on the following statement:





Strongly disagree 	 []
1 7b. What is your view on the following statement:









SECTION 3 LABOUR FLEXIBILITY AND PRODUCTIVITY
18. What is your view on the following statement:










20. What is your view on the following statement:






Strongly disagree 	 [1







22. Do you believe that you are now working harder compared to 10 years ago?
Yes [1	 No []
	
Undecided []
SECTION FOUR	 OUALITY ISSUES
23. What is your view on the following statement:









24. Do you support or oppose the idea that you and your colleagues should actively criticise each
otherfor poor workmanship?





25. Do you support or oppose the idea ofyou and your colleagues meeting once a month in small
groups to discuss ways of improving the productivity, efficiency and quality of each other's work?





SECTION 5 COMPANY COMMUNICATIONS
26. Are you satisfied with the amount of information you receive from management about what's






27. Do you feel that you have enough say on decisions made at work:
Concerning your own job and working conditions? 	 Yes [1 No []
Concerning the running of your department/section? 	 Yes []No [1
Concerning the whole factory?	 Yes [ ] No [1
28. What is your main source of information about what is going on at work? (If more than one
applies choose the main three and rank them in order of importance from 1 to 3 with 1 as the most
important):




My trade union	 []
Team briefing	 []
Company notices on notice boards	 [1
Company newsletter	 [1
Other (please specify)	 [I
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Figure C.2 Continued
SECTION 6 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

















SECTION 7 WORK VALUES






33. Which THREE ofthefoiowing aspects of work are most important to you and which THREE
are least important?
Decent working conditions
Getting on well with my work colleagues
Getting on well with supervision
Good pay
Having an interesting job
Having responsibilities at work
Job security
Plenty of overtime





























34. What Is your view on the following statement:






35. Which one of the following statements sums up your relationship with your supervisor?
I decide what I do and how I do it []
My supervisor decides what I do but I decide how I do it [1
My supervisor decides what I do and how I do it []
36. What is your view on the following statement:






37. Ifyou have any comments on any of the above Issues, or any other aspect ofyour employment at
CarPress, then please write about them in the space below. You may continue over the page fyou
wish.
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Fi2ure C.3, CarPress workforce attitude survey
second questionnaire (November 1995)
CARPRESS LTD. WORKFORCE ATTITUDE SURVEY
QUESTIONNAIRE
All answers are strictly confidential. Please attempt all questions in each section by ticking the
appropriate answer box or by writing down your answers when requested.
SECTION 1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION






2. Are you: ............Male...[











4. How many years have you worked at this site?
5 years or less
6to 10 years
Over 10 years






6. If so, which trade union9 ..................................
7. Are you weekly or monthly paid' .... . Weekly [ ] Monthly [
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Finure C.3 Continued
SECTION 2 TEAM WORKING
8. What is your view on the following statements? (please tick the appropriate box for each
statement).
a) I get more satisfaction from working on different machines each day rather than working on the
same machine.
AGREE [1	 DISAGREE [1	 UNDECIDED [1







c) I enjoy the extra responsibilities that you get with teamworking.
AGREE [1	 DISAGREE [1	 UNDECIDED [J
d) I'd like to take on extra tasks such as machine cleaning and simple maintenance because that would
improve my job satisfaction.
AGREE []
	
DISAGREE [1	 UNDECIDED [1




DISAGREE [1	 UNDECIDED [1
I just haven't got the time to take on new tasks and responsibilities.
AGREE [1	 DISAGREE []	 UNDECIDED [1
9. What is your view on the following statements and questions?
a) I believe that all managers and employees should be members of the same 'company team'.
AGREE [1	 DISAGREE [1	 UNDECIDED []
b) I think that the management here believe they are in a separate team to the employees.
AGREE [1	 DISAGREE []
	
UNDECIDED [1
c) If you encounter a problem with your work, such as faulty components or your machine is producing
poor quality parts, do you first:
See your Manufacturing Manager [ ]
	
See your Unit Manager [ ]
Try and solve the problem yourself [] 	 Do nothing	 []
10. What impact has teamworking had on your overall interest in the job?
IMPROVED [1	 REDUCED []	 NO IMPACT [1
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Fi2ure C.3 Continued
11. What is your view on the following statements?
a) Teamworking has given me a new pride in my own work.
AGREE []
	
DISAGREE [1	 UNDECIDED [1
b) Teamworking allows me to make my own decisions about the job instead of having to ask my
supervisor.
AGREE [1	 DISAGREE [1	 UNDECIDED []
c) As a teamworker I'm no longer a number, I'm now treated as a human being.
AGREE []
	
DISAGREE [1	 UNDECIDED []






e) Teamworking has given me more tasks to do but no real skills.
AGREE [1	 DISAGREE [1	 UNDECIDED []






g) Now I'm a teamworker I accept that meeting the needs of the customer is more important than
hitting my score or target.
AGREE []
	
DISAGREE [1	 UNDECIDED [1
12. What do you believe is the main purpose of the ITEMINVQ Programme?
To develop my technical skills
	 E I
To enable me to carry out my work more efficiently 	 [
To help me develop more positive attitudes to change at the workplace 	 [ J
It's all just window dressing put on to impress the customer 	 [ ]
It serves no useful purpose at all 	 [ ]
13. Would you say you are now working harder compared to a year ago?
YES [I	 NO []	 UNDECIDED []
370
Figure C.3 Continued
SECTION 3 QUALITY ISSUES
14. What is your view on the following statements?
a) I'd like to get into a kaizen group because I'm interested in helping the company improve plant






b) I'd like to get into a kaizen group because it will give me the opportunity to develop new problem-
solving skills.
AGREE [1	 DISAGREE []
	
UNDECIDED []
c) I'd like to get into a kaizen group because I want to share my interest in improving company
performance with other people.
AGREE []
	
DISAGREE [1	 UNDECIDED [1
d) I'd like to get into a kaizen group because it will give me a welcome rest from production work.
AGREE []
	
DISAGREE [1	 UNDECIDED [1
e) If I make suggestions to improve plant performance it'll make no difference because management
will take no notice.
AGREE [1	 DISAGREE []	 UNDECIDED [1
f) I'd only be interested in getting into a kaizen group if! new the company would pay me for my
suggested improvements.
AGREE [1	 DISAGREE [1	 UNDECIDED [1
g) I'm not interested in kaizen groups because I think they will be used to cut jobs.
AGREE []
	
DISAGREE (1	 UNDECiDED [1
h) I'm not interested in kaizen groups because raising productivity just means I'll have to work even
harder.
AGREE [1	 DISAGREE [1	 UNDECIDED [1






15. Do you think it makes sense to regard your colleagues in your team as customers of your
work?
YES [1	 NO []	 UNDECIDED []




NO [1	 UNDECIDED []















19. When you are given a job do you ever think about the requirements of the main customer
(Rover, Opel, Toyota, etc.) as you carry out your work?
Most of the time [ ]
	
Sometimes	 [ I
Rarely	 [J	 Never	 [1
SECTION 4 COMPANY COMMUNICATIONS
20. Would you say that company communications have improved over the past 12 months?
Improved []	 Unchanged [1	 Worse [I
21. What are your main sources of information about what is going on at work? (If more than






Quarterly business review 	 I
Company notices on boards
Company newsletter 	 I
Other(please spec5,)...................	 I
22. Do you believe most of the information you receive from management?
YES []	 NO [I	 UNDECIDED [}
23. Do you believe most of the information you receive from the union?
YES []	 NO [I	 UNDECIDED [I
24. Do you find the information you receive from the company of interest?





25. What impact do you think your team briefings have had on the following:
The amount of useful information you receive about the Company
Increased [] Decreased [1 No change [ J
Your understanding of management decisions
Increased [ ] Decreased [ ] No change [ I
Your commitment to the company
Increased [ ] Decreased [ I No change
Management's openness
Increased [ ] Decreased [ I No change [ J
Opportunities for you to have a say about what's going on at work
Increased [ ] Decreased [ I No change [
26. Do you feel that you have enough say on decisions made at work:
Concerning your own job and working conditions?	 Yes [1 No [I
Concerning the running of your departmentlsection? 	 Yes [I No [I
Concerning the whole factory? 	 Yes [I No [I
SECTION 5 MISCELLANEOUS
27. What do you think of the overall level of trust that exists between management and the
workforce here? Would you say that there is:
Complete trust
	 [
Trust most of the time	 [I
Not much trust	 [ I
No trust at all	 [I
28. What is your view on the following statement?: 'I think that CarPress is a pretty good place
to work these days'.
Agree [J	 Disagree [I	 Undecided [I
29. What is your view on the following statement?: 'I think that recently, the Company has put a
lot of effort into cultivating a spirit of trust between management and workers'.
Agree []	 Disagree [ ]
	
Undecided [ ]
30. All in all, would you say that you have experienced a lot of changes in working practices at
CarPress over the past 12 months?
Yes [1	 No [ ]	 Undecided []
373













Getting on well with my work colleagues
Getting on well with supervision
Good pay
Having an interesting job
Having responsibilities at work
Job security
Plenty of overtime




31. Which THREE of the following aspects of work are most important to you and which
THREE are least important?
32. If you have any comments on the above issues, or any other aspect of recent changes at
CarPress, then please write about them in the space below or overleaf.
Thanks for your co-operation again!
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APPENDIX P
CARPRESS NEW WORKING PRACTICES AGREEMENT
TEAM WORKING AND CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT
POLICY AGREEMENT
It has been agreed between the parties that the attached Team
Working and Continuous Improvement Policy will be incorporated
as a term of employment for all employees employed at the
Company's Lianelli Plant.
To ensure the attainment of the objectives of the Policy
consultation with representatives of the Trade Unions recognised
by the Company will be enhanced to ensure maximum
understanding of the Company Performance, Competitive Practices
and Standards, Product and Company plans and all areas of
activity affecting the Company and its employees.
The parties agree that all discussions concerning all Terms
and Conditions of Employment and all other matters relevant
to the employees employed at the Llanelli Plant will be
conducted at Company Level and the Group Joint Negotiating
Committee will be discontinued.
The Unions accept that in order to achieve the objectives
of the Policy any Grievance or Dispute concerning the Policy
should first be resolved using the Company Grievance Procedure.
The Union accepts that it will not initiate or take any form
of industrial action until this procedure has been fully
exhausted.





Ltd. and its employees are committed to the establishment of an
environment that promotes:-
i. The adoption of Continuous lmprovementiTeamworking activities
throughout the Plant.
ii. The continuous growth and development of all employees to enable them
to contribute towards realising both personal and business objectives.
iii	 The empowerment of all employees to enable them to make the
maximum contribution to the setting and achieving of business goals.
iv	 The creation of a Single Status Company where all distinctions between




NEW TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT
1. FLEXIBILITY
All employees will be expected to perform any job or function for which they
have the relevant skills and training. Every employee will have unrestricted
access to the use of Company tools and equipment necessary for them to make
their contribution. All employees will be available for work for the entire period
of their shift.
2. GRADING STRUCTURE








GRADE 4	 -	 £249.44
All employees will be committed to achieving a minimum Plant Gross Efficiency
Performance of 133. A Plant Bonus Scheme of 7Op per point for all Grade 1 and
Grade 2 employees and £1.20 per point for all Grade 3 and Grade 4 employees
will be introduced for Plant Gross Efficiency levels between 134 and
138.
Subject to an improved and consistent Gross Plant Performance being sustained
the Plant Gross Efficiency Bonus will be consolidated into basic pay (up to a
maximum of 138) on 1st January 1996.
The amount consolidated will be the average bonus achieved over the six month
period 1st July 1995 to 31st December 1995.
3. PROGRESS BETWEEN GRADES
Progress through the Grades will be through the achievement of recognised skills
and competencies. A system of general and plant specific National Vocational
Qualifications will be introduced at all levels and all employees will be required
to undergo training that will increase their opportunity to contribute to the
achievement of Company Goals.
4. CURRENT EMPLOYEES
All current employees will be transferred immediately to the New Grading
Structure. All employees will be required to undergo the full training necessary
to enable them to achieve the N.V.Q.s appropriate to their new appointments.
TRANSFER SCHEDULE









The Company will progressively introduce Teamworking throughout the Plant on
the same terms and conditions as outlined in this agreement. All employees will
be phased into Teams in line with their abilities and the needs of the Company.
6. TEAM-MEMBERS
All current employees entering teams will enter at their existing Grade.
Future progress will be as a result of achieving the appropriate competency
standards.
7. TEAM LEADERS
All Team Leaders will on successful completion of the appropriate N.V.Q. be
transferred to a minimum of Grade 3. Progress through the remaining Grades
will be as a result of achieving further appropriate N.V.Q.'s All current Team
Leaders will be appointed to Grade 3 immediately on the conditions outlined in
Clause 3.
8. NEW STARTERS
All new starters will undertake a Company assessment and will be appointed
to the grade appropriate to their skills and competencies as evidenced by a
current N.V.Q.
9. CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT
Continuous Improvement is the continual improvement of the Companies
performance and competitive position through process improvement, the
elimination of waste, and increased levels of efficiency. All employees will
participate in Kaizen Discussion Groups, Quality Action Teams, and all other
activities that continuously improve processes and company performance.
10. SENIORITY
The only measure of seniority will be Plant Seniority. There will be no restricted
practices associated with Seniority. All employees will be flexible within their
skills competencies and abilities.
11. REDUNDANCY
There will be no Compulsory Redundancies as a result of any Teamworking and
Continuous Improvement activities.
12. PLANT BONUS SCHEME
Ltd. and its employees will commit themselves to achieving
the highest Plant Gross Performance Levels they can achieve. In order to allow
the Plant Gross Performance Level to realistically reflect plant efficiency
all teams will be measured and performance standards applied. This will mean




Shift Premiums will be paid as follows:-
6.00 a.m.- 2.00 p.m. and 2.00 p .m. to 10.00 p.m. (FIXED)	 16.66%
6.00 a.m. - 2.00 p.m. and 2.00 p.m. to 10.00 p.m. (ROTATING) 22.66%
NIGHTS	 33.33%
Management confirm that they have no intention of introducing a fixed shift
pattern for the foreseeable future. Any changes to the current Shift Patterns
would be subject to consultation with the relevant Trade Unions.
14. OVERTIME RATES
All overtime worked above the standard 37 hour week (pro-rata to include
Bank Holidays, Holidays etc) will be paid at current premium rates. All overtime
worked before completion of 37 hours in any one week will be paid at basic
rate. The 37 hour week will be assumed to be inclusive of all worked hours from
Monday to Friday.
15. HOLIDAY PAY
Holiday Pay will be paid at basic rate earnings in the Year in which the holiday is
being taken.
16. SICK PAY
A New Sick Pay Scheme that introduces payment at basic rate earnings, from
Day One of Sickness for a maximum of eight weeks, in line with the current
Staff Sick Pay Rules, will be progressively introduced as follows:-
STAGE 1
Sick Pay for 3rd day of sickness will be introduced for the period 1st July
1994 to 31st December 1994.
If the average absence for the period January - December 1994 is below 5.SYo
Stage 2 will be introduced.
STAGE 2
Sick Pay for the 2nd day of Sickness will be introduced for the period
1st January 1995 to 1st April 1995.
If the average absence for the period January - April 1995 is below 4.5%
Stage 3 will be introduced.
STAGE 3
Sick Pay for the 1st day of Sickness will be introduced for the period April
- December 1995.
If absence rates do not fall below the outlined levels the phased introduction will
be halted until the levels have been achieved for a full calendar year.
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If Sick rates increase to above the levels that allowed the adoption of any stage
then the previous stage rules will be reintroduced for a full calendar year to
allow the absence rates to fall below the required level to reintroduce that stage.
17 • CREDIT TRANSFER
With the exception of those people unable to open a Bank Account for legal
reasons all employees will be paid by Credit Transfer by 30th June 1994.
18. HOLIDAYS
Holidays and Shut-down periods will be dictated by Customer Schedule and/or
demand. Holiday date allocation will therefore fluctuate from department to
department and team to team based on Customer Service requirements.
19. UNION RECOGNITION
Ltd. will continue to recognise the following Trade Unions:-
AMALGAMATED ENGINEERING AND ELECTRICAL UNION
TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS UNION
Consultation with representatives of the recognised Trade Unions will be
enhanced to ensure maximum understanding of Company Performance,
Competitive Practices and Standards, Product and Company Plans and all
areas of activity affecting the Company and its employees.
20. PLANT BARGAINING
All future discussions concerning Terms and Conditions of Employment will be
conducted at Plant Level.
21. TRAINING
All employees will be required to undertake all training identified by the
Company that will enable them to contribute to the achievement of Company
objectives.
22. GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
In the event of any grievance or dispute which any employee may have the
Company Grievance Procedure will be used to resolve the problem - there will be
no industrial action until this procedure has been exhausted and the necessary
legal procedures adhered to.
23. LAYOFFS
The Company do not intend to lay off its employees. When a problem
distrupts production employees will be engaged in other worthwhile
activities unless:
the problem is caused by any form of internal
industrial action
the problems are prolonged by any exceptional
Circumstances.
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24. CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT
Following acceptance of this agreement all Hourly Paid employees will sign New
Contracts of Employment detailing all the agreed changes to Working Practices
and Terms and Conditions of Employment.
25. CUSTOMER COMMITMENT
Under this Agreement	 Ltd and its employees are committed
to total customer satisfaction by ensuring that outdated industrial relations
practices that restrict or threaten the interruption of customer supplies will
be eliminated.
26. FUTURE PLANS
Discussions will take place with the relevant Trade Unions to establish
framework agreements to cover the following agreed objectives:-:-
All employees if they wish will be invited
to participate in a regular health check
provided by the Company.
Everyone working within the Company will
wear Company Workwear.
The minimum notice period for all employees
will be one month when monthly paid.
A Performance Development Programme covering





CARPRESS DISMISSALS: NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY APPEAL
4th November 1994
Dear
NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY APPEAL
This letter is advance notice to inform you of the details of how your Appeal against the
decision to dismiss you for gross misconduct will be conducted.
TIME. DATE AND PLACE
Your Appeal will be heard at:
TIME:	 8.30 am
DATE:	 WEDNESDAY 9TH NOVEMBER 1994
PLACE:
APPEAL
The Appeal will be by way of a reinvestigation of the events leading up to and including the
walk Out that occurred on 26th October 1994. (The Company J.N.C. no longer exists and
therefore the structure has been agreed with your Union as being a fair way to proceed.) You
will be given a full opportunity to state your case and be heard and raise any points or evidence
if you so wish. The decision of the Appeal Chairman will be final and will exhaust the
disciplinary procedure.
REPRESENTATION
You are entitled to be accompanied or represented by a Full Time Officer/Senior Shop Steward.
The Appeal will be heard by the Company's Managing Director, 	 .. (The
Company's Human Resource Manager	 will also be present at the Appeal but
will take no part in the decision making process.
WITNESSES
You are entitled to call any witness of your own to be heard or to question any witness of the
Company whose evidence may have been relied upon. In order to ensure that any such person
is available, please ensure that the Company is given advance notice of any witnesses whom
you will wish to question.
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ADJOURNMENTS
The Appeal Hearing may be adjourned in exceptional circumstances if necessary for further
investigations. If so, it will then be re-convened as soon as reasonably possible.
REASON FOR DISMISSAL AND EVIDENCE
At the initial Disciplinary Hearing you were found guilty of gross misconduct in participating in
unofficial industrial action and in leaving your workplace without authority. In particular the
grounds for your dismissal were that:
Participating in Unofficial Overtime Ban from Tuesday 25th October 1994.
Leaving your workplace without authority on the afternoon of Wednesday
26th October 1994.
Attending an unauthorised meeting on the afternoon of Wednesday
26th October 1994.
Refusing to obey a repeated instruction to return to your workplace by a
Senior Manager.
Refusing to obey a final instruction to return to your workplace leaving a
Senior Manager with no alternative but to request you to clock off if you were
not prepared to return to your workplace.
You materially caused, influenced or contributed to employees leaving their
workplace without authority.
Your explanation of events leading up to and including the above events cannot
be accepted as accurate.
You showed no remorse or regret and showed disregard for your Contract
Terms.
A copy of the notes of your DISCIPLINARY interview and the Production Manager's Written
Statement, is enclosed with this letter.
DECISION OF THE APPEAL
You will be notified of the outcome of the Appeal in writing. It is envisaged that the Company
will communicate that decision after it has heard all the Appeals in respect of this matter.
That decision could be to confirm that it was appropriate for you to have been summarily
dismissed for gross misconduct, reduce the penalty or overturn the original finding of gross






CARPRESS STRIKE BALLOT: LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN
Dear Colleague	 30 November 1994
On Wednesday, 26th October 1994, 104 of your fellow employees at
	
Ltd. took
unofficial industrial action by leaving their place of work without authority.
Their action was taken over an issue that was already under discussion between the Company and
your Unions under the agreed disputes procedure. Accordingly there was no justifiable reason for
them to do what they did.
The employees taking the action were suspended and following the subsequent Disciplinary and
Appeal Hearings, 21 employees who were at the heart of the action were dismissed. The remainder
received Final Written Warnings.
This whole episode was both damaging and disappointing given the commitment everyone in
had made to "The Way Forward document. The commitment made to change
outdated working practices, eliminate walk-outs, work to rules and other types of wildcat unofficial
industrial action, did not last very longl
I personally told our customers that the signing of New Contracts by the employees at
was a new beginning. I told Rover in particular that our unreliable performance was a thing
of vie past and that they could now confidently give us new business. Rover have since told me that
the employees who broke their Contracts on 26th October have given them a very different message.
Despite all that has been said and done, Rover believe nothing has changed.
Quite frankly, I do not believe this is true. I believe it is a minority who have now put under threat
what the majority have achieved. .1 also believe that the Management had absolutely no option at all
but to take the action they did and that by doing so, they were protecting the jobs of the majority
in our Company.
This week there is to be a ballot to ask you whether you are prepared to take strike action in support
of those who have been dismissed. The very ballot will be damaging to our Company but, even
worse, a strike would just torpedo our future existence. In any event, strike action will not persuade
management to change their decision. The proper route for the dismissed employees is to take their
case to an industrial tribunal.
I want to make it clear to you that any employee who does not abide by the terms of his or her Contract
may be liable to dismissal. This is not Management being heavy-handed. It is demonstrating to our
customers that	 can be relied upon to keep its commitments. Without that assurance,
I can tell you customers will not place business with us.
We have set the wheels in motion to secure the long term future for the business and to maintain jobs
in Llanelli. Do not confirm Rover's view that nothing has changed. Do not let the actions of this
minority jeopardise our business or threaten the livelihoods of you and your family. Above all
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